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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING:
WITH REFERENCE TO THE SUPPLY OF LIQUIFIED PETROLEUM GAS THROUGH LYTTELTON PORT

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the role of public participation in planning. The initial approach involves a case-study of the planning pertaining to the provision for bulk liquified petroleum gas supply through the port of Lyttelton. The focus in the case-study is on portraying and investigating how the people of the impacted community might be considered to have participated. Public participation is identified as having a value-laden 'essence'. The poor basis for the elucidation of an appropriate role that exists in the literature and practice concerning public participation in planning is discussed. A framework based on the range of social order theories is adopted that accommodates principal variations in meaning. The case-study events are identified in terms of the framework. The nature of society and the task of planning are considered and conclusions derived, revolving on the inappropriateness of the assumption of value-consensus and models and perspectives based on this. The political nature of planning is affirmed and explicated. The meaning of accepting perspectives founded on value-conflict is explored primarily in relation to considering the case-study situation.
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1. THE CASE-STUDY: PLANNING FOR LIQUIFIED PETROLEUM GAS THROUGH LYTTELTON PORT

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The goal of this study is to investigate the role of public participation in planning. A 'gut feeling' motivates the study. This feeling primarily involves the consideration that planning needs public participation for essentially moral reasons - perhaps ultimately because planning, as a form of social intervention, cannot be justified (as opposed to 'legitimized') satisfactorily without it. A second consideration is essentially a pragmatic one, or so it appears; that public participation has important utilitarian value for planning.

Confusingly, but unavoidably, the study has three central subjects that are problematic. This is confusing not only in itself but also because what is problematic in each instance is not independent between subjects.

The first problematic subject is represented by the goal - What is the role of public participation in planning?

The second problematic subject - what is the nature and role of planning? - is problematic in itself given the lack of consensus and continuing debate on the subject. (Recent British discussion is contained in 'Planning and the Future', a discussion paper prepared by a working group established by the Royal Town Planning Institute (1976) and ensuing articles (see, for example, symposium on above paper in Town Planning Review, vol 48: 233-46; commentary on symposium by Chairman of working group, Law, op cit: 365-72). From America, Hudson's (1979) recent discussion and comments of the theoretical bases of planning reveal the diversity, and incompatibility, of various planning traditions.)
The subject is however rendered centrally problematic in this study in the face of consideration of public participation. Conceptions of public participation in relation to planning frequently question the nature and role of planning; often major redefinition and transformation is suggested.

The third major problematic subject is public participation. It is a highly confused concept. The confusion starts with its definition, which introduces the seemingly endless paradoxes and contradictions which bedevil the literature (see Spiegel and Mittenthal, 1968:3-4; Kasperon, 1974). Consider: is civil disobedience participation? Kasperon (1974: 3) contemplates "Perhaps the word is best treated like the kaleidoscope - twist it gingerly this way, turn it about slowly, and examine the configurations and designs which emerge ...". The virtual absence of both empirical and normative theory signals its complexity and its defiance of generalisation. So, the nature or 'essence' of 'public participation' is also centrally problematic.

The approach by which this study pursues its goal is through the 'medium' of a case-study. The intention is that the particular contextual circumstances involved will serve to elucidate and illustrate issues relating to the goal, as well as to provide an empirical base from which to 'test' ideas.

The case-study delimits inquiry to some extent at least in Chapter 1. The 'public' that is of principal concern is that of the impacted community. The case-study involves, and thus this report emphasises, development planning; attention and consideration in the case-study focusses on the particular planning and approval organisation and procedures that were involved. Issues that are emphasized by the case-study in this report derive not only from these arrangements, but also from such as the nature of the development: for example, this brings the issue of 'safety' into some prominence as it was a focal issue of concern to the community.
It is not intended however that the case-study subsume the goal or delimit the study unnecessarily - at the end of the day, it is desired to draw conclusions of applicability to planning in general.

1.2 THE CASE-STUDY: REVIEW OF SITUATION AND EVENTS

1.2.1 Introduction

The case-study concerns planning pertaining to the introduction of Liquified Petroleum Gas (L.P.G.) through the port of Lyttelton.

The immediate development proponent is Liquigas Ltd, the bulk New Zealand distribution company. It has monopoly contractual access to L.P.G. available in New Zealand. Since its inception in June, 1981, it has been active in developing plans, initiated earlier by various oil companies who became partners in Liquigas, for nationwide L.P.G. supply, in conjunction with government prescriptions.

One part of these plans consists of the provision of supply to the Canterbury-Westland region through a sea-fed facility utilising the port of Lyttelton. Consequent to requirements for such provision, the plans as evolved involve a bulk storage facility being located at Woolston, a pipeline being constructed for its supply from Lyttelton and the use of the oil-wharf located in the inner harbour at Lyttelton, as the terminal site.

1.2.2 Sequence of Events

In this section a sequence of events is presented pertinent to the evolution of the plans and planning arrangements. The aim is primarily familiarisation with the events.

Late 1970's: Evolution of government economic policy in relation to energy strategy inclusive of "goals": (i) "to reduce New Zealand's dependence on imported oil" and (ii) "to increase diversity in New Zealand's energy supply system" (Ministry of Energy, 1980:6).
1979: Crystallisation of government "policy" (goals) as regards production, distribution and pricing of L.P.G. Revealed as transmitted to the Commerce Commission in terms of s 2A(1) of the Commerce Act (1975). Included:

"(a) The production of L.P.G. from the Maui and Kapuni fields should be combined so that effectively there will be a single supplying entity.

(b) A national bulk distribution system should be established ...

(c) There should be an assured supply of L.P.G. to the South Island.

(d) A common bulk price should operate ex ... main ports in the South Island, so that South Island consumers can gain direct benefit from the North Island gas fields ..." (Adams-Schneider, 1980:2617).

1979 on: Calculation of forecasted demand for L.P.G. by Planning Division, Ministry of Energy. These calculations effectively become basis of oil companies' and Liquigas's planning (for example, compare Ministry of Energy, 1981:56 and op cit:59). Anticipated initial market development of 110,000 tonnes per annum by the late 1980's. Capacity of ship, storage etc. based on this (Liquigas, 1981:4).


1979, November 23: Lyttelton Borough Council (L.B.C.) makes submissions to Parliamentary Select Committee on the proposed National Development Bill (1979), expressing concern that the Bill might be used for the L.P.G. proposal - thus depriving the L.B.C.
of its controlling functions bestowed by the Town and Country Planning Act (1977) (T&C.P.A., 1977). The L.B.C. was "assured that the L.P.G. project was too small for the National Development Bill and that as long as there was provision for L.P.G. in ...(the)... District Scheme, then any L.P.G. proposal would go through normal town and country planning procedures" (Cretney, 1982:2).

1979, late: L.B.C.'s town planning consultants instructed to ensure provision made in the District Scheme (then under review) for any L.P.G. proposal (op cit: appendix one:1).


1980, June 19: Meeting convened by B.P.(N.Z.) Ltd with Christchurch local authorities, to outline several options for storage and distribution facilities - all involving use of inner harbour oil wharf at Lyttelton, the wharf's use being the focus of concern and criticism in the local community (loc cit).

1980, June, July: Telephone survey of nearly 200 residents living in Lyttelton and Woolston conducted by the Auckland Research Group for B.P.(N.Z.) Ltd recorded that 52% of Lyttelton respondents indicated that they would not be "willing to have a L.P.G. storage depot in ... (their) ... area." (Glazer, 1982:4).

1980, October 16: Plans revealed to public which broadly correspond to plans being implemented.
1980, November 18: Crystallising of community dissent. Public meeting attended by 150 residents and L.P.G. Action Committee formed. Councillor Cretney later reported that "extreme concern was expressed ... about the proposed off-loading of L.P.G. at the present dangerous goods wharf ..." and that "many were also worried about public participation in the decision-making and were assured by myself that there would be a town planning hearing where any individual or groups ... would have the opportunity to express their concerns" (Cretney, 1982:2).

1980, November 20: Lyttelton's mayor reinforced assurances concerning use of and accessibility rendered by the T.&C.P.A. (1977); indicated "safety ... would be a prime factor in considering any application" ('The Star' 20 Nov, 1980).

1980, December 16: News release for "Liquigas Group" suggested that applications for planning consent pursuant to T.&C.P.A. (1977) would go to local authorities "possibly in mid-March". Also indicated that "local residents groups ... (would be) ... consulted first" (Cretney, 1982:appendix two).

1980, December: Petroleum Amendment Bill (2) 1980 passed through parliament to become law: this legislation gave the potential for the pipeline to be authorised outside town planning controls. Subsequently all parties to these events express ignorance of its potential relevance at the time of its passage.


1981, April 1: L.P.G. Action Committee launches petition to keep tankers out of inner harbour area (op cit:2).

1981, April 8: Liquigas and L.B.C. meet - Liquigas indicates preparedness to ask Minister for Commission of Inquiry under s. 54 of Petroleum Act (1937), a request the Minister could not refuse, given ss 54 (1) (op cit:appendix one:2).

1981, April to July: L.B.C. continue representation to and discussions with Minister of Energy, and Mines Department concerning commission requiring (1) right for residents to be heard and (2) inclusion of transfer and wharf facilities in the definition of "pipeline", and thus a subject of the Inquiry (Lyttelton Harbour Board had given its permission for use of the wharf). By July, Minister rejected both requirements, based on his interpretation of P.A.A. (2) 1980 (op cit:appendix one:2-3).

1981, August 1: L.B.C. lodges writ in the High Court challenging Minister's interpretation of P.A.A. (2) (op cit:appendix one:3).

1981, September: Parliamentary Committee on Commerce and Energy hear petition and submissions on the same (loc cit). (Petition signed by over 60% of Lyttelton's adult population).

1981, October 2: Liquigas apply to Heathcote County Council for planning consent for Woolston storage and distribution facility. Commissioner appointed to hear application and objections.

1981, November 11: Public learn that petition has lapsed because Commerce and Energy Committee did not report back to Parliament.
by the end of the session. Mayor Foster is amongst outcry: "we consider it a gross discourtesy ... that all ... (the) ... work has been effectively wasted because a decision was not made" ('The Press' 11 November, 1981). A 'Star' editorial states "it really does look as if the petition was shuffled to the bottom of the pile for political purposes ..." and "... (it is) ... an affront to democracy" ('The Star' 12 November, 1981).

1981, December 7: Liquigas finally apply to the Minister of Energy for pipeline authorisation pursuant to the Petroleum Act (1937) and request the Minister to set up a Commission of Inquiry.

1982, March 10: Commissioner appointed by Heathcote County Council recommends consent be given to Woolston application. Only the pipeline itself remained to be 'approved'.

1982, May 17: After over a year of 'bargaining', the Minister announces terms of reference for enquiry - they are broad, incorporating the L.B.C.'s requirements. The High Court writ is dropped ('The Star' 17 May, 1982).


1982, November 18: Commission concludes after 53 sitting days and 68 witnesses.

1983, January: Report made public. Recommended to Minister, partially subject to various recommendations and conditions, that Liquigas be granted authorisation to construct and operate proposed pipeline (Commission of Inquiry report, 1982).
1.3 THE CASE-STUDY: DISCUSSION

1.3.1 Introduction

In this section the intention is to identify and discuss features of the case-study events and circumstances that pertain to the goal of this report - to investigate the role of public participation in planning.

There are two problems immediately raised involving the scope of this discussion. They extend from the previously mentioned assertion that the nature and role of both public participation and planning are problematic in this study, in addition to the question posed by the goal. It would be pre-emptive of later stages of this study to definitively deal with these problematic points. (It would also, in fact, limit the utility of the framework adopted in Chapter 2.) The orientation thus must allow for a wide consideration of interpretations as regards both the essence and role of both participation and planning. The prime danger at this stage is undesirable delimitation of investigation and thus wide scope of consideration of the two concepts is both desirable and allowed for. The consequence of this extends from that, at the time when it is desirable to 'bound' the discussion, the above imperatives suggest against this: thus the discussion cannot be considered comprehensive in any sense - it should be treated as simply a selection of what I consider to be principal relevant points pertaining to the goal.

The main difficulty with the scope of 'planning' relates to whether to isolate the activities and rationalities of planning and politics and attempt to treat them separately. The separation and thus their isolation in consideration of these events is conceivable but considered ill-advised. Public participation raises issues that are fundamentally political or ideological. To consider planning solely as an apolitical activity or to consider only the apolitical aspects of
planning will effectively suppress the fundamental issues raised by public participation.

At another level, identification of these separate rationalities in the practice of 'planning' regarding these case-study events is frequently seemingly impossible - such is characteristic particularly of contemporary development planning in New Zealand. In effect the rationalities intermix: whether one considers this undesirable from the point of view of regrettable subsummation of either planning or political rationality by the other or whether one considers it simply inevitable (matters returned to later), the reality must be acknowledged.

Thus the avoidance of undesirable delimitation of this discussion insists that the consideration of planning does not exclude the interaction of planning with political rationality. Similarly, consideration of what might constitute public participation is broad and left reasonably open - in effect, no effort is made to state what public participation, in essence, is. It is all too easy to take a hortatorical stance as regards what public participation is and is not as the literature both observes and attests to. The error in this is the inherent preclusion of whole ranges of opinion about how the public (whoever they are precisely) 'take part', and the related ignoring of ranges of political theories of governance and democracy, which both reflect and inform that opinion.

Thus, the idea of public participation by representation is not excluded, antagonistic as this is to many conceptions of public participation. Similarly, no attempt is made to confine the conception of participation by discriminating according to such as purpose, form, motivation, consistency, intensity or degree of deliberativeness.

The approach initially is to consider successively the events pertaining to location-specific plans, portrayed here as 'the process', by which plans evolved from policy and goal formulation to approval. It is to be emphasized that in using the 'process' below, the reference
is to the particular events and not to the institutional approval process per se, although it obviously relates to this.

The focus is on public participation - how and where it could be considered to have occurred and to have been limited by the process and a depiction of its implied role and the interaction between it and the process. The intention of this discussion is to give a basis for later analysis and characterisation of the inherent role of public participation in the process. The phases of the process considered are:

(i) policy and goal formulation
(ii) development of plans
(iii) the planning approval procedures
   - evolution of planning approval procedures
   - the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980 and the Commission of Inquiry

1.3.2 Policy and Goal Formulation

The focus of concern of this case-study relates to location-specific plans. Policy formulation, which occurred at the national, governmental level, is clearly relevant but consideration in terms of location-specific planning was effectively thwarted at this level of the process by the 'remoteness' of goals, objectives, and particularly, actual plans. In the particular context of the type of development planning involved here, it is unrealistic to consider there is a basis for anything other than consideration of impacts in general or scenario-based terms. This basis is dubious for 'meaningful' consideration of project-level developments because of the essentially speculative nature of possible developments. Consequently, public participation is not considered here relating to this stage of the process.

This is not of course to say that public participation at the stage of policy formulation is not possible - in fact it occurred in
several forms. Nor is this to say that efforts to envisage 'down-stream' consequences of policies cannot be undertaken. It can be noted that the higher the level of policy formulation, that is the more centralised the policy-making, the more this effect will occur. The dilemma in this is that energy planning needs considerable centralised co-ordination.

Goal formulation concerning the production, distribution and pricing of L.P.G. was primarily in the hands of the Government, although some degree of collaboration with the six promoters of Liquigas can be inferred, particularly from the "White Paper on Liquigas Assurances" (Minister of Energy, 1981). At this level of the process there is a basis for consideration of location-specific plans given that specification that a sea-fed facility be developed "preferably at Lyttelton/Christchurch ..." (op cit:6) evolved at this stage.

Participation could perhaps be considered to have occurred in three respects. The first type can be called participation by national governmental representation. The reference here is to the notion that a government represents the nation, as opposed to parliamentary representation where individual M.P.s represent electorates. It has a political mandate basis which is the source of a fundamental inadequacy in terms of authority in relation to location-specific planning: the mandate, along with the accompanying exercise of authority and basis of accountability has its basis in the national polity. Thus the representation of the impacted community in the case-study is on a par with all other communities and yet, obviously, the costs and benefits are unequally shared.

The issue of this inadequacy is a characteristic feature of development planning, where policy formulation and consequences, particularly negative consequences, pertain to widely varying population scales. From the point of view of political authority, the downstream project investigation and approval procedures stand to ameliorate and perhaps overcome this inadequacy by the exercise of a 'weighted' community
In relation to the events under consideration here, the degree to which this inadequacy remains is of central concern. It is to be noted that the above-mentioned remoteness of policy and project have placed a burden on this 'illegitimate' basis.

The second type of participation which could be considered to have occurred is by parliamentary electorate representation. This has a significantly better authority basis for the representation of an impacted community given that the scale of representation is likely to be appropriate to the scale of the impact, and, in relation to the case-study circumstances, this is so.

However, this considered form of participation is severely limited, at least in the context of New Zealand governmental procedure. The central issues here relate to the effectiveness of parliament and legislative functions and the independence of the latter from executive functions. These issues have been the subject of much recent debate (see, for example, Palmer, 1979: Chapter 1; Hoadley (ed), 1979) and need not be reiterated here. However, parliament's generally conceded impotence in relation to decision-making is to be noted - in effect, potential legislative decision-making effectiveness is subsumed by executive power. The possible role of parliamentary representation, and thus this considered type of participation, is limited by the minor possibilities for influence and reform that parliamentary and select committee involvement provide. These limited possibilities themselves are hindered by the "cloak of secrecy ... (which) ... covers everything of any importance in the decision-making structure" (Palmer, 1979:10).

It is the lack of openness of intention and action on the part of the executive domain that explains the actual minimal role of this considered form of participation in relation to goal formulation. The fact is that the goals were internally generated by the Government and not subject to anyone's knowledge, and hence scrutiny, before they were transmitted as "policy" to the Commerce Commission (see sequence). The
function of this considered form of participation, especially given that the case-study community's representative was a member of the Opposition, was relegated to the level of simple response to a 'fait accompli' - the function could be described as participation by electoral representative objection.

Another form of what might be considered participation occurred by virtue of the fact that the public were informed of the goals in the "White Paper on Liquigas Assurances". This can be depicted as participation as one-way information. The particular example related here must be considered of minimal importance in the Lyttelton planning process as actual planning had reached the stage of firm proposals over eighteen months previously. (The text of the "White Paper on Liquigas Assurances" was released in mid-1981.) This delay in the one-way information flow effectively prevented it from being the basis for two-way communication which might have resulted from representative, interest group or individual response via the media, Parliament or directly to the Minister, Ministry of Energy or Liquigas. It was of low pertinence by the time of its release: actual plans were being discussed.

No participation in the form of consultation or dialogue with the community of Lyttelton or its representatives appears to have occurred in the course of goal formulation.

1.3.3 Development of Plans

The development of plans was principally in the hands of Liquigas, although the objectives pertaining to capacities of facilities were 'handed down' from the national level in the form of forecasted estimates from the Planning Division, Ministry of Energy (see Sequence). This, to the small degree that it was based on actual market performance, could be regarded as a form of participation by survey.

Liquigas's actual planning to the stage of the formulation of the first plan being submitted for consent in November, 1979 seems to
have been devoid of any extra-consortium involvement. There was apparently no information or consultation pertaining to the evolution of these plans, yet it is to be noted that this was the period in which alternatives of where to bring L.P.G. ashore in Canterbury inclusive of the choice of form and location of berthage were investigated and decided upon; this stage then, is of prime concern to the consideration of planning rationality.

To give this initial 'low profile' and later actions appropriate explanatory context we can begin by noting that Liquigas is fundamentally a private enterprise consortium. Within the bounds of the restraints of the consortium's relationship with the New Zealand Government, as well revealed by the 'White Paper' and inclusive of the influence of considerable financial dependence on the Government, Liquigas's prime motive is profit-maximisation - or loss-minimisation. Its vision is self-regarding and brings to the fore decision-making criteria which stress efficiency, defined essentially in financial terms, rapidity and certainty of implementation. While Liquigas cannot be expected to orient its decision-making or any other activity primarily to the 'public interest', there are two factors which influence its attitude.

The first derives from its collaboration with the Government. Government's policies considerably determine and constrain Liquigas's existence and operation (see Sequence; Adams-Schneider, 1980:2617; Ministry of Energy:1980). An important base to the collaborative relationship is the Government's large financial involvement in the overall project. This occurs in two ways. Firstly, the Government is involved through the 25 percent shareholding of Offshore Mining Company Limited. Secondly, the Government has arranged for considerable state assistance for Liquigas particularly in relation to its South Island developments which include tax write-offs for storage tanks, suspensory loans "designed to increase South Island deliveries", grants covering 25 percent of costs for storage vessels under the Gas Development Grant
scheme and other undisclosed assistance ('The Press' 12 March, 1982). It is clear that Liquigas cannot and will not act without consideration to the government's interest.

It thus is pertinent to consider what might be the effect of national government's 'interest'. Particularly with their financial involvement they will be interested in economic efficiency. Their interest in rapidity stems both from this and the electoral costs of delays, particularly considering this is an energy project and due to be completed in an election year. This latter interest also brings the desire for certainty of implementation. These three factors are shared in common with Liquigas. But there is a fourth factor - legitimacy: the Government, to the extent that it might be perceived to be a party to the development by the polity, or otherwise responsible for it, cannot be seen to be riding rough-shod over communities. This compounds the next point.

The second factor which influences Liquigas's attitude to the public and public involvement relates to and extends from what can be portrayed as a dilemma. On the one hand Liquigas desires and possibly needs certain levels of support and consent. Widespread dissent may bring marketing difficulties, industrial and other unrest and raise the difficulty and cost of gaining approval, if not preventing it. Liquigas failed to obtain planning consent in Onehunga for a bulk storage depot in 1979 amidst considerable public dissent (Auckland Research Group, 1982:2).

On the other hand, interaction with the public may produce unacceptable hindrance and difficulty in the form of costs and delays. It may also raise demands that are contradictory, illogical and irreconcilable with either each other or the particular perceived constraints deriving from Liquigas's operational imperatives.

Liquigas's above-mentioned lack of consultation and paucity of information concerning initial planning can be seen as part of a
strategy for partially escaping from the dilemma outlined. Delaying
the announcement and detail of plans avoids possible adverse discussion
and forms of dissent. There is of course a danger in this strategy,
that for Liquigas in New Zealand has complicated the above-described
dilemma. Withholding information and intentions runs the risk of
creating and stimulating feelings of mistrust which may persist.

Nevertheless, Liquigas has made a habit of such delay. Liquigas's release of consultants' safety assessments and planning
consent documents pertaining to all intended New Zealand installations
has generally been left until immediately before consent procedures
commence, although in the case of the safety assessments, it is clear
that they all became available in 1982. Although somewhat arguable,
it can be suggested that the delayed informing of the Lyttelton Borough
Council about the applicability of the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980
until Liquigas had resolved that they would use it, also conforms to
this strategy (see Sequence).

Such a strategy clearly hinders the informing and reaction of
interested or concerned parties in addition to the above-noted potential
for interpretations of secrecy and feelings of mistrust. And perhaps
most importantly it effectively stifles public debate of alternatives
before the presentation to the public of a firm proposal. The gain for
Liquigas in terms of the above-identified operational imperatives is
arguable as 'history' attests: the subsequent attention to alternative
schemes by 'opposition' groups and individuals and the obliged defence
by Liquigas of the selected proposals has involved considerable
time and cost.

After plans were submitted for consent in March, 1980,
Liquigas's public communication became considerable and took several
forms. Considerable consultation with local authorities and prominent
and concerned residents' associations occurred. It is difficult to
depict the precise function of this considered form of public participation
by consultation - was there any possibility of change of plans as a consequence of these consultations? Or was the role conceived of for public participation simply that of placation? Or again, was the motive to 'convert' the audience in some sense? There is the possibility that Liquigas reacts, at least, to dissenting voices, particularly regarding the eventual decision to remove the site of the storage depot from Lyttelton to Woolston. However, discounting the above possibility in relation to this decision is the fact that at the time of the withdrawal of the application for town and country planning consent of March 6th, 1980 (see Sequence), there was little, if any public dissent in Lyttelton, and I know of no public opinion surveys that had been done at this time which may have given an indication of a significant dissent level.

Distinguishable from the consultative function, although related, is an information function. In relation to both the time leading up to both the Heathcote County Council town and country planning hearing and the Commission of Inquiry in Christchurch, Liquigas's information to the public and involved authorities was comprehensive. The planning documents and their appendices were inclusive of the widest range of information which was generally well presented and organised. Availability of these documents was good, with their supply to all libraries, interest groups, local authorities and many individuals known to be concerned being undertaken on the initiative of Liquigas. Additionally, Liquigas widely circulated two pamphlets, held a display in Cathedral Square and held several meetings with concerned groups.

In order to assess the conceived role of these efforts one important fact must be kept in mind: the development of the plans for all intents and purposes was finished. It can therefore be considered that the role of this considerable effort was to explain and justify decisions already taken; the orientation to convince the audience of
the wisdom of planning pursued henceforth. The above functions can be labelled public participation as public relations, and to some extent, public participation as propaganda.

1.3.4 Planning Approval Procedures

1.3.4.1 Evolution of planning approval procedures

As is apparent from the earlier-related sequence of events, the procedure by which plans were to seek approval evolved during the period of the development of plans. The fact of this evolution and manner of it raises several points of concern relating to the involvement of the public.

Firstly, it is noted that in general terms uncertainty of such as approval procedures essentially brings negative aspects. Clearly, parties wishing to make preparations for the pursuance of their particular interests are hindered in such preparations. This hindrance potentially falls on all parties. A developer may be affected by such as not knowing when, in what terms, and to whom he may have to defend his proposals. Various representatives and interest groups will be unsure as to when and in what terms they may have an opportunity to present their case - or indeed whether any such opportunity, or sufficient opportunity will be provided. The potential for 'unnecessary' and possibly inflammatory extra-institutional action is apparent.

Still talking in general terms it can be noted that if one party is in less of a position of uncertainty then an advantage accrues to that party. Similarly, if the degree of uncertainty is to some extent able to be controlled or influenced by one party then advantage accrues to that party.

In the Lyttelton situation, as has been related above, the principal representative body for the community, the Lyttelton Borough Council, believed, and was assured in its belief, that established Town
and Country Planning Act (1977) procedures would determine approval. In addition to providing for representations from interested parties, this 'pathway' assured the Council of some control, an exercise of its authority. The Council used the prospect of this 'pathway' to assure residents that due provision would prevail for them to put their case.

The surveys related earlier indicate that a consistent majoritarian opposition existed in the community throughout and after the period in which approval procedures were evolving. This opposition cannot be explained with certainty. However, it is suggested that the long period that ensued before the public knew of the precise nature and timing of approval procedures may have contributed to the development of this opposition, as is perhaps reflected in the previously noted growing dissent in the latter part of 1980 in the Lyttelton community.

Similarly, it can be suggested that the change from earlier indicated procedures to those pursuant to the amended Petroleum Act (1937) contain at least the potential to generate senses of manipulation and mistrust amongst those members of the community, including their local representatives, concerned with the proposals, towards perceived proponents. Although there is no indication of such an effect in the Lyttelton context, the change in approval procedures had the potential for some of the engendered mistrust to fall upon the Council-citizen relationship.

It is perhaps too harsh to suggest that the uncertainty in approval procedures represents an orchestrated strategy. However, it is, at least, regrettable that the Lyttelton Borough Council remained in ignorance of the significance of the new Petroleum Amendment Act (2) (1980). It has already been noted that until Liquigas had actually resolved to apply for approval under the provisions of the Act, it seems that the consortium was content to leave the Lyttelton Borough Council believing that approval would be granted under the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act. Obviously, at some stage before this
time Liquigas had become aware of the possibility of using the Petroleum Act (1937).

Uncertainty as regards the manner in which development projects are to be approved, then, brings with it considerable potential for frustration and mistrust between parties involved. These negative aspects are exacerbated when it seems likely or is apparent that some parties in a development issue have information relating to a procedure to be used that other parties do not share. It can be noted that, while uncertainty as strategy is perhaps not part of established political development method in New Zealand, uncertainty, as regards approval procedures to be used, is certainly a frequent phenomenon.

The utilitarian dysfunction of uncertainty to the basis for considered forms of public participation has been emphasized, but moral issues are close to the surface: can uncertainty regarding planning approval procedures be countenanced as acceptable in terms of planning or governmental principle?

1.3.4.2 The Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980

The Petroleum Act (1937) emerged as the vehicle whereby planning approval was to be given - it enables the Minister of Energy to authorize certain pipelines of the dimensions of the Lyttelton-Woolston facility.

This Act can be seen as one product in a now consolidated tradition of such statutes spawned by contemporary Government which collectively are transforming traditional planning procedures and have considerable implications for development planning generally. As with the National Development Act (1979), the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980 incorporates considerable executive ability to bypass established planning traditions. The Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980, particularly in the inherent extension of executive control represents a particular
interpretation of the role of government in planning, inclusive of an implied role for considered forms of public participation.

Before considering the particular provisions, the onus that is upon the Act is to be noted. The Act enables the authorisation of pipelines independent of all statutory controls. Thus, to the extent that the project is to be subject to appraisal and scrutiny the Act determines that its provisions are the sole means for such functions to be effected. Additionally, it has already been established that, to the degree that the impacted community is to be regarded to any greater extent than the national population, that regard is to be incorporated in investigation and approval arrangements - the entire onus for this regard of community opinion falls upon the Act.

An initial concern stems from the fact that the Act is merely an approval procedure. This orientation stands to limit attention to the particular plans rather than broader contextual considerations such as the need for the project and, particularly, alternatives to the plans. The Act provides for the requirement that every application for a pipeline authorisation shall include certain detail and be accompanied by a report setting out its effects (s.51), but there is no requirement for such as its relative merit in relation to alternatives.

More significantly, the fact that it is simply an approval mechanism was instrumental in determining the provisions of s.54(2) and s.55: at the end of the day, neither the Minister nor any Commission of Inquiry can approve or recommend respectively any alternatives to the plans. While the proponent's report, the Minister's consideration, and any Commission of Inquiry's proceedings are not necessarily prevented from considering the wider contextual issues, the focus on a particular plan stands to bound the scope of consideration. From a planner's point of view, this focus deprives what can be considered a central point of planning rationality ensconced in and accepted as basic planning
method, namely scrutiny of alternatives. From an opposing community's point of view, the focus means the procedure is, at best, not centrally concerned with the community's desires and opinions. Of particular concern in relation to the Lyttelton events, is that the question of alternative berthing arrangements was at the heart of community concern - the focus on approval stands to, and actually does, inhibit the consideration of at least this central point of concern to the community. The focus determines that elements of public participation that are critical of the plans adopt a negative stance - there is little room for or purpose in constructive criticism. As far as public participation in the Commission of Inquiry by the generally opposing Lyttelton community is concerned, involvement had only the potential to be public participation as negatively-oriented objection. The consequence of the converse is that the proponents couldn't be expected to air reservations or receive suggestions. Is not this opportunity for public participation doomed to be emphasized by destructiveness, distortion and antagonism?

Of central concern in consideration of the role considered forms of public participation play, is the control and considerable discretionary power bestowed on the Minister by the Act. Under s.55 the Minister alone decides on the granting or refusal of any application and his decision is final. (Even the limited appeal provisions of the National Development Act (1979) are not matched.) He is the unchallengeable arbiter of the 'public interest'. The import of s.55 in the consideration of public participation is that all considered forms of public participation other than that labelled earlier as public participation as national governmental representation are prescribed a role which is non-inclusive of decision-making.

Given that it has previously been asserted that national governmental representation has an inadequate authority basis in terms of the case-study events, the significance of s.55 is considerable:
the complete deprivation of all non-Ministerial decision-making responsibility represents an exercise of power rather than authority. Compounding this unsatisfactory situation in regard to the case-study is the consideration that the Government, and particularly the Minister, are hardly disinterested parties regarding the outcome.

Other provisions extend the power of the Minister further in his monopoly on decision-making. "S.66(1) gives him total discretion to amend or revoke terms and conditions of any authorisation having been given. Incidentally, the Act prescribes explicitly here that he is to decide the 'public interest'. S.60(1) gives him total discretion regarding possible changes to the pipeline route after any authorisation has been given. Similarly, s.59 allows for Ministerial discretion concerning deviations, changes, extensions or reductions to an approved pipeline and this may involve overriding of the provisions of Part II of the Act if modification is "not of a significant nature" and "as he thinks fit" (s.59(2)). S.88(4) exempts the Minister, in making an authorisation, from requirements of consultation and approval from local authorities and other Ministers respectively, embodied originally in s.29 of the 'mother' Petroleum Act (1937). These requirements constitute, under the mother Act, an important safeguard for a wide range of lands inclusive of National Parks, public reserves, marine reserves, Maori reservations, state forests, wildlife refuges and sanctuaries, railway land, soil conservation reserves, foreshore, seabed and lake and river beds. This provision of s.88(4) must be considered an abandonment of an important established safeguard.

1.3.4.3 The Commission of Inquiry

For the issue of public participation the provisions of the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980 relating to Commissions of Inquiry are of considerable importance. I have already suggested that the approval procedural orientation, reinforced by the provisions of s.54(2) and s.55,
preclude to a large degree the possibility of a constructive, positive, co-operative and even honest basis. The participatory roles are cast for a fight, not dialogue. In the not unlikely event in development planning where the Minister is not disinterested in the success of the application, those objecting have the ogre of s.55, which bestows the Minister as the unchallengeable referee, threatening the likely prospect of loss. But this important procedural exercise is, generally, even more circumscribed: the fight may not even take place:

Under the provisions of S.54(1), a Commission of Inquiry can only be initiated by the Minister, in his discretion, or the applicant. In relation to the latter case, the subsection requires of the Minister to refer the application to a Commission of Inquiry if so requested by the applicant. The logic inherent generally in this subsection has considerable implications for the issue of public involvement in relation to this Act, given that the Commission of Inquiry is the sole provision for formal public hearing relating to the subject of any application: the logic is that a public right to any hearing or investigation other than that which the applicant is required to undertake pursuant to S.51 (mentioned above), simply does not exist. The issue is to be decided by the proponent and Minister, who in the case-study at least, as already noted, is hardly disinterested. In terms of what can be considered established planning principle as incorporated in, for example, successive town and country planning legislation regarding hearing and appeal provisions pertaining to both scheme preparation and consents, this is remarkable. Effectively, to the extent that the Minister is not disinterested, the whole basis for a Commission of Inquiry, and thus the forms of public participation it provides for, rests on the will and desires of the project advocates.

Additionally, it is to be noted that the Minister both sets the terms of reference for any Inquiry and chooses the Commissioners (see Sequence).
As the sequence reveals, the terms of reference became something of a political football. Like the hearing itself, the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980 effectively determines that no rights exist except for the proponents and Minister. If any other party has any part in the determination of these matters, it is in terms of a political dog-fight. The question asked: is this a good basis for the determination of an important aspect of public involvement?

Relating to the Ministerial appointment of Commissioners, it must be asked whether, given the contended lack of disinterest at least in relation to the case-study events, such appointment is satisfactory. A concern relates to the majority appointment of engineers to the Commission, when a central issue was that of safety. Judgements concerning such issues are open to both subjective and objective interpretations. The issue of what interpretation is to be emphasized is important and crucial to major conclusions. People trained in technically-oriented trades and professions are likely to emphasize objective interpretations and, at worst, dismiss arguments based on subjective interpretation as irrelevant.

The Commissioners eventually concluded that both the pipeline and ship/shore interface facility would "have minimal adverse effects on the social environment ..." (Commission of Inquiry Report, 1982:280 and 283). Can this not be considered a nonsense when it is unchallenged that the majority of Lyttelton residents are concerned that it is dangerous? Has not "the social environment" anything to do with people's consciousness? Is not the majority appointment of engineers 'mobilization of bias' against an interpretative mode that is consistent with the idea that, put bluntly, the determination of social welfare might bear some correspondence to what affected groups consider is their welfare?

Briefly, other general characteristics of the case-study Commission of Inquiry are to be noted pertaining to further considered
limitations on the role and scope for various participating parties. Most of the characteristics relate to the limitations on those opposing the application consisting of representatives, organisations, trade unions, interest groups and individuals principally from the Lyttelton area. The basis on which they presented their case must be described as unfair.

Financial ability to hire lawyers, and expert witnesses was severely restricted, compounded particularly by the long duration of the hearing. The reserves set aside by groups quickly ran out and had some parties withdrawing legal representation and even lay presence, while the Lyttelton Borough Council embarked on a street appeal in the small community and canvassing of other local authorities. A Government grant eased the L.B.C.'s difficulties to some extent, but a "shortfall of several thousand dollars" (Commission of Inquiry Report, 1982:298) resulted. I understand the total costs to the L.B.C. to be near $20,000. A comparative figure of expenditure for Liquigas is unavailable but based on hearsay, lawyers and likely witness, consultants fees and costs, I would estimate it to be in excess of $800,000.

The 'catchment' for the six witnesses for the L.B.C. was the Christchurch area, whereas several of Liquigas's twenty-five witnesses came from Europe and North America. Despite several instances of successful challenges of sometimes central Liquigas evidence by L.B.C. witnesses, the disadvantage in terms of expertise and resources was evident.

The semi-legal foundation of proceedings and the relatively formal adversarial atmosphere was not readily conducive to lay involvement. It has already been suggested that it was also not particularly conducive to constructive and honest dialogue.
This case-study concerns the process by which certain development proposals evolved from policy formulation to approval. The above account has focussed on portraying features of the process relating to how particularly the people of the impacted community might be considered to have 'taken part'. A central intent, thus, has been to depict the inherent role prescribed for public participation. The central question on which the remainder of this study focusses is whether that role is appropriate.

In approaching this question, it is to be recalled that it involves three interrelated problematic subjects, none of which have thus far been 'resolved'. These subjects can be related to the case-study events.

Briefly, do all or any of the considered forms of public participation, or do they taken collectively, constitute appropriate public participation? Perhaps most importantly, did the deprived direct decision-making role of the impacted community negate the essence of public participation? Relating to the goal, did such as the deprived decision-making role of the local community diminish the utility of public participation to planning in some sense? The New Zealand Planning Council (1978:80) has considered "that greater efficiency will be achieved not by edict but by the greater involvement of citizens in the decisions that have to be taken". Does that mean in decision-making? If so, did planning efficiency suffer in Lyttelton? What is the meaning of this and should planners and society be concerned on utilitarian grounds at the re-iterated position of contemporary Government Ministers that natural resource decision-making should solely be the province of government (for example, see 'The Dominion' 28 November, 1983).
Then there is the other side: whatever the answer to such utilitarian-orientated questions, should planners and planning be concerned at such legislative arrangements and Ministerial pronouncements on moral grounds? Does public participation raise matters of principle for planners and planning? Such questions relate to the problematic subject concerning the nature and essence of planning as will be seen.

As is probably evident to the reader, the answers to such basic questions surrounding the subject of public participation in planning, are unlikely to be simple or simply elucidated. But the issues involved, even though there would seem to be little concurrence even as regards precisely what they are, are important and require answers. The pursuit of the answers pivots on the question that is at the heart of this study: what is the appropriate role for public participation in planning?
2. PERSPECTIVES FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The terms 'public participation' or 'citizen participation' are modern. The essential idea (or is it ideas?) of the concept and the central issues involved, (and invariably raised), date at least to the times of Herodotus and Aristotle. The 'essence' of the concept is central to debates of 'wise government' that have concerned philosophers for millennia. Central issues include such as the essential meaning of democracy and relative virtues of egalitarianism and elitism. The pertinence of the concept of public participation to such fundamental issues of government and public affairs is probably apparent to the reader. The fact of the centrality of the concept to such issues, and elucidation of the relationship between different possible positions and conceptions held in regard to such issues and their implications in terms of prescribed meaning and imputed roles for 'public participation', will become apparent later in this chapter when several groups of theories of democracy are outlined.

Public participation then, is a political concept. Like most social concepts, it intrinsically has meaning that is value-dependent: that is, the 'essence' of the concept is value-laden. The meaning of this is that such as the definition, perception, discussion or interpretation of the concept is permeated necessarily by value positions in the form of such as attitudes, preconceptions, premises and assumptions.

In this chapter it is contended that there are fundamental and widespread problems with both the literature and practice concerning public participation in planning that contribute significantly to the situation wherein there is a poor, confused basis for the elucidation of an appropriate role for public participation in planning, the goal of this
study. The problem can frequently be related to failures to explicate and/or, seemingly to appreciate the existence and/or significance of the value bases of word and action necessarily involved in, respectively, the literature and practice pertaining to public participation in planning.

This situation determines the emphasis of the remainder of this study. It is contended that the clarification of the 'essence' of public participation is an essential prerequisite to the sufficient identification, and thus discussion, of basic issues involved. This in turn is a prerequisite to the possible consideration of what might be an appropriate role for public participation in planning.

It is considered that the amelioration of the situation whereby, in effect, public participation in planning often lacks due philosophic context is best facilitated by a portrayal of the range of value-dependent meaning contained in the concept when considered in the context of planning.

In the latter part of this chapter a little-discussed paper is partially reported on and a framework based on it adopted which allows a portrayal of the range of value-dependent meaning. The framework utilises a major dichotomy in sociological theorizing concerning social order and permits the elucidation of such as the attitudes, preconceptions and assumptions pertaining to a wide range of possible perspectives by which public participation in planning can be regarded. This provides a suitable basis for consideration of the appropriateness of particular perspectives concerning the role of public participation in planning, along with the consideration of important assumptive bases contained within these perspectives. These latter tasks are pursued in Chapter 3.

From the above outline it will be apparent that the remainder of the study will be dominated by a certain 'philosophic' emphasis. No apology is tendered for this. Indeed I consider it a major irony that so much attention has been given to such as the methodology, efficacy, implications, evaluation and variously, advocacy and rejection of public
participation in planning, when underlying assumptive bases and meanings have been unattended both generally and regarding particular commentaries and experiences. As is indicated below, the lack of attention to the 'philosophic' underpinnings comprises the central element on which rests the contention that there is a poor, confused basis for the elucidation of the goal of this study.

2.2 THE PHILOSOPHIC VACUUM

Assertions of particularly-construed inadequacies in the literature on the subject of public participation in planning are not uncommon. Kasperson (1974:1) has observed that discussion concerning public participation in public affairs has "retreated from the great issues of value". Wengert (1976:24) in the context of considering the explanation for the lack of normative or empirical theories applicable to the topic, considers that "much of the literature ... has dealt with the subject of participation as though it had never before been the subject of intellectual attention and as though it bore little relationship to earlier streams of political thought and analysis ... ". He further complains that "much of the literature ... has tended to be prescriptive and hortatory, abounding with rhetoric and polemics and resting on unanalyzed premises and assumptions" (loc cit).

Such comments can be seen to be in lament of perceived absence of concern with placing the subject of public participation in planning in due philosophic context. Public participation is a value-laden concept; it has a variable 'essence'. There are choices to be made before its role in relation to any contextual subject or social institution can be elucidated.

Evidence that the choices have been addressed and made could be considered to be indicated by the existence of clear and explicit guidelines for practice. These might take the form of such as ethical or
philosophical statements of purpose, principles for practice, or, at a lower level, policy and goal statements. (Integration of such conclusions with theoretical development could be considered to be indicated by the expounding, and relating of such as philosophic conclusions and principles in the context of normative planning theory.)

The first indication and component of what has been contended is a poor, confused basis for the elucidation of the role of public participation in planning is simply the paucity of such philosophic conclusions and guidelines at all levels of planning practice. This situation is but the manifestation of underlying confusions and inadequacies concerning the consideration of the subject generally and it is thus on this underlying situation that attention must concentrate. However, the extent and something of the nature of the problem is revealed by a brief consideration of this 'philosophic vacuum' in relation to practice.

There is a broad and growing range of arrangements and techniques relating to planning that constitute mechanisms for public participation. (See, for example Ryan, 1979:app. B, 66.) The planning literature is full of accounts documenting the introduction or experimentation with such mechanisms. (See, for example, People and Planning, March 1980: various; Sadler (ed), 1979: particularly Vol.2; various.) Meanwhile, existing procedures are being seemingly constantly revised and reformed. (See, for example, Gresham and Crothers (eds), 1979:1-2; Heberlein, 1976.) Their justification rests on lofty but often inexplicit and unexplained premises, such as that it is important to give the public more voice and it is important that the debate surrounding planning decisions be wide and open, perhaps so that greater 'efficiency' will prevail.

As is frequently pointed out, it is regrettably usually the case that the precise purpose and function of particular exercises and techniques of involvement are left unclear. It is the norm for participants and everyone else to have little idea of the precise relationship between the participation and the outcome. Ideas of increased induced
accountability mingle uneasily and often, it is to be noted, incompatibly, with ideas such as that the participation might have a more direct influence on the outcome. The doubt and uncertainty are functions and reflections of the lack of 'philosophical' clarity. Or more bluntly, no one is quite sure what is supposed to be the precise function, because this is not explicitly indicated.

The uncertainty concerning either specific participation mechanisms or participation generally is revealed in discussion concerning practice. For example, New Zealand's largest symposium to date on "Public Involvement in Environmental Planning" reveals a large range of opinion concerning, and particularly criteria for the evaluation of, public participation, that exists in the planning community (Gresham and Crothers (eds.), 1979). Such documents incorporate the fruits of what Kasperson (1974:1) has described as "the genuflection to the altar of citizen participation". There is an illusion of a unity of concern as all respect its generally-suspected, but unclear, importance. The diversity of philosophic positions however is obvious, ranging from conceptions that participation is simply a means (for example, Young, 1979:11-12) to conceptions that it is an end in itself, fundamental in the exercise of democracy and involving major structural alterations in existing relations of power (for example, Debnam, 1979:35-44). Clearly, in this diversity are major and fundamental differences of position, yet the debate seems hardly to get off the ground, seemingly smothered by the reverence-inspired consideration that there must be 'more of it'.

The 'philosophic vacuum' further manifests itself in what can only be described as a remarkable inconsistency of provision for public participation both within and between various New Zealand statutes relevant to resource management and planning, as has recently been demonstrated by Robertson (1979:30-33). When one searches for statutory statements of purpose reflecting positions of principle concerning public participation one draws a blank. Although, of course, all New Zealand planning arrange-
ments include components which can be considered forms of participation, the concept is never explicitly referred to or prescribed in the pertaining statutes, nor is there clear indication of what might be its precise purpose.

Judging from some major statutory excursions overseas concerning public participation, perhaps we should be grateful. The philosophic confusion incorporated in such as the United States Economic Opportunity Act, 1964 (antipoverty legislation), which required "maximum feasible participation", and urban renewal legislation (The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, 1966), which required "widespread citizen participation", has been deafening. (See, for example, Kasterson and Breitbart (eds), 1974.)

Similarly, considerable confusion has accompanied the statutory requirement in the British Town and Country Planning Act (1968) that local authorities should undertake planning participation exercises. Again, the Skeffington Report, commissioned by the British Government specifically to enlighten the planners and public (and perhaps the politicians) on how the 1968 Act requirements could be met, has seemingly done little to reduce the confusion. (See Damer and Hague, 1971; Thornley, 1977; Hampton, 1977.) Recent indications that central government will request local authorities to state the objectives of their structure planning participation programmes and formulate 'achievement criteria' has turned confusion to panic (Boaden et al, 1980:98).

The common experience internationally seems to have been that 'public participation' has been prescribed, with little accompanying indication of what its precise function should be.

The field of evaluation and assessment of public participation exercises and techniques also reveals considerable confusion in overseas experience. This aspect of experience is poignant simply because evaluation must be based on conceptions of the purpose of the activity. Sewell and Phillips (1979) have recently reviewed twenty-two North American
evaluative studies. In addition to revealing unsurprising variation within experiences of purposes as perceived by different parties, the studies reveal a considerable range of conceptions of purpose among experiences, as perceived by similar parties, inclusive of planning agencies.

Furthermore, Sewell and Phillip's consideration of several suggested models for evaluation has revealed that some such models are biased towards agency and key actor perceptions of objectives and take little account of such as citizenry satisfaction. The subject of evaluation has focussed debate concerning the purpose of public participation in planning particularly in Britain; this is the subject of attention later in this section.

A brief examination of some of the confusions and inadequacies in the literature concerning the consideration of the subject might elicit some of the contributing sources of this philosophic vacuum which confuses the practice.

That the literature concerning public participation in planning has also not coped very well with basic philosophic questions is perhaps firstly indicated by the lack of both theoretical treatment and the integration of such development with normative planning theory. This has been the subject of concern of various writers. (See, for example, Wengert, 1976.)

Other recent concern and debate which centrally does not focus on the subject of public participation, but is, nevertheless, of key importance to the confusion in the accommodation of the subject, concerns general planning theory, and the sense in which it and planning is problematic in regard to the subject of public participation in planning.

Much orthodox planning theory and practice rests on a 'rational' model (see Faludi, 1973:various). The model fosters and is based on
ideas that the rationality of planning is distinct from political rationality and, related to this, that planning is essentially apolitical and amoral. Recently, a growing debate has developed which revolves around such basic issues as 'what kind of activity is planning' and 'what do planners do'? This debate is laying the foundations for the possible emergence of new planning theories that will fundamentally oppose the above-related ideas. (See, for example, Bolan, 1980; Forester, 1980.)

For the issue of public participation, it being an essentially political idea, this debate is of fundamental importance. It is logical that if one considers that planning is essentially apolitical and amoral, then the philosophic vacuum is not centrally 'planning's problem'.

The sustainability and appropriateness of various pertaining planning theoretical positions are discussed in Chapter 3. What is of concern here is that in the discussion (and confusion) concerning public participation in planning there are involved different conceptions of planning, which not only may yield different possible theoretical bases for the accommodation of the subject, but which may question the very need for any normative theoretical basis to be provided.

Awareness of this problematic nature of planning in attempts to identify the role of public participation in planning, or in writing which implies significance or role, would appear to be vital. Ones conception of the essence of planning constitutes part of the value position upon which such as ones consideration of the meaning and significance of public participation rests. Yet in much of the literature concerning public participation in planning, such awareness would appear to be poor.

Although not very constructive, the point must be substantiated. Fagence (1977:Chapter 3), as part of a voluminous exploration of "Citizen Participation in Planning", reviews a wide variety of models of the planning and decision-making process. In these models is a valuable range of conceptions concerning the functions which public participation
has been considered to be involved in, pitted against the functions that planning has been considered to be involved in. The models comprise, therefore, images of perceived interrelationships between the two principal problematic subjects concerning public participation in planning. Yet Fagence does not relate to the variation in planning models as being problematic.

Another example concerns Connor's (1976) "Constructive Citizen Participation - A Model", presented below:

Figure 2.1

Connor's approach is of concern here. As the text accompanying the diagram reveals, Connor does not consider that there is anything problematic concerning his model of the planning process (which, to be noted, includes "decision by representatives") when juxtaposed to the notion of the public participation process. Yet Connor's model contains a not untypical major assumption that decision-making is finally the province of representatives, despite the curious "decision" that the public comes to. A central debate concerning the meaning of participatory decision-making is thus largely
precluded by the approach, yet this is not acknowledged. (See Cook and Morgan (eds), 1971:various; Pateman, 1970; Pranger, 1968.)

The problem with the failure to have awareness of, and give recognition to, such as the problematic nature of planning is that, in this failure, unexplicated assumptions and preconceptions are introduced. These assumptive bases preclude the accommodation of at least some of the numerous political and ideological interpretations of public participation, thus circumscribing the consideration of the essence of public participation, and/or the role it may play in planning.

Important and immediately identifiable 'victims' of such circumscription wherein assumptions concerning planning are unexplicated, are those elements of conceptions of public participation that are questioning of the particular conception of planning involved.

A quick glance through the literature pertaining to 'failed' planning projects concerning such as motorways, airports and urban renewal projects remind that there are numerous such elements. (See, for example, Wilkinson, 1976; Mutch, 1977; Thomson, 1977; Wood, 1976.) It is important to note that many of these considerations of the essence and purpose of participation and many of the demands for its greater inclusion in planning are not merely challenging the substantive content and results, but also the planning and/or decision-making organisation and process involved and the underlying precepts of action. Here we see the likelihood that the inclusion of unexplicated assumptions will ignore or overlook the fact that many conceptions of public participation and issues raised are questioning planning's role in society or other aspects of planning as a social institution.

It is apparent from the argument thus far, that to give due consideration to the role of public participation in planning one must be aware of, recognise and ideally explicate the assumptive bases by which one's investigation proceeds, for these assumptive bases circumscribe the consideration of the essence of the concept. It is on the contention that
these crucial assumptive bases often seem not to have been considered, let alone addressed and explicated, that I base my assertion that the literature provides a poor and confused basis for the elucidation of the role of public participation in planning.

These failures relate not only to considerations of the nature of planning but also more generally. Similarly, the negative results of these failures are often not simply confined to 'undeclared' circumscription of the consideration of the essence of the concept (as illustrated above), but also often contribute to confusion and inconsistency. To illustrate these points we can return to Fagence's book and consider his general approach.

Any author aiming to make comments concerning such as the significance, importance or role of public participation in planning must adopt value positions whether wittingly or unwittingly. In Fagence's approach (Fagence, 1977), which is not untypical in its undeliberate style, these have been introduced predominantly in conceptions and considerations that he has adopted and/or accepted. For example, Fagence accepts Burns's consideration that "participation is an addition to, not a substitute for, professional planning" (op cit:122). Also he accepts Skeffington's conception concerning a possible decision-making role, when he adopts Skeffington's (ostensibly) pragmatic (sic) stance, saying "there is a point beyond which lay involvement cannot proceed, if only because a moment is reached at which the consultation and deliberation must stop and a decision made" (op cit:12).

Such adoptions are often contradictory to yet other adoptions: for example, Fagence's acceptance of Godschalk's conception of public participation as a "decision-forming partnership" (op cit:4) and his acceptance of the consideration that participation is about the equalisation of power (op cit:11), are antagonistic to several other adoptions, including the above-mentioned stances of Burns and Skeffington.
The result of this somewhat casual adoption of partially contradictory essence-bounding notions is confusion concerning what Fagence considers to be the essence of public participation. His failure to offer definitions of key terms (see op cit:13), another characteristic of the literature generally, further compounds the uncertainty about what is being referred to.

In Fagence's case, at least, perhaps part of the explanation for the confusion can be attributed to the incorporation of proclaimed "pragmatism" (op cit:12) which, as I see it, denies any significance to matters of principle in the nature of the concept for its consideration in regard to planning. It is interesting to contemplate that Fagence, while pronouncing his pragmatism, in the same sentence claims to have an ideological position concerning public participation in planning (loccit).

Given what is considered to be the widespread failure to recognise the significance of and address and explicate the crucial assumptive bases which give meaning to the essence of public participation, it is not surprising that much of the literature concerns allegations that another writer or 'practitioner' has failed to identify a 'reality' or 'due significance'. An example is Kasperon's rebuttal of those suggesting the impracticality of participation on the grounds of empirically-established apathy, with the consideration that low participation levels are simply the inevitable result of depoliticization of those on "the periphery" whose interests are often the subject of public participation demands (Kasperon, 1974:2).

Such dialogue occupies much of the literature and represents the intellectual search for answers to such as the importance of public participation in planning. However, the absence of progress towards conclusions means that such continuing debate does not substantially assist in the effort to find a basis whereby the role of public participation in planning may be elucidated.
Neither does the writing of those who have attempted to come to conclusions about the subject in a piecemeal manner (for example, White, 1982).

Similarly, the pursuit of the identification of what are considered to be the 'crucial issues' does not substantially assist - it is inevitable that there is little agreement of what these might be. 'Suggestions' include representation (Fagence, 1977:69), control (Bailey, 1975:39) and egalitarianism (Sewell and O'Riordan, 1976:16). Wengert convinces as regards the unlikelihood that this approach will bear fruit: he contemplates "perhaps the issues are ... issues of controlling government, assuring sound and wise decisions, providing for due process, protecting minority views, establishing responsibility and responsiveness, seeking equity and striving for the public interest"! (Wengert, 1976:39).

Again, those who have focussed on the identification, formulation and pursuit of 'critical questions" (for example, Wengert, 1971; Sewell and Coppock, 1977:7-11) do not substantially assist.

What is generally lacking in the continuing dialogue and intellectual endeavour, it is suggested, is a perspective of the range of the imputed meanings and the corresponding value positions: an overview which relates to the dimensions by which the essence of the subject varies, and thus viewpoints concerning how its significance and role vary. As indicated earlier, the pursuit of the identification of such is considered to hold the best promise of amelioration of what constitutes, it has been contended, a poor basis for the elucidation of the role of public participation in planning.

There have been several writers who have reviewed various aspects of the literature with an orientation to identifying and ordering the different pertaining perspectives and their underlying normative bases. May (1971) has reviewed a large range of studies employing the four Parsonian categories of socialization, integration, adaption and goal-
attainment to categorise perceived goals inherent in the respective analyses. Her approach yields findings that are commensurate with the framework later adopted. These are in brief that analysts who pursue socialization or integration value political stability, those who focus upon adaptation value political rationality and those who focus upon goal-attainment value political conflict. Lowenstein (1971) presents a simpler categorisation of a smaller range of studies.

Most reviews of the literature, however, have not ordered the pertaining perspectives or the bases of analysis. Some (for example, Spiegel and Mittenthal, 1968) are content to simply record the argument and/or position taken, often in the context of contrasting stances, without systematically identifying or characterising the pertaining normative base.

Kasperson (1974:Chapter 1), in the context of an impressive pursuit of the essence of the word 'participation', identifies a range of types of distinctions, each type involving numerous variations, some of which he indicates along with respective emphases and 'blinders'. Kasperson's article alerts the reader to the diversity, complexity and incompatibility of relevant dimensions which might contribute to the delineation of the meaning of participation. The idea of being able to logically order all meanings suddenly is seen to be an impossibility, if it ever wasn't.

Kasperson's article reveals the relevance of a range of dimensions inclusive of incorporated images of society, modes of analysis, conceptions of human nature and a diversity of values inclusive of those pertaining to political arrangements. Other articles stand to confirm the relevance of the particular dimensions outlined above. The identification of the dimensions as problematic is often prompted by various previous articles or actions that have involved a particular stance that the later commentator is questioning. For example, and of particular interest given the basis of the framework to be adopted, are those who have questioned the consensus
image of society that other authors have adopted. (For example, Boaden et al's (1980:16) critical comments of Smith's attempt to treat the subject of public participation in planning theoretically.) (See also Smith, 1973.)

Other articles indicate that yet other dimensions are relevant. For example, Friedmann (1973:4), in the context of a forum article concerning the philosophy of public affairs, suggests images of man are pertinent in his condemnation of the "predominant" utilitarian view that he considers planners hold.

2.3 PERSPECTIVES FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING: A FRAMEWORK

2.3.1 Introduction

In the remainder of this chapter an article is partially reported on, which stands alone in the literature for its attempt to identify and order the range of value-based positions that might be held concerning public participation in planning. The article is by Andrew Thornley (1977) and is entitled "Theoretical Perspectives on Planning Participation".

Thornley's paper was motivated by perceived contradictions concerning planning that arose consequent to the passing of the Town and Country Planning Act (1968) and the Skeffington Report, both of which acted as major stimuli to participation in Britain. His concern is centrally with establishing a basis for the evaluation of participation techniques and his thesis is that before such assessment can occur "it is necessary to have a clear conception of the role and purpose of participation itself" (Thornley, 1977:3).

Thornley develops a framework which enables the identification and exploration of a series of perspectives, each corresponding to different value-based positions pertaining to the role of public participation in planning.
This framework is useful for exploring the goal of this study, the role of public participation in planning, for several reasons. Firstly, the framework appears to meet the claim of Thornley that all approaches and views on public participation can be related to the range of perspectives accommodated in it - that is, the range of what is problematic concerning public participation is accommodated. Secondly, and similarly, the framework seems to accommodate the range of what can be considered problematic concerning the nature of planning and its role in society. Thirdly, the framework allows a wide range of key assumptions to be identified within each perspective. Fourthly, the framework allows for implicit views of, and implications for, relevant issues to be identified within each perspective, and assists in the explication of these issues.

The framework is partially based on two polar ideal-typical models of social order. Social order has long been a central problem for sociologists. Indeed many sociologists would probably contend that it is the central problem. (See, for example, Cohen, 1968:Chapter 2.) Fundamentally, the two models of social order can be considered as extremes on a continuum of sociological theories.

The two models have been described by Dahrendorf (1959:159) as the "two faces ... (of society)". These 'faces' vary basically in the emphasis they give as to the relative importance of conflict or consensus in society. As Dahrendorf iterates, consensus theory, which he calls integration theory, "conceives of social structure in terms of a functionally integrated system held in equilibrium by certain patterned and recurrent processes" (loc cit). On the other hand, conflict theory which Dahrendorf calls coercion theory, "views social structure as a form of organisation held together by force and constraint and reaching continuously beyond itself in the sense of producing within itself the forces that maintain it in an unending process of change" (loc cit).

(It should be noted here that the terms consensus and conflict will be
The significance of the dual models is profound and far-reaching as Bailey (1975:Chapter 5) suggests and Horton (1966:705-706) explicates; the adoption of one view rather than another brings with it distinctive images of man and society, human nature, values, bounded definitions for social problems in addition to indicating particular modes of 'scientific' analysis. Here we see the accommodation of a considerable range of dimensions identified as pertinent in the last section.

Before outlining these theoretical visions of society further it should be established that although the theories are essentially mutually exclusive, both can co-exist in an explanation of society. Indeed, Dahrendorf, lamenting the domination in sociological thinking of consensus theory at the time of writing, suggests that "in sociology (as opposed to philosophy) a decision that accepts one of these theories and rejects the other is neither necessary nor desirable. There are sociological problems for the explanation of which the integration theory of society provides adequate assumptions; there are other problems which can be explained only in terms of the coercion theory of society ... for sociological analysis, (and axiomatically I would suggest therefore for planning and decision-making analysis), society is Janus headed, and its two faces are equivalent aspects of the same reality" (Dahrendorf, 1959:159). Thus Dahrendorf states later that "neither of these models can be conceived as exclusively valid or applicable", and that "whatever criticism one may have of the advocates of one or other of these models can therefore be directed only against claims for the exclusive validity of either" (op cit:163).

Below is a brief outline of the contrasting, mutually exclusive models.
Consensus theories of society, like all systems theories, stress the interrelatedness between component parts. Hence the theories seek out and dwell on those factors of societal action which illustrate tendencies to unity and interdependence. Hence culture is perceived of as something shared, and values and moral standards as the subject of agreement; these characteristics are presumably the key to omnipotent stability. Change is conceived of as a consequence of disturbance to the equilibrium condition under which the societal system normally functions. However, such a disturbance is not transforming of the basic system - the common culture and values ensure societal members have a similar interpretation of any event or situation: this provides the basis for control processes that are conceived of as "bring(ing) the system back into adjustment" (Thornley, 1977:6). Order is seen as both a functional characteristic and a necessity, and systems theory tends to discount divergence of either opinion or action, tending to consider them as 'unsystematic' phenomena, the product of individual, rather than societal, perturbation.

Conflict theory sees society essentially in terms of a "continually contested struggle between groups with opposing goals and world views" (Thornley, 1977:6). Conflict, for reasons variously explained but generally stressing such as diversity of values and standards, is seen as endemic in society. It is also seen as a necessary condition of social change, a phenomenon which is explained in social structural terms rather than in terms of individual personality. Social order cannot be the product of social or cultural integration, but rather is imposed by some form of social organisation, for example, a dominant class. 'Equilibrium' cannot last; while change can be arrested and stability can exist temporarily, this can only be at the expense of growing tension and eventual increased violence at the next stage of social change.
Dahrendorf (1959:161-162) has summarised the assumptions inherent in these two types of theory:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consensus</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Every society is a relatively persistent, stable structure of elements.</td>
<td>(1) Every society is at every point subject to processes of change; social change is ubiquitous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Every society is a well-integrated structure of elements.</td>
<td>(2) Every society displays at every point dissensus and conflict; social conflict is ubiquitous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Every element in a society has a function i.e. renders a contribution to its maintenance as a system.</td>
<td>(3) Every element in a society renders a contribution to its disintegration and change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Every functioning social structure is based on a consensus of values among its members.</td>
<td>(4) Every society is based on the coercion of some of its members by others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.2 The Framework

2.3.2.1 The Basis: the Social Order Dimension

Thornley's framework consists of the juxtaposition of two scales or continuums. One accommodates the range of theories of social order; the other the degree of participation. The framework is illustrated below:

Figure 2.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High</th>
<th>Degree of social change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degree of participation

(adapted from Thornley, 1977:8)
Thornley, in establishing the horizontal axis, defines participation as "the involvement in societal decision-making" (Thornley, 1977:8) and, at least initially, is concerned with extent of participation; the continuum, however, can also be considered to have a qualitative dimension perceived, necessarily, subjectively.

Thornley selects three theorists of social order, namely Marx, a conflict theorist, Almond and Verba, consensus theorists, and Dahrendorf, representing a middle position. In a content analysis of major writings of these authors he derives their respective views concerning participation in relation to their theoretical position concerning social order. His findings are represented below:

**Figure 2.3**

```
| High Degree of social change | Marx |
|---------------------------- |
| Low                        |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Degree of participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Thornley, 1977:20)

Elaboration of this analysis and the respective views of participation and social order is called for as this forms the basis of the framework. It is, however, essentially truncated.

**Marx**

Ignoring early works of Marx analysed, Marx's attitude to participation derived from his concern with the class struggle and he emphasised the dynamic elements of nineteenth century society. He perceived unresolvable clashes of interest in society that created a
need for structural change. Participation was an inherent aspect of class struggle which raised consciousness and had an educational value. Participation occurred in relation to the organisation of class interests, to communes with decentralised decision-making powers and to mandated delegates.

Marx was concerned with analysing social change which he saw as developing in an antagonistic class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie. The 'end' of this struggle depended upon the proletariat increasing their consciousness as an essential ingredient for the process of revolution by which change occurred. In this sense all citizens 'participated', although it is clear that Marx did not think direct participation in such as decision-making was possible. (Mandated delegates fulfilled such roles.)

Almond and Verba

Almond and Verba are concerned with the political 'subsystem' in their analysis which is based explicitly on the structural functional framework of Parsons. Thus, Almond and Verba's work emphasises consensus attitudes to stability and change in society. As Thornley says "the approach can be described as one which attempts to explain the social phenomena in terms of the parts they play in the existence and survival of a wider society" (op cit:13).

The focus of attention is on how the 'dynamic equilibrium' is maintained. Change occurs in cyclical adjustments to the system, thus both avoiding the need for, and by definition, the possibility of, revolutionary or structural changes. Such handling of social change is dependent on value-consensus existing in "some higher, overarching attitudes of solidarity, whether these attitudes be the norms associated with the 'rules of the democratic game' or the belief that there exists within the society a supraparty solidarity based on non-partisan criteria" (Almond and Verba, 1965:492).
Thornley writes, "interest in politics is ... kept to a limited level and conflicts dealt with through adaption. Personal interest in politics and any conflicts that arise are kept within the bounds set up by the general attitudes. This general level 'manages' differences of opinion by creating cohesion through agreement on these 'more important' values. Political culture is used to describe that aspect of the general value-consensus that refers to attitudes to the political system'. He adds "Almond and Verba are seeking the ideal political culture to maintain democratic stability" (Thornley, 1977:14).

The political culture they are proposing they call 'the civic culture' which is a composite of three elements - the 'parochial culture', the 'subject culture' and the 'participant culture'. In the first, ignorance precludes even any attitude to politics. In the second citizens are knowledgeable but passive. In the last an expectation exists that it is possible to play a part in political activities. Participation thus, is important to "maintain ... governmental power and governmental responsiveness ... (and) ... maintain other balances that derive from the power-responsiveness balance" (Almond & Verba, 1965:476). Participation, however, is necessarily limited - it is only one element in the balanced 'civic culture'. The implication is that it would be undesirable if too many people participated.

The belief that people could participate is what is important. Almond and Verba write "if decision-makers believe that the ordinary man could participate ... they are likely to behave quite differently than if such a belief did not exist. Even if individuals do not act according to this belief decision-makers may act on the assumption that they can, and in this way be more responsive to the citizenry than they would if the myth of participation did not exist" (Almond & Verba, 1965:183). As Thornley iterates "participation has to remain as a myth because of the impossibility of organising participation in reality". While only a belief in the myth of participation is needed, "if it were
attempted to change the myth for reality, then this would upset the system" (Thornley, 1977:16).

As extended participation is impossible, Almond and Verba conclude that "the maintenance of elite power is essential in a democracy" (Almond & Verba, 1965:490). The structural-functional logic is apparent in the following: "the comparative infrequency of political participation, its relative lack of importance for the individual and the objective weakness of the ordinary man allow government's elites to act. The inactivity of the ordinary man and his inability to influence decisions help provide the power that governmental elites need if they are to make decisions" (op cit:481).

Dahrendorf

Dahrendorf, in his "Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society", not only accepts that there is conflict in society, but sees it as a hallmark of a healthy society. He thus insists that it is, and is concerned with how it can be, managed. He outlines three forms of regulation - namely conciliation, mediation and arbitration - which are the basis of the management of conflict.

Participation's role lies in its contribution to these processes. This requires interests being organised into identifiable groups. The implied possibility and effectiveness of such organisation for the management of conflict is reminiscent of pluralist theories of democracy which stress that the governmental elite is partly constituted by representatives of interest groups. Dahrendorf sees this, along with the regulatory mechanisms outlined by which groups can influence all parts of the governmental elite, as ensuring the responsiveness of the elite to society. As Thornley relates (1977:19), Dahrendorf placed more faith in elitist decision-making (and thus less on participation) in his later writing. (This explains why he is given two positions in respect to degree of participation - see Figure 2.3.)
2.3.2.2 The Democratic Theory Dimension

Thornley discusses various theories of democracy which he eventually places in the framework. This is to "give more substance to the framework (and thus) the application of theoretical perspectives to participation in planning" (op cit:23).

However, Thornley's accommodation of the democratic theory debate is of more fundamental importance than the somewhat incidental contribution suggested. Thornley's treatment of the debate concerning democratic theory is of fundamental importance to the consideration of the role of public participation in planning in that it enables perspectives and opinions concerning 'participatory planning', which may not be concerned to establish political implications or positions, to be related to these theories. This is so because it identifies through the medium of the framework that there is a certain coincidence in the assumptions of particular theories of social order and particular groups of theories of democracy. In other words, to a certain extent, different theories of democracy rest on different conceptions of social order.

Thus the treatment enables the assumptions concerning democracy to be generally related to differing conceptions of social order. This also enables differing implications for the role of participation to be more readily identified.

Thornley identifies two principal categories of theorists, the modern democratic theorists and the participatory democrats. Theorists of participatory democracy can be seen as having contributed greatly, in the last twenty years, to promotion of the idea of greater participation both in planning and other activity. The modern democrats represent, arguably, the "mainstream" democratic theory thought in post-war Western world.
Thornley relates both the theories of modern democracy and of participatory democracy to those of the age-old classical theorists. He depicts the modern democrats, founded by such writers as Schumpeter, as essentially confronting the preceding conspicuously-normative classicist theorists in order to cope with the realities of contemporary society. The new thrust was on constructing supposedly value-free and empirically-based theories. These are the theories of 'realpolitik'. The theorists of participatory democracy are depicted as commonly reacting to the conservative bias of the modern democrats, and in their attack and formulation of their theories they return to the participatory principles of the classicists, although their view of social order is generally quite different.

The classicists, as was suggested above, represent a long tradition from Greek origins. While there is considerable diversity, a central principle of popular sovereignty is common. (See Pennock, 1979.) This typically leads to a considerable stress on concepts of participation in public affairs. Rousseau, for example, considered it possible and beneficial to develop each individual's potential so that he or she learns to become a public as well as a private citizen. Public institutions are essentially participatory ones which allow for the full education and self-development of individuals so that the citizen is psychologically and presumably educationally capable to appreciate and exercise what is best for society, which is incorporated in the social contract, which is both the statement and creator of a harmonious and integrated community.

Thornley identifies three functions of participation as Rousseau sees it: firstly ... 'the individual increases control over the course of his/her life and environment, it enables collective decisions to be made more easily accepted by the individual, and thirdly it has an integrative function in increasing the individual's feeling of belonging to a community" (Thornley, 1977:23).
In Thornley's framework, Rousseau is placed in the bottom right-hand corner (see Figure 2.4): he believes in the maximum participation of all citizens (given popular sovereignty) and conceives of an harmonious community.

The Modern Democrats

As mentioned above, the modern democrats are concerned to question the assumptions and tenability of propositions of the normative classical theories and present empirically-based theories which explain the realities of modern society. The approach is reflected in Schumpeter's reformulation: "... the democratic method (original emphasis) is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1943:269).

The focus is on realities. Thus, a first question for these theorists is to try to explain how democracy can operate when uninterest in politics is high. Reflecting the tendency characteristic of functionalist and other systems thinking to explain the consequent in terms of the premise, they conclude that apathy is in fact necessary for the stability of society. Thornley (1977:23) quotes Berelson "... we need some people who are active in a certain respect, others in the middle and still others passive".

This conclusion leads to a central contention that due to the complexities of society a representative system of decision-making is required. It can be noted that this shifts the emphasis for evaluation of decisions (and democracy) from the people and the process to the outcome. As Thornley notes, "the success of decision-making is to be judged by the quality of the decisions made" (loc cit).

The role of the citizen is, generally, passive. As elites need to work out the complexities of issues the focus of modern democratic theory is on identifying the conditions whereby they can best do this.
Thus Thornley explains the need and tendency for theorists to stress democracy as the method "of ensuring the continued stability and equilibrium of the prevailing society" (op cit:24). Thus a consensus model is desirable, and adopted. Apathy is desirable in preserving the balance of the system (and to enable the elite to get on with their work). An underlying value system is necessary. Socialization is perceived as the means by which value-consensus and hence stability and hence democracy is assured. It can be suggested that manipulation of society has a positive meaning for the defence of democracy. The role of participation to ensure accountability of the elite is frequently conceived of as being limited to elections.

Thornley summarises the implications for participation in the reformulation of democracy to fit 'modern conditions': "This (reformulation) rejected the ideal of participation of everyone and substituted a representative system in which decision-making is allocated to a small elite. Participation is required to the extent that it makes this system work, i.e. through ensuring accountability of the elite. This is achieved through making the elite stand for re-election at regular intervals. The elite also must believe that some people have the ability and desire to participate if they think the results of decisions are not acceptable" (op cit:26).

The position of the modern democrats is thus seen to be identical to Almond and Verba's (see Figure 2.4). They have rejected the participatory ideal as impossible yet still conceive of, and desire, a harmonious, stable society. But this stability is achieved by considerably different means than Rousseau envisaged.

**Theorists of Participatory Democracy**

As mentioned earlier, theorists of participatory democracy can be seen as reacting against the conservative bias of the modern democrats and, in this, represent a return to the participatory ideals of the
classicists. Their view differs from that of the classicists, however, in that in their rejection of the aim of maintaining the status quo they are advocating a higher degree of social change. Thornley (op cit:27), questions the degree to which participatory theorists are in fact advocating revolutionary change and whether they could be located at the top of his framework along with Marx. He points to the varying attitudes to social change that are held by these theorists. He says, "they are not very explicit on how far they would go in supporting radical changes and one can only obtain hints ... to establish their views. Some may see status quo advocacy as detrimental simply because it does not allow the full development of the individual that can be obtained through participation. Others would suggest that a radical change in the social structure is needed to overcome evident social conflicts and as a prerequisite of meaningful participation" (op cit:28).

Thus the position of the theorists of participatory democracy on the framework (see Figure 2.4) is in the high participation area, and on the 'degree of social change' dimension, taking a path from the position of Rousseau towards (although not necessarily arriving at) that of Marx.

Thornley concludes the formation of his theoretical framework as depicted in Figure 2.4 below, in which the positions of the theorists of social order are plotted together with the democratic theorists. The three shaded areas in the diagram represent three alternative perspectives which are the culmination of his work. Perspective One is represented by the viewpoint of Almond and Verba and the modern democratic theorists, Perspective Two by Marx and the somewhat extended ideas of the theorists of participatory democracy, and Perspective Three by (early) Dahrendorf.
2.3.3 Some Implications for Public Participation in Planning

In the final section of his essay Thornley produces a synthesis of his work, focussing on the three perspectives. This includes comment relating to various techniques of public participation which would be appropriate to achieve particular goals within particular perspectives. These aspects are primarily concluding comments relating to the preceding analysis of the development of planning in Britain. These aspects need not be related here.

His synthesis also involves a summary of the perspectives, inclusive of the central assumptions and an indication of their general implications for public participation in planning. These aspects are of central relevance for our purposes, but their iteration here in full would involve considerable repetition concerning the perspectives and component key assumptions. Therefore the perceived implications for public participation are stressed and, although some repetition concerning the perspectives' makeup is unavoidable, these latter aspects are not fully
included: the following should therefore be considered in relation to earlier indication of their respective content.

Perspective One: Consensus and Stability

From the viewpoint of this perspective, society is seen as a complex system within which stability is achieved through its adaptive response to the environment. Adaptability is achieved through a process of 'dynamic equilibrium' whereby feedback is acquired from each part of the system. Thornley points to the importance of information in this feedback process, then to the role of public participation in providing this information, and the implication: he writes, "participation would be seen as a means of improving this information and hence the adaptability of the social system" (op cit:43). He sees this role for participation prescribed in several British proposals. He notes that "participation is not seen as involvement by people in decision-making but as a two-way information exchange ..." (loc cit). Information flows one way when the public let the 'planner' know of its views (thereby providing a "much more comprehensive coverage") and flows the other way when the 'planner' publishes his view. Thornley stresses that "... the plan adapts to public attitudes but is not formed by them" (op cit:44).

Within this perspective the assumption of value-consensus is seen to have important implications for the role of public participation in planning. Thornley notes that "within the sub-system of planning this overriding value occurs in the notion of 'the public interest' and the role of participation in providing information "would be used to modify and adapt the composition of 'the public interest'. The more information obtained, the greater the legitimacy given to the concept and plans justified on the basis of it" (loc cit). The assumption of value-consensus
incorporates the idea that people tend to have similar interpretations of a situation. Participation is seen as an aid to promoting this similar interpretation and thus as a tool for socializing people into the norms of society. Thornley notes that because of this "methods of participation are to be preferred that are oriented towards the individual rather than methods that might foster group solidarity against system-wide norms" (loc cit). Mixed attitudes to participation are seen as desirable whereby some people remain apathetic towards or uninvolved in planning issues.

From the viewpoint of this perspective emphasis is placed on allowing an elite to make decisions. Participation is seen as useful in ensuring the accountability of this elite and in improving the quality of information on which these decisions are made.

The essential role of public participation from the viewpoint of this perspective is summarised in the following: participation "is seen as a means of improving communication, coordination and understanding. In this way people are integrated into an acceptance of the 'rules of the game' and the system is provided with the feedback necessary for adaption and maintenance of equilibrium. Conflicts only result from personal misunderstanding. These can be overcome through participation that integrates people into the mainstream of social values" (op cit:45).

Within this perspective further implications for the role of the planner extend from the implications for power relations. Power is seen as an "attribute that accrues to certain positions of authority in society as a result of the commonly agreed value system ... a resource used by the legitimised leadership to make decisions in the general interest of the whole community" (op cit:53). Hence the role of 'the planner' is seen in terms of taking "the lead in determining the needs and requirements of the community and the way in which they are satisfied" (loc cit).
Perspective Two: Conflict and Increased Consciousness

From the viewpoint of this perspective conflict is seen as endemic in society. Social problems are seen to be the result of a fault in the structure of society rather than in terms of individual problems. Inequality is a major concern:

Thornley writes that "participation within the status quo is seen as always being a participation between unequal partners" (op cit:46), and, further on, that the "essence of this perspective is therefore that equality is required in order to create a system of participation that is meaningful in both instrumental and developmental terms. For this to happen the power relations in society must be changed. These are radical, structural demands. What means can be used to achieve them and what role can participation in planning play?" (loc cit).

The major role of participation within this perspective is seen as raising consciousness and thus creating radical change in the structure of society. This consciousness can be seen to develop through a number of stages: firstly, the individual realises that his problem is not unique but held by many other people. Secondly, he realises that the solution to these common problems is against the interests of other groups in society. The third stage involves realisation that such class opposition pervades all aspects of the individual's social situation. The final stage involves the conceiving of an alternative social structure through a struggle against the opposition. Participation would be seen as attempting to involve all sections of the community in this process of increasing consciousness, not only those belonging to the well-educated upper and middle classes who have been shown to be the most likely to participate. One of the prerequisites for this involvement by all sections of the community would be that the ideas and reports of planners and politicians would be 'translated' into a language that could be understood by all.
As in Perspective One, further implications for the role of the planner extend from the implications for power relations. Through participation's role in consciousness-raising, the public would gain increasing understanding of planning issues and thereby acquire power, based on expertise, from a small group of professionals. The professional planner's executive role would be taken over by mandated delegates who would determine needs and control the action of planners.

**Perspective Three: Containment and Bargaining**

Within this perspective, the existence of conflict in society is recognised. Conflict is seen as constructive and healthy provided that it is openly recognised, accepted as legitimate by all parties and is managed. As regards the acceptance, by all parties, of the conflict as legitimate, Thornley notes that the necessary preconditions for 'constructive conflict' will be absent if criticism is regarded as troublesome and irresponsible by one of the parties (op cit:48). The aim which underlies this perspective can be seen as "peaceful, gradual change" (loc cit) within existing legislation and policy.

The role of participation in planning within this perspective can be seen in Dahrendorf's emphasis on the need to develop ways by which conflicts can be managed through processes of conciliation, mediation and arbitration. Thornley writes: "He (Dahrendorf) would see as necessary the setting up of formal means by which objections to planning proposals could be dealt with ... (such as) ... public inquiries (which) would be seen as a form of institutionalised arbitration" (loc cit). Within this perspective the role of public participation in providing the means by which new interest groups would develop, especially from under-represented and under-privileged areas of the
community, would be stressed. It would be important that all interests would be involved: from the viewpoint of this perspective more violent conflict is often seen to be the result of a lack of balance within the democratic system, this lack of balance caused by the under-representation of certain groups "in the peaceful conflict of parties in a pluralist system" (op cit:47). The involvement of these groups would be seen as preventing this violent conflict.

This perspective would view the role of the planner in terms of facilitating and ensuring the process of mediation, resolving conflicts and reaching compromises. Thornley notes that although the concept of 'the public interest' would be in evidence within this perspective, in contrast to Perspective One, the planner "would explore the competing views expressed in the bargaining process in order to formulate this public interest rather than taking a leading role" (op cit:53), and further that attempts would be made "to ensure that sufficient participation occurs ... to allow .. (him) .. to carry out ..(his) .. mediating function equitably and efficiently" (loc cit).

2.4 LYTTELTON REVISITED

In this section it is intended to relate the events and discussion of the case-study as presented in Chapter One to the perspectives of Thornley's framework. A portrayal only, as opposed to a comprehensive consideration of the relation, is intended. In looking at the development of planning participation in Britain, Thornley has noted that although planning does attempt to combine different perspectives on social order "it is probable that certain perspectives will dominate at particular points in time" (Thornley, 1977:31). I suggest here that the assumptions and viewpoint implicit in Perspective One (Consensus and Stability) were dominant in the planning arrangements pertaining to the case-study.
As noted earlier, Perspective One (based on the writings of Almond and Verba and the theorists of 'modern democracy') places great emphasis on allowing an elite to make decisions. This characteristic is very much in evidence in the Lyttelton events: at the stage of goal formulation it was noted that the goals were internally generated by the Government and not subject to anyone's knowledge before they were transmitted as "policy" to the Commerce Commission. It was noted that the public took no part in the decision-making process surrounding the various stages of the development of plans. It was only after the plans were submitted for approval that Liquigas began its "communication" with the public.

This emphasis on allowing an elite to make decisions is perhaps most vividly seen in looking at the power bestowed upon the Minister by the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980. We saw that under s.55 of the duly-amended mother Act, the Minister alone decides on the granting or refusal of any application and that his decision is final. Other provisions of the Act which give the Minister further power over decision-making were noted (see pages 30-31). In looking at the import of s.55 in consideration of public participation it was concluded that all previously considered forms of public participation (other than those that had earlier been labelled as public participation as national governmental representation) were prescribed a role which was noninclusive of decision-making.

Relating to this emphasis on elitist decision-making in relation to Perspective One, Thornley has pointed to the perceived usefulness of participation in improving the quality of information on which these decisions are based. As noted earlier, from the consensus viewpoint this information is seen as a tool whereby the adaptability of the system is ensured. Thornley pointed to how "the plan adapts to public attitudes but is not formed by them" (op cit:44) through a process of two-way
information exchange. In the Lyttelton events there is not much evidence to suggest that either the plans adapted to public attitudes or that any two-way information exchange took place. Possibly one exception to this, although the insinuated influence must be considered highly doubtful, relates to the decision to change the siting of the L.P.G. bulk storage facility from Lyttelton to Woolston after a telephone survey had shown that there was considerable feeling against the Lyttelton siting by the Lyttelton community.

It would seem that the flow of information was mostly one-way; from Liquigas to the public. It was earlier noted that during the stages of initial planning there was a general lack of consultation and a paucity of information on the part of Liquigas. It was only after the plans were submitted for approval that Liquigas's communication to/with the public became considerable: the availability and wide circulation of well-organised, well-presented documents, the publication of two pamphlets, a display in Cathedral Square and the holding of meetings were noted. As the development of plans was completed at this stage, it is not possible that the role of information here was to improve the quality of the decisions made.

From the viewpoints of Perspectives Two and Three, such information might be seen as having a citizen developmental function, that is, providing a better education, understanding and personal development for those participating - more specifically; consciousness-raising in the case of Perspective Two, and, in the case of Perspective Three, providing under-represented and under-privileged people with the necessary 'tools' for entering the arena of organised bargaining. From the viewpoint of Perspective One, such consciousness-raising and attempts to involve the public are seen as undesirable. As noted earlier, mixed attitudes to participation are seen as desirable whereby the stability of the system depends on some people remaining apathetic or uninvolved in planning
issues. In the Lyttelton situation, there is no evidence to suggest that the role of information was seen as a means to raise consciousness (and hence overthrow 'the system') or to stimulate public involvement by a wide range of people. Rather the view that existed would seem to conform to Perspective One, wherein this information would be seen to be contributing towards developing within the community a similar interpretation of decisions already made: participation through information-giving on the part of Liquigas conforms to a socialising role whereby people are integrated into a similar, and ultimately their (Liquigas's), 'way of thinking'.

It was noted earlier that methods of information exchange that are oriented towards individuals rather than those that might stimulate interest-group involvement would be preferred within this perspective. Liquigas's 'methods' can be seen in this light: pamphleteering, displays, literature-supply, not to mention failure to convene promised meetings in Lyttelton.

The assumption of value-consensus, lying behind the goal of developing similar interpretations etc., as discussed above, is also seen in the notion of 'the public interest' as incorporated both implicitly and explicitly in the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980. As related in Chapter One, under this Act, the Minister is the unchallengeable arbiter of 'the public interest'. It was noted earlier in this chapter that, from the viewpoint of Perspective One, "information received from participation exercises would be used to modify and adapt the composition of 'the public interest'" (loc cit), and that "the more information obtained, the greater the legitimacy given to the concept and plans justified on the basis of it" (loc cit). In the case of Lyttelton, although the notion of 'the public interest' was prevalent, again it seems that little, if any, information was actually "received" on the part of the 'planners' in order to carry out these processes of modification and adaption and thus give greater legitimacy to the plans.
At a first glance the existence of the Commission of Inquiry may seem to conform to the suggestions of Dahrendorf as outlined in Perspective Three. As noted earlier, Dahrendorf advocated the setting up of a formal means by which objections to planning proposals could be dealt with, the goal being to resolve conflict through processes of conciliation, mediation and arbitration. These processes would work only if all parties were to accept the conflict as legitimate and if interests were organised into groups. The involvement of under-represented and under-privileged groups would be important.

It can be seen that for a number of reasons the Commission of Inquiry did not fulfil these goals or conditions and therefore did not conform to the viewpoint of this perspective. Firstly, as noted in Chapter One, the public had no right to any hearing: under the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980 a Commission of Inquiry can only be initiated by the Minister or at the proponent's request. The Minister in turn sets the terms of reference and appoints the Commissioners. The proceedings took place in a semi-legal, adversarial atmosphere. These above conditions would seem unlikely to provide a background in which conciliation, mediation and arbitration could take place, especially as by this stage the plans would have been formulated and the Minister has the power of final say anyway.

The above-mentioned adversarial atmosphere, together with such factors as financial inequality and lack of 'expertise' on the part of the Lyttelton public, could be seen as unconducive to involving the under-represented and under-privileged. The role of the Commission of Inquiry could be better seen in the light of Perspective One, wherein its goals might be perceived of as those of integration, fostering consensus through the process of socialization ... and this is generous.
3. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING -- WHAT IS APPROPRIATE?

3.1 INTRODUCTION

It is perhaps fitting to commence this section with the only definitive conclusion that I can come to concerning the goal of this study. This is based on the consideration that attitudes and opinions about the role of public participation in planning are value-dependent: there can be no such thing as an objectively 'right' role; there are various value-laden positions by which one prescribes meaning to the component subjects and hence by which one views public participation in planning. Failure to be aware of and/or explicate ones value position does not alter this fact and one cannot escape its ramifications. A principal ramification is that, whatever ones opinion, it has a basis for which one can claim no exclusive validity.

In a very real sense then, any attempt to come to conclusions as to the question of what is an appropriate role for public participation in planning, is arrogant. (Although constituting something of a major irony, it is a firm implication of the argument developed in this chapter that public participation must itself be involved in deciding the role for public participation in planning.) In the sense that value positions are personally held it must be considered that I can only proceed with a good deal of presumption. I acknowledge this, but can only state in defence that if discussion of value-laden issues was precluded on such grounds, much, if not most, and perhaps all, that is important would never be discussed. It is to be recognised also that failure to pursue issues can only constitute conservative support for the status quo.

There is a consideration that, arguably, serves to ameliorate the arrogant aspect of my pursuit. The consideration is that value positions
are not only personally held. There are several aspects to such a consideration. Every person is a member of society. If there is any validity to the notion that the essence of 'society' has any moral dimension, then values are to that extent shared things. Similarly, if one accepts that such as the planning community can and should have some degree of moral or ethical cohesion, then my value position pertaining to such as the subject of this study should be of interest and concern to others as theirs should be to me.

Another aspect of the consideration that value positions are not only personally held relates to the idea that social organisation and institutions themselves embody value positions. That such is true of planning arrangements and procedures is apparent from this study so far.

The basis by which conclusions are to be drawn concerning what is an appropriate role for public participation is predetermined. The orientation must be to the appropriateness of the indicated perspectives and their respective assumptions.

In the last section of Chapter Two, I suggested that an implicit 'consensus' perspective and assumptions were dominant in the planning arrangements pertaining to the events concerning the case-study, and I gave some indication of the manifestation of this.

On a more general national level and pertaining to social planning and the methodology of development in New Zealand, recent consideration has suggested that principal components of a consensus viewpoint have, particularly in the last decade, underlain planning activity (Thorns, 1982; Hall and Shirley, 1982:146-149).

Hall and Shirley, in the context of the application of a framework developed for the investigation of the methodology of community development as practised in New Zealand, a framework which is similar to that developed by Thornley and adopted in this study, identify consensus assumptions as key
components of New Zealand's mainstream development methodology. Although they identify a range of programmes and organisations that implicitly are based on alternative perspectives or models of development, planners and the planning institution are notable for their absence in these movements.

Hall and Shirley note the contradictory traditions that lie at the heart of New Zealand's social and political development - viz: communalism/colonisation, socialism/capitalism (Hall and Shirley, 1983:146; see also Cleveland, 1979:Chapter 2). Development policy and planning decisions are seen as not having confronted the contradictions, but rather as being oriented to "a form of 'economic myopia' which correlates social well-being with increased economic growth" (Hall and Shirley, 1983:146). Meanwhile, a consensus perspective based on the perceived 'economic myopia' is seen to be oriented about pragmatic economic policies with State agencies "ensuring system-maintenance and integration" and "a small group of policy-makers making decisions for an increasingly depoliticized citizenry" (loc cit).

The development rhetoric stresses shared values as the cornerstone of a functionalist (consensus) approach. (For latest example see National Development Strategy, 1983:3.) Such is perceived as being explicated in legislation (the Town and Country Planning Acts, 1953, 1977 and the National Development Act, 1979), the documents of quasi-state organisations, and the practice of statutory and voluntary agencies and personnel. For example, of the New Zealand Planning Council exhorting "all sections of the community to become 'social partners in the great social experiment of planning by participation'", Hall and Shirley state: "if one goes beyond the rhetoric and explores the underlying assumption in the Council's bipartisan approach, then it reveals a fundamental commitment to market forces, system maintenance and the preservation of the status quo" (op cit:148).
The consideration of the appropriateness of the perspectives and their pertaining assumptions in this chapter is pursued, principally, on a more general and conceptual level, at least initially. This facilitates the pursuit of the goal by enabling direct consideration of theoretical and conceptual issues involved while promising conclusions of general applicability.

What then are the subjects or dimensions by which appropriateness is to be decided, which establish the criteria by which to comment on what is appropriate? The answer must accommodate the range of subjects that have been identified as problematic. Hence, clearly the range of subjects must be broad. Although not necessarily to be equally emphasised, consideration must be given to the nature of both planning and society, to the nature of issues confronting planning and resource management and generally to the role of planning and planners in society.

Before proceeding with investigation of the appropriateness of the various perspectives, I must establish a limitation that exists concerning the possible scope of conclusions. The limitation has its origins in the content-analysis basis of the perspectives' makeup. It aligns rather than correlates the constituent elements of the perspectives. It is a portrait rather than a strictly logical construct. While this must be considered a negative aspect of Thornley's approach, the contended and demonstrated impossibility of being able to logically order all meanings, let alone all downstream characteristics, suggests that the approach is as much as can realistically be considered achievable.

However, and this is what is of importance to us here, the constitution of the perspectives hinders the scope of conclusions able to be logically drawn. Firm conclusions can only be derived from the features that give unity to the perspectives, that is the models of social order and their respective assumptions, rather than in relation to all the characteristics that constitute the other elements of the perspectives.
To attempt to draw firm conclusions on this wider basis would be to assume that the elements relating to the social order models correlate with, and thus have strictly logical interdependence with, the other elements that make up the perspectives. Although Thornley does not explicitly deny such an assumption (neither does he suggest it), I cannot see that this assumption can possibly be made, despite a certain intuitive feeling for the pertinence of the perspectives as entities.

The initial approach in this chapter then, focusses upon the models of social order and particularly upon their respective core assumptions. The argument is pursued at a general and predominantly conceptual level. In the final section of this chapter, the implications of the central conclusion of the initial (following) section are considered both in relation to the social order 'cores' and the wider perspectives, this despite the above-iterated difficulties with the latter. In this latter section, brief evaluative consideration of the case-study arrangements and procedures in terms of the appropriateness of the implicit prescribed role for public participation is incorporated.

3.2 THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF VALUE-CONSENSUS

The context for the consideration of the central assumptions of the social order perspectives, namely value-consensus/conflict, must involve a consideration of the nature of contemporary society and the characteristics of the interaction between society and planning that arise, given the task of planning. These matters constitute the subjects of the initial approach. Therein and thereafter in this section, the approach is oriented to the consideration of several issues that are seen as centrally pertinent to the elucidation of a role for public participation in planning and that give structure to the discussion. The very broad and complex nature of the subjects and issues involved, as outlined above, determine that the following discussion is somewhat cursory.
I have already noted the fundamental contradictory foundations of at least New Zealand's social fabric. Many authors have stressed the heterogeneity, division and diversity of goals and life-styles that increasingly characterise New Zealand and western society generally.

For example, Shirley (1979:41) writes "all societies are characterised by conflict between different groups who do not necessarily share the same values and aspirations ...". Similarly, Damer and Hague (1971:225) iterate "society ... (comprises) ... a multitude of social groups having different, competing, and not infrequently conflicting sets of values". He continues; "this view of society is neither cynical nor pessimistic; it clearly has some empirical reference ...".

Some authors offer elaborate accounts. For example, Emery gives a portrayal of the "turbulent social field" that she suggests has characterised western society for the last two decades (Emery (ed), 1976:6-10). Many other authors have observed and/or are centrally concerned with this perceived characteristic nature of society. (See, for example, Simmie, 1974, for a more comprehensive account; also, Gans. 1973:10; Ryan, 1979:28.)

Despite the unsurprising and seemingly incontestable picture of society outlined by these observations, it is worth noting, and arguably significant in the context of the following discussion, that many planning documents discussing such as social goals, make light of the diversity and frequent incompatibility of societal values and goals. The report of the task force on economic and social planning (1976:particularly 31-36) is not untypical. It, arguably, reflects what I consider to be a pertinent preference, perhaps reflecting an operational need, for planners to stress such as common goals and unity of purpose.

The central contention in this concluding chapter is that planners should generally not proceed in their activity on assumptive positions that do not recognise, or de-emphasise, the social diversity of goals; that is,
they should not proceed with assumptions of value-consensus. The contention rests not on the argued preeminence of the diversity in itself but on the pertinence of this diversity to the task of planning.

Most, if not all, planning and resource management activity is centrally concerned with the allocation and management of (scarce) resources. Generally the allocation is oriented to, whether implicitly or explicitly, some notion of optimising the social benefit of the resource.

Such orientation is often prescribed in planning statutes, albeit frequently ambiguously. For example, the Town and Country Planning Act (1977) prescribes that use and management of resources should proceed "...in such a way as will most effectively promote and safeguard the health, safety, convenience, and the economic, cultural, social and general welfare of the people, and the amenities of every part of the region, district or area" (s.4 (1) Town and Country Planning Act, 1977). The correctness of the anthropocentric orientation of planning's task has been indicated by O'Connor, et al (1982:121,122). I call this orientation of planning's task the 'social prescription'.

The fact that resources are scarce means that planning and resource management are essentially involved in trade-offs. Optimising the social benefit of resource allocation cannot mean satisfying all societal interests. In this sense planning can be considered 'political' - that is, it involves choice between competing interests.

But there is a deeper sense in which planning is 'political'. In the competition for resources are involved different ideas about what criteria should determine the allocation. These ideas are value-bound, inconsistent and often conflicting. Thus the task of planning, that is, allocation, is concerned with mediating not simply between competing interests, but competing and other interests that are likely to hold different value positions about the criteria by which the competition should be 'solved'. 
To adopt other than a value-consensus assumption of the nature of society is to emphasise that the task of planning is at least related to a contest concerning the selection of criteria which will determine the allocation over others that will not. The converse of this is that an assumption of value-consensus will tend not to recognise such contest, but rather will tend to presume the existence of a 'formula' for a socially-optimising allocation or the possibility of the identification of such a 'formula' by apolitical means. Such a presumption is, clearly, wrong.

On these grounds, I can at this stage come to a central conclusion: that assumptions of value-consensus and thus also the consensus model of social order are quite inappropriate generally for planning and resource management. It follows that a role for public participation in planning prescribed commensurate with this model is, similarly, inappropriate. Inasmuch as one accepts the pertinence of the non-social order elements of Perspective One, and, I must stress, only to that extent, then Perspective One represents an inappropriate basis by which to define a role for public participation.

To reiterate the argument: the social prescription incorporating the notion of optimising social benefit in the allocation and management of resources is the principal orientation of the task of planning. But that prescription rests on values and goals held by individuals and groups in society that will often be conflicting. We can say that the prescription has no internal consistency. The task of planning is concerned with mediating between the different criteria which reflect and represent the different societal goals and values that comprise the source of the social prescription.

Planning is 'political' most fundamentally because there is no way to 'know' or come in contact with the meaning of the social prescription in operational terms other than to be exposed to the societal goals and values that comprise or underlie the social prescription:
principally perhaps because of its internal inconsistency, its meaning cannot be ascertained by any other than 'political' means.

The argument as outlined relates to several issues that are recurrent in the planning literature. They have common ground in considerations of whether planning can and should be, or be regarded as, 'political'. Although they cannot be adequately pursued here, a brief consideration of several authors' thoughts will serve to establish the relationship, my thoughts, and assist in indicating a role for public participation in planning. Various viewpoints held in relation to these issues will be seen to conform with the bases of the perspectives.

The issue of whether planning is a political or apolitical activity occurs in many discussion contexts and is central, implicitly, in others. The position that planning is apolitical is most commonly associated, along with criticism of this position, with the rational planning model. (See, for example, Hemmens, 1980:259-260.) This model dominates much planning theory. (See Faludi, 1973.)

The model varies concerning its precise content but commonly consists of a four to six stage process which is oriented to the positing, analysis and evaluation of alternatives, generally to serve externally-generated goals and policy. It emphasises planning as means-oriented, although it is not necessarily so confined. However, certainly the wider aspects of societal ends-generation are externalised as are other aspects of politics that pertain to choice and the responsibility for this. Furthermore, related to the last point, and of considerable significance, the model externalises implementation.

Van Gunsteren presents an explication of the rational model which is the basis of a conceptualisation of "orthodox public planning", which he suggests "is presented as the only means by which we can realise our substantive and common goals" (van Gunsteren, 1976:5). The conceptualisation is one of several that embody what he entitles the rational-central-rule approach, which he eventually concludes is unworkable as
"its rationality is inappropriate because it is too far removed from ongoing forms of life and from politics in particular" (op cit:150).

Van Gunsteren notes that orthodox planning, although isolating planning and political rationality in theory, in practice does not. The planner, in that the goals that are presented to him are mostly multiple, conflicting and vague is involved in making 'political' decisions in that he will tend to focus on some goals at the expense of others. Further, van Gunsteren notes that, in order to ensure the "comprehensiveness", or perhaps rather we could say the fulfilment, of his plan, the planner will want to control its implementation and therefore important decisions will need to be incorporated into the plan. This desire to see the fulfilment of the rationale of his work is noted by Rein (1969:239) both for its rightness - "planning that disregards the question of implementation languishes as an academic irrelevancy ..." - and for the fundamental dilemma it poses.

Relating back to van Gunsteren and his conceptualisation, because of the need to ensure fulfilment of plans, orthodox planning needs to subordinate political rationality to planning rationality. In order to do this it requires a 'new politics' wherein the planners become the 'rulers'. He quotes Schelsky: "finally all authors give the same answer to the question about the relation between ('rational') planning and politics: in order to ensure the rational development of the future, the planners must be the rulers, or politics must at least become planning-oriented, which is inconceivable without the planners' participation in the exercise of authority" (Schelsky in op cit:10). The basis of such thoughts can be seen as commensurate with the notion that planning can be suprapolitical, a notion that is considered later in this chapter.

Van Gunsteren firstly notes that, with his involvement in politics, the planner loses his special status as a neutral and objective expert. He also loses his legitimation: "the justification and practice of planning become indistinguishable from the justification and practice
of ordinary policy-making, to which planning was supposed to be an antidote, correction, guide, or whatever" (loc cit).

Van Gunsteren then considers deeper problems concerning the relationship between politics and planning which further elucidate why planning rationality cannot supercede or circumvent political rationality: "the attempt to make planning rationality take the place of political rationality does not make sense" (loc cit). This contention revolves on the impossibility of planning providing the "solutions for the inevitable problems of power and co-operation" (op cit:11), solutions which it requires in order to fulfil its rationality, but which can only be solved by political means.

Briefly, power configurations stand between the rational plans and their effective implementation, thus distorting the rationality of the plan inasmuch as there are inequalities of power. Also, van Gunsteren sees that "orthodox planners cannot rationally and comprehensively govern the polity because they are not sufficiently able to change existing power structures" (op cit:10). Therefore planning has to live with existing inequalities of power. Thus plans may well end up benefitting such as well-organised groups, rather than those who should have benefitted according to "the rational insight of the planners" (loc cit).

Planning, then, is impotent in the face of, and thereby accepts, existing inequalities of power. In politics "problems of power and authority are at least discussed and sometimes even are the subject of common decisions that are more than mere words or confirmation of the status quo ante" (loc cit). The notion of the subordination of political to planning rationality therefore involves the subjugation of the ability to discuss and perhaps correct problems of power and authority that "are inevitable themes of human living together" (loc cit). This subjugation antagonistic to planning rationality itself.
Similarly, van Gunsteren sees that orthodox planning also needs the co-operation and commitment of many people in order to be effective, but that these can only be developed by political means. This is essentially because, as I understand van Gunsteren's argument, any particular Government is only part of the political system. Government doesn't constitute the wholeness of politics and thus the notion that the conceptualised rational planning can attain access to the 'logic' of the political system is mistaken. The logic of the political system and thus the basis for co-operation lie at the level of social organisation, in "social life itself" (op cit:11). Yet planning, as conceived in at least the rational-central-rule approach, does not have access to this.

Van Gunsteren further rejects the possibility of "division of labour", that is, planning providing rational policy, and politics providing power and co-operation. His grounds are, firstly, that this relies on the notion that planning can be apolitical, whereas it cannot if a planner wants his plans to be effective. Secondly, and more importantly, he argues that it is impossible to treat questions of power and co-operation apart from questions about the content of policies, that is, that changes in co-operation and power relations logically imply changes of policy: "discussion about power and co-operation is discussion about the content of policy" (loc cit). Planning rationality cannot do without such discussion that represents the very workings of political rationality, yet it kills the possibility of it as it kills political rationality and "cuts the ground away from under its own feet" (loc cit).

Any conception of planning which envisages that it can be apolitical while at the same time aspiring to be effective is erroneous. As van Gunsteren concludes - "Only in a society where human plurality - and therefore power and co-operation - is no longer a problem can planning rationality take the place of political rationality" (op cit:12).
As van Gunsteren hints, the notion that planning rationality can subordinate political rationality effectively, therefore implicitly presumes the kind of society that "Marxism" contemplates wherein absence of classes and therefore of plurality and political conflict mean that there is no function for 'politics'. Here we have a social model (in the pure post-revolutionary Marxist state) which contains the social conditions for which assumptions of value-consensus could be considered appropriate for such as the derivation of an appropriate role for public participation in planning. Need more be said?

Aspects of the question of whether planning can be apolitical, as addressed by van Gunsteren, have also been addressed by Gans in an article in which he responds to a paper by Friedmann (Gans, 1973; also see Friedmann, 1973). Several concepts and notions that frequently occur in planning are discussed.

Gans is questioning Friedmann's interpretation of the 'public interest', in particular the issue of whether his conception is either workable or desirable. Gans argues against Friedmann's conception of the public interest as a suprapolitical norm, which "can do away with the political dissensus of a pluralist society ..." (Gans, 1973:10). He argues that all societal goals are political in that any one goal is unlikely to be commonly shared and is likely to benefit some over others.

He points out that there are only three goals which can be seen as in the communal interest, that is, which are not political goals - namely, individuals' survival, democracy and equality. (I personally would argue even against the first, at least in such general terms, as presumably would anyone who thought that war was ever justified.)

He concedes that his "observations about the difficulty of applying the communal public interest concept are relevant mainly to large pluralistic communities - and nations ..." (op cit:11), and that in smaller communities where there might be homogeneity and thus more likelihood of
political consensus, there is a case for a concept of the communal public interest. But how much planning, particularly development planning, has or should have, its total frame of reference at the level of a small community anyhow?

The issue of whether the public interest is to be determined by 'majoritarian' or 'communal' criteria (Gans's terms which he equates with Friedmann's 'procedural' and 'substantive' criteria) is seen as being 'resolved' by the difficulty in identifying communal goals in a pluralistic society and thus the essentially 'political' nature of all societal goals. That is, because all societal goals are political, the public interest can and should only be worked out by procedural criteria or by political means.

Here again we see that planning cannot be apolitical, that it needs 'politics'. Also the notion of supra-politicism is seen to rest on ideas of there being identifiable substantive criteria which can be the basis of planning and resource management decision-making.

Accepting broadly the argument of Gans, I reject such contentions. Substantive ideas are important as principles which orient a planner's approach but they cannot be principles for direct decision-making - they are principles which the planner must argue with and for, but they, or contentions based on them, must be endorsed in 'struggle' in the political arena before they are legitimate. (And by 'the political arena' I mean that 'space' in which the whole social community are actors.) This is a necessary requirement of fulfilling the social prescription of the planning task. The notion of public participation takes on new importance with these conclusions.

It is perhaps fitting to bring this section to a close by relating something of Gans's optimism in facing his conclusions about the inability to identify goals that are in the communal public interest. While he acknowledges that the 'suprapolitical measuring rod(s) against which to assess political goals would make life (and planning) easier
(op cit:12), he states, and I agree, that "the fact that goals are political in nature and can be achieved only by political struggle does not mean chaos" - as Friedmann has intimated - "The ultimate outcome of a world in which all goals are political is not chaos but compromise" (loc cit).

3.3 WHAT IS APPROPRIATE? TOWARDS POSITIVE ANSWERS

It has been argued above that the assumption of value-consensus and concepts and notions, as indicated above, that are founded on it, are inappropriate generally for planning, given its task and the nature of society. Thus it has also been argued that this core assumption constitutes an inappropriate basis for the elucidation of the role of public participation in planning. To the degree that one considers Perspective One a cohesive entity, particularly between its central assumption and other key elements, it follows that Perspective One generally should similarly be relegated as inappropriate.

In this final section the emphasis is on the more positive aspect of considering the meaning of accepting as appropriate the core assumptive base of value-conflict and aspects of Perspectives Two and/or Three as a basis for the elucidation of a role for public participation in planning. As will be seen, attention focusses on Perspective Three. A primary orientation is to consider the case-study situation in relation to the role for public participation commensurate with elements of Perspective Three. As I pursue this synthesizing of Perspective Three with the case-study situation an indication of the meaning of Perspective Three in terms of procedural and organisational principles will be seen to emerge. In effect, the consideration of the broad imperatives of Perspective Three are clarified when juxtaposed to the contextual situation of the case-study. In this section, discussion relates to some of the principal non-social order model features and ideas of the
perspectives despite the fact that their make-up determines that a comprehensive and conclusive fulfilment of the goal cannot be hoped for, at least within the confines of this study. These limitations were expounded in Section 3.1. Numerous issues, ideally to be explored in relation to the broad range of planning functions and processes, need to be addressed and resolved before the goal could be considered fulfilled.

I do not intend to be preoccupied in this final section with the differences between, and relative appropriateness of, Perspectives Two and Three. It is unlikely that planners would ever accept Perspective Two in toto as a basis for their accommodation of the participation of the public, not least because it implies a fundamental downgrading of the importance of planners and a relinquishing of at least all policy and goal formulation functions. The role of the planner becomes that of a technical servant. However, the perspective contains several ideas that could be realistically accommodated in the identification of a role for public participation in planning.

Given that the operationalization of the social prescription logically requires the active interest and involvement of all affected citizen groups, the Perspective Two emphasis on raising consciousness levels and organising interests is useful, although perhaps not in the context of its 'revolutionary' meaning. The reflections and elucidation of this meaning as expounded by those emphasising such as emancipation and conscientisation of citizens (see, for example, Habermas, 1971, 1973; Freire, 1972; Shirley, 1982: particularly 285-288), might however serve at least as idealistic orientation for the planner's approach. The stress on the educative development and 'activity' or politicization of the citizenry stands only to facilitate the planning task as considered. The general broadening of the conception of social change to incorporate its societal-structural relevance can only be healthy for planning and promises greater fulfilment of the 'social prescription'. The wide perspective on social change can, arguably, be linked to those who argue
such as that policy review should be an integral part of the planning process (for example, O'Riordan and Sewell, 1981). Similarly, the viewpoint of at least the potential for social stability to be rooted in oppression and non-authoritative power is useful to the planning task. Other aspects central to Perspective Two would appear to be in line with much planning thought: for example, the stress on equality. (See, for example, Friedmann, 1973:56; Blake et al, 1983:Chapter 4).

Perspective Three, while perhaps generally being more likely to be accepted by planners as a basis for their accommodation of the participation of the public, contains some similarity in emphasis despite the radically different purposes involved. These similarities include educative functions, the organisation of all interests and stimulation of the citizenry. Both also share, although to significantly different degrees, the idea of the devolution of reliance on elitist planning and decision-making functions. Within Perspective Three perhaps lies the best basis for the delineation of a role for public participation in planning.

Dahrendorf's views on the desirability and imperative of accommodating conflict are reminiscent of Galtung's views. Galtung notes the tendency in our culture to treat conflict negatively, for it to be thought of as something to run away from or to be eliminated. However, having noted that conflict is on the increase and that we no longer have suitable mechanisms for coping with it, he advocates that it be treated in positive terms; as a constructive force. He writes: "... if you can't beat it, join it. If you cannot remove conflict, why not adjust your thinking about it? Why not try and see conflict as the salt of life, as the big energizer, the tickler, the tantalizer ..." (Galtung, 1968:25).

Similarly, Dahrendorf emphasised conflict as constructive and healthy, but considered it imperative that it be 'managed'. The 'management' of conflict and the challenge that this poses is a major
concern of Perspective Three. This necessity to 'manage' conflict can be related to an idea established earlier in this chapter concerning the role of planners: that planners should, principally in order to fulfil the social prescription that constitutes their task, recognise and ensure the accommodation of the conflict in societal values and goals.

Let me now, in relation to the contextual circumstances of the case-study, consider the meaning of the 'management' of conflict and thus what the prescribed role for public participation in planning commensurate with Perspective Three might amount to.

In section 2.3.3 an indication was given of the meaning of the 'management' of conflict commensurate with Perspective Three. Much emphasis is placed upon the organisation for the accommodation of conflict. A principal feature of this organisation includes the provision of a structure that allows different interests to demonstrate their conflicting views. As people have views concerning all levels of decisionmaking, that this structure allows for the expression of conflicting views at all stages of the planning process (from policy formulation to implementation), is important. Clearly the provision of this organisation is related to the issue of the provision of information to the citizenry - generally, advocacy of openness of planning and government is implied here, inclusive of early indication of intentions by proponents. This organisation for the management of conflict would be built into permanent planning arrangements and embodies rights for the citizenry. Mechanisms for the resolution of conflict - conciliation, arbitration and mediation - are central features of the organisation.

As reflected in Chapter One and section 2.4, the planning arrangements and procedures pertaining to the case-study were fundamentally antagonistic to such notions of organisation for the accommodation of conflict.
It was seen that goal formulation occurred largely without the knowledge, let alone the consultation of the public. Exacerbating this severe limitation on public participation was the fact that mechanisms of national governmental and parliamentary electoral representation were far from satisfactory. The effect of this contextual 'environment' for goal formulation was that little knowledge, let alone debate, of alternative strategies prevailed. It was pointed out, additionally, that the public were only informed of the goals and the details of downstream planning long after site-specific planning had effectively been completed.

In relation to the development of site-specific plans it was noted in Chapter One that prior to plans being submitted for approval, the public was not consulted by Liquigas. This was related to considered operational imperatives and the working rationality of Liquigas.

Thus, as regards goal formulation and the development of site-specific plans, there was generally a lack of knowledge, debate and consultation. In terms of Perspective Three's imperative that the management of conflict should allow for the expression of conflicting views at all stages of the planning process, these shortcomings are serious. Perspective Three stresses the role of information in encouraging the formation of new interest groups and in providing the public with better means by which to become involved. Both the lack of and delay in supply of information in the above events served to hinder the public in becoming involved and thus served to stifle rather than allow expression and therefore resolution of conflict. Stifled conflict is not resolved conflict: to so stifle expression is to deprive the whole conception of the role of public participation in planning inherent in Perspective Three. Such deprivation was considerable at the stage of formulation of goals (and objectives) and site-specific plans.
The deprivation of knowledge and information concerning goals and plans was not the only source of frustration for fulfilment of a role for public participation commensurate with Perspective Three. The public and principal local authority involved had not only to contend with unnecessary 'mystery' as outlined above, but also, as iterated in Chapter One, they had to contend with uncertainty as regards what consent procedures would apply. At least some of this uncertainty was unnecessary. One aspect of this uncertainty was that information concerning the evolution of the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980 was, at least for the impacted community, not forthcoming until an unnecessarily late stage. Also, not only was there no consultation about the evolution of the Bill, but it would seem that both Liquigas and the Government Executive were quite content to leave the Lyttelton Borough Council, and the Lyttelton community generally, believing that the Council would be performing a semi-judicial role in consent proceedings under the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act (1977), even when they knew that they would not be performing such a role.

The uncertainty that existed as regards what consent procedures would apply is unacceptable from the viewpoint of Perspective Three. The lack of consultation, again, served to hinder the public's involvement. But more serious than this was the potential for the contended mistrust and frustration that occurred as a result of this lack of consultation and uncertainty to develop into more intense and possibly irresolvable or unmanageable conflict. In order to avoid this, Perspective Three, in its emphasis on the resolution and management of conflict, stresses the need for all interests to be involved, and, more importantly here, for parties to agree on and adhere to certain 'rules of the game' for the regulation of conflict. The uncertainty surrounding consent procedures that existed in the Lyttelton events and the negative consequences resulting from it, would likely have been avoided given the formalisation of the 'rules of the game' within a structure which allows for the management of conflict. 'Formalisation' might need to be interpreted to incorporate the idea of the provision of constitutional guarantees, particularly
given recent Government action.

In Chapter One I iterated the effects of the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980. The extreme level of Ministerial monopoly in decisionmaking was noted along with the absence of citizen rights that have been embodied in other planning legislation for decades. The fact that the community had to indulge in a protracted political fight for 'a hearing' and for the terms of this, was pointed out. It was also noted that the Act, basically in that it is only an approval procedure (this despite the fact that it is the only investigation necessary before a proponent can proceed with a development), allows only a limited review of plans and accommodates, at least as a matter of necessity, no consideration of even site-plan alternatives, let alone policy alternatives. That this orientation towards approval stands to limit attention to the particular plans rather than to broader contextual issues was emphasised.

Several features of the above-related effects of the Petroleum Amendment Act (2) 1980 can be seen as contrary to the appropriate accommodation of public participation implicit in Perspective Three. The Ministerial monopoly in decisionmaking is contrary to notions concerning decisionmaking expressed in Perspective Three. Given the earlier-related conclusion that national governmental representation rests on an inadequate authority basis and thus is unsatisfactory as a considered form of public participation in the circumstances of the Lyttelton events, the Minister's monopoly is to be regarded as even more serious. Perspective Three, although not against the idea of decisionmaking by an elite, stresses the need for this elite to be open and responsive to societal conflict and for decisions to be based on competing views expressed in a bargaining process. That all interests have equal access to this bargaining process is important. The need for a formalised structure to be devised for the accommodation of competing views is clearly not
provided by or commensurate with the Ministerial monopoly in decision-making, particularly given its finality.

That the community of Lyttelton had no right to, and had to fight for the terms of, 'a hearing' is also contrary to the intrinsic imperatives of Perspective Three. Again, the provision of a structure which embodies such rights is desirable. The focus upon approval procedures and the iterated negative effects that occurred as a result of this in the Lyttelton events would be avoided given a structure as implied in Perspective Three. It was noted in Chapter One that the focus on approval and thus on particular plans rather than possible alternatives, both regarding site-plans and policy, resulted in any criticism of plans taking on a negative orientation. Perspective Three emphasises the need for a positive role for, and view of, criticism, and the full 'structural' accommodation of this, as a necessary precondition for constructive conflict management.

In Chapter One many features relating to the case-study Commission of Inquiry were noted that are antagonistic to the conception of a role for public participation in planning commensurate with Perspective Three. Such facts as that the plans to all intents and purposes had been finalised, and that the Inquiry was simply an adjunct to an approval procedure and only had the power to make recommendations, contributed to a situation in which there was little room or purpose in constructive criticism. I have already noted Perspective Three's emphasis on the need for a positive role for, and view of criticism, together with its full 'structural' accommodation. The Inquiry was characterised as a fight rather than as dialogue and, as noted above, a fight to which the public did not even have a right to partake in. The Perspective Three advocacy of a structure for the embodiment of such rights has also been noted.

Inequalities that existed at the Commission of Inquiry between the proponents, Liquigas, and the Lyttelton community were
pointed out. Advantages of finance, expertise, resources and influence were shown to accrue to Liquigas. Such inequalities are antagonistic to Perspective Three's emphasis on the need for all interest groups, inclusive of new interest groups from previously under-represented areas of the community, to take part, together with its emphasis on the equality of access to and equality within the bargaining arena. That the Minister has the right to choose the Commissioners for such hearings can be seen as further compounding this inequality.

It was noted that the proceedings of the Inquiry took place on a semi-legal foundation and in a relatively formal adversarial atmosphere. Such a foundation and atmosphere, particularly in the potential they have for contributing to such as a lack of self-confidence, are antagonistic to the Perspective Three imperative of encouraging people to become involved and to openly express criticism and views. That this atmosphere was not conducive to honest and constructive dialogue was also emphasised.

It was perhaps the Commission of Inquiry that could have provided the necessary forum for the incorporation of the Perspective Three processes of conflict management - conciliation, mediation and arbitration. The above-related features of the case-study Inquiry would suggest that considerable reform is required in such hearings before there is the likelihood of these processes successfully occurring within such a context.

In the concluding part of this section several studies and articles are indicated that have been concerned in varying contexts with issues pertinent to the concern of this study. They serve to further clarify the meaning and implications of accepting the procedural and organisational principles suggested in the above discussion.

The last subject considered in this discussion concerned
the Commission of Inquiry. The planning institution of the hearing is an increasingly used facility in planning and, in its various forms, is, as suggested above, an obvious organisational basis for accommodating the Perspective Three processes.

Many authors have investigated or considered this institution both in general terms and in relation to particular functional contexts. Particularly recently, many have suggested reforms that, as I see it, are commensurate with Perspective Three prescriptions.

Ebbin and Kasper (1974) have comprehensively studied the Atomic Energy Commission's hearing process in the United States. They have recommended a number of procedural guidelines for the hearing which are similar to and expand upon those outlined as appropriate above (op cit:272-289). One of Ebbin and Kasper's recommendations is similar to Dahrendorf's advocacy, of particularly the early resolution of conflict. This can be associated with those who recommend early hearings, in relation to such as development planning and as part of a multi-step public decisionmaking process, in which are discussed broad policy issues. (See, for example, Open Government Report, 1983:no.16: 12-15;no.17:6-7.)

A number of Ebbin and Kasper's recommendations reinforce the Perspective Three emphasis on equality, and in particular equality of access to and equality within the bargaining arena. They recommend that funding be provided to legitimate citizen groups so as to remove the financial and manpower inequality that frequently exists between these groups and proponents. They recommend that hearings should involve evening or weekend sessions to enable greater equality of access. That formal statements and written comments made at hearings be summarised in language able to be understood by non-scientists, non-engineers, and non-lawyers is seen as important in safeguarding equality. This emphasis on the safeguarding of equality is also to be seen in
recommendations calling for the provision of independent assessment of such as the impact of technology on the physical, social and human environment and for the impartiality of adjudicators presiding over hearings.

Estrin (1979), in the context of a critique of Canadian planning experience with 'the hearing', has made several similar recommendations stressing particularly the necessity for funding. He warns that "in the absence of ... funding the public would in many cases be better off without the hearings" (op cit:87). He usefully iterates the criteria for funding established by Mr. Justice Berger in relation to the McKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry (op cit:86-87).

In consideration of questions concerning decisionmaking in relation to radioactive waste disposal, Abrams and Primack (1980) have presented a model of the decisionmaking process that prescribes a role for public participation that is commensurate with Perspective Three. Their model, which they entitle "Critical review and public assessment", stresses and accommodates such as the desirability of constructiveness and openness of scrutiny, and the importance of 'political' public debate. Of particular interest is its perspective on, and accommodation of, the vital role of experts in public criticism.

To conclude, there are two works that I would like to mention, both of New Zealand origin, which further assist in explicating the meaning of accepting a role for public participation in resource management and planning consistent with the broad principles indicated as inherent in perspectives which acknowledge value-conflict.

The first, in the context of a study concerning proposed tenure change in the pastoral high country, is useful particularly for its expounding of democratic process principles despite the fact that they are, ironically, identified on the basis of a consensus perspective (Blake et al, 1983:113-121). The principles, broadly commensurate with Perspective Three, are good operational guidelines that could readily be
applied to exploration of the broad range of planning functions and processes. Such application, beyond the scope of this study, would serve to further clarify the meaning and implications of accepting the procedural and organisational principles suggested in the discussion in this section in relation to the Lyttelton case-study.

The second work, which prescribes a role for public participation more commensurate with Perspective Two than with Perspective Three, is a "Code for Resource Development" produced by the Ecumenical Secretariat of Development (1982). The Code contains some clarification of principles in terms of broad guidelines for practice which align with a role for public participation that is considered appropriate in terms of this study. However, perhaps its greatest value lies in its clear reminder that a prescription for a role for such as public participation rests on value-bases, a fact which planners and resource managers can only ignore to the risk of their professional performance and the resources they manage.
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