FROM EARTH’S LAST ISLANDS

The global origins of Green politics

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Since World War Two the world has undergone a profound economic and political transformation, from an international economy and internationalist politics to a global economy and globalist politics. The Bretton Woods international financial institutions have ‘structurally adjusted’ Third World countries, and similar structural reforms have occurred in First World countries. The environmental consequences of globalising economic activity have been severe and also global; the social consequences of the structural reform process are equally severe. National sovereignty has been radically compromised by globalisation, and previous nationally-based initiatives to manage the activities of capital in order to mitigate its negative impacts on society and the environment, such as social democrat/labour politics, have ceded their authority to globalism. Green parties have arisen to contest the negative environmental and social consequences of the global expansion of capital, and are replacing socialist parties as a global antisystemic political force. Green politics had its origins in the world-wide ‘new politics’ of the New Left and the new social movements of the 1960s, and the world’s first two Green parties were formed in Australia and New Zealand in 1972. A general history of the global forces which gave rise to Green politics, and a specific history of the first two Green parties, demonstrates the interplay of global and local political forces and themes, and provides an opportunity to redefine the core elements of Green politics.

Key words: Green; politics; parties; globalisation; history; Australia; New Zealand; social democracy; labour; networks; environment; society; Values Party; United Tasmania Group
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Certain of my friends must also be thanked for living this work with me. Perhaps not coincidentally, given the global theme of my work and of the age, not one of these friends was born in New Zealand – those who live here now were all brought here by parents participating in the significant migration of labour from Europe to Australasia that occurred in the 1960s, which was part of the globalisation of the world economy that I address in the thesis. The foreign friends also exemplify the globalisation theme. Jürgen Maier, who was International Secretary of Die Grünen (1988-91) and is currently the director of the German NGO Forum on Environment and Development, based in Bonn, is an inspiration when it comes to both thinking and acting globally in Green ways. With Greg Crough in Sydney I have maintained a dialogue on the global economy in its Australasian manifestation ever since we compared notes on the tax evasion practices of Comalco at the Three Nations conference in Christchurch in 1980. Neil Levy in Melbourne is my first 'cyberfriend', but no less real for all our computer mode of communication, and I am very grateful for the moral support and also professional assistance he provides. Closer to home Maud Cahill and Ian Burn endured much thinking out loud by me on the subject matter of the thesis, and asked stimulating questions in return, as well as providing moral support. Norman Smith, in a way ‘got me into all this’, by encouraging me to apply for a job with the Values Party, and his work for and on Green politics, and his very practical support of my work, has been much appreciated. At home I am very fortunate to have Martin Oelderink providing support and encouragement for my intellectual and political endeavours, and grounding me in a secure and loving relationship.
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Introduction

What more do we need to know about Green politics? (and how should we find it out?)

Questions for investigation

For some twenty years, merely by being a New Zealander of an inquiring and historical bent of mind, who was an active participant in the world's first national-level Green party (the New Zealand Values Party), I have been in possession of information not readily available to others who have studied Green politics. No stranger to 'new politics' in theory or practice, I have also participated in and written for and about the peace, environmental and feminist movements, including a history of the Women's Liberation Movement in New Zealand, 1970-1985 (Dann, 1985b).

In 1990 I embarked on researching a history of the environment movement in New Zealand - a project which over six years changed shape and direction and evolved into the current work. It seemed to me that while a narrative history of the New Zealand environment movement would be a worthwhile and useful work (and certainly one which I would have appreciated referring to while researching Green politics), it was not the way to gain further understanding of Green politics as possibly the most important development of late twentieth century global* politics.

* A note on terminology. When using the word global in this work I mean it in the sense used by Castells (1996, 92) i.e. a world-wide economic, political and social system operating in real time through virtual networks; globalist refers to the ideology of a world wide economy dedicated to continual growth; globalisation is what results from global and globalist activities, and is described in detail in Chapter Two.
This became clear to me as I read more widely on Green politics, including the literature on Green parties. I became concerned that ignorance of (and/or lack of interest in) the actual historical origins and development of Green politics was leading to severe distortions in our understanding of what Green politics was, is, and will become. Nor did some of the academic conclusions being drawn about Green politics tally with my firsthand experience of three Green parties (the New Zealand Values Party, the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, and the Australian Greens).

A number of questions began to rise in my mind. They included:

(1) Was it coincidental? or a freak? that Australia and New Zealand had the world's first two Green parties?

(2) If not coincidental, was it of any particular significance? To whom, and on what scale?

(3) If Green politics is or was primarily environmental politics (politics about and for the physical environment), why did it start in Tasmania and New Zealand, where the seemingly clean and uncrowded cities and the unpolluted and pristine natural environment are the envy of the rest of the 'developed' world?

(4) The Values Party and the United Tasmania Group were not formed from or by the environment movement, or the environment movement alone, and nor were most subsequent Green parties. Is it therefore correct to define Green politics primarily as environmental politics?
(5) If Green politics does not derive directly and/or principally from the environment movement, from whence does it derive?

(6) What, if anything, was significant about the timing of the first Green parties? Were they a direct response to the perceived 'environmental crisis' of the late 1960s, or were there other, more significant factors at work?

(7) Could one of these factors be the post-World War Two acceleration and proliferation of global economic activity, which certainly led to a deepening of environmental problems, but also to a change in economic and social relations?

(8) Other political parties, and most particularly social democrat parties, began to develop policies on the environment, and to lobby and legislate for better environmental protection and standards, from the late 1960s onwards. If they were sincere about taking care of the environment, and were able to be elected to government to do so (unlike most minority parties in most jurisdictions), why were Green parties felt to be necessary or desirable?

These questions sparked off a number of subsidiary questions, which formed part of my exploration of the global context and development of Green parties. The essence of the approach adopted in this thesis (which I explain in detail in Chapter One) is to ask historically and geographically specific questions. Also to derive historically and geographically specific answers, rather than to attempt to derive a grand explanatory schema of what Green politics is in any abstract sense, severed from the time(s) and space(s) in which it takes place. This requires particular attention to the issue of scale - selecting the appropriate length(s) of time and breadth(s) of space to make sense of the fit between research questions and data.
Beginning with the initial questions set out above - which were further refined into four absolutely basic questions, set out in Chapter One - I then went out exploring for answers on both a global and a local scale, and within both a 'contemporary' (1960s-1990s) and a 'modern' (1780s-1980s) time frame. I decided that the best way to find answers was by engaging in:

(a) a proper comparative history of the development of the first two Green parties;

(b) a summary of relevant post World War Two developments in world history, having particular regard to:

(i) the acceleration and proliferation of economic globalisation

(ii) the 'new politics' phenomenon, from the New Left in the early Sixties through the new social movements in the late Sixties to the first Green parties in the early Seventies

(iii) the rise and decline of social democracy as a parliamentary route to modifying and/or ameliorating the adverse social and environmental impacts of globalised capitalism.

The answers I arrived at (or failed to find) are covered in the appropriate chapters - which also suggest more questions which are not within the purview of this thesis. (The questions for further investigation are given in Chapter Eight.) At no point in this work do I try to derive a hierarchy of causative factors or provide a simple 'working model' of Green politics. The past is not a laboratory. In Marx's famous words, 'Men make their own history; but they do not make it as they please, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past' (Marx, 1978,
595). To understand what is going on, we need to study not just the 'men', but also the circumstances. Chapters Two, Three and Four concentrate on three sets of circumstances (economic globalisation, the decline of social democracy, and global new social movements,) which seemed to me, when read against the actual history of the first two Green parties, to be of primary salience to understanding the global Green phenomenon. (This is not to imply that these sets of circumstances are in any way independent, non-human factors. Indeed, it is the interaction between the creation of 'new times' and 'new politics' that we are able to understand why and how not just the Greens but other political formations wax and wane.)

Nor in selecting these sets of circumstances do I intend to suggest that they are the only salient sets of global circumstances. There are at least two other subject areas that I believe require close attention before we can fully contextualise and comprehend the development of global Green politics. The first of these is the expansion of the capacities and use of new information and communications technologies, from gene technologies to the Internet. These technologies have a strong bearing on both the subjects and the means of global politics in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The second issue of relevance to the development of Green politics is what is currently happening to the nation-state as a site of political activity. The debate about the 'end of sovereignty', and what opportunities this opens and forecloses for new political formations (especially those with a democratic and parliamentary orientation), is extremely relevant to Green parties and their prospects. Manuel Castells (1985, 1989) has specialised in charting and analysing the global 'network society', and has recently drawn this work together with studies on what is happening to global society and global politics (Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998). In Chapter Eight I use his work to frame the historically specific data on the development of Green party politics given in the rest of the thesis, and discuss the interplay between global generalities and Green specifics which will determine the future of Green politics.²
Since there are so many factors that need to be considered in order to gain an understanding of the complexities of Green politics, I am reluctant to engage in a ranking exercise. Either within the three sets of circumstances I chose for fuller investigation, and/or between those circumstances and any other factors. I have no doubt that the three I chose are all extremely important; and I am also sure that trying to rank them in some sort of universal priority order, as the causative factors behind global Green politics, would be a worthless and pointless exercise. Therefore I confine myself to outlining and exploring the connections (and also the discontinuities) between these particular sets of circumstances and the historical development of Green politics, and to contextualising specific historical events, actors and practices which have hitherto been considered in isolation, or in a partial context only. That is, if they have been considered at all - and as a large part of this work consists of presenting previously inaccessible information and in making original connections between it and existing information, I make no apologies for concentrating on a manageable compass of key factors.

**Theoretical frameworks**

Finding (and where necessary developing) a theoretical framework within which to locate my investigations proved problematic at the outset. I was initially at a loss as to which framework to adopt. It was plain that the nation-state and state actor-centred theorisation of ‘politics’, which is the dominant approach taken by the discipline of political science, would not serve my purpose of explaining a global political phenomenon which is based on mass new social movements rather than elite state actors. Indeed, I had already run into the limits of this approach as a political science graduate, when I proposed conducting research into the Women’s Liberation Movement (Dann,
My research proposal was initially criticised on the basis that the research would be more appropriately conducted in a sociology rather than a political science department.

But it was plain to me then (and now) that political movements can not be understood purely as 'social' phenomena. They are not reducible to an aggregate of social characteristics such as the age, sex, race, class, nationality, religion, etc. of their participants. Their political goals, practices and discourses must be taken seriously as having an existence which is related to, but not necessarily or inevitably a product of, the social characteristics of those who create it. Political movements are also historically specific, and the historical circumstances that give rise to them are at least as important as the social characteristics of the participants in explaining what they consist of and why they arise.

An extremely important set of such historical circumstances is the economic circumstances in which each political generation finds itself. Thus the approach taken by contemporary 'political economists' seemed to provide a better theoretical framework for reconciling the political, social, economic and historical dimensions inherent in a study of global Green politics. 'Political economy' is a fairly loose term, sometimes used as, or believed to be, synonymous with a 'Marxist' approach. This is not necessarily the case, and it is possible to put some tighter boundaries on what the approach consists of when used as a way of analysing national and international political and economic phenomena. This is what Palan and Gills (1994) and their contributors do in Transcending the State-Global Divide: a Neostructuralist Agenda in International Relations, and it is their 'neostructuralist' approach to such phenomena that I use in this thesis.

Considering that Green politics is a global political phenomenon of over twenty years standing, it is perhaps surprising that this theoretical approach has not already been applied to understanding it.
In fact it should be a matter of concern to scholars of global politics that my work breaks new ground in this area, and I find it hard to explain why an approach which seems to me to be both obvious and effective has not been used before now. It may be because the increasingly critical salience of the environmental dimension of Green politics has distracted commentators from its economic and political underpinnings, or caused them to concentrate on the environmental dimension to the neglect of other factors. Mostly, however, I believe that they have remained trapped within ways of theorising Green politics that are inadequate to the task of describing and assessing its global and social characteristics and significance.

From both a theoretical and practical point of view, therefore, it is important that existing mistakes and omissions are rectified. Hence this thesis may be seen as carrying a significant sub-text, or to constitute an argument in itself, for more sophisticated theorising about the causation and development of global political phenomena. It is not only a matter of looking at factors other than the formally identified actors in the global political system; it also requires a deeper examination of the structures underlying the linkages between economic and social phenomena, and environmental and social phenomena.

The question then arises - what is the best way to do this? This opens up another area of theoretical interest - and difficulty. In pursuing this study I have had to engage in a large amount of academic disciplinary 'boundary-crossing'. In particular, I have had to make use of work created within the varied 'disciplines' of history, geography and the social sciences. The issue of 'boundary crossing' really constitutes a critique (and potential revision) of educational theory rather than political theory, and is therefore far from the subject and purpose of this study. However it did have implications for my methodology, and it is worth outlining the way in which the 'conflict of interest' is conceptualised and resolved by Immanuel Wallerstein (1991).
Wallerstein considers the different approaches taken by those who study the meaning(s) of the past (historians) and those who study the meaning(s) of society (sociologists), and discusses the traps into which each side can fall. On the historians' side there is the danger that focussing on constructing meticulous chronologies of specific events (the idiographic approach) ends up telling us nothing about the meaning or significance of those events. This is partly because the historical record is flawed, and researchers of it can't be sure that every 'significant' event and actor has been properly accounted for. But mainly and more importantly it is because the significance of historical events is not a function of how large they loom in any particular and partial narrative, but rather of how they fit into a wider picture of social and political change over time. This is where the role of the social scientist in constructing theories of human individuals and societies comes into play. In this case, however, there is the danger that the creation of 'universal' theories of human behaviour (the nomothetic approach) loses sight of the specific historical location of societies and individuals, and the interplay between the abstract and the specific. It therefore ends up with broad generalisations which also fail to explain the significance of particular events.

It was clear to me that it was necessary to adopt a rigorous historical approach to understanding Green politics as a global phenomenon, and to work on a much larger historical and geographical canvas than any previous studies. However I was not interested in narrative for the sake of narrative, and thus the socialscience approach to past and present politics was necessary in order to find out exactly what story I was telling. Finally, it was important to ground the study in the changing physical realities which Green politics is in many ways caused by and reacting to - hence the necessity of understanding global geography in its economic, social and physical aspects.
While not aspiring to a 'grand theory of everything', therefore, I have opted for a broad rather than a narrow approach to what needs to be considered when developing theories about how a global politics came into being, and how it will develop. I have aimed for an integration rather than a separation of knowledge(s) as the basis for a better understanding of the Green political phenomenon.

Methodological considerations

Within the thesis I traverse the boundary between the Scylla of nomothesis and the Charybdis of idiography, sometimes condensing towards the former and sometimes expanding towards the latter. Having decided that the work needed to employ both historical and social science methodologies in order to provide a complete account of the subject under consideration, the next question was how to do this without compromising standards in either of these disciplinary orientations. In my preliminary reading on the topic I was repulsed by some of the breathtaking 'historical' generalisations made on the basis of (deliberately?) restricted source material, by writers whose ideological axes can be heard grinding in their interpretations of the 'facts' they present. (Two prime cases in point, one from the 'liberal' and the other from the 'socialist' end of the political spectrum, are Bramwell, 1989 and Pepper, 1993).

Therefore it seemed to me that a first priority was to provide an accurate and comparative historical record of the first two Green parties. In doing this I chose to work wherever possible from primary sources (party archives and publications, and interviews and correspondence with Green activists). This was partly because the published record is meagre, and unpublished secondary sources are also extremely limited. Mainly, though, it was because the mistakes and omissions in these sources.
(These ranged from minor misquotations and inaccuracies in dating through to gross errors, such as the representation of a conservation policy as an economic policy.) This convinced me that further primary research was needed. In pursuit of this more accurate history I spent many hours working with the Values Party papers archived in the Turnbull Library in Wellington, New Zealand, with the Kunowski Collection in the MacMillan Brown Library at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, and with the United Tasmania Group papers archived in the Tasmaniana collection in the State Library of Tasmania in Hobart.

I also conducted interviews and had conversations and correspondence with leading activists in the Values Party and the United Tasmania Group, and related political movements, in Australia and New Zealand. As I was working on an historical analysis rather than a sociological description of the Green political phenomenon, I concentrated in both my archival research and in the interviews and correspondence on which events had taken place where and when, what was said and done by the key actors, and how those events and words were understood and interpreted at the time by those involved. Conferences on 'Environmentalism, Public Opinion and the Media', 'Ecopolitics' and 'The Values Party: A Quarter Century Retrospective', in Hobart, Canberra and Auckland respectively provided further opportunities for contact with those studying and practising Green politics, and another chance to get feedback from the activists on academic interpretations of their work.

Secondary sources used included theses and research papers on the Values Party and the United Tasmania Group. (There are only four and a half on the former and two on the latter.). Also books and academic journal articles which consider the various facets of the Green movement in Australasia (not very many of those, either). Finally, political serials that were published during the period under study (1970s/80s) that paid some attention to the 'Green' as well as other political
currents of the period (of which the most useful were the Australian journals *Arena, Social Alternatives* and *Australian Left Review*).

So far this is a fairly simple and standard historical research methodology, but it covers only the 'local' side of my questions, and does not address the 'global' side. Completing this side of the equation involved a major change in scale. This included a shift in time-scale (from the 1970s/80s to a period beginning in the late eighteenth century but in particular focussed on the 1960s through to the 1990s). Also a shift in space (from the islands joined by the Tasman Sea to 'the globe', but more especially those countries which were at the forefront of initiating and driving economic globalisation). It also required a shift from working with simple political documents and activist statements in order to construct a coherent narrative, to investigating extensive literatures on diverse subjects. These literatures included those on economic globalisation, the history of labour and social democratic parties, contemporary social movements, wilderness, landscape and 'Nature', the industrialisation of primary production, and Green party politics in Europe. From these sources I was able to build up an in-depth picture of the circumstances which gave rise to and continue to influence Green politics.

In two instances I proceeded by way of conducting a case study or 'thought experiment' using one or more of the literatures. These are outlined in Chapter One. Although very little from them appears in the thesis proper, they proved a valuable means both of exploring and testing the limits of my theoretical framework, and of answering certain important subsidiary questions which had to be addressed before I could go on to answer the main questions.

A specific case in point is the question begged in one of my initial queries, concerning why Green parties emerged first in countries with 'unpolluted', 'natural', 'pristine' physical environments. Were
these environments really as 'clean and green' as they appeared to be, and if not, why not? My first case study brought together the general literatures on economic internationalisation and the industrialisation of primary production with the specific history of the commercial colonisation of New Zealand and the development of farming in nineteenth century New Zealand. The results are summarised in Chapter One - they show that despite superficial appearances to the contrary, the logic of globalised capitalism and industrialisation means that New Zealand and Australia are ideally placed to generate Green politics.

Although in working with 'global' literatures from a variety of national and international perspectives it was not possible (or in most cases necessary) to go back to actual primary sources, I continued to use this approach where it did seem useful and desirable. Principally, when dealing with the words and deeds of non-Green party and political movement activists (covered in Chapters Three and Four) I approximated as closely as I could the methodology I used for Green activists in Australasia i.e. the use of verbatim primary material. Hence the use of source documents on the Australian Labour Party collected by Ebbels (1965) in Chapter Three, and the use of equivalent collections from the New Left/ 'the Movement' by Goodman (1970) Jacobs and Landau (1967) and Teodori (1970) in Chapter Four.

Of course contemporary quotations can be misused so as to give a false verisimilitude rather than the actuality of 'how things really were'. Nevertheless, if chosen carefully on the basis that they are the best representations of the tenor of the times, and not because they pander to the author's prejudices, and if they are used to flesh out the context rather than to distort it, they can give us something that second-hand interpretations cannot do. This is a 'feel' for how it was, for what our political ancestors actually said and the way that they said it, which is both different from now and yet has the power to reverberate in what we say and feel today.
When Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit (1969) conclude their book on the May 1968 events in France with the words 'C'est pour toi que tu fais la révolution.' (and the translator of the English edition, and presumably the authors, choose to leave this sentence in its original - and intimate - French), the original citation is to my mind worth a dozen pages of exegesis on how New Left activists saw and felt about their political activity. This is part of the actual legacy they bequeathed to the Greens, for better or worse, and I feel it is valuable to record it verbatim where possible.

Apart from a small survey of party members attending the 1995 New Zealand Green Party annual conference, I did no quantitative research for this thesis. The 1995 survey was mainly an attempt to assess whether there had been any significant change in Green party activist characteristics since the larger survey done by Miller in 1991, and the findings are included in Chapter Six. Most of the questions I sought to answer were not resolvable by this means. Further, my active involvement in Green politics over the period I was researching and writing the thesis certainly gave me rich sources of information and opinions that I would not otherwise have been able to access. These have played an important role in helping me select questions and frame answers. However this work is in no sense a 'participant observation' study, in the anthropological or sociological meaning of the term. I was not interested in the way in which people make meanings - my focus is entirely on the meanings that they make as expressed via their political practices and verbal discourses. In subjecting these practices and discourses to critical scrutiny I attempt to identify what is problematic about the practices and discourses in themselves, rather than in the individuals or groups who create them.

In summary, therefore - it is in the interplay between global literatures and local narratives, between grand themes over time and small events in space, between the abstract theories of social scientists and the specific accounts of historians, that I locate this work and the way that I do it.
Notes


2. Castells (1997, 122) asks 'Why did ecological ideas suddenly catch fire in the planet’s dried prairies of senselessness? and in answer says 'I propose the hypothesis that there is a direct correspondence between the themes put forward by the environmental movement and the fundamental dimensions of the new social structure, the network society, emerging from the 1970s onwards: science and technology as the basic means and goals of economy and society; the transformation of space; the transformation of time; and the domination of cultural identity by abstract, global flows of wealth, power, and information constructing real virtuality through media networks.'

3. Subjects for interview and correspondents were selected on the basis that they play(ed) a leading role in key ‘Green’ events and organisations in New Zealand and Australia, both party and non-party political, and the interviews focussed on the public role(s) played by these people in the relevant events and organisations in which they participated. Personal information about interviewees was not solicited or supplied (except occasionally where relevant to the political chronology e.g. two of the interviewees were married as a political gesture in a church due to disappear under the waters of a hydro-dam,), and at all times the focus of the interviews on the activities rather than the activists. Interviews were therefore structured to take subjects chronologically through events and organisations they were involved in, and allowed for information on other subjects to be freely volunteered.

Two types of data were gathered from the interviews:

(1) information on the events and organisations the activists were involved in, which was used to supplement and/or correct information in the archival and published records;

(2) opinions, interpretations and analysis of events, organisations and personnel from the activist’s perspective and experience.

Data in the first category provided for greater accuracy in factual details, and enabled identification of areas of confusion requiring further work. The views of activists in the second category often suggested further lines of inquiry and/or alternative interpretations that were worth exploring, and in some cases replaced existing questions and answers.

My access to suitable interviewees and correspondents, and my ability to conduct comprehensive interviews with them (or elicit quick answers from them), was greatly facilitated by the circumstance that I was known to most of them, and had worked with some of them, as a fellow Green activist. Most of them were, like me, tertiary-educated people who are familiar with the conventions of academic research, and in general my relationship with them was one of collegial equality. I found that most of them had both the ability and the inclination to reflect on their political practice, if given the opportunity. Their considered opinions were as
valuable to my research process as the information they supplied about their activities, often causing me to revise my own views, or to work harder to provide evidence for them.

A list of the people I interviewed can be found in Appendix I.
In 1938 the poet Karl Wolfskeh! came to New Zealand, seeking refuge from the horrors of Europe descending into war. Sixty-nine years old, he entered a strange new world, very different both physically and culturally from the urbane nineteenth century Germany in which he was socialised. He characterised his experience as a dream – ‘Bin ich noch Ich? Ich traue kaum/ Dem Spiegel, alles wird mir Traum.’ (Am I still me? I scarcely trust the mirror, everything seems to me a dream). Part of his dreaming was a green dreaming – ‘Traumwandernden Traum-Grün erfrischt’ (Dream wanderings in a green dream refresh me).

One imagines the lonely, aging exile finding his way to the Waitakere ranges to the west of the city of Auckland, and wandering dreamily along muddy tracks among the great tree ferns, nikau palms and the many broadleaf evergreens which dominate the
northern New Zealand flora. He would then return to the city refreshed by this contact with living green things.

Wolfskehl’s Antipodean dreaming did not include a vision of the Green parties which were to be created there three and a half decades later, yet his story provides a link between the European past and Australasian present which resonates in many ways with the themes of the age.

Karl Wolfskehl was a German national who lived in Germany for most of his life. He thought and spoke and wrote in German. Yet he saw himself as ‘...einen Bürger der Welt, einen Sohn unseres Planeten’ (a citizen of the world, a son of our planet), ‘jüdisch, römisch, deutsch zugleich’ (Jewish, Roman, German equally) (Asher, 1956, 65-66). The inscriptions on his tombstone in Auckland are not in German (or English) but in two ancient ‘world’ languages – Hebrew and Latin.

A descendent of the people of the first recorded diaspora, Wolfskehl’s life and death epitomise the dominant theme of world history in the past half-century – globalisation. New Zealand was a refuge from the imperialist designs of Hitler’s Reich, (which had no place for ‘world citizens’ like Jews and gypsies).

Paradoxically, however, New Zealand existed as a modern nation-state, able to offer refuge from Hitler’s global expansionism, only by virtue of the imperialist designs and economic expansionism of Britain in the previous century.

Yet it was in this place, unlikely as it may seem, that the world’s first national-level Green party, the New Zealand Values Party, was founded in May 1972, closely
following the world’s first state-level Green party, the United Tasmania Group, which was founded in March 1972.

Most people who know anything about global Green politics at all are usually under the impression that the world’s first Green party was the German party, Die Grünen. Die Grünen came together in West Germany in 1979, contested its first federal election in 1980, and was successful in 1983, when twenty-six Greens took their places in the Bundestag and became the world’s first national level Green elected political representatives. Die Grünen certainly was the first political party to use the name Green, and it has undoubtedly been the most significant of the Green parties in terms of gaining parliamentary representation, political influence, international profile and scholarly documentation.  

Indeed, in acknowledging the formation of Die Grünen, the Values Party hoped that it would become ‘a useful model’. Values Party officeholder John Horrocks (1980) went on to say that Die Grünen was ‘the overseas party nearest in character to Values’. He noted the difficulties (as Values knew from experience) of sustaining a group made up of diverse political elements, and he commented favourably that Die Grünen was further to the Left than other ‘Values-type’ parties, such as Britain’s Ecology Party and the Australian Democrats. This meant, he thought, that Die Grünen held the promise of becoming ‘more than just a coalition of protest groups.’  

So Die Grünen was first in name but not in kind – the first place in world Green party history goes jointly to the two parties from ‘Earth’s last islands’. The dreaming of Green politics is a world dreaming, and this is where it first took party form.
In this work, I examine salient aspects of the global economic, political and social context in which Green politics arose, and then go on to look at the specifically local origins and characteristics of the Values Party and the United Tasmania Group. I conclude with a discussion about what the origins of Green politics, and the evolving global context, may tell us about how Green politics is likely to develop in the twenty-first century. But to begin with, it is necessary to consider the meanings of the term 'Green', and how the term will be defined for the purposes of this study.

What do we mean by 'Green'?

The term 'Green' has been in political currency since the late 1970s, and has acquired many shades of meaning. It is commonly used to encompass a wide and diverse range of political and social activities and lifestyle practices. A collector of 'Green' literature can soon amass a shelf of books with titles like *The Greening of Medicine, The Green Family Cookbook, The Green Cleaner, The Green Alternative Guide to Good Living, The Little New Zealand Green Book, The Green Consumer Guide* and *It's Easy Being Green*. They are more numerous than overtly political volumes such as *A Green Manifesto* and *Green Parties An International Guide*.

The common thread running through the popular usage of the term 'Green', as evidenced by these examples, is an awareness of the physical environment and an advocacy of the protection and enhancement of that environment. Farmers,
homeowners, doctors and citizens at large are exhorted to become ‘Green’ in their work and play, and in Australasia the epithet ‘clean and green’ is perceived – and contested – as a prime marketing tool for attracting tourists, and for trading in agricultural produce.

In this sense ‘Green’ appears to be a-political, and to resemble common sense beliefs and practices (rather like personal hygiene), which are universal and not connected with any particular political theory or practice. Political parties of all kinds now talk about their ‘green’ policies, meaning their explicitly environmental policies. Does this mean that when it comes to defining Green, anything goes?

Stephen Young (1992) has attempted to capture the range of political meanings in the term ‘green’ within a flow chart entitled ‘Different Dimensions of Green Politics’. This is ‘...designed to separate deep ecology ideas from shallow ecology approaches; and to identify the dimensions of study and action that each gives rise to.’ (Young, 1992, 12-13). Everything starts with Box 1 (‘From the Industrial Revolution to the late twentieth century: population growth; economic growth; and industrial expansion ’). In response to this situation comes Box 2 (‘Criticisms of industrialisation and limitless growth from a green perspective – the emergence of Green Politics’). Then the chart divides into the ‘Deep Ecology’ side (‘Solutions based on dark Green ideas aimed at radical economic and social change’) and the ‘Environmental Reformism’ side (‘light green shallow ecology ideas based on mitigating the effects of industrialisation and continued growth ’). The rest of the chart elaborates on the different inputs and outputs contributing to and stemming from these divergent responses to the environmental ‘crisis’. On the ‘deep’ side these
Flow chart designed to separate deep ecology ideas from shallow ecology approaches; and to identify the dimensions for action and study that each gives rise to.

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include spiritual dimensions, eco-feminism, Green parties, extra-parliamentary strategies, different forms of democracy, and the principles and practice of sustainability. On the 'shallow' side are getting environmental issues on to political agendas at different levels, environmental projects by non-profit groups, private sector responses such as 'green' consumerism, environmental pressure groups, and policy making and implementation (See Figure 1).

Young's typology shows that even when looking at just the 'ecology' dimension (and if this work does nothing else, it will at least show that there is more to 'Green' politics than a single-minded focus on the physical environment), there is a wide divergence of theory and practice. In the rest of his paper he unpacks his boxes to show the complexity of green politics in its many facets, and how some parts just don't fit together snugly, or even at all. The gulf between those who believe that radical change of a rotten system is necessary, and those who think that tinkering with a basically sound system will suffice, is often impassable.

Young locates Green parties (correctly) on the 'deep' side of the divide. However this must be principally because they advocate a radical analysis of the environmental crisis and radical solutions to it, rather than because they necessarily believe or fully endorse the eco-philosophies of 'deep ecologists' (such as Arne Naess), or the practice of deep ecologist militants, (such as Earth First!).

So just what does the 'deepness' of Green parties consist of, and where does it come from? In limiting my compass in this study to Green parties – their programmes, policies and actual practices – I do not deny the existence or relevance of all those
other forms of green politics. However, in narrowing my focus to the more manageable consideration of structured Green political organisations, I avoid the confusing plethora of environmental and lifestyle groups and practices which are considered (or consider themselves) to be 'Green'. Paradoxically, I also extend the definition of Green, since Green parties do not restrict their programmes to environmental and lifestyle concerns, nor their practices to conventional forms of participation in existing political structures.

Further, while Green parties were the first political parties to build their party platforms on an explicitly environmental plank, and the environmental dimension is certainly fundamental to them, the environmental plank is only one of four foundational principles common to Green parties. The fundamental importance of the other dimensions of Green politics as defined by Green parties is perfectly illustrated by events at the foundational conference of Die Grünen.

*More than environmentalism*

In October 1979, at a tense and drawn out congress in Offenbach, Germany, the 'four pillars' of Green party politics were decided upon by the proto-party which was to be come Die Grünen, the first party to use the name 'Green'. While none of these principles were politically novel in themselves, their combination into the basis of a party platform certainly was. As August Haussleiter described the fraught and historic moment:
"Although agreement seemed impossible, I took a piece of paper and wrote four words on it: ecology, social responsibility, grassroots democracy, and non-violence. Then I called Gruhl (leader of the conservatives) and Reents (leader of the left) into the room where the journalists were and said 'Sign'. We then went back into the convention hall and announced 'We have a programme.' (Parkin, 1989, 120).

Within a year (and after two more foundational and programmatic conferences) individuals and groups with past or present right-wing connections and/or programmes (including Haussleiter himself) were no longer in Die Grünen (Hülsberg, 1988, 94-96). But the four foundational principles agreed to at Offenbach were entrenched as the original and defining Green party principles.

These principles have been translated into many languages in the succeeding years, and were the inspiration for the Green Charter formulated by the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand at its foundational conference in March 1990 (see Appendix A). They were also prefigured in 1974 in 'The New Ethic' of the United Tasmania Group (see Appendix B). What do they mean?

Under the heading ecology comes the Green concern for ecological sustainability. This means that the quality, quantity and diversity of life on planet Earth (and the physical environmental elements on which it depends, such as soil, air and water) are not further compromised by pollution, degradation, extinctions and so on. Also that where possible habitats and ecosystems are restored and/or enhanced to improve already compromised quality, quantity and diversity. By social responsibility Greens mean that both individuals and social institutions are under obligations of mutual
respect and aid. Both must play their part in ensuring that every member of society is accorded the rights and the means to realise their full potential both as an individual and as a contributor to society. Grass-roots democracy is a Green ideal, involving extending democratic participation beyond formal and token activities at the representative parliamentary level through to equal participation at community level, in the tradition of the ancient Athenian assemblies or the contemporary New England town meeting. Finally, non-violence is not just the absence of armed conflict and a commitment to national and international disarmament, but includes positive alternative ways of resolving conflicts at international, national, local and even domestic levels.

As defined by Green parties, therefore, Green politics means more than environmentalism; it means a foundational linkage of environmentalism with the three great goals of 'progressive' politics in the West since the eighteenth century—justice, democracy and peace. In choosing to focus on Green politics as defined by its practitioners and theorists in Green parties, and in choosing to exclude the wealth of Green theorising conducted by a wide range of philosophers, and the practice of people in the broader social movements who would consider themselves 'green', I do not deny the salience of either academic theorising or lifestyle practice to Green politics. On the contrary, much of what the non-party philosophers and practitioners come up with ultimately finds its way on to Green party platforms. Practitioners working in the areas of sustainable production, appropriate technology, human rights, species conservation, co-operative enterprises, local scale economies, energy conservation, alternative health care, animal welfare and so on frequently provide the
real working models on which Green policies presented to the electorate can be based.

However, it is Green parties which have taken on the job of attempting to make a coherent political programme out of these seemingly disparate areas of interest and expertise, and of offering it as a package to fellow citizens as a democratic choice. Two terms one frequently encounters when researching Green politics are 'rainbow' and 'holistic'. Green parties have set themselves the probably impossible task of reconciling the rainbow of new social and environmental politics into an holistic philosophy and a coherent political programme.

Without denying the important role of non-party Greens, therefore, it is to Green parties that we must turn to explore the full meaning of Green politics as it is played out in today's world. To understand the role played by Green parties globally it is necessary to understand the context within which they take their place on the stage of world politics. In the rest of this chapter I consider the ways in which we might gain that understanding, and how I came to prioritise certain routes over others. As part of that process it is necessary to begin by clarifying and correcting some common misconceptions about the origins of Green politics.
Case studies in conceptualising the origins of Green politics

In trying to select the most salient factors that have precipitated and influenced Green politics as a global phenomenon, one is faced with what seems like a bewildering array of choice. There are Green voices arguing for a variety of precipitating factors. These include a loss of wilderness (Hay and Haward, 1988), industrialism (Porritt, 1984), spiritual malaise (Spretnak and Capra, 1984) and just about every other ill of modern global society, including over-population, the energy crisis, resource depletion, consumerism, pollution, structural unemployment, exploitation in the Third World, and nuclear energy and weapons.

Theorists within the Green movement are supplemented by academics who emphasise the role of the subject matter of their discipline. These include sociologists looking at new social and political movements (Boggs, 1986), political scientists examining 'value change' in voting publics (Inglehart, 1977; 1990) and political economists considering changes in the world economy (Lipietz, 1988, 1992). The arguments from the activists are generally limited to special and partial pleading based on a restricted selection of data, and sometimes an ideological bias. The academic accounts, even where free of overt ideological bias, can also be limited, often taking on the aspect of being little more than an effect of the methodologies typically employed by the discipline (see, for example, Levine, 1975, on the limitations of Rokeach's value dimension scale). How is it possible, therefore, to select what has real explanatory value, and what warrants further investigation, from the range of possibilities?
I decided that it was necessary to start by investigating the 'assumptions behind the assumptions'. Behind the assumption that Green politics is a radical form of environmentalism lie two further assumptions about what constitutes and/or precipitates environmentalism or ecology as a politics. In heavily urbanised and heavily populated Western Europe the discourse of environmentalism is largely around the pollution and degradation of human living and working space and the depletion of the natural resources used for industry. In equally urbanised but not quite so heavily populated North America and Australasia there is an additional (and sometimes dominant) concern about the degradation and depletion of 'Nature' and 'wilderness'. The European position is sometimes characterised as 'anthropocentric' or 'shallow', being concerned primarily with protecting human standards of living; the Europeans can easily riposte that the preservation of 'Nature' position is riddled with philosophical and practical contradictions.

Both these positions are canvassed below, via case studies in which I attempted to tease out just why neither approach is able to answer fundamental questions about the timing, location and actual content of Green politics. For a 'common sense' attempt to derive environmentalism as a politics generally, or Green parties specifically, from either industrial pollution and depletion or attacks on nature/wilderness would surely conclude that Green politics would (should) have started in Great Britain in the mid-nineteenth century, not New Zealand in the late-twentieth. Obviously just what we mean by 'industrialisation' and 'nature' therefore require further examination.
Against Growth?

The trashing of the immediate environment is as old as human history (I still remember with wry pleasure that inspirational marine ecologist Professor John Morton quoting to me – in the original Latin – Horace’s complaint at the pollution of the Tiber by the effluent of ancient Rome). But it is only in the last two centuries that human beings have developed the technological capacities and the commercial imperative to lay waste to and deplete the resources of an entire planet (not to mention exploit or destroy literally millions of themselves). The Industrial Revolution, based on the new technologies of steam power and industrial chemistry, and with its associated depopulation of the countryside and rapid urbanisation of Western Europe, was responsible for the acceleration and exacerbation of existing environmental problems such as water and air pollution and over-crowding. Also for the creation of new ones, such as the toxic processing and adulteration of food on a mass scale.

In the twentieth century breakthroughs in physics (especially the jet engine and nuclear fission) further increased the range of environmental hazards and rendered them globally ubiquitous, creating a ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1995). The science of the twentyfirst century, which is already upon us, is biology. The genetic codes of life are being cracked and shuffled between species with as much care – and as little thought – as nuclear tests were conducted in the American, Australian and Soviet ‘desert’ lands in the 1950s and 60s. (Accounts of just how much (usually terminal) damage those tests did to people who were never told that they were being
experimented upon, and the places where they lived, can be found in Alcalay (1988; 1995); Alcalay and Todd (1994); Dibblin (1988); Johnson (1984); Kerr et al (1984); McClelland (1985); Miliken (1986); Smith (1985) and Tame and Robotham (1982). It gives me no pleasure to contemplate providing a similar listing for genetic engineering experimental damage on unsuspecting and non-consenting human subjects and other species twenty years hence.)

The enormity of the environmental impacts of the widespread application of these technologies has certainly created environmentalism or 'political ecology' as a politics of resistance to the destruction. But environmentalism is essentially a reactive politics, addressing symptoms rather than causes. This is not to say that it is a useless or futile politics, since it is generally worthwhile to ameliorate distressing symptoms, even as one searches for a cure. But it is not the same as Green politics, which has theories of causation that Green parties develop and address in their platforms and policies.

The causes of ecological and social distress and dysfunction most often cited in the early Green literature are 'industrialism' and 'consumerism' – two forms of highly organised social behaviour which are both the means and the ends of 'economic growth'. Economic growth is a goal which Greens reject both as an end in itself, and as a means to achieving 'the good life'. While not opposed to economic growth in principle, when it is achieved in ways which are ecologically and socially benign, the Green critique of economic growth rests on its reification, by other political tendencies, into a sacred cow of national and international economic management.
The rejection of economic growth as a major focus and function of contemporary state-craft remains the original and abiding difference between Green politics and other forms of party politics, of both the left and the right. Hence the Green scepticism towards both socialism and capitalism, where these are touted as superior ways of achieving economic growth, and Green neutrality towards both planning and markets as economic tools for organising production and distribution. The Green approach is to assess particular plans and particular markets with regard to their ability to deliver ecologically sustainable and socially equitable production and distribution outcomes.

If the unquestioning, unchecked drive towards economic growth is a primary cause of environmental destruction then the roots of Green politics can be found anywhere where expansionist industry and commerce have made their mark on environments, and also on societies where the mass of people have been deprived of land and of sustainable, equitable, secure livelihoods. What better place to examine this thesis than a country which only came into as existence as a nation-state by means of its new found role as a participant in the expanding world economy?

In a case study entitled 'Colonisation and Alienation: the origins of Green politics in the world market economy and industrial agriculture in the nineteenth century' (Dann, 1995a) I cast a critical eye over the 'discovery' of New Zealand, and its later development. New Zealand was given its current name in 1642 by the leader of a Dutch trade expedition. Abel Tasman's expedition was a commercial failure, but James Cook's late eighteenth century explorations identified several 'natural resources' which had become important items of world commerce at that time. Seals,
whales (for oil), fibre (for ropes and sails) and timber (for masts and ships' planking) were valued principally because they provided raw materials for the industries which produced the growing fleet of ships that made the expansion of global trade possible.

The first, and purely exploitative, phase of New Zealand's economic 'development' began on a beach in a remote fiord of southern New Zealand in 1792. There a gang of sealers constructed a rude barracks and began an escalating regime of slaughter that was to culminate in the destruction of an estimated 90% of the New Zealand fur seal population (Clark, 1949, 49-50). (The sealskins were in demand as a fashion clothing commodity for the growing European and American middle classes.)

Pure exploitation of natural resources was followed by a settlement phase, where the chief commodity traded (in England as well as in New Zealand) was land. The creation of markets in land, which had taken centuries to come to pass in Europe, (Polanyi, 1980) was well established as standard practice in Britain by the nineteenth century. This system was rapidly superimposed on the non-market land acquisition and utilisation systems of the indigenous Maori people, eclipsing their systems completely (not without creating gross injustices and major grievances which are only finally being rectified via a special tribunal set up for the purpose over one hundred years later).

The third phase in New Zealand's economic development was that of industrialised primary production, which secured its ongoing participation in the world economy. At first this was based on grazing sheep on extensive range-lands, which were converted from native grasses and shrubs to more palatable albeit less stable exotic species by widespread burning, repeated annually (Stephens, 1965). Wool was
removed from the sheep in large shearing factories, known as woolsheds, where up to two hundred workers at a time carried out the labour in a highly compartmentalised fashion. There was (and is) rigid separation of the tasks in and around the woolshed. The jobs were split into herding and handling the sheep before and after shearing; shearing itself (where the tasks are further divided into the relatively unskilled removal of dirty wool from the hindquarters only, and the highly skilled rapid removal of a whole, clean fleece); trimming, pressing and baling the fleeces; and keeping the shed tidy. This organisation of labour was the epitome of 'Taylorist' or 'Fordist' assembly line industrial production – John Martin (1990) provides a good account of industrial work practices on large farms in New Zealand in the nineteenth century.

With the invention of refrigeration technology in the late nineteenth century meat processed in 'freezing works' and butter and cheese made in 'dairy factories' were added to New Zealand's export commodities. The dairy products sounded the final death knell for the once-extensive lowland podocarp and mixed broadleaf forests, which grew in damper areas more suitable for conversion to dairying (Petersen, 1965). The wool went straight to the textile mills that were contributing to the pollution of northern British towns (and creating urban labour markets therein); the meat and dairy produce to the mouths of the growing urban population of Britain. Both economies grew – and slumped – and grew – and slumped throughout the nineteenth century – mutually dependent on an increasingly internationalised economic framework. The title of Simkin's (1951) history of the New Zealand economy says it all – *The Instability of a Dependent Economy*. Farmers (and their economic interests) dominated New Zealand politics in numbers and influence right
up until the 1960s, with labour politics being equally tied to the international economy (as we shall see in Chapter Three). Indeed, 'labour' itself was a product of the mode of industrialised development of New Zealand, being unknown to the Maori and not much favoured by them when they were first introduced to the concept. First sealers and whalers, then farm labourers, freezing workers, dairy workers and so on worked for low wages in conditions which were conducive to developing a politics of labour which contested the recently established 'fact' of economic life – the creation of markets in labour (Polanyi, 1980, 72-73).

The 'naturalness' of markets in land and labour (and capital), and their relative importance, is taken for granted by late twentieth century participants in the world economy. So much so that it comes as a shock to read contemporary accounts from the nineteenth century that show how the new system had to be explicitly promoted and defended, and its claims to dominance reinforced, by all manner of apologists and advocates. These included the shipping reporter of the *Lyttelton Times* in 1858. His report in the November 24 issue of the paper on the arrival of the barque Indiana, (which brought my assisted immigrant great-grandparents John and Jane Lee from Sunderland in north-east England to New Zealand), was telling. It included the words 'There are not a few also of that class, the first and second cabin passengers, who help to maintain the balance of capital against labour.'

With the imposition of markets in land and the application of marketised labour, and with the concomitant failure to recognise for purposes of necessary conservation and wise investment something that is readily recognised for the purposes of profiteering – namely that natural resources within a capitalist context constitute a form of capital
the natural environment in New Zealand suffered grievous blow after grievous blow. A descriptive audit of the carnage was undertaken by Andrew Hill Clark (1949) in the mid-twentieth century, and it was found to be extensive. Generation after generation of 'nature lovers' lamented it and attempted to redress it, via legislation, lobbying, and the purchase of reserves (Dalmer, 1983; Lochhead, 1994; Potts, 1882).

The preservation and planting of forests even became an issue capable of triggering a major reformation of New Zealand's political structures (Wynn, 1977). In the mid-twentieth century a new profession of soil and water conservators (Roche, 1994) was created. Their mandate was to try and turn around the frightening loss of soil and water resources that came in the wake of the deforestation, overgrazing and proliferation of pest plants and animals which was attendant upon the imposition of industrialised agriculture.

New Zealand, as a nation state, has never known anything other than a fully industrial, commercial, capitalist approach to land and other 'natural resources'. It has always been conscious that its 'standard of living' (which, as Greens were to argue, is not necessarily synonymous with its 'quality of life') is directly related to its successful supply of primary produce to the global economy. Devoid of the ameliorating legacies of previous economic and social systems that prevailed in Europe, or the capacity to be economically self-sufficient like the USA, New Zealand is a particularly clear example of the interplay between industrialised methods of production, the expansion of the world capitalist economy, and the destruction of the natural environment. The negative results of these interactions are
identical to those identified and excoriated by the American green farmer-philosopher Wendell Berry (1977) and are thus an unsurprising seedbed for the growth of Green politics.

For Nature?

But is this explanation of Green origins the only one, or the definitive one? In my exploration of the assumptions that conflate environmentalism with Green politics, I came across another major explanatory strand of thinking on the origins of the Green political impulse. In this perspective primary attention is paid to the psycho-social dimension in the history of humanity, to the functioning of structures of dominance and subordination, oppression and exploitation. In this telling of history, 'Culture' is opposed to 'Nature', and Nature is invariably the loser. Some accounts (see, for example, Griffin, 1980; Gray, 1981) make explicit connections between forms of human exploitation/oppression and the exploitation of Nature generally.

The 'Nature' perspective on Green politics has a much longer history and a far greater literature (both polemical and scholarly) than economic approaches. For every Alain Lipietz (1995) wooing a nervous left-wing friend with accounts of why the Greens have a better analysis of the world's economic, social and environmental ills and better proposals for addressing them than socialist parties, there are dozens of appeals to a love of and concern for Nature as a (self-evident) basis for Green political action.
The most erudite scholarship and bewitching literary style has certainly, and no
doubt fittingly, been brought to bear on the subject. From Thoreau’s *Walden* (1854)
to Annie Dillard’s (1974) *Pilgrim at Tinker Creek*, through Gary Snyder’s poetry
and essays (1970, 1974, 1992, 1995), not to mention accounts of specific areas such
as Barry Lopez (1986) on the Arctic, this is a literature where reading can give
almost as much pleasure as being there, and probably a lot more insight. Academic
approaches can even reach the same heights – between the pinnacles of Leo Marx
(1964) and Simon Schama (1995) there is a wealth of other almost as well-written
explanations and evocations of the landscape/culture connection, and what it means
to live in, with and by ‘Nature’.6

The low threnody that one hears running through and behind this literature rises to a
shrill pitch in the Nature polemists. Taking as their text Thoreau’s ‘In wildness is
the preservation of the world’, writer after writer (representative exemplars include
Burton, 1990; Grumbine, 1995; McKibben, 1990; Shepard, 1992; Sessions, 1995 –
most of the writers on this subject are male and North American or Australian)
bemoans the moral, material and spiritual calamity of the destruction of Nature in
general and Wilderness in particular. They also advocate the necessity of protecting
‘wild’ places and ‘wild’ creatures. A case has even been made (Hay and Haward,
1988) for the philosophy and practice of protecting wilderness as an historically
anterior and philosophically superior basis for Green politics.

The idea that the protection of wild Nature is both the major cause and the major
goal of Green politics is certainly plausible. Can we therefore stop reading here? Not
yet, for there is still another literature – one which examines the Nature literature
from a new critical perspective. Fortunately or unfortunately for the Nature writers, in the 1980s they received the attention of readers influenced by the deconstructionist approach of the intellectual trend of 'post-structuralism' or 'post-modernism'. In their rejection of the 'Grand Narratives' of modernity, these theorists included a rejection of the posited antithesis of 'innocent Nature' with 'corrupt Civilisation'. They set out to demonstrate that 'wilderness' is a construct of the very Western 'civilisation' which was primarily responsible for destroying or damaging the species and lands on which the geography and ecology of wilderness is physically based. (The debates and their protagonists are covered in a variety of ways in Dansereau (1975), Evernden (1992), McLaughlin (1993), Oelschlaeger (1991), Plumwood (1993), Simmons (1993), Soper (1995), Worster (1979) and Young (1985), to name but a few of the excellent works which uncover the specific historical links between 'Nature' thinking and practices.)

Nor was the 'naturist' position seen as more fundamental or coherent philosophically, or more likely to lead to Green (or even environmental) politics than an 'anti-naturist' one. 'Nature' and 'natural' have always been politically loaded terms, carrying a negative or positive change depending on who uses them. Jonathan Dollimore (1991, 3-18) documents the persistent efforts of the writer Gide to justify and promote the 'naturalness' of homosexuality as part of his survival strategy as a writer and an individual. This was certainly more successful than Oscar Wilde's intellectual and personal refusal to accept any normalisation or naturalisation of his behaviour. Robert Pois (1986) discusses the way in which the Nazis used the concept of 'natural' in order to justify a number of unpleasant activities. These included the extermination of 'inferior' humans and the promulgation of rigid sex roles which
kept 'superior' women breeding more 'superior' men to conquer more territory for the 'superior' race to expand. Simon Schama (1995, 67-70) documents the tender protection which Hermann Göring bestowed on the primeval Polish forest of Bialowieza, where in the midst of war every natural leaf and animal was to be preserved – and every Jew who lived there to be destroyed. It is not difficult to show that 'doing what comes naturally' is not as straightforward as it seems, and appeals to Nature are at least as often (probably more often) used to justify regimes of domination and scarcity as those of liberty and plenty. Paradoxically, as Neil Levy (1998) points out through a comparison of the positions of the 'naturist' philosopher Heidegger and the 'anti-naturist' Foucault, a just and democratic environmental politics may well be more safely built on an 'anti-naturist' foundation. This is the point Donna Haraway chooses to make in her 'Cyborg Manifesto' (Haraway, 1991, 149-182). She urges the 'grand narrative' politics of socialism and feminism (which she espouses) to loosen up a little and understand the positive political implications of embracing the 'non-natural' in the form of the part-animal/part-machine identity of the cyborg, who will be the 'normal' political actor of the twenty-first century. Moving from the philosophical to the practical, the desirability and possibilities of a technics of nature (specifically, sustainable forestry) based on a postmodernist re-conceptualisation of the scientific project are canvassed by Dean Walker (1996) in his study of New Zealand native beech forest management.

Finally, to complete the rout of Nature as a basis for politics, there has been a revolt of 'the natives'. The 'Noble Savages', whom the Romantic imagination fondly believed to dwell in rude simplicity and harmony in 'the Wilderness', began to fight back in academic fora. The march of Western 'civilisation' across the rest of the
globe had largely dispossessed their ancestors from whatever simulcrums of Arcadia they had managed to occupy and/or create. They were deprived of the opportunities to make a 'natural' living in 'the wilderness' by deforestation, other ecological damage, and the institutions of private property and markets in land. They were reduced to a precarious relationship with the labour market, and decimated by the ill health consequent on introduced diseases, poor diet, alcohol, and enforced overcrowding. To add further insult to injury they were even driven out of 'the wilderness' in order to make it more 'wild' (the fate of the Ahwahneechee Indians of Yosemite – see Schama, 1995, 186). Thus rendered into natural paupers, the only further thing the original inhabitants of the Americas and Australasia appeared to have to offer Western culture was a form of 'nature spirituality' which placed great emphasis on conservation of resources and reverence for other species. But alas, even that has been exploited – to the point of trickery – by the politicking over Nature being fought out within Western paradigms. (For the sadly disillusioning tale of the manufacture of Chief Seattle's much-reprinted inspirational statement of a right relationship with nature see 'The Gospel of Chief Seattle is a Hoax' by Hargrove (1989).

When 'the natives' do get to speak for themselves, a key point they are insistent upon is that what Westernised people called wilderness, they called home. ('Anyone who claims that land where Aboriginal people lived for thousands of years is 'wilderness' ignores that behind each rock, each gully, each cave, each river lies a story, a legend. From those legends Aboriginal people were guided in their movement. How can you get lost in your own home?') (Mansell, 1990, 104) (See also the example given by McLaughlin, (1993, 10), regarding the inability of a
The primary political interest of indigenous peoples ever since their expropriation by wilderness-loving and wilderness-destroying Westerners has been getting back the title to their erstwhile homes. This has been a long project, with many and various tactics employed. In 1887 in New Zealand the leadership of the Ngati Tuwharetoa tribe even managed to parlay the nascent Western passion for 'wilderness' into a way of protecting their ancestral mountains and securing tribal title to them. This was done by incorporating them into what became Tongariro National Park - the world’s fourth national park (Harris, 1974). Other indigenous peoples – and other Maori tribes - have not fared so well. Hence we have the 'nation within a nation' politics of indigenous peoples in Australasia and the Americas, as they struggle to right the severe environmental and other wrongs that have been and are being done to them (Johnston, 1994). A Green politics built upon the relationship of indigenous peoples to 'Nature' is therefore not one that romanticises that relationship in the past, but rather one that seeks to rebuild it on the basis of secure title in the future. In Australia this has been expressed in practice by unwavering support from the Australian Greens for the provision and extension of Native Title legislation; in New Zealand by Green Party support for the land restitution processes of the Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal.

Despite these reservations about wilderness discourse and practice, however, and the salutary corrections to colonialist assumptions from indigenous perspectives, plus all the debunking and deconstruction of simplistic notions of an a-historical, essential
'Nature', writers like Bill McKibben (1990) in *The end of nature* still seem to have a valid point. Radical changes have taken place in the natural environment in the past two centuries, and the pace of change appears to be accelerating. Some of those changes are now either irreversible, or so difficult to turn around it may take generations of human lifetimes to do so. This must surely have a deep impact on human consciousness, and hence on politics?

I investigated this possibility with a case study entitled 'Wildness in the West: has Nature become an Agent of History?' (Dann, 1996). I began by studying the major changes in the natural environment which have indeed taken place in the twentieth century. They include:

1. the burden of nuclear radiation from weapon explosions and nuclear accidents, which causes genetic mutation and other damaging effects long after the original event;

2. the destruction of natural habitat, the proliferation of environmental toxins, and the lack of proper protection which has led to an extinction rate for mammals, birds and flowering plants that is now more than 1000 times above the natural geological base rate – this means that as many as one third of the species of this planet will be extinct by the mid twenty-first century, and that vertebrate evolution may have already ended in North America;

3. the impact of the accelerating production and application of ever greater numbers of synthetic chemicals in agriculture and manufacturing, which is
known to be a major contributor to wildlife mortality and morbidity, and has recently been shown to affect humans in similar ways;

(4) the industrialisation of primary production, with first machinery, then chemicals, and finally biological technologies, such as genetic engineering, has in the words of Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson (1987, 153) 'eliminated land and nature'. Open air farms have been replaced by inhumane animal factories, with animals engineered to grow faster and give more of their 'products'. Genetic engineering is at the service of transnational corporations, whose primary concern is profitability and who are not much interested in downstream environmental effects (Coghlan, 1998);

(5) the destruction of the ozone layer, and climate change associated with global warming, which both have major impacts on nature on earth, as species struggle and sometimes fail to adapt to altered conditions, and humans substitute dubious 'cures' (sunscreen and insurance) for more-difficult-to-achieve preventative measures. We may also speculate on what impact an increase in the frequency and ferocity of hurricanes, to the scale of Hurricane Mitch, which devastated parts of Central America in 1998, will have on the global economy and on local politics.

From the evidence from all sides, then, there is no doubt that damage to the natural environment, both locally and globally, is so severe, and so widespread, that a Green politics based on redressing and preventing it, and it alone, makes perfect sense. Even if we have base 'anthropocentric' motives (such as having healthy children,
eating safe food, avoiding cancer, using ‘wilderness’ for recreation, and saving on insurance premiums), we can see how taking an ‘ecocentric’ approach to political programmes will help us achieve these goals, while providing positive spin-offs for other species as well.

But what is the motor force behind all the destruction? Simon Schama (1995) provides example after example of nature appreciation and protection or preservation going hand in hand with, and even being practised by, the very individuals and classes who were driving the economic expansionism and exploitation which was destroying the nature they purported to love. The American paper magnate Zenas Crane, for example, who in what Schama calls ‘the most remarkable case of unembarrassed cultural schizophrenia’ (Schama, 1995, 207) actually commissioned a superb painted elegy to the giant redwoods to grace his walls – trees which in the business context were just so much proto-pulp. First aristocrats, and then industrialists and merchants (and as we have seen, even Nazis) preserved the great forests of Europe, with ‘the poor’ cast in the villain role of ‘destroying the environment’ in their need to personally cut down trees and kill animals for fuel, housing, food and clothing.

The same arguments regarding the greater environmental destructiveness of the poor are tediously advanced today. They are generally presented in the benevolent guise of accelerating the ‘development’ of the Third World so that the people there will spend less time scratching a living directly from the land. They will then presumably pass their days like their Western counterparts, ‘sustainably’ in air-conditioned offices, perhaps trading in ‘futures’ in the commodities of world commerce such as
oil, minerals, grain, etc. Which could once again be produced (to the detriment of the local environment) in the erstwhile First World countries?

It is in exploring this ridiculous false contradiction between the supposedly wilful desire of the majority to make a living, at whatever cost to the environment, and the seemingly benevolent inclination of the few to get rich, in order to better appreciate Nature, that we reach the limits of finding the roots of Green politics in attitudes and practices towards Nature. Nature is not an independent variable; it is a highly dependent and contested battleground. Green parties can not derive their politics and policies from a 'Nature' which is in itself a politically charged concept, not an eternal verity.

I therefore concluded my investigation into Nature politics with the view that there was no getting away from human agency. Rather than projecting our good and bad sides on to 'Nature', and thence into politics, and seeking to derive explanations for political behaviours at a remove, it was more useful to focus on historically specific trends and events. In particular, it is important to examine the global expansion of capitalism, for better explanations as to why and how the environment is being damaged on an historically unprecedented scale and at an equally unprecedented rate, and how this is connected with social and political change. This required a proper theorisation of world political phenomena, to which I now turn.
Green politics, like its internationalist nineteenth century predecessors socialist politics and feminist politics, is a world historical phenomenon. It first manifested itself in party form in Australasia in 1972, but within twenty years it was observable right around the globe, with Green parties appearing in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. By the late 1990s, these Green parties were linked via the Internet, were holding regional and international congresses, and were undertaking joint regional and global initiatives on issues of mutual concern, such as nuclear testing and nuclear waste disposal.

The vast majority of previous accounts of Green party politics have concentrated on it as a national or at most as a regional phenomenon. The most extensive literature is on the Green parties of Western Europe. This includes works which focus on one country alone, especially Germany, but the other countries of Western Europe are also considered separately, or are compared with the German scene.¹

One work (Parkin, 1989) covers all of the then existing Green parties in the world, giving a brief description of the history, structure and achievements of each one, but it is now well out of date, and does not attempt an analysis of Green politics as a global phenomenon. Two works which use the German Greens as the main object of study (Markovits and Gorski, 1993; Spretnak and Capra, 1984) also contain attempts to assess the wider international significance of Green politics. However, they are both flawed by the author’s biases towards explaining certain features at the expense
of others. In Markovits and Gorski's case the over-emphasis is on the 'leftism' of the German Greens, while Spretnak and Capra claim a universality for the 'spiritual' dimension of Green politics, which they emphasise heavily. Neither work considers Die Grünen as an exemplar of the global political trends that have brought forth Green parties on all continents. Stephen Rainbow's thesis (1991) gives an account of Green politics in New Zealand (principally the Values Party) which is contrasted with Scandinavian Green party politics, but again Rainbow does not analyse Green politics as a global phenomenon, but concentrates on criticising its shortcomings, both theoretically and in specific nation-state contexts.

The study of Green party politics to date, therefore, has been largely confined within the conventional boundaries and concepts of the discipline of political science, where the nation-state is taken as the prime organising structure for politics, and parties are studied chiefly as actors within that structure. International comparisons are precisely that — inter-national — and give primacy to nation-state level structures. This state-centred approach to political analysis is now being contested by some political scientists (see for example, Magnusson, 1996), and it has always had limited utility to those wishing to analyse the other levels and dimensions of the exercise of power. While national and regional level accounts of Green party politics are both necessary and useful, even if they are all added together they fail to address the driving forces behind Green politics as a global phenomenon. They are a collection of trees that obscure one's view of the wood. They can not answer basic questions about Green politics as a global and historical phenomenon, including the questions which I began this study by asking.
A different theoretical approach to understanding global political phenomena is therefore required. There is already an existing and highly developed literature on world or global political activities which falls under the general rubric of 'International Relations'. As it deals principally with the interactions between nation-states and their governmental representatives and military forces, it is of little theoretical or practical use for examining Green politics as a global activity conducted largely by non-governmental actors. In the preface to her book *The Retreat of the State The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* Susan Strange (1996) discusses what the state-centred approach leaves out, and why the discipline of international relations is inadequate to the task of analysing and comprehending the multiplicity of forces at work in global politics today.

The study of non-governmental global political actors is just one important facet of world politics that is conducted outside the international relations theoretical framework, mainly by sociologists, geographers, historians and political economists. They have developed alternatives to the international relations approach, as it is summarised here by Barry Gills and Ronen Palan:

'Formerly, the dominant theories of state transformation took each state to be an ontologically distinct and organic entity. The preponderance of theoretical work during the post-war period was unilinear and evolutionary, privileging endogenous factors of change over exogenous or "external", "international" stimuli of transformation.' (Gills and Palan, 1994, 3)

Contrasting this with the structuralist approach represented by dependency theory (whose major theorist is André Gunder Frank), and world-systems theory (whose
major theorist is Immanuel Wallerstein), Gills and Palan claim that while the shift to understanding that there are global as well as national forces was welcome, there was a tendency to 'over-correct'. This occurred by focussing ‘...too intently on the governing processes on a world scale without always sufficiently problematizing the domestic level of response and transformation.’ (Gills and Palan, 1994, 3).

In describing a neostructuralist approach, Gills and Palan advocate putting the transformative processes themselves at the centre of analysis (Gills and Palan, 1994, 3), rather than merely the relations between the governments of states. Neostructuralism is an attempt to provide a more rigorous and useful theoretical base for the analysis of global politics. Like dependency theory and world-systems analysis, it is more of an approach than a definitive method. The key features that distinguish structuralist approaches from the international relations approach relate to the way in which the historical, economic and social dimensions of global activity are integrated with the formal political realm. Specifically, there is a different conceptualisation of political space and time, of political actors and agents, and of political economy, and there is a much greater emphasis on the politically transformative role of science and technology. The main differences are set out briefly below.

Political space and time

Political space (i.e. the boundaries of nation or other states, and of regional blocs) is considered within the framework of political time (i.e. the historical economic,
political and social factors which have led to these spatial political phenomena). Political spaces are essentially transitory and contestable, and should not be used as the base unit of analysis for understanding global processes. (For an outline of this conceptualisation of political time/space see Wallerstein, 1991)

Political actors and agents

If the geographically-based state is not the base unit of global political analysis, then it follows that such analysis is not confined to state-based actors and agents, and can and should include actors and organisations within what is quaintly but perhaps inadequately named ‘civil society’. Indeed, neostructuralist approaches are frequently more interested in the actions of these individuals and organisations as agents of global historical change, since they are arguably more significant than the majority of nation-state actors. Studies of such agents range from those of powerful transnational corporations, some of which are larger and wealthier than many nation states (see, for example, Barnet and Cavanagh, 1994; Korten, 1996), through to citizen-based environmental and anti-nuclear global movements (see, for example, Falk, 1982; McCormick, 1989; Wapner, 1996).

Political economy

Neostructuralist approaches to world politics are not necessarily (or even usually) economic determinist approaches, but they sometimes attract this criticism from the
international relations camp because of the greater emphasis given to the effects of changes in economic theory and practice on global politics. Political space and time, and political actors and agents, are certainly heavily influenced, even if not completely determined, by economic factors. It would be impossible to understand where many of the nation-states existing in the world today came from, for example, without reference to the phenomenon of European economic expansionism, and associated colonisation and de-colonisation. Nation-states were and are economic actors in their own right, and move politically to gain economic advantage. However, they are not the only economic/political actors on the global stage, and a neostructuralist approach seeks to encompass the political effects of all economic activities.

**Political sciences**

Weaving through the historical, economic and social strands in neostructuralist approaches to world politics is a strong consideration of the role of science and technology, harnessed to economic and political ends, in determining political outcomes. Again, the approach seeks to avoid determinism while still giving proper weight to the way in which new scientific technologies open up new global political possibilities, from nuclear holocaust through to cloning humans and animals to fulfil certain roles. Global politics in itself effectively began with modern transport and communications technologies, and every change in those technologies, from the steam train to Concorde, from the telegraph to the Internet, has had the effect of 'shrinking' the globe as a political space (Leyshon, 1995). Some theorists make
explicit links between the dominant technological mode and the dominant political mode – an example being Donna Haraway’s quasi-mathematical statement of proportion on the shift from nuclear to gene technology with its associated political shifts:
Manuel Castells (1997, 123) sees in the ambiguous and deep connection of science and technology with Green politics the opportunity to develop a true science of life rather than life under science.

Technology is certainly not politically neutral in the global context, and when considering the global role of Green politics, in particular, it must be given greater consideration than it would receive using an international relations approach.

Without committing itself to any particular (neo)structuralist approach, therefore, this study of Green politics in its global context definitely draws on the strengths of developing more sophisticated concepts of the matrix of influential global political factors, and of focussing on transformative processes rather than on discrete entities. It seeks to understand Green politics as a global political phenomenon that both acts and is acted upon by world historical social, economic and technological changes.
Subsidiary explanations

Although it is in my view necessary to go beyond current ways of theorising politics in order to understand the Green phenomenon, it is still necessary to look at what existing approaches have contributed to our knowledge of the subject, before attempting to extend that knowledge. The literatures on the industrialisation of primary production, on Nature and wilderness, on economic globalisation, on the rise and decline of social democracy, on new social movements and on contemporary Green parties do not exhaust all the possible sources of causation theories for Green politics. After deliberately leaving aside the possibly influential role of the new communications technologies, and the changes that are occurring in the concept and function of the nation state in a globalised world, there are at least two other major avenues that have to be explored for possible explanatory value.

The first of these is the thesis first promoted by Ronald Inglehart (1977), that voting publics in Western democracies were showing signs of a 'value shift', from 'materialist' to post-materialist' reasons for voting. Considerable further work has been done on Inglehart's hypothesis, both to extend and follow up on his particular surveys. Such studies include Dunlap and Van Liere (1978); Flanagan and Inglehart (1987); Inglehart (1981, 1990); Knutsen (1990); Kreuzer (1990) Milbrath (1984) and Van Liere and Dunlap (1980). Further investigations and analysis of election results in specific countries within a 'post-materialist' framework has also been done. Australasian examples of such work include Bean et al (1990); Vowles (1991, 1993)
and Vowles and Aimer (1993). Does this point us to the true origins of Green politics?

Fortunately an extensive investigation of the connection between 'post-materialism' as an electoral hypothesis and the actual theories and practices of Green politics has already been done. Tim Tenbensel (1994, 1995) has explored the content and boundaries of the 'value change' approach and concluded that it is of limited explanatory and predictive value in understanding Green politics as a global (or even a national) political phenomenon. He found it impossible to pin down a set of consistently related 'values' and policy orientations even for *bona fide* Greens, let alone for a wider voting public. He further noted that while it may be highly significant to show that Green voters and supporters tend to come from the 'new' middle classes, this is not because all or even most members of these classes exhibit 'post-materialist' or 'Green' values. In fact an equally significant grouping of them are supporters of economic rationalist policies, and other 'values' which are antithetical to 'Green' values. In brief, he concluded that this approach was a dead end when it comes to understanding where Green politics is coming from, let alone where it is going. Nevertheless, it continues to be used by political scientists interested in voting behaviour, and in the course of the surveys they conduct there are occasional valuable snippets of information about Green politics. (Any such information relevant to this study can be found in Chapters Five and Six.)

If the quantitative survey approach to uncovering the origins of Green politics is unhelpful, is the qualitative assessment of ideas more useful? While many people have advanced 'Green' theories about how the world works, and how it needs to
change, most of them have been at the level of polemic and pop philosophy - engaging and even inspirational though some of them may be. Good examples of the genre include Bahro (1984); Brown (1990); Capra (1985); Kelly (1984); Porritt and Winner (1988) and Tokar (1987).

A few theorists have gone more deeply into 'ecopolitics', and Robyn Eckersley (1992) has made a critical examination of their contribution to environmentalism as a political theory. She assesses the work of political/environmental theorists coming from a leftist position, such as André Gorz, Jürgen Habermas, Murray Bookchin and Herbert Marcuse, and compares it with the work of theorists claiming to be 'ecocentric' rather than 'anthropocentric' in their approach, such as Warwick Fox and various ecofeminists, and finds the leftists lacking from an ecocentric perspective. However the ecocentrics are vulnerable to the criticism that they neglect or fudge equally important Green political principles, and especially the principle of democratic decision-making – a criticism elaborated by Albert Weale (1993) in his review of Eckersley.

The subject of the connection between democracy and other Green political ideals is such a critical one that Green theorists are now developing critiques and new formulations on the matter. Examples can be found in the volume edited by Brian Doherty and Marius de Geus (1996), to which Eckersley contributes a chapter on Greening liberal democracy. The debate around this issue as conducted by its activist protagonists is further canvassed in Chapter Four – it is sufficiently divisive and unresolved to show that Green politics is not simply based on being more rather than less ecocentric in orientation. Nor, indeed, on any one particular philosophical or
theoretical underpinning, as the diversity of approaches taken in the volume

*Ecopolitical theory: essays from Australia* (Hay and Eckersley, 1992) underscores. This is developed further by Andrew McLaughlin (1993) in his discussion of anthropocentrism and deep ecology. Work on and by green theorists is helpful for assessing which strands of green thinking do (or do not) contribute to Green party programmes. But there is no way in which Green politics as it was and is actually practised can be 'read off' from any particular theorist or group of theorists.

The deep roots of Green politics

If global Green party politics is not a direct result of the pollution and degradation of the physical environment, the destruction of 'Nature', a shift in voter preferences, or an over-arching political theory – how much deeper do we have to dig to find the true roots? I now had four absolutely basic questions to address:

1. What was causing the global environmental and social degradation and destruction that Greens were reacting to in their distinctive fashion, and when did it start operating?

2. Why were no other party political tendencies coming up with a 'Green' response?
(3) Who (which individuals and groups) actually created Green politics, and who were their direct political antecedents?

(4) What were the connections between the locally specific creation of the first Green parties and the global factors that give rise to Green politics?

As I had discovered via the case studies and literature reviews outlined above, there was no literature that directly addressed these questions, let alone answered them in ways that I thought were satisfactory. With the honourable exception of Alain Lipietz (1988, 1992, 1995), and the India-based analysis of Bandyopadhyay and Shiva (1989), very little writing on Green politics, by Greens or others, pays much attention to the global economic framework within which nation-state and international politics has been conducted in the late twentieth century. Indeed, the overwhelming impression one gains from an overview of the literature on Green politics, as it has been developed by both Greens and academics, is of an endless debate around ecology and ethics, with remarkably little attention paid to the power of economic forces to direct and shape that debate. This is not to say that Greens are not interested in or do not write about economics, because there is a considerable literature in which Greens and their sympathisers construct critiques of neo-classical and ‘free’ market economics and posit alternatives. (Examples include Eckersley, 1994; Ekins and Max-Neef, 1992; Henderson, 1988; Kemball-Cook et al, 1991; Lutz and Lux, 1988; Rosewarne, 1994; Seabrook, 1990). Greens have also developed new forms of micro-economics (Douthwaite, 1996; Meeker-Lowry, 1988; Partridge, 1987). They have also attempted to develop economic and commercial theories and practices based on the physical realities of energy and ecosystems (Costanza, 1991;
Daly, 1977, 1980; Ekins, 1986; Group of Green Economists, 1992; Hawken, 1994; Jacobs, 1991; Peet, 1992; Perrings, 1987). But there is a gap when it comes to putting politics and economics together, so that much of the writing comes across as hopelessly idealistic, with optimum political scenarios developed without reference to the (existing and potential) economic constraints on achieving them. Conversely, exciting economic alternatives are proposed within a political vacuum. While in this work I am not attempting to write a full-blown political economy of the Green phenomenon, I do make a start on rectifying the huge lacuna in the literature by focussing on both the economic and political dimensions in tandem, and on the play of power between them.

The second area of omission that I address is the remarkable change in left politics that took place in the 1980s, especially with regard to parliamentary leftism. There is one comparative study (Castles et al, 1997) of the changes that took place under the Australian and New Zealand labour party governments of the 1980s, and one international study (Piven, 1992) that looks at the decline in social democrat/labour parties as an artefact of 'post-industrialism'. However, there are no studies that look at what was happening to social democrat/labour politics on a world scale as a result of globalisation. As I shall document, the changes that took place in the global economy were both part of and more than changes in the industrial mode of production which provided a basis for mass labour politics (Hobsbawm, 1989). The political changes involved governing parties in the First World democracies, no matter what their ostensible label and orientation, actively imposing 'structural reform' on their nation-state economies and societies. While all governing parties were prepared to implement these reforms, it is of more interest that social
democrat/labour parties were and are prepared to do so. This was in direct
congradiction to their previous political strategy of building up and controlling the
economy of the nation-state in order to meet the needs of their working class
constituency. I could find no analytical studies of why and how this change occurred,
yet it seemed to me to be a vital part of the explanation of why and how Green
politics came to find a place on the parliamentary political spectrum. Therefore this
was another major omission that had to be addressed.

With regard to who created Green politics, and who their political ancestors were,
there is a lot more published research available, especially on the New Left and the
new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. The books and other material
consulted for this work include Anderson (1995), Astin et al (1975), Borkin and
Rosenstone (1972), Breines (1989), Campbell (1991), Considine (1992), Frankel
and Stewart (1989), Lyman (1995), Offe (1985), Pakulski (1990), Piven and
Cloward (1977), Scott (1990), Teodori (1970), Touraine (1981) and Whalen and
Flacks (1989). However, none of these studies start from the personnel and platforms
of particular, historically and geographically specific Green parties, and works
backwards to uncover the connections. Carl Boggs (1986a) George Katsiaficas
(1987), however, go further than most in developing where the linkages lie, and I
make extensive use of their work in Chapter Four. The 'New Left to Greens
connection' is therefore another gap in the historical record that I close in this work,
with the first two Green parties providing good sources of genealogical information.
Finally, one uncovers many, many passing references to Green politics being *global*, and hence one concludes that this must be an important feature of Green politics—but to date there has been no analysis of what this really means. This is probably due to the lack of attention paid to the motor of globalisation—economic forces. However, it also encompasses the lack of attention paid to the whys and wherefores of Green politics being embedded in certain key artefacts of globalisation, such as the global electronic media and the Internet. This is the fourth under-researched and under-analysed element of Green politics that I start to examine in this work, although I am unable to study it exhaustively.

My approach to these elements, the concerns I try to address, and the way I structure this work accordingly, are outlined below.

**Globalisation**

It is necessary to take a much closer look at the *world economic system*, with a view to discovering the ways in which first the internationalisation of economic activity, and latterly the transnationalisation (or globalisation) of such activity has created unprecedented environmental and social effects. These effects are of concern to Greens, and are contested by them.

Therefore in Chapter Two I examine the phenomenon of economic globalisation and its impacts on politics. Some of these are brutally direct, such as the destabilisation of the national control of economies, and hence the partial disenfranchisement and
increasing redundancy of citizens (at best) and armed conflict over resources (at worst). Some are less direct, but arguably no less brutal, such as the unprecedented effects which globalising economic activity has had on the natural environment.

These include climate change, ozone depletion, global deforestation and accelerating species extinction. On human society the impacts include the widening gap between rich and poor (observable at both the national and the global level) and the severe increase in financial indebtedness at the personal and the national level. Of major economic and geographical, as well as social impact, are the extensive translocations of economic migrants and refugees from state to state and continent to continent and the consequent social impacts on the 'host' countries and 'guest' workers alike. For the first time in history the entire world has come to be dominated by one economic system, with massive and comparable social, political and environmental outcomes which cross nation-state boundaries. As a result, the physical environment and its 'resources' have become a prime site of global political contestation. It is not possible to understand the political parties which embody a response to the new politics of the environment and society without understanding the underlying forces of economic globalisation which brought the new environmental and social problems into being.

In Chapter Two I give a brief summary of those forces, including their historical development and their geographical reach. I also examine the seeming paradox that Green parties first appeared *before* the worst negative effects of globalisation became apparent. In fact they and their New Left and new social movement precursors appeared at a time when the world economy was booming, and young people, in the First World at least, had 'never had it so good'. And yet in the midst of
this time of economic ‘progress’ and general prosperity there was a world wide
‘revolution’ (the protests, strikes and riots of 1968, which occurred right around the
world), which was based on the seeds of the Green critique. Why and how this was
so is also given further consideration in Chapter Four.

The decline of social democracy

A thorough examination of what happened to the parliamentary party politics that
arose from and contested some of the harsher features of the first phase of creating
an international economy is also necessary. This politics was known generically as
‘social democracy’, and parties within this tendency called themselves social
democrat or labour parties. These parties were strongly nationalist in their approach
to economic management, and the goal of their economic policies was to improve
the standard of living of the majority of the citizens in the nation-states of which they
were sometimes the government.

I use the past tense in describing these parties, as although parties with these names
still exist, and indeed are currently in government in some states, they no longer
espouse or practise nationalist economics as a means of improving the lot of citizens.
Instead they put their faith in greater participation in the global economy as the route
to general national prosperity. This makes their economic policies almost
indistinguishable from those of the ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ political parties with
whom they share parliamentary power.
This obviously has significant implications for parties which do take a different approach to globalisation, and in Chapter Three I take up the task of contextualising the internationalist and globalist political party scene, within which Green parties locate themselves. Curiously, there are no substantial nationally-based accounts of how Green parties relate to their closest rival and closest ally in the party political spectrum, the social democrat/labour parties, let alone any consideration of social democracy as an internationalist phenomenon, and its relation to Green politics. This is despite the fact that West European Green parties have shown an overwhelming preference for forming coalitions with social democrat and other 'left' parties, rather than with conservative and other 'right' parties. (I use quote marks for the terms 'left' and 'right', as their meaning is not as clear cut as it once was. This is explored in Chapter Three with reference to what happened to social democrat/labour parties, and in Chapter Seven with regard to the first two Green parties.)

As well as the evidence from actual coalition formation in Europe there is supporting evidence from voter and party member studies in Australia and New Zealand (Bean et al, 1990; Dann, 1995b; Mackwell, 1977; Miller, 1991; Vowles and Aimer, 1993). This shows quite clearly that Green voters have generally been more likely to give their second preference to Labour than any other party (in Australia), or to vote Labour in the absence of any (or any viable) Green candidate (in New Zealand). Within global party politics, therefore, Green parties and their members are associated more closely with 'left' parties.
In Chapter Three I therefore provide a brief comparative history of the rise and decline of social democrat/labour politics, from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century, and show how a politics founded on (inter)nationalism comes to founder on globalism. It is in their rejection of their formerly successful nationalist methods of achieving socialist economic goals, and their failure to adapt globalist means to socialist ends, that social democrat/labour parties have ceased to be parties of the left in all but a rump of sentiment. In so doing they have created a space in the political spectrum for a Green critique of and opposition to capitalist globalisation. Understanding why and how this came about is important to understanding the political legacy bequeathed to The Greens from the Left, and what room it gives or takes for their political manoeuvring.

**New social movements and new politics**

Political parties are social institutions. While this may appear to be such a self-evident statement that it is not worth making, in fact in my study of Green politics I have been surprised at how feeble a grasp some commentators appear to have of this basic fact. While Green politics has its fair share of charismatic individuals and daring theorists, these do not, of themselves, a political party make. A successful party politics depends upon literally thousands of unnamed, unsung, 'ordinary' individuals co-operating to play out prescribed social roles within the party framework, (such as candidate, spokesperson, chairperson, secretary, organiser, publicist, campaign manager, fundraiser, etc.). So many people making such a commitment to what is usually unpaid work do not suddenly spring from nowhere.
By the time a politics takes party form it has been through considerable trials and refinements in other social groups.

There has been little attention paid to exactly which social groups gave rise to the Greens, and in what order, and what this means in terms of the political theories and practices adopted by Green parties. Therefore I undertake a detailed examination of the principal political ancestors of Green politics outside the parliamentary arena – the New Left and the new social movements, which fed directly and rapidly into Green parties, but only slowly and incompletely into other parties. Chapter Four consists of an historical investigation into the global development of each of the major new social/political movements that have influenced Green politics. Special attention is paid to the global environmental movement, although this was actually the last of the major new social movements to develop historically, and has contributed the least to the political structure and processes of Green parties, although it has made a major contribution to their political content.

*Green parties*

The influence of the new social movements in the formation of the first two Green parties is clearly discernible in Tasmania and New Zealand. In inspiration, rhetoric and practice these parties both were, and were conscious of being, part of a *movement* that was global in its range and impact.
Therefore in shifting the focus of the work from the global and general to the local and specific in Chapter Five I pay particular attention to the ways in which global economic, political and social trends were highly significant within the local context of the 'settler colonies' of Australia and New Zealand. The labour parties in New Zealand and Tasmania were resistant to the 'new politics' and they supported the industrialisation of the local economy and the pursuit of consumer-led economic growth as keenly as parties to the right. New social movements of all kinds were highly active at this time in Australasia, and provided a seedbed of ideas and personnel for the new Green parties, which were open from the beginning to influencing and being influenced by global trends and changes.

Chapter Six covers the small amount that is known about the group characteristics of the first Green party members that has a bearing on their ability to create a globally-oriented form of politics. Chapter Seven focuses on what differentiates Green parties from both the social movements that fed in to them, and from other 'left' or 'progressive' political parties, within the global framework. Following on from the history of 'new politics' ideas and practice given in Chapter Four, it looks specifically at what differentiates Green party policies from all other party policies, including policies on the environment. This is Green economics, and Chapter Seven discusses the way in which the Values Party developed the world's first recognisably Green economic policies. Since what happened to the definition of Left and Right is one of the key questions of global political theory at present, and since the Greens are deeply implicated in the process of re-definition, it also covers the debates that the first Greens themselves had on the subject.
The future will be Green – or not at all?

One of the major criticisms levelled at Green politics – with some justification – is that it lurches between gloom-mongering and doom-saying to idealist Utopianism. Greens can be likened to the White Queen in *Through the Looking Glass*, reminding Alice that ‘The rule is, jam tomorrow and jam yesterday – but never jam today.’ (Carroll, 1910, 94). All too often Green tracts read as whinging about how bad society and the environment are today – tiresome even though it may be true. They then make a sudden leap into a glorious future where the lion of industrialism will lie down with the lamb of nature, and all will be well within and between the peaceable federations of independent and co-operative bio-regional communities.

While it is easy to satirise Green visions and methods, the persistence of Green politics for over a quarter of a century shows that the Greens, at least, take themselves and their cause seriously. They also intend to continue to play a part in trying to influence national and international thinking and practice in a Green direction. My subsidiary purpose in investigating the global origins of Green politics, once a fuller and more accurate account had been established, was to see what this account might have to suggest to us about where Green politics might be going. To know where one is going, it helps to know where one has been, and what baggage one is carrying along the way. Of course not only Green parties are moving on the world stage, and so in considering where Green politics is going it is necessary to look at what is happening in the global economy, and within party politics and social movements as well.
Therefore I conclude with a chapter which considers both the internal and external challenges facing Green parties in the twenty-first century, and the likelihood that they will be able to rise to meet them, given both their past history, and the circumstances in which they find themselves.
Notes

1. The full poem reads

Auf Erdballs letztem Inselriff
Begreif' ich, was ich nie begriff.
Ich sehe und ich überseh'

Des Lebens wechselvolle See.
Ob mich auch Frohsinn lange mied,
Einschläft das Weh, das Leid wird Lied.
Bin ich noch ich? Ich trau bald

Dem Spiegel, alles wird mir Traum.
Traumlächeln lindert meinen Gram,
Traumträume von der Wimper kam.

Traumspeise wird mir aufgetischt,
Traumwandernden Traum-Grün erfrischt,

Hab auf Traumhellen einzig Acht.
So ward der Tag ganz Traumesnacht,
Und wer mir Liebeszeichen gibt,

Der fühle sich, wisse sich traumgeliebt!

The poem and a brief account of Wolfskehl’s New Zealand exile (in German) can be found in John Asher (1956) Des Erdballs letztes Inselriff, Deutsche erleben Neuseeland. München: Max Hueber.


3. The formation of Die Grünen was recorded in the Values Party’s monthly newspaper, Vibes (then in its fifth year of publication) early in 1980. John Horrocks wrote:

The German “Greens” have now formed a nation-wide political party. Over 1000 delegates met at Karlsruhe in January to formally establish the Green Party…As in Values, the members of the new movement are drawn from very diverse backgrounds and include dissatisfied liberals, communists, opponents of nuclear power and other environmentalists. A commentator in the Badische Zeitung saw this diversity as a potential source of strength and suggested that the Greens could become a gathering point for the “undogmatic Left” as well as offering an acceptable alternative to the middle class voter who is dissatisfied with traditional parties.

The experience of Values is that this type of grouping is difficult to sustain. The Greens seem, however, to have emerged as the overseas party nearest in character to Values and, if successful, could be a useful model. Most other parties with an ecological bent, such as Britain’s Ecology Party…and Australia’s New Democrats lack the left-wing thrust of the Greens…their openness to the Left gives a promise that the Greens may become more than just a coalition of protest groups. (Horrocks, 1980, 2).


5. Most poignant of all, even the ‘progressive’ politicians of nineteenth century New Zealand were deeply implicated in the destruction of indigenous ecosystems and their replacement by
ersatz European replicas. For example William Pember Reeves, a Liberal politician, friend of labour, and a feminist, sentimentalised and romanticised the replacement 'old New Zealand' with 'little England' in verses like 'A Colonist in his Garden' (1895) and 'The Passing of the Forest' (1898) (Temple, 1998, 97, 84).


8. Wallerstein (1991) builds on the classifications of historical time first postulated by French historian Fernand Braudel, to develop the ideas of 'phasic' time and 'ideological' space. L'histoire conjunctuelle or 'middle term' history is the history of cycles or phases within 'structural' time. Wallerstein has written a history of the development of world capitalism from its origins in the sixteenth century to the twentieth century, (Wallerstein, 1974, 1980) and identified the 'conjunctural' shifts that have taken place within this longue durée. One of these is undoubtedly the shift that occurred in the 1970s, which is discussed within the overall context of the history of the twentieth century by Hobsbawm (1994).
Chapter Two

The global shift

'Think globally Act locally' is a slogan that appears on Green party and other green literature right around the world. Is it just a cunning piece of advertising puffery, or does it capture something essential about the Green approach to politics? In this chapter I provide a brief history of globalisation, examining the economic, social and technological dimensions of the phenomenon, and how they interact both with each other and with the sphere of formal politics to generate new political possibilities and actualities. I pay particular attention to the negative impacts on the natural environment and on society which have resulted from the successful pursuit of an agenda of global economic expansion. I also consider the interplay between the technologies of globalisation and economics and politics in general; and I provide a New Zealand case study of globalist politics in action. Finally I look at the first signs that globalisation was creating a new antisystemic politics, and I conclude that the association between thinking globally and going Green is not at all coincidental, and requires further historical investigation, which I undertake in succeeding chapters.
Global action, Green reaction – the case of the MAI

Green politics appears at the point in world history when the world economy makes a conjunctural shift, from internationalisation to globalisation. New international economic institutions and entities (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, transnational corporations) and new transport and communications technologies were developed immediately post World War Two. By the 1960s they were having major impacts on everyday life around the globe, especially in the ‘developed’ nation states. The relentless expansion in national and global level economic activity was also – for the first time in world history – having global environmental impacts.

The trend towards economic globalisation accelerated in the 1970s, until by the 1990s it had been recognised as a new phase in world history, and was being closely studied. A little attention had also been paid to the political dimension of globalisation, with consideration given to whether and how the prime locus of antisystemic political activity could or should shift from the national to the global (Camilleri and Falk, 1992) or from the national to the local (Magnusson, 1996).

By April 1998 the OECD proposal for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) among its member states was effectively (if temporarily) stymied after concerted global lobbying by non-government organisations (NGOs), whose efforts were facilitated by extensive use of the Internet. At this point the new economics, politics and technologies of globalisation appeared to have merged. Writing under
headlines such as 'Network Guerillas' and 'How the Internet killed the MAI',
journalists reported senior OECD negotiators making comments like "This is the
first successful Internet campaign by non-governmental organisations...It's been very
effective." (Drohan, 1998), and "This episode is a turning point...It means we have
to rethink our approach to international economic and trade relations." (de
Jonquieres, 1998)

Green parties were part of the global 'coalition' of anti-MAI activists, with a Green
member moving the anti-MAI motion which was supported by an overwhelming
majority of the European Parliament, and this particular campaign encapsulates the
changes that have taken place since Green parties were first formed in the 1970s.
These changes include problematising previous ways of conceptualising politics
conducted on a world scale. Economic globalisation has definitively altered political
spaces, perhaps most dramatically by adding cyberspace to geographical space as a
realm of political action. The creation of cyberspace is in itself frequently considered
to represent a form of annihilation of geographical space. This is of course not total,
and it would be unwise to neglect the role of geographical realities in geo-politics.
Especially not at a time when much of the content of geo-politics being contested in
cyberspace is now based around unprecedented transformations to geographical
realities, such as rainforest destruction and fisheries depletion. However, the relative
by-passing of physical time and space which is possible via the Internet must now be
factored into a consideration of the nature and purpose of international politics, along
with the different consciousness which globalisation impresses upon political actors.
In this chapter I look first at the visible and palpable impacts that globalisation has had on the physical environment, and on daily reality for those living in the countries which brought forth the first Green parties. I then go on to consider how the changing structures and processes of the world economy are reforming and reformulating everything we once took for granted about politics – and even about life itself – and how this is fundamental to creating Green politics.

The experience of globalisation

The experience of globalisation at the level of the (First World) individual was apparent during the global stock market crash of 1987. Panic spread from Wall Street to Wellington and back around the world. Ten years and a few days later it all seemed to be happening again, this time with the run starting on the Hong Kong market. Thanks to globalised media a New Zealander could get the latest results when the New Zealand market opened, hear how Wall Street did 'overnight', then wait a couple of hours for the Australian markets to open – and so on round the world. The sense of being a chemical (or a catalyst) in a global chain reaction was total, and this is a major part of what makes globalisation different from internationalisation. While people living on the geographical edges of the globe in the nineteenth century were undoubtedly part of the international economy and polity, prior to the advent of electronic communications and rapid air travel their
sense of participation was at best partial, and definitely 'international' rather than 'global'.

Speaking of this qualitative shift, Malcolm Waters states that 'Globalization involves a phenomenology of contraction...Because space tends to be measured in time, to the extent that the time between geographical points shortens so space appears to shrink. Insofar as the connection between physically distant points is instantaneous, space 'disappears' altogether. A more recent phenomenon is that localizations of time disappear – if, for example, a Korean house-spouse can watch with an American FA-18 pilot as she bombs a chemical factory in a Middle East war, their time frames become synchronized. Globalization implies the phenomenological elimination of space and the generalization of time.' (Waters, 1995, 62-83)

Andrew Leyshon also uses the example of the Gulf War of 1991 to demonstrate the contemporary experiential nature of globalisation as brought to us by the electronic media, thus:

'The instantaneous nature of the coverage meant that this was a war conducted simultaneously in three time zones. It was conducted in the 'real' war time of the Middle East, but it was also fought with more than an eye to the time in Europe and the United States, with the result that military briefings were scheduled to coincide with the deadlines of European and North American media...It is also worth noting that the initial attack by US and UK military planes on Baghdad took place in the early hours of the morning local time – and that this was 18:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, the beginning of the peak viewing period on US television.' (Leyshon, 1995, 15)
In the 1990s people were not only living in a globalised world, they were also able to know that they were part of the 'global village'. They were able to know this not just because it was on their TV screens, but also because it had become part of everyday experience. In their interactions with the natural environment and with their fellow human beings they were experiencing the impacts of decisions and processes which originated somewhere else on the planet, and had been spread or applied right across the globe.

These impacts come right down to the level of daily diet, with chicken pieces processed in Malaysia becoming generic transnational chain hamburger components in New Zealand. Similarly, 'Australian' brand-name frozen confections are manufactured in Portugal and shipped to Australia for sale, with the brand-name royalties accruing on the Australian sales being remitted straight to Nestlé’s transnational headquarters in Switzerland (Burch, 1997; Pritchard, 1997).

The impacts are also to be found in the air, water and atmosphere surrounding people, in the soils they live on, in the urban, rural and 'wild' landscapes they cherish, and in the other species they share the planet with. Environmental problems stemming from economic activities are no longer restricted to slag heaps in the Midlands, smog in the Rhineland, or deforestation in the French Alps. The concurrent globalisation of both economic activity and degradation of the environment needs to be analysed more closely, and I outline the main issues below.
World War Two was the first truly global war, moving in time and space across the globe and affecting non-combatant as well as combatant states. Internationalist political movements had observed the trends in conventional rearmament in the 1930s and there were local and international interventions of various kinds to try and prevent rearmament and oppose fascism. Some 45,000 male and female volunteers from 53 different countries (Cockburn, 1995, 73) went to support the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War. In retrospect, the novelty of foreign combatants in a national conflict being volunteers defending international principles, rather than professional mercenaries, gains greater salience as a sign of the way the world was heading. National and international pacifist organisations also flourished at this time, with strong links with the labour and women’s movements.

The globalisation in time and space that this represented was brought home to me in July 1982 when I attended a rally against nuclear warship visits in Melbourne. A retired unionist reminded the crowd that in the 1930s wharfies refusing to handle war matériel (iron destined for Japan, which had just invaded China) were punished by the state. The progressive section of the Australian labour movement did not wish to be party to furthering Japanese imperialism. Crushed by ‘Pig Iron Bob’ (Prime Minister Robert Menzies) in this instance, within a few years the wharfies were loading supplies on to troop ships taking soldiers and sailors into the Pacific to fight Japan, or further on to North Africa and Europe.
Japan's intentions in that war were audaciously global, and are exemplified by its pioneering of the use of long range aircraft to strike at targets thousands of kilometres away from Japan – a 'globalising' feature not available in previous conflicts. Yet the archetypal symbol of the shift from internationalisation to globalisation that occurred post World War II was the global weapon that ended that war – the atomic bomb.

Atomic weapons and their delivery systems epitomise the time-space compression that Harvey (1989) identifies as a key characteristic of globalisation. Before aircraft could be used to 'shrink' the world for positive civilian purposes (the boom in civilian use of aircraft did not begin until the late 1950s), they were used to demonstrate the extreme vulnerability of civilians in a global conflict. For the first time civilians could be attacked with relative ease and impunity by missiles and plane-delivered bombs – and they were. Great capitals like London and Berlin and obscure and isolated towns like Darwin were equally vulnerable. This was bad enough with conventional bombs – but the atom bomb achieved much more.

Not only could far fewer bombs cause a much greater degree of devastation in space – the A bomb could also continue to kill in time, as nuclear radiation took its toll on individuals not born or even conceived when their parents were exposed to nuclear fallout. Radioactive molecules decompose at differing rates, with some taking thousands of years to lose their destructive power. During that time they can move not only directly into human tissue in the immediate vicinity, but also, borne by the wind and water currents that circle the globe, into global food chains. This was brought home forcibly to Britons in 1986 when the explosion in the Chernobyl
reactor thousands of kilometres away in the Soviet Union sent fallout as far as
Britain, contaminating food growing in and grazing on the ground for months and
months.

Nuclear radiation (whether released by weapons or by ‘peaceful’ accidents) is
therefore a global threat on a scale that has never been experienced before. The
systems set up to produce, process and deliver radioactive material are also global.
Uranium mined in Australia, for example, may cross the world to France for use in
nuclear power plants. As Australia has no control over the material once it reaches
France, however, there are no guarantees that none of it ever found its way back to
the Pacific in French bombs that were tested at Moruroa. By the 1990s nuclear waste
from Europe was regularly passing through the Pacific on its way to be reprocessed
in Japan, while both Japan and the USA were looking for nuclear waste storage
facilities in the Pacific. Raw and spent nuclear material thus circles the globe —
provoking an outcry from Green parties, Greenpeace and other global political
formations.

The delivery systems for nuclear weapons are also organised on a global basis. One
of the first jargon terms a novice studying this field must learn is ICBM, standing for
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile. Although they were the ancestors of ICBMs, the
V1 and V2 rockets of World War II now seem closer to medieval cannon balls than
to missiles that can cross the Pacific Ocean. Not only is the range of these missiles
global, but their firing pads are also conceptualised and implemented globally, with
nuclear capable ships and submarines cruising the globe and able to launch an attack
literally from ‘nowhere’.
Nuclearisation is thus truly global – and it brought forth a global anti-nuclear movement. Jim Falk (1982, 90-109) documents the beginnings of anti-nuclear power and weapons organisations independently of each other in Japan, the USA, Britain and West Germany in the 1950s. In 1959 a European Federation Against Nuclear Arms was set up, and by the 1960s it was linking not only European anti-nuclear groups but also bringing in activists from the Americas and Australasia to report on anti-nuclear activities in other parts of the globe. The anti-nuclear movement inevitably linked up with, drew from and fed into the other new social movements of the Sixties. It thus provided a highly significant and influential global perspective on oppositional politics that was to reverberate throughout the movement and on into the Green parties which came out of the Sixties ferment.

Another source of 'global' thinking derived from an environmental problem was the issue of acid rain that surfaced in the 1970s. While acid rain is more of a regional than a global problem, it is a prime example of the irrelevancy of state boundaries to preventing the spread of molecular-level industrial pollution, which can be dispersed by wind and/or water over large areas. Such pollution not only goes sideways across the globe, it also goes upwards into the atmosphere. In the 1980s the widening hole in the ozone layer over the Antarctic, and the thinning of the ozone layer generally, was added to the list of global environmental threats. New Zealand children produce none and consume very little of the chemicals that thin the ozone layer. Yet they still must learn a new personal hygiene regime of 'slip, slap and slop', drummed into them by schools, health authorities and the mass media, to get them to wear shirts, hats and sun creme when outdoors in summer. This is to try and ward off rising rates
of sun-induced cancer (Henzell, 1999). A paradox of globalisation is that its effects can be highly localised, and even personalised, as this example shows.

Hard on the heels of ozone depletion and international efforts to contain it via the Montreal Protocol, signed in 1987, came a growing awareness of the global impact of 'greenhouse' gas emissions (especially carbon dioxide) which was referred to first as 'global warming', and then, more accurately, as 'climate change'. This has proved a much harder problem to resolve in international fora, as round after round of climate change summits since Rio in 1992 have failed to get consent to and/or implementation of realistic CO2 emission reduction targets. Unlike ozone depletion, which can be addressed by a simple phasing out and substitution of specific chemicals, making major reductions in carbon emissions strikes right at the motor of economic globalisation.

The dramatic expansion of production and especially of world trade post World War II has been based on a concomitant increase in the use of fossil fuels, the prime source of carbon emissions. The model of 'development' which has been promoted by the Bretton Woods international financial institutions (IFIs – the World Bank, IMF and GATT) has consisted first of attempting to industrialise, and then of economically 'restructuring', the 'Lesser Developed Countries' and linking them into the world economy via strategies like 'export-led growth'. But industrialisation and exporting require energy, and energy obtained from fossil fuels creates greenhouse gases, while energy from nuclear fuels creates huge safety problems both in production and disposal. Even so-called clean energy, for example hydro-electricity, is not without its environmental downside. As we shall see in Chapter
Five, it was the ‘hydro-industrialisation’ of Tasmania which catalysed the world’s first Green party.

Energy-greedy mass production and distribution of products is one side of the global environmental jeopardy equation; the other side is mass consumption. The first Green critiques of industrialism recognised the foundational link between industrialist productivism and mass consumerism, and concentrated heavily on attacking the latter. Their simply produced complaints (see for example, the dull black and white type of the Values Party’s first manifesto, which devotes three pages to making links between mindless consumerism and rising unemployment) were no match for the blandishments of the advertising and public relations industry. This industry soon had transnational companies of its own busy purveying the sales messages of the transnational producers and putting a ‘spin’ on their environmental transgressions (Beder, 1997).

However, when attention is paid both to what is consumed, and to the amount and varieties of waste produced by different styles of consumption, it is no longer possible to ignore the fact that the world is more divided than ever along consumption as well as production lines. Nor that differing styles of consumption have very different environmental impacts. The Worldwatch Institute has analysed the inhabitants of the planet according to their ‘category of consumption’, and concluded that there are 1.1 billion people in the ‘consumer’ class. These people live in households whose annual income per member is above $7,500, they eat meat and processed foods and drink soft drinks, travel in private cars, and most of their possessions and tools are designed or intended to be thrown away after a short time.
in use. In stark contrast are the 1.1 billion in the 'poor' class, with annual incomes under $700, subsisting on insufficient grain and unsafe water, with only their feet for transport and all tools and possessions being derived from the local biomass. In between are 3.3 billion people who have adequate amounts of grain to eat and clean water to drink, who travel on bikes and buses, and who own and use durable tools and possessions. (Baird, 1997, 10)

The environmental impacts of the 'consumer class' have been evident since the 1970s, principally in the form of huge and increasing amounts of waste as 'disposable' goods are thrown away. These cause pollution-related problems to humans and other species in the form of unprotected hazardous waste sites, dump fires, toxic leachate, toxic algal blooms, vermin, disease and other ills. There has also been a dramatic rise in noise pollution caused by increasing road and air traffic, and the extended ownership and use of power tools and appliances. Another downside of increased consumption is the scarring of the landscape with advertising hoardings encouraging more consumption, and increasing amounts of 'throwaway' items, from rusting car bodies in ponds through to fast-food packaging, strewn along the roadside and around the countryside.

Litter has become a global problem, dirtying and degrading the environment for humans, and endangering other species, such as the sea birds and mammals strangled by discarded plastic strapping from beer cans dropped by individuals and discarded fishing nets left to roam the oceans by companies fishing in international waters. Finding ways to internalise the 'external' costs of production and consumption, which include the proper disposal of waste, remains the reluctant responsibility of
nation-state regulatory authorities. Few of these are even prepared to go as far as Germany in passing a law which allows consumers to discard unwanted packaging at the point of sale – let alone to require minimisation of wasteful packaging altogether.

The problems of wasteful consumption in the 1990s have definitely overshadowed the old ‘limits to growth’ arguments against industrial expansionism advanced by Greens in the 1960s and 1970s, when the emphasis was on the finite and rapidly depleting stocks of non-renewable natural resources, especially energy resources like oil and coal. The ‘oil shocks’ and ‘energy crisis’ were a result of globalisation – but of changes in global financing rather than changes in global production. Rightly or wrongly, the emphasis has shifted to the limited capacity of the planet and its atmosphere to absorb and contain the pollution effects of the global expansion of production, trade and consumption. These effects have literally gone stratospheric, and are impacting on millions of people who had no hand either in creating them or in enjoying the ‘good life’ based on global consumerism. Millions are also being exposed to other negative environmental outcomes resulting from the globalisation of production, trade and consumption.

The industrialisation and globalisation of food production, for example, has not led to increased food security for the poorest third of the world’s population. However it has reduced land-based employment, and exposed producers and consumers (and non-human species) to the known risks of agricultural chemicals and the potential risks of genetic engineering. The global risks of synthetic agricultural chemicals first became apparent in the 1960s, when Rachel Carson (1962) documented the deleterious effects of chemicals like DDT on wildlife across North America,
including species living in supposedly uncontaminated areas, such as eagles in the high mountains. DDT was banned in the USA and other ‘developed’ countries, to be replaced by chemicals that were allegedly safer. However, the update on Carson’s *Silent Spring* (*Our Stolen Future*) shows that the new generation of chemicals is now globally ubiquitous, being found in the fat of polar bears inside the Arctic Circle and the bodies of toads in the mountainous jungles of Costa Rica. In both places they are endangering the reproductive capacity and ultimate survival of the species affected. (Colborn et al, 1996)

Nor are humans exempt from this internal pollution. It is no longer possible to find a sufficiently isolated and hence ‘pure’ human population to use as a control group in a study of the effects of these chemicals. The Inuit living alongside the polar bears in the Arctic are as contaminated as their ursine neighbours – and as their human cousins in Toronto or Boston. As with the non-human animals, the main effects on humans from synthetic chemicals appear to be reproductive system abnormalities and serious reproductive dysfunction.

The problem has been fully globalised – there is literally no ‘away’ to escape to. City and wilderness dwellers, First or Third World inhabitants – all are at risk. As with carbon emissions, reductions and substitutions in synthetic chemical use must happen globally, not just locally. To make this happen will be as difficult as reducing carbon emissions, because global industrial production, both primary and secondary, is predicated upon the widespread use of chemicals. A reduction in chemical use, in the absence of cost effective non-chemical substitutions, would mean a reduction in production and hence a likely reduction in profit – a result which global investors
will not contemplate. While it is certainly possible to make a transition to 'clean' substitutes (as it is with energy), this will not solve the problem so long as industrial methods of production and delivery are adhered to. For example, hydro-industrialisation has the deleterious environmental effect of destroying wild rivers and is therefore merely a displacement of rather than a solution to the problem of sustainable energy supply. Similarly, the substitution of 'organic' chemicals (i.e. chemicals approved by organic growing organisations) for synthetic chemicals in industrial forms of farming will lead to the same problem of the build-up of pest resistance, while simultaneously reducing the armoury of 'safe' pest controls.

Fundamental to globalisation is the establishment and generalisation of systems that direct and regulate productive and other economic and social activity within narrow parameters that are understood and applied globally – regardless of the impacts on local sustainability.

This is particularly apparent in the case of the latest global environmental issue that has been problematised by Greens – genetic engineering. Gene technology represents the biological pinnacle of time-space compression. In From Farming to Biotechnology: A Theory of Agro-Industrial Development, Goodman et al (1987) demonstrate the ways in which the industrialisation of agriculture eliminated first space (land) as a consideration in primary production. This was via feedlot, battery and other space intensive methods for animals, and by mechanisation, selective breeding for higher yields, greenhouse cultivation and chemical applications for crops. It is now proceeding to eliminate time via genetic engineering. The creation of transgenic organisms, such as soy beans with Arctic fish genes which increase cold tolerance, and pigs with rabbit growth genes to make them double their weight in
half the time, (Macer, 1990) is largely directed towards eliminating normal cycles of growth and reproduction. This allows plants to mature faster, or grow out of season, and remain edible for longer after harvest, while animals become biological factories, producing more milk, meat, fibre or eggs in less and less time.

The gene technology industry, like the information technology (IT) industry that it so closely resembles, is impossible to describe without reference to its generic globalist features. Like the IT industry it was created by and is dependent upon a global network of scientists and technicians working through internationally standardised channels of communication and appraisal (albeit in a highly competitive and secretive manner a good part of the time). Also like the IT industry it initially drew significant numbers of personnel and significant amounts of funding from defence sources (Wilkie, 1993). As with the IT industry the initial small, innovative companies (many with university connections) have been rapidly swallowed up by large companies – in the genetech case mostly chemical, pharmaceutical and food transnationals. As a science-based industry with such obvious market applications and implications for national economic competitiveness genetech also expects and receives state support, and markets itself to political decision-makers as the key to prosperity (Haraway, 1997, 90-93).

In her essay ‘Femaleman_Meets_Oncomouse. Mice into Wormholes: A Technoscience Fugue in Two Parts’, Donna Haraway draws together the strands that connect the splitting of atoms and the splicing of genes with global politics and economics in the late twentieth century, and summarises them in a cod mathematical statement of proportion, thus:
She then unpacks this statement as follows: 'The expanded form of the proportion reads: The transuranic elements (such as plutonium produced by nuclear reactors) are to transgenic organisms (such as the genetically engineered mice and tomatoes produced in biotechnological laboratories) as the Cold War (fuelled by its core generator of nuclear culture) is to the New World Order (driven by its dynamic generator of transnational enterprise culture).’ (Haraway, 1997, 52-53).

Haraway's statement encapsulates the contemporary indissolubility of 'environment', 'politics' and 'economics', and the globalisation of these spheres of action. This represents a profound shift in reality and in our understanding of it, which has only a tenuous connection with politics as defined by party and pressure group politicians taking pro or anti 'environment' positions within the historical nation-state political arena. Global environmental politics is not merely the quantitative expansion of nation-state resource, pollution and conservation politics on to an international stage, but also (and more significantly) a qualitative shift in the very concepts 'political' and 'environmental'.

The nuclear and gene industries are both creators and creations of globalisation. Humans need to breathe, drink and eat to live. They are now breathing global air, drinking global water and eating global food - all of them containing global contaminants. Global corporations, (dozens of which are larger and more powerful
economic entities than many member states of the United Nations), make global decisions about these quantity and quality of life issues by default, simply by following the capitalist imperative of seeking an increased rate of return on investment. They engage in vigorous globalised political activities aimed at preventing or avoiding the application of environmental and/or social restraints on global production, investment and trade, (with the MAI being the most recent case in point). They also have representation within global ‘international’ financial institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation, where ordinary citizens, NGOs, and even governments are not represented.

The ‘environment’, whether measured as air quality, water quality, species sustainability, landscape aesthetics or by any other biophysical or cultural criteria, does not normally influence the production and investment decisions of the transnational corporations and their nationally based subsidiaries and contracting companies. The only environmental protection restraints on their activities come via direct action from consumers (e.g. boycotts of drift net-caught fish), or legislative or regulatory constraints imposed at nation-state level, or voluntary, unenforceable agreements at international level. Monitoring for compliance of regulations and agreements at national level is variable in quantity and quality, while at the international level it is risible.² This goes a long way to explaining why the trend in global environmental health indicators has been consistently downwards since the first international environmental conference (UNCHE) held in Stockholm in 1972, despite all the ink that has been spilled and talk fests that have been held to alert the public and governments to the problems to try and get action on them. Global corporations bothered by environmental restraints in one location have the option of
moving to a less restrictive regulatory environment – an option which they may not have to exercise if they can parlay the threat of it – and hence loss of local employment – into laxer standards in their present site. Global public relations and advertising companies are at the service of global chemical, oil, food and other companies, whose products have global environmental impacts, to professionally and attractively deny, disguise, downplay or otherwise manage any bad publicity resulting from environmentally unfriendly activities (Beder, 1997; Burton, 1995). Similarly, hordes of global corporate lawyers are available to hamstring pro-environment activities, with the long running ‘McLibel’ trial being a case in point (Beder, 1997, 68-69), while public relations firms are willing and able to whitewash even the execution of environmental activists (Beder, 1997, 121).

The global capitalist economy of the late twentieth century is literally bringing an end to billions of years of evolution on planet Earth. The delicately balanced mantle of gases which surrounds the earth, a protective covering beneath which all life evolved, has changed in composition with frightening rapidity in the past two decades. Not only are whole states and parts of states (Kiribati, Bangladesh, the Maldives, the Netherlands) at risk of being inundated as a result, but more importantly for global politics the impact on human health and the health and viability of other species is of utmost concern. Adding to, rather than subtracting from, the ‘energy crisis’ problems of the late twentieth century, nuclear radiation from nuclear power plant ‘accidents’ during production, transport and storage of radioactive materials has been causing deaths, terminal and chronic illnesses and genetic mutations since the 1970s. They will continue to do so long after nuclear
power generation is finally abandoned. The cost to human society is great; the cost to other species incalculable.

The loss of other species as a direct or indirect result of human economic activities, (including pollution, deforestation, agro-industrialisation, unsustainable fishing techniques, climate change) continues to increase despite desperate efforts to reverse the trend by international bodies like the International Union for the Conservation of Nature. This has led some scientists to the conclusion that vertebrate evolution is no longer possible (Sessions, 1995, 361-362). Biodiversity reduces by the day as another hectare of virgin tropical forest falls somewhere in the world, while the fires that follow the logging continue the damage (Given, 1996).

Mono-cultural plantations of a limited range of genetically engineered crops, which 'succeed' the destroyed forest, drive the final nail into the coffin of biodiversity, and epitomise the intellectual and social bankruptcy of global industrialism (Shiva, 1991; 1995). Not only can very little else survive the chemical and mechanical regime of industrial primary production, but with the creation of transgenic organisms the core principle of evolution – natural selection – is utterly confounded. While genetic engineering has thus far been restricted to plants and animals of economic significance, the first reports of transfer effects to wild species have already appeared (Lefol et al, 1995). Despite reassurances from global corporations and the scientists in their employ that eating genetically engineered food is 'safe', the effects on humans have yet to be properly studied. Indeed, it is difficult to know how one could conduct an ethical controlled study on human beings, as even if volunteers were
readily available, they would be volunteering not only themselves but also their unwitting descendants.

In assessing the significance of the 'short twentieth century' (1914-1991) historian Eric Hobsbawm believes that from the perspective of the third millenium the most outstanding feature of the last century of the second millenium will not be the confrontation between 'capitalism' and 'socialism'. This will be a matter of limited interest, comparable in significance to the Crusades of an earlier period. What will be of much greater importance is that the end of the twentieth century was also the end of the seven or eight millenia of living from the land, which had endured ever since the invention of agriculture some time in the Stone Age. It was the end of the long era in which the overwhelming majority of the human race lived by growing food and herding animals (Hobsbawm, 1994, 9).

In seconding Hobsbawm's view I would also add that the way in which humans have made this shift, via globalising industrialism as a way of producing things, and markets as a way of distributing things, is creating systemic biological, ecological and physical dysfunction among humans and other species. Thus the political history of the next millenium will increasingly deal with conflicts arising from these sources.
The world makes money go round – economic globalisation


It may well be all of these things, and more – but underpinning the theory and practice of globalisation is the expanding global economy. Although globalisation has economic, social, political, technological and cultural dimensions, which can not be disentangled, and which each impact upon the other, there is considerable agreement that the driving force behind globalisation is the economic expansionism inherent in capitalism. Capital can only grow itself by finding or creating new products and new markets. Whereas before the mid-nineteenth century access to products and markets was limited geographically, the new technologies of steam power and telegraphic cable meant that by the late nineteenth century production and marketing could take place on an international scale with much greater ease (Leyshon, 1995, 28-30).
World trade began to expand accordingly – between 1800 and 1913 international trade as a proportion of world product grew from 3% to 33%, with most of the increase taking place after 1870 (Waters, 1995, 67). Capital flowed into the ‘settler colonies’ of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, Uruguay and Argentina to set up banks, meat processing plants, grain and wool stores, timberyards, railways and other facilities and businesses. These were part of a global chain of such enterprises, owned by and responsible to off-shore investors and proprietors. (Denoon, 1983) Although these were technically the first multinational enterprises, they were tightly linked with the old imperial structures, and trade between the imperial power and its colonies was not perceived as ‘trans’ national, but rather as transfers within one political entity, the empire. Nevertheless, they pioneered a way of doing global business using new technologies and management structures which were readily adaptable to the post World War II era, when transnational companies, most of which were initially based in the USA, overtook the old imperial companies.

After the Second World War world trade grew tremendously quickly, with an increase of over 800% in commodity exchange. Between 1950 and 1975 foreign direct investment by US based companies grew more ten times, and the returns from abroad increased from 7% to more than 25% in the same period (Teeple, 1995, 60). By 1980 transnational companies based in the USA accounted for 80% of that country’s exports and over 50% of its imports. Transnational companies took up almost 30% of world trade outside the socialist bloc by the 1980s, while over 30% of world trade currently takes the form of intra-firm transfers (Camilleri and Falk, 1992, 70).
Post World War II, therefore, world trade not only changed dramatically in quantity, it also changed qualitatively, with trade between nationally based enterprises becoming much less significant compared to trade between and within transnational companies with a global reach. Critics of the globalisation thesis frequently point to the unevenness of this alleged global coverage. It is certainly true that large parts of the world – in particular most of sub-Saharan Africa – are currently of little interest to transnational traders producing and marketing what are, in global terms, luxury commodities like vehicles and carbonated beverages. As McMichael points out, roughly 80% of world income is produced and consumed by 15% of the world’s population, and the other side of this coin is that 80% of the world’s population does not have access to consumer cash or credit. Therefore, he concludes, we must consider the world economy to be global in relational terms, but not necessarily in social or geographical terms (McMichael, 1997, 15, emphasis added). (For details on exactly how the world’s income is divided, see Chossudovsky, 1998, 39.)

In any case, the growth in transnational trade in real commodities, although substantial, has been and always will be limited by the genuine physical constraints involved in finding real resources, making real products and marketing to real consumers who can afford to buy the goods. The really dramatic side of economic globalisation is not the increase in trade in real commodities, but the stunning escalation in trading in what we would now name a ‘virtual’ commodity i.e. money. How has this happened, and what are its political impacts?

In the late nineteenth century the telegraph greatly enhanced the capacities of money markets and the stock exchange. Global trading in currencies, stocks and bonds
became possible for the first time. This change required a considerable adjustment in the relationship between nation-states and internal markets (Cerny, 1994). A major development was the creation of an internationally strong benchmark currency, backed by the gold reserves of a nation-state. This 'backer' role was the one performed by Britain and the pound sterling before World War I. When the financial hegemony of Britain collapsed in the 1920s, and the world plunged first into a depression and then into another war, there was a consensus among the Allies that the key to future peace was a return to global financial stability. Hence they met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944 to conclude an agreement which, by tying the US dollar to the gold standard, ensured that the USA would become the post-war global hegemonic power. At the same time they also set up institutions to oversee global financial management – the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Three years later the creation of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs completed the troika of global financial institutions, which by the promotion of certain policies and the suppression of others, have effectively ended nation-based economic sovereignty across the globe.

These non-elected, non-democratically accountable organisations gained in power when the US abandoned the gold standard and thus its role of financial hegemon in 1971. This set in motion a chain reaction in the global economy which led to the massive 'de-regulation' of national economies which took place in the 1980s. In its turn this linked states more closely with the global market regime and reduced opportunities for independent and sovereign action (Cerny, 1994; Chossudovsky, 1998; Kelsey, 1997; McMichael, 1996; Oman, 1996; Teeple, 1995).
By the time de-regulation was taking place the telegraph had long been superseded by international telephone linkages and associated facsimile transmission technology, and computer networks had moved from specialist military to widespread civilian application. It was easier and faster than ever before to trade in money products – and with the abandonment of fixed exchange rates (which was forced upon ‘developing’ countries as a condition of receiving IMF and World Bank financial assistance) it was also much more lucrative. By the 1980s the money market was the biggest and fastest growing market in the world. The turnover in the foreign exchange component alone surpassed $1000 million per day in 1993 (Leyshon, 1995, 39), while the mid-80s global exchanges in goods and services ($4 trillion per annum) were dwarfed by gross financial exchanges ($60-$70 trillion per annum). Trade between the USA, Europe and Japan grew at an average rate of 8% between 1980 and 1986 – unimpressive set alongside a rate of 54% for gross capital exchanges (Cerny, 1994, 231-232). By 1997 it was possible to conclude that

‘Developments in the late-twentieth century seem to have reversed our ontological bearings: no longer does money make the world go around, rather it is the world that makes money go around – more than US$2 trillion circulates globally every day. At present the total annual value of global financial transactions are twice the total value of world production, and the real economy in foreign exchange transactions is down to 2.5% with the remaining 97.5% speculative.’ (McMichael, 1997, 1).

O’Brien (1992, 89-90) concludes that the capital market is now genuinely global, and that this is truly a new phenomenon. Integration at the level of financial markets is fuelling the drive towards complete economic integration at the super-regional
level. The European Union was the first example, being the first to take the common market route, and now the common currency route. Other common market initiatives followed Europe, including Australia and New Zealand with the Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement of 1983, and the USA, Canada and Mexico with bilateral agreements and then the trilateral North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1990s. O'Brien sees the super-regional blocs as an attempt to replace lost national sovereignty with a form of regional sovereignty. This is a project which Cerny (1994, 227) thinks is unlikely to constitute a serious, countervailing power to globalising finance, while Teeple (1995, 63) sees them as yet another indicator of 'profoundly circumscribed national sovereignty'.

Despite the debates over details, the overall picture is clear. Where once the regulation of currency and its flows was a vital part of constituting nation-states, now the replacement of nationalist and internationalist regulatory bodies by global ones has played a crucial role in de-constituting the nation state. For while there is debate over the exact linkages between the nation-states which began forming in Europe from the late seventeenth century onwards, and the global expansion of capitalism (some of which is canvassed in Palan and Gills, 1994), there is agreement that the relationship was complementary. The era of European imperialism, from the conquest of the Americas onwards, was both economic and political, with states following markets and vice versa.

States and markets were, in fact, self-constitutive. McMichael (1997) following Polányi (1957) expresses the relations between the development of nation states, national currencies and national and international markets thus:
...British capitalists used their political power in the post-Napoleonic era to create markets for land, labour and money to facilitate machine production and its insatiable need for price-governed inputs and market outlets. Thus was born the ideological construct of the 'self-regulating market', as a market complex relatively untrammelled by government intervention. Projected globally, this apparent self-regulating market needed a universal commodity equivalent, gold, to facilitate global exchanges among national and imperial markets. Gold became the world money, standardised in sterling balances held by governments in London, and through which the City redistributed liquidity to make the world go around. In turn, central banks used monetary policy to adjust the value of the national currency to the standard of value set by sterling/gold as the world money. Constitutional governments arose to represent those interests affected financially by currency adjustments.' ...

'While British measures to institute commodity markets subjected the nineteenth-century world to the dynamics of industrial capitalism, they also generated the famous protective cycle of market regulation across the world of constitutional states. In this movement lay the various national forms of regulation: land markets and agricultural trade generating agricultural tariffs...; labour markets generating social democratic responses (in domestic labour legislation and early import-substitution industrial strategies); and money markets generating currency management to stabilise national economic relations. Polanyi emphasized the "constitutive importance of the currency in establishing the nation as the decisive economic and political unit
of the time” (1957: 203). In short, the protective response was formative of the nation state.’ (McMichael, 1997, 4-5).

If this is how nation-states were created, just how are they being destroyed? Specifically, how exactly did abandoning the gold standard in the 1970s and subsequent global financial deregulation lead to the de-formation of nation-states? Michel Chossudovsky (1998) has made a study of the globalisation of poverty via the activities of the international financial institutions (IFIs). The IMF, World Bank and (since 1995) the World Trade Organisation are the ‘new interventionists’ of the world economy. The structural adjustment programmes which they enforced first on sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, and then on the Balkans and Eastern Europe, involve the same set of steps. Steps which separately and collectively have the effect of destroying the nationally-based economy and making whatever economic activity remains part of the global system. The steps will be familiar to many First World citizens too – particularly to New Zealanders who will recognise that they were all applied locally, beginning the moment that the fourth Labour government was elected in 1984, and continued with renewed vigour by the National government elected in 1990. Belinda Probert (1994) provides an excellent summary of the generic global processes behind specific national restructuring, using Australia as a case study. Details of the New Zealand case can be found in Barry (1996), Boston and Dalziel (1992), Easton (1989; 1997), Holland and Boston (1990), Jesson (1989), and Kelsey (1997). Easton (1997, 82-83) has a comprehensive listing of the specific reforms which took place in New Zealand post 1984.)
While the consequences have not been as extreme in absolute terms, since New Zealand started from a higher economic and social base than most Third World countries, in relative terms New Zealanders are now worse off than they were in 1984. Higher unemployment, lower average incomes, a bigger gap between rich and poor, poorer health, reduced access to education, and higher levels of crime and violence are the legacy of the reforms. Le Heron and Pawson (1996) provide a geography of restructuring in New Zealand which shows that this has been the most rapid and severe period of radical change in New Zealand's history. Those who started with the least e.g. women and Maori, had still less again (Bunkle, 1996; Else, 1997). Further, in a classic 'blame the victim strategy', by 1996 government agencies had begun talking about a supposed pathology of psycho-social 'dependency' which was held to be a cause rather than an effect of poverty (O'Brien, 1997). This was followed in 1997 by the Department of Social Welfare hosting an international conference called 'Beyond Dependency', at which American neo-liberal 'experts' advocated further savage cuts in social welfare assistance to the unemployed and solo parents (O'Brien and Briar, 1997). What did it take to achieve this state of affairs? In New Zealand as in the countries 'restructured' by the IFIs the necessary steps included:

1. devaluing the currency
2. removing exchange controls
3. de-indexation of wages and other wage depression measures (e.g. removal of collective bargaining structures and opportunities)
4. removing the Central Bank from national, democratic control
5. instituting cost recovery ('user pays') for health and education services
progressively lowering the 'acceptable' level of the national budget deficit

putting public works out to international tender

eliminating price controls and/or subsidies

reducing/eliminating tariffs and import quotas

privatising state assets and enterprises

changing the tax structure to undermine domestic production and consumption

de-regulating the banking system

shrinking the state sector (especially in health and education)

(After Chossudovsky, 1998, 55-67.)

The social impacts of implementing these economic measures are both massive and disturbing. Firstly, unemployment and under-employment increases dramatically. State sector workers are thrown out of their jobs in order to 'make up' the fiscal deficit. Small and medium-sized productive enterprises are faced with the effects of devaluation-induced inflation (rising costs), enforced competition with cheap imports, and falling returns for exports on a glutted world market – all of which means they can no longer afford to stay in business and provide employment. Declining health standards are another significant consequence, as cost recovery to the user and lack of investment in urban sanitation and public health infrastructure start to bite on populations (Philp, 1999). As a result communicable diseases which were formerly well controlled in the Third World (e.g. cholera, yellow fever, malaria, dengue, bubonic and pneumonic plague) are now resurgent (Chossudovsky, 1998, 71-72). Tuberculosis, which was considered to be virtually eradicated in First
World countries, is the top global disease (ahead of AIDS and malaria), and is staging a comeback in First World countries among populations with poor housing and sanitation, and resistance to therapeutic drugs. This points to the other major connection between globalisation and disease – diseases are also spreading and getting worse as a direct result of the very practices of globalisation, such as mass tourism, and the industrial production and mass consumption of medical drugs, leading to the transport of disease right across the globe, and the development of 'super-bugs' (Lyons et al, 1995, 24-45).

Education standards are another victim of economic restructuring, with the state pushing the responsibility for providing and funding education and training on to private providers and individual ‘users’. Welfare provision is increasingly left to charitable organisations reliant on private rather than state support. New Zealand provides an extreme example of the rapid turn around from the welfare state, where basic needs were met by public provision, to private charity. In 1980 there was one ‘food-bank’ in Auckland, helping needy families. By 1994 there were 365 of them throughout the country, most of them church-run and supported, giving out 40,000 food parcels a month, with an estimated annual value of $25 million. In 1999 the Christchurch City Mission alone gave out 35,000 food parcels. (See Leslie, 1996; McClure, 1998, 245-7; McGurk and Clark, 1993; Olds, 1991, for details on the New Zealand food-bank phenomenon.)

Rising levels of crime and violence are another consequence of structural adjustment. In the First World crime and violence are still largely contained at a domestic or intra-state level. Nevertheless, Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1994)
makes a case for considering this to be a state of 'molecular' civil war as surely as
the conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia, Yugoslavia and Chechnya which are largely or
partially attributable to social stresses resulting from harsh IFI interventions. Civil
war has been endemic in Latin America for the past two decades – it is hard to think
of a country there that has not experienced significant state and counter-state
violence – or close IFI attention. As the global number of people living – and dying
– in scenes of poverty and violence attributable to structural adjustment rises to
millions we are witnessing a destruction of human life which puts all previous
nationally-based genocides in the shade.

Where is the political will to contest this, and what form can such political
contestation take in a world in which the three centuries old institutional basis of
political action on an international scale – the nation-state – no longer has an
economic rationale for its existence?

The Internationale divides the human race? – political globalisation

The world in 1972, when the first Green parties formed, was an internationalised
world that was in the throes of globalisation. As in economics, so in politics – world
history records a shift from political internationalism to political globalism that
begins to occur at this time. But first let us look at what preceded it.
By the late nineteenth century internationalism had become imbedded as the dominant way of understanding world scale politics, from the perspective of both the rulers and the ruled. In addition to an expansion of inter-state relations across the globe, specifically international movements and organisations began to arise. The most prominent of these was socialism, principally because it entered the realm of nation-state politics by forming political parties which (whether communist or social democrat) had considerable success in gaining state power. While this state-oriented approach was controversial and was hotly debated within both social democrat and communist circles in the nineteenth century, by the twentieth century 'socialism in one country' as an approach had largely triumphed over the alternative of internationalist proletarian solidarity. World War I was probably the watershed experience which symbolised the end of the 'workers of the world unite' dream, when even the more revolutionary social democrats in the Reichstag initially voted for war credits to arm German workers against French and British workers.³

To focus on the trajectory of socialist parties as exemplars of internationalist politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries may obscure the achievements and salience of equally internationalist but non-statist movements of the period. The most significant of these were the women’s rights movement and its offshoots the peace and temperance movements. While by no means global in the contemporary sense made possible by satellite broadcasting and the Internet, the women’s movement was at least as consciously internationalist as the socialist movement. Dorothy Page (1993, 5) notes the significance of the steamship mail link which opened between Auckland and San Francisco in 1871 in bringing New Zealand within the ambit of the women’s suffrage and women’s temperance movements in
the United States. The huge women’s suffrage marches in London in the early twentieth century grouped the marchers according to nationality as well as by occupation and other categories. New Zealand suffragists visiting or living in London were pleased to march as an example of enfranchised womanhood, and they also lobbied vigorously for the vote for British women. (Dalziel, 1993; Page, 1993, 19-21).

Returning the interest and support, feminist activists from the U.S. and the U.K. regularly toured Australasia. The result of all these exchanges was the development of a movement that had generic international goals (female suffrage, equal pay, equal education and employment opportunities, better health care, voluntary maternity), but nationally specific ways of achieving them.

International politics had thus been in existence for approximately a century, in both party and movement forms, before the era of ‘globalisation’ arrived. When the women’s movement revived in the 1960s it rapidly internationalised, as did the anti-war and anti-nuclear movements of the same time. By the 1970s three new internationalist movements were also active across the world. The environment movement had set up new international organisations (e.g. Friends of the Earth). Indigenous peoples’ movements began linking up and creating international councils and forums. The Gay Liberation Movement set an example of ‘grass roots’ internationalisation by publishing ‘The Pink Pages’ and other travel and advice guides. These made the gay and lesbian resources of the ‘gay’ cities of the world available to both nationals of the countries they were in and to the many international gay and lesbian visitors. The GLM perhaps achieved the epitome of combining
political, economic and social globalisation when some of its places and events (certain districts of New York and San Francisco, the Mardi Gras parade in Sydney) entered the global economy as significant tourist attractions/destinations.

The first Green parties were part of this internationalist/globalist trend. Despite the seeming geographical marginality of Australia and New Zealand, (from a European or North American perspective) they were and are actually located in the ‘heartland’ of internationalisation and globalisation. In fact, by the centrality of their participation in world trends they prove the internationalisation/globalisation thesis. The example of the early achievement of female suffrage which first New Zealand (1893) and then Australia (1894-1908) were able to extend to the rest of the world via the efforts of New Zealand and Australian nationals in the international women’s movement were paralleled by precocity in labour politics. The world’s first successful labour parties were formed in Australia in the 1890s, precisely by those workers (shearers, dockers, seamen) whose prospects were then most closely linked with the fortunes of the international economy. When communism rose to prominence as a state political power following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 the example was not lost on China – or on New Zealand. Communist parties were established in both countries in the same year, 1920.

With this tradition behind them, the United Tasmania Group and the Values Party conceptualised themselves from the beginning as exemplars of a politics that had international political significance, and they pulled every internationalist string available to them, from personal contacts to the mass media. Details of this are given in Chapter Five, and show the considerable effort put in by various international
secretaries and other party members to network the globe with news and views from the parties, and to insist on the global significance of their new political formulations.

The tradition of internationalisation in oppositional politics goes a long way towards describing and providing an understanding of the initial form of Green politics. If we were to leave it at that we would have an understanding of Green politics as mid-twentieth century socialism plus late twentieth century environmentalism, with a dash of 1960s libertarianism thrown in to leaven the lump. This is indeed how some commentators (e.g. Markovits and Gorski, 1993) characterise it, making it difficult to distinguish Green politics from the 'reformed' social democracy of the 1980s, which was more sensitive to environmental issues, more liberal on lifestyle issues, and less militarist than before. Are the Greens, as enthusiastic users of the new communications technologies merely supreme practitioners of an internationalist progressive politics gone global?

I contend that this is a superficial understanding of Green politics. For as we have seen, at the basis of Green politics is a profound resistance to the environmental and social impacts of globalisation, and hence to globalisation itself. The Green use of the new communications technologies can be seen more as a way of fighting fire with fire, or of retrieving whatever positive capacities the new technologies hold (for play, for friendship, for working together on a wider scale than previously possible). Further, I believe that without globalisation there would be no Green politics, but rather a continuation of nation-state based leftist politics with stronger environmental and libertarian dimensions. The New Zealand case study presented below traces the
connections between the politics and economics of globalism as an ideology, and gives the grounds for Green politics as oppositional politics.

Social and environmental ‘reform’ – the globalist political agenda at play in New Zealand

That Green politics is the natural antisysemic successor to previous nationalist and internationalist forms of progressive politics has always been clear to the creators, owners and managers of the international financial institutions and transnational capital. Also to their propagandists, even if some Greens are still confused about how they seem to have made a giant leap from cleaning up a local toxic waste site or planting an organic garden to taking on the might of global capital.

A good example of how the personal and political connections are made within the context of one small nation-state which is subservient to the ideology of neo-liberal globalism is provided by the 1989 conference of the Mont Pelerin Society, which was held in Christchurch, New Zealand.⁵

The Mont Pelerin Society is one of the oldest and most influential international New Right economic think tanks, founded in 1947 by the ‘grandfather’ of contemporary economic liberalism, Friedrich von Hayek. In 1989 it chose to hold its annual conference in the Southern Hemisphere for only the third time in its history – for reasons which will become clear. Attendance at what was touted (by the conference
organiser) as '...the most intellectually significant event in New Zealand for many years to come...' consisted of the cream of New Zealand's neo-liberal establishment, who were especially invited to attend. (Mont Pelerin Society gatherings are closed to non-members – only members and those invited by them may attend). Some local academic invitees expressed unease at attending a closed conference, especially given that the ostensible purpose of holding the gathering was to honour the liberal philosopher Karl Popper, who wrote his most famous work, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, while resident in New Zealand. This is an important point, and Barbara Vincent (1995) has analysed the extent to which the neo-liberalism advocated by the New Zealand Business Round Table (New Zealand's most powerful New Right lobby group) constitutes a religious ideology, impervious to refutation by real world mismatches between theory and practice. Brian Easton (1999) is also conscious of the irony of neo-liberals choosing to claim Popper as one of their own. Such reservations about neo-liberalism were and are lost on most of the guests at the conference, who included the architect of New Zealand's very own 'structural adjustment programme', former Labour Party finance minister Roger Douglas, and his National Party successor in that role, Ruth Richardson. Both Douglas and Richardson are now members of the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT), a neo-liberal political party formed in 1994, which in 1996 won eight seats in the New Zealand parliament (Rainbow and Sheppard, 1997, 178-179).

Two people who were to become part of the ACT parliamentary caucus (Maori businesswoman Donna Awatere and Lincoln University resource economist Rodney Hide) were also present. Environmental neo-liberalism was represented by National Party MP Simon Upton (who ten years later was Minister for the Environment and
chair of the U.N. Commission for Sustainable Development), and Maruia Society chief executive and founder of the Progressive Greens party, Guy Salmon. At least a dozen key figures in the New Zealand business establishment, who were responsible for advising both the 1980s Labour and 1990s National governments on the whys and wherefores of structurally adjusting New Zealand, were there. So were several highly-placed civil servants from Treasury and the Reserve Bank. To complete the honoured guests list there were economists from four of New Zealand’s seven public universities, with the largest contingent coming from the University of Canterbury, the New Zealand centre for training in neo-liberal economics.

While it may not have been the most significant intellectual event in New Zealand in that or any other year (especially as it was not open to intellectuals, like a normal academic conference), the 1989 Mont Pelerin Society conference is certainly significant for other reasons. Firstly, the key elite shapers of the globalisation agenda, both national and international, can seldom have been brought together in a way which so clearly shows the overlap and synergy between the business, party political, governmental and academic players in the global game. The smallness of New Zealand made this possible – as indeed it made the Roger Douglas blitzkrieg (Easton, 1997b) on the economy possible. The Mont Pelerin Society conference was merely the tip of the iceberg – Brian Roper (1992) documents that ways in which all the major business lobby groups (farmers, manufacturers, commerce) came to adopt neo-liberal positions and to pressure the government of the day to follow suit.

A second significant aspect of this conference was that one of its purposes was to ‘expose’ the efforts of the Green movement to protect the environment by ‘illiberal’
(i.e. non-market) means. Papers presented at the concluding session on ‘Economics, Politics and the Environment’ included one entitled ‘Controlling the Environmental Threat to the Liberal Order’. The author of this paper did not actually mean that environmental degradation was calling into question ‘the liberal order’, and therefore urgent steps needed to be taken to address environmental problems. Rather he focussed on the role of the environmental movement as the ‘threat’, and blamed it for an assortment of damage done to business and individuals (even the allegedly hundreds of ‘extra’ road deaths he claimed were a result of Americans being forced to switch to smaller, more fuel-economic cars). This individual was one of several ‘experts’ who came to tour New Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s at the invitation and expense of business lobby groups such as the New Zealand Business Round Table, and the think tanks that they finance, such as the Centre for Independent Studies. Their task was to argue against the reality of global environmental problems such as climate change, and against the efforts of environmental organisations and Green parties to address them.\(^6\)

Thirdly, and most importantly for New Zealand, the conference reinforced the personal and political connections between the local globalists, and between the local and foreign globalists. (There were ninety-three New Zealanders present and ninety-one foreigners, with the largest foreign contingents being from Australia and the USA.) In a series of case studies on the ‘commercialisation’ of New Zealand Brian Easton (1997) documents how this close matching between individuals with a shared ideology and shared interests in business, academe and government was responsible for the speed and severity of the structural reforms that were imposed on New Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s.
Chossudovsky (1998, 17) asserts that 'The global economic system is...characterised by two contradictory forces: the consolidation of a global cheap-labour economy on the one hand and the search for new consumer markets on the other.' (Emphasis in the original.) New Zealand has certainly cheapened its labour – indirectly by increasing unemployment and directly by depressing wages via a range of mechanisms – from legislation which replaces collective employment contracts with individual ones through to a 'work for the dole' scheme. It has also tried to expand its markets. However, doing this via the 'trade liberalisation' route has merely meant a frenzy of importing consumer goods which further contributes to the balance of payments deficit. Since 1995 New Zealand has run a continuous balance of payments deficit, and by the end of the century this meant a combined trade deficit of over $2 billion. A good part of this was due to the importing of vehicles following the systematic closure of New Zealand's car assembly plants (Donald, 1999).

However, despite the 'market medicine' exacerbating rather than curing economic and social ills, the same dose has been deemed appropriate for the environment. In 1997 the Minister for the Environment (Mont Pelerin Society member Simon Upton) reneged on his 'promise' to apply a carbon tax if New Zealand industries could not reach agreed carbon dioxide emission reduction targets voluntarily (they hadn’t). In 1998 he embarked on a review of New Zealand’s seven year old Resource Management Act with a view to pushing through a privatisation of the consent granting process, and watering down the act generally (Fitzsimons and Burtt, 1998).
New Zealand politics is thus an increasingly perfect case study in global economic push and local political pull. This is nicely exemplified by the recent fortunes of the National Party, the leading party of the right. Failing to get an outright majority at the 1996 election, National formed a shaky coalition with the New Zealand First party, which had campaigned vigorously and successfully on an anti-globalist/pro-nationalist platform. Once in government, however, New Zealand First acquiesced with most of National’s economic programme, and it was not until Jenny Shipley replaced Jim Bolger as Prime Minister in 1998 that she called New Zealand First’s bluff by taking the coalition to the wire over the privatisation of Wellington airport. NZF blinked, and first the coalition government, then the NZF caucus fell to pieces. National then formed a minority government, which was dependent largely on the grace and favour of the ACT party, (led by the former Labour minister who drove the privatisation of state assets process in the 1980s), for its continuance in office. This is the globalist context writ small on the national page within which the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand (and Green parties elsewhere) struggle to find a political purchase for the alternatives they espouse.

Seeing through the glitter of globalisation

The contrast between the 1990s and the 1960s is huge. Even in 1972 Australia and New Zealand still had full employment, public health, education and social welfare systems that were the envy of the rest of the world, very low crime rates, and most
families were able to take a relaxed, affordable summer holiday at an unpolluted, uncrowded beach. That all this would be transformed to its opposite within twenty years was beyond most people's wildest nightmares.

Paradoxically, the first signs that the globalisation dream would end in nightmare were picked up by certain 'canaries' living in the privileged First World, for the first phase of globalisation was virtually indistinguishable from the long post-war economic boom. In Western(ised) countries full employment was the norm, the numbers of young people in higher education rose dramatically (see Chapter Four), luxury goods for mass consumption rolled off mechanised assembly lines, and business boomed. The power of computers was applied to civilian life – production, consumption, education, participation – for the first time. The only apparent downside appeared to be the pollution generated by the industries creating the goods for mass consumption, and the wastefulness of producing so many varieties of non-necessities, with their associated packaging.

The costs of living in a fully industrialised, mass consumerist society, expanding on a global scale via new scientific and technological means, were initially felt as psychic rather than material costs. As we shall see in Chapter Four, the Situationists kicked off theorising the new antisystemic politics with a scathing critique of 'the society of the spectacle'. They attacked the boredom, inanity, oppressiveness, stupidity and environmental insanity of the industrial production and mass consumption of commodities. Their alternative was a total redefinition and realignment of art and life via the re-construction of the physical plant of cities and the lives of those who lived in them (Knabb, 1981).
The first salvos in the new antisytemic battle were delivered by American and French students defending their right to criticise 'the system' and to put a spanner in the works. Mario Savio, the leader of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, which brought that campus to a halt in 1964, expressed it as:

‘There is a time when the operation of the machine is so odious, makes you so sick at heart that you can't take part; you can't even tacitly take part, and you've got to put your bodies upon the levers, upon all the apparatus, and you've got to make it stop. And you've got to indicate to the people who run it, the people who own it, that unless you're free the machine will be prevented from working at all.’ (Savio in Stern, 1970, 156)

The Situationist students who wrote the manifesto ‘On the Poverty of Student Life’ (Knabb, 1981, 319) in 1966 went even further, calling for the suppression of commodity production, and hence of the proletariat and of work itself. They were tried for using students' association money to publish and distribute these views. Their characters, and the nature of their opposition, were described by the judge as follows:

‘...these students, scarcely more than adolescents, lacking any experience of real life, their minds confused with ill-digested philosophical, social, political and economic theories, and bored by the drab monotony of their everyday life, make the empty, arrogant and pathetic claim to pass judgement and even to heap abuse upon their fellow students, their professors, God, religion, the clergy, the government and political and social systems in the entire world.'
Rejecting all morality and restraint, their cynicism does not hesitate to preach theft, an end to all studies, the suspension of work, total subversion and world revolution with unlicensed pleasure as its only goal.’ (Cohn-Bendit, 1969, 26).

The ‘bad’ example was not lost on other French students, including Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, who made sure that Situationist material was widely circulated and even discussed in class on the Nanterre campus, where the (eventually nationwide) French student revolt broke out two years later. There was a confusing and chaotic flowering of critiques. These ranged from the high-flown intellectualising of the French to the simple slogans of American students, who took the computer as the prime symbol of what they were objecting to, and came up with lines like ‘Are you a student or an IBM card?’ (Stern, 1970, 156) and ‘I am a human being – do not spindle, fold or mutilate.’

The first intemperate, and in some cases Luddite, critiques of the new communications and transport technologies which facilitated globalisation are nicely represented by Eduardo Rothe’s views on the space programme. ‘The conquest of space is part of the planetary hope of an economic system which, saturated with commodities, spectacles and power, ejaculates into space when it arrives at the end of the noose of its terrestrial contradictions.’ (Rothe, 1981, 292). They were not supported by systematic, quantitative criticism until the 1970s. By then Ivan Illich, André Gorz and Theodore Roszak were pointing out that while the new global technologies promised to liberate people from drudgery and physical constraints, in practice they did not live up to their promises. To the contrary, they frequently
contributed to human alienation and disempowerment rather than relieving it. Moreover, the ‘people’ who had access to such material benefits as were made available by industrial production and consumption and global trade continued to be divided upon predictable national, race, gender and class lines, with the global majority missing out (Gorz, 1982, 1985; Illich, 1973, 1978; Roszak 1969, 1973). However, the same technologies greatly facilitated the expansion of global business in general, and global financial business in particular, and their critics were largely ignored by governments who were also trying to get a slice of the action.

Most of the students erecting barricades on the Left Bank in Paris in May 1968 did not have access even to descriptions, let alone analysis and criticism, of the full extent and potential impacts of globalisation. They were as critical of ‘obsolete communism’, as it was practised in the Soviet Union and by its ‘fellow traveller parties in the West, such as the French Communist Party, as they were of the capitalist side of the Cold War divide. But how could they have known that despite the frightening nuclear stand off between ‘communism’ and ‘capitalism’ the two ostensibly opposing sides had almost completed the virtually subterranean construction of a global (capitalist) financial system, with communist countries opening disguised Eurodollar accounts in the West from 1949 onwards? (McLellan, 1999). In fact the youthful protesters, focussing on lifestyle rather than economic issues, would have been mostly unaware of the very existence of Eurodollars. They could not have surmised that the rapid expansion in trading in the Eurodollar market in the late Sixties would soon put intolerable pressures on the American financial system and cause the abandoning of the gold standard, with all its flow-on effects in terms of economic restructuring. They could scarcely conceive how this would
eventually come back to affect students as contemporary right-wing governments (whatever their ostensible party label) cut back on ‘free’ tertiary education provided by previous reforming social democrat governments. The main indicator and motivator for most of the protesting students of the Sixties who began to critique ‘the system’ was paradoxically what they experienced by way of the factory-like conditions and standards of learning imposed upon them in the new tertiary institutions they were now able to attend. Documents from the Berkeley Free Speech Movement of 1964 (Teodori, 1970, 150-161) show the student leaders adamantly opposed to the concept of the University of California as a ‘multiversity’, a service centre producing information and personnel for industry, business, government and the military.

Manuel Castells was a participant in the Paris 1968 events, and says of the student and other social movements that they ‘...were not reactions to the economic crisis. Indeed, they surged in the late 1960s, in the heyday of sustained growth and full employment, as a critique of the “consumption society”,’ Rather, the Sixties movements were ‘...a multi-dimensional reaction to arbitrary authority, a revolt against injustice, and a search for personal experimentation.’ (Castells, 1998, 339). As we shall see in Chapter Four, they were part of a project of actually realising liberty, equality and above all community, which globalisation, even its first glittering phase of economic growth and mass consumption, could not satisfy. They were also definitely connected to Green party politics. This was recognised by the first International Secretary of the Values Party nine years later, when he wrote of the student protests in France in May 1968: ‘That challenge was seen as left-wing, but it had the added dimension of being decentralist and strongly critical of
communist state bureaucracy. In fact, many ideas that we think of as Values ideas emerged from discussions in the occupied Sorbonne.' (Straton, 1977, 1).

Be that as it may, even in the First World in the Sixties and Seventies most people were not students, and most students were not involved in protest action. Although some (particularly the young) shared the student movement's sense of frustration - and some of its analysis of the causes - for most people the problems of globalising industrial production and consumption became part of the popular experience in other ways. The first major indication that trouble might lie ahead on this route came with the 'oil shocks' of the early Seventies, when the luxury levels of transport fuel usage in and by Western(ised) countries appeared to be in jeopardy. These engineered 'crises' actually represented a hiccup in the deployment of global economic power, rather than a genuine shortage of fuel, but once again the critics (such as Hans Magnus Enzensberger) who made a causal connection between the globalisation of capital and its social effects, and argued for a more sophisticated and critical approach to 'environmental' issues, were largely drowned out by the dominant explanations of the time, such as the much-discussed Club of Rome report (Meadows et al, 1972).

Nevertheless, no one could avoid noticing the boom starting to go bust in the 'stagflation' of the early 1970s. The theory and practice of social democrat economic management appeared to have been discredited (see Chapter 3 for more on this). Even though ostensibly liberal/conservative governments persisted with 'protectionist' and 'interventionist' approaches to national economic management throughout the 1970s, by 1980 the new 'monetarist' and 'supply side' brooms
wielded by the Thatcher and Reagan governments were sweeping out the British and American economies. By the mid-Eighties the same economic approaches were being applied by labour governments in Australasia. The international financial institutions were applying the same ‘structural reform’ medicine to the heavily indebted Third World – and so we come full circle to the development of the new Green form of antisystemic politics.

This is a politics that begins with questioning the fake prosperity that leads to genuine poverty. A politics which questions the ‘Left’ (which has supported the globalisation project just as enthusiastically as the ‘Right’), as much as the Right, thereby calling into question the relevance of those time-honoured political labels, that were developed in an earlier era of social and economic distress. In the next two chapters I go on to look at how the non-revolutionary left moved from economic nationalism to economic rationalism, and hence globalism; and at how the first social and political opposition movements on a global scale were formed, and led to the Green movement and Green parties.

Notes

1. The use of the word ‘conjuncture’ to describe a medium term phase in a world-historical phenomenon is explained by Wallerstein (1991) in ‘The Inventions of Time Space Realities: Towards an Understanding of Our Historical Systems’. As an example of its application, see McMichael (1997) for a discussion of the changes in world food production regimes in relation to conjunctural shifts in global capitalism.

2. Paul Wapner (1996, 21-23) gives examples of both national regulations and international agreements which have not been complied with, to the considerable detriment of the environment and endangered species. He also cites the views of critics who claim that
international treaties and the like always represent lowest minimum standards negotiable, rather than the optimum for the environment.

3. This retraction from the ideal of international proletarian solidarity is covered in further detail in Chapter Three. Magnusson (1996, 38-40) argues that success at state level undermined the original internationalist project of socialism and has ended in the rout of social democracy in the late twentieth century, with the majority of social democrat parties being indistinguishable from conservative and liberal parties – and repressive dictatorships – in imposing globally driven ‘economic restructuring’ on the states they rule(d).

4. Statistical information on new technology use by different political tendencies has yet to be created, so the information we do have is necessarily subjective and anecdotal. My impressions of Green use of new communications technologies have been formed from watching the New Zealand Green Party make extensive use of computer-based communications, including conducting executive-level discussions and making executive decisions via e-mail. (This is covered in more detail in Chapter Eight.) One prime example of how ‘wired’ New Zealand Greens are can be found in the response to a 1998 on-line poll conducted by New Zealand’s National Business Review via its website. Responses to the question ‘Who would you vote for if an election were held tomorrow?’ put the Green Party in front with over 30% of the votes cast, followed closely by the New Right party ACT. Next came National, then Labour, and lastly the Alliance. This was at a time when scientific random telephone polling had National first with over 30%, Labour second, then the Alliance, then ACT (with around 5%), and finally the Greens with around 1%. As the cyber poll was entirely voluntary and unprompted, what this result shows is not actual party preferences, but rather how ‘politically wired’ the Greens and the New Right are, compared to older/more conservative political parties. For a further discussion of Greens and cyber-politics see Chapter Eight.

5. Information on what happened at the conference and who attended it was obtained from ‘Bludgers Prizegiving’, (1990). The article on the conference cites and quotes several other New Zealand media sources on the conference and its participants. Further connections between attendees at the conference and their subsequent role in the ‘commercialisation’ of New Zealand are given by Brian Easton (1997b).

6. For an account of such tours and how they were too much even for the Minister of the environment see Speden (1995).

7. Enzensberger’s 1973 essay ‘A Critique of Political Ecology’ (in Enzensberger, 1988) differed from most of the contemporary socialist/communist critiques in not denying the realities of environmental degradation. It also differed from contemporary Green critiques in being aware that the burden of environmental degradation and deprivation was not and is not distributed evenly or fairly, but according to existing class and other social cleavages.
Chapter Three

The rise and fall of social democracy

'The militant reform associated with the early history of social democratic parties, which secured limited but important concessions from dominant classes, has gradually dissolved. The over-riding objective is no longer the execution of a clearly defined programme of economic, social or political reform but the exercise of the power of patronage which the state apparatus confers on those who administer it. Social democracy no longer articulates, much less carries through, transitional strategies aimed at the transformation of society. It lacks the will, the analysis and the means needed to challenge the current direction of advanced capitalism. It has outlived its historical mission.' (Camilleri, 1986, 58)

The international gives way to the global

Joseph Camilleri's epitaph on social democracy may have seemed a little premature in 1986, but it was in fact extremely prescient - by 1996 his conclusions had been
well documented in Australia and New Zealand by numerous studies, which began to appear shortly after Camilleri’s critique. They include Bell and Head (1994), Boston and Dalziel (1992), Boston and Holland (1987), Burchell and Mathews (1991), Castles et al (1996), Denemark (1990), Easton (1989, 1997b), Jesson (1989), Johnson (1989), O’Brien and Wilkes (1993), Oliver (1987), Pusey (1992) and Scott (1991). The common theme of these studies is that it was labour governments, not liberal/conservative ones, which were primarily responsible for instituting economic and social reforms and restructuring in the 1980s. These reforms were intended to increase national participation in the global economy, and were readily adopted and further developed by liberal/conservative governments that shared the same globalist orientation.

In this chapter I examine the relevance of this shift in social democrat/labour politics to development of Green politics. To do this properly involves going back to the origins of social democrat/labour politics in the internationalisation of the world economy in the late nineteenth century. Then I ‘fast forward’ to the 1970s and 1980s to show how the nationalist systems of state economic management developed and defended by social democrat/labour parties were ultimately rejected by them in favour of globalisation. Thus although these parties worked hard in the 1970s to take on board the messages of the new social movements with regard to gender and race equality, in the final analysis these remained as ‘clip-ons’ to an economic policy which limited their realisation. In turn, this provided a political space within which Green parties could develop and prosper, and even function as the ‘Left’ within parliaments which no longer have a genuine Left. (See Chapter Seven for more on this point.)
For although parties retaining the labour name continue to exist and attract significant voter support in Australia and New Zealand, their economic policies are no longer the same as those promoted and implemented by pre-1980s labour governments. Far from challenging the current direction of advanced capitalism i.e. globalisation, they endorse it and seek to foster it. In this respect, if they have not outlived their historical mission, they have certainly redefined it to become the opposite of what it previously was.

In doing so they have delivered a major blow to established forms of non-revolutionary leftism, which now no longer have a party with a chance of becoming government to support, infiltrate or influence. In Australasia voters and political activists wanting ‘leftist’ parliamentary options have had to look towards reconstituting labour politics, e.g. the New Labour Party in New Zealand. Also to liberal centrist parties like the Australian Democrats, or to ‘rainbow’ solutions like the Alliance of five parties (the Democrats, the Greens, the Liberals, Mana Motuhake, the New Labour Party), formed in New Zealand in 1991. Finally, there is the Green party option (the Australian Greens formed in 1992, and the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand formed in 1990, which joined the Alliance in 1991, and left it in 1997). Of these options, the Green parties are the only ones that are part of a global movement of related political parties. They also have an economic programme which, while seeming to contain and combine elements of both leftism and liberalism, is based on different premises (the formation of this economics in New Zealand in the 1970s is discussed in Chapter Seven).
Does this mean that Green parties can and will eventually be as dismissive of social democrat/labour parties as Trotsky was of the Mensheviks? (‘You are bankrupt. You have played out your role - go where you belong: to the dust-heap of history!’) (Deutscher, 1954, 314). The answer to that would seem to lie in a better understanding of the forces that created social democracy as an international politics, and that caused it to founder on the shoals of globalism.

In this chapter I consider the extent to which social democrat/labour parties were both a creation and a creator of internationalist world politics, and how this had to change or die with the shift to globalism. Also at how this affected their economic, labour, social welfare, national security and environmental policies in ways which left them open to both the forces of globalism, and the Green critique. I use the Australian and New Zealand labour parties and governments for most of my historical examples, as they provide the best case studies of the nationalist/globalist shift in social democrat/labour politics, but I also use supplementary examples from European social democrat/labour parties.

Despite the difference in name, social democrat and labour parties both originated in and were the creations of the wider labour movement which began forming in the latter half of the nineteenth century. There are undoubtedly strong national and cultural differences between social democrat/labour parties in countries as different as Germany and Australia, and each country with such a party has its own unique set of historical circumstances which shapes its labour politics. However, in the final analysis the parallels between social democrat politics in Europe and labour politics in Australasia are both striking and significant, and their politics and economics are
directly comparable (Denemark, 1990). This is not surprising, given that both were and are being shaped by the same international forces, and hence the same trends can be observed in Europe and Australasia.

Whether called social democrat or labour, these parties all attempted to work out an 'historic compromise' between labour and capital. The goal was to successfully manage a 'mixed economy', which provided a good rate of return on capital on the one hand, and low unemployment, good wages and a high 'social wage' on the other (Przeworski, 1980, 1985). However by the 1970s the conditions under which this compromise had been temporarily possible were changing. Capital was using new technologies and going global to increase the rate of return. On the labour side, as Hobsbawm (1989) notes, by the 1980s only two of the five factors responsible for the rise of mass labour/socialist movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries still had some historical life left in them. This pointed to the conclusion that they were all historically determined and historically specific, and a new politics was needed for new times. Thus Hobsbawm entitled his essay on the subject 'Farewell to the classic labour movement?' Belinda Probert (1986) was similarly moved to ponder on why erstwhile socialist or left parties might no longer be the only or the best means of achieving socialism. In considering the globalist influences that brought about such changes I focus in this chapter on the commonalities which were important in creating a point of resistance - and of departure - for Green politics.
From economic nationalism to economic rationalism

The mutually constituting relationship of national markets, national currencies and constitutional nation-states within the context of the expanding international economy and politics of the nineteenth century has already been noted in Chapter Two. To recap - constitutional nation-states were required to defend national currencies and expand international markets. The political parties that became the vehicle for constitutional parliamentary politics rose and fell principally on their actual or perceived ability to manage the national economy and defend the 'national' economic interest internationally. The international economic hegemony of Great Britain was due to the adoption of the pound sterling as the international benchmark currency.

This was the international economic and political milieu within which the socialist parties and international socialist movements that began to create themselves from the mid-nineteenth century onwards had to operate. Social democracy had its beginnings in Germany in the 1860s, with the formation of various labour leagues, followed in 1869 by the Social Democrat Workers Party, which merged with the All-German Workers Association in 1875 (Breuilly, 1987). In Scandinavia the Norwegian Labour Party was formed in 1887, the Swedish Social Democrat Party in 1889 (Castles, 1978). Political labour associations formed in Australia in the late 1880s, with the various state-level Labor organisations joining up in the 1890s to create the Australian Labor Party (ALP). National level labour politics in Australia thus preceded the constitution of Australia as a federated nation-state, and the ALP
long predates the major liberal and conservative parties in Australia. The closeness of the timing is not coincidental - the linkage between nationhood and labour politics was fundamental to the economic programmes and electoral success of Australasian labour parties. In his introduction to *The Australian Labor Movement 1850-1907* L.G. Churchward says that 'Perhaps the greatest achievement of Labor in Federal politics in the period up to 1914 was to give political expression to Australian nationalism.' (Ebbels, 1966).

In New Zealand and Great Britain a leftist form of liberalism which was electorally successful delayed the formation of separate labour parties capable of forming a government until the early twentieth century. However various labour leagues and social democrat parties were set up in both places from the 1870s onwards (Hinton, 1983; Roth and Hammond, 1981), and both countries were definitely part of the international trend.

The formation of the ALP is a textbook illustration of the push and pull between national and international economic factors. Prior to the invention and widespread application of refrigeration technologies, Australia (and New Zealand’s) chief export and main contribution to the world economy was unprocessed wool. Removing the wool from the sheep required a large labour force of shearers; getting it to the ports and then overseas required large numbers of transport workers, dockers and seafarers. It was these workers, organised into labour unions in both Australia and New Zealand, who participated in the Maritime Strike of 1890 (the first Australasian strike) - and were soundly defeated by their employers on both sides of the Tasman (McMullin, 1991, 1; Roth and Hammond, 1981, 38).
Queensland pastoralists then decided to capitalise on the post-strike weakness of the unions by announcing wage cuts for shearers, and refusing to negotiate. A strike of shearers and associated workers began in early March 1891, followed by a general strike later that month. Severe state repression ensued, with strikers convicted, imprisoned and dragged in chains for contravening an obscure 1825 conspiracy law, which had been repealed in England but not in Queensland, and the strike collapsed in mid-June (McMullin, 1991, 3). The main lesson which Australian labour drew from these major industrial defeats was that it needed to increase its efforts to gain political representation. A secondary lesson was that to do so it had to modify its political platform.

In Queensland the ‘People’s Parliamentary Platform’, drawn up by Utopian socialist William Lane for the Australian Labor Federation in August 1890, advocated nationalising all sources of wealth and all means of production and exchange in order to provide funds for education, sanitation, pensions for invalids, the elderly and children. It also called for ‘social justice [for] every citizen’. It was replaced in March 1891 by a platform which rejected wholesale nationalisation but called for electoral reforms, a statutory 8 hour day, protective labour legislation, free compulsory education, pensions for orphans and the elderly, a state bank and state control of irrigation and water conservation (McMullin, 1991, 6).

Labor parties in the other states adopted similar platforms in the 1890s, and the ALP was elected to the federal parliament and even formed the world’s first labour
government, albeit briefly, between April and August 1904. In 1905 the federal platform of the ALP set out the following objectives:

‘(1) The cultivation of an Australian sentiment based upon the maintenance of racial purity, and the development in Australia of an enlightened and self-reliant community.

(2) The securing of the full results of their industry to all producers by the collective ownership of monopolies and the extension of the industrial and economic functions of the State and Municipality.’

The key planks of its ‘Fighting Platform’ were

1. Maintenance of a White Australia.
2. Compulsory Arbitration.
3. Old Age Pensions.
5. Citizen Defence Force.
6. Restriction of Public Borrowing.
7. Navigation Laws.’

(cited in Ebbels, 1966, 222)

The concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalisation’ can thus be seen to be foundational to labour politics in Australia. Similarly, organised labour in New Zealand at that time was mostly giving its support to a Liberal government that discriminated against citizens of Asian origin, and was opposed to Asian immigration. Yet it was also prepared to pass a compulsory arbitration act and provide old age pensions (the latter were initially for white citizens only).
The early twentieth century labour concept of 'nation' is now well out of fashion. Labour governments in Australasia in the 1980s began the moves to privatise state monopolies, restrict state and local government enterprise, and reduce levels of tariff and other forms of economic protection. These were all put in place by their predecessors in order to create a 'self-reliant community', and secure 'the full results of their industry to all producers'.

Until the 1980s about-face, however, the corollary of nationalism in economics was a commitment to improving the participation and welfare of all citizens of the nation state, not merely the elite. Hence the early labour emphasis on the extension of the suffrage, both in law and in practice. Also important were the protection of wage workers (via compulsory arbitration and other industrial relations reforms), and a universal social welfare programme. This usually began with old age pensions and moved on via widows, orphans, sickness, maternity and unemployment benefits to the creation of the 'welfare state'. Although somewhat limited, in late twentieth century terms, due to its elevation of the status of the white male wage earner relative to other non-elite groups, this approach was nevertheless a substantial departure from previous conceptions and practices concerning the role of the state.

It also required a different approach to national economic management. When social democrat/labour parties were able to gain government power for any meaningful length of time, they were able to implement their new approach.

By the 1930s, after two major world depressions, it was clear that laissez faire economic doctrines could not guarantee full employment. Social democrat/labour parties therefore had little hesitation in adopting policies of the type advocated by
J.M. Keynes, which included a different role for the state in the management and planning of the economy, one which was more focussed on securing full employment and social security rather than providing opportunities for rentiers, speculators and other 'investors'. Such policies were electorally popular in the 1930s and 40s, and when coupled with efficient and effective state management (as in Sweden and New Zealand) ensured long terms in office for social democrat/labour parties. Where labour governments were replaced by conservative/liberal governments (as they were in Australasia in the 1950s) those governments continued a commitment to the state's role in maintaining employment, though they placed a greater emphasis on stimulating or assisting private rather than public provision of jobs.

Social democrat/labour parties saw a role for direct state provision of jobs, although they took different approaches to achieving this aim. In Britain the Labour Party placed a heavy emphasis on nationalisation of major industries i.e. on maximising the power of the state to create or maintain employment by extending the economic enterprises in state control. In Germany and New Zealand, despite socialist sentiment within the parties in favour of this route, it was never given such a high priority. The parties focussed instead on ensuring that strategic assets (especially the major transport, communications and energy facilities) were maintained in, transferred to, or established in state ownership. The ALP gave nationalisation higher ideological priority, but Labor attempts to widen state control to include interstate airlines in 1947 and banks in 1948 fell foul of restraining interpretations of the Australian constitution by conservative judges on the High Court. In the case of banks there was
also a vigorous campaign against the proposal by interested parties which led to Labor losing power in New South Wales (McMullin, 1991, 246-250).

By the 1960s there was still some life in the nationalisation debate in Britain, but in Australasia and Germany the mixed economy was firmly supported by the labour parties and the German SPD. The SPD had moved slowly and erratically away from socialisation in the 1940s and 50s. By the time of the tradition-breaking Bad Godesberg Programme of 1959 (in which it abandoned the last vestiges of Marxist goals and terminology) it was committed only to publicly owned coal-mining and atomic energy industries, plus central planning for the power industry (Childs, 1966, 92-106).

Rather than pursue nationalisation of all existing key industries, the German and Australasian approach was to create state versions of those industries as competitors to the private concerns e.g. banks, insurance companies, shipping lines. This was particularly feasible when the state could be in at the beginning of industries based on new technologies, such as hydro-electric and nuclear power, aviation and telecommunications, and set them up as state enterprises. Labour governments also played a pro-active role in the establishment and subvention of manufacturing in Australasia, not always wisely or successfully. The failed Nelson cotton mill experiment of the 1957-60 New Zealand Labour government is a case in point. Similarly, for all the state subsidisation of New Zealand’s only aluminium smelter (a project initiated by the same Labour government) it is impossible for independent researchers to establish whether the project has ever made a corresponding financial return to the community (Bertram and Dann, 1981).
The 1972-75 Labor government in Australia probably represents the last full-blown effort by a labor government to actively manage a modern mixed economy in accordance with social democratic economic principles. At the same time it also had to try and stimulate growth and investment to compensate for the stresses and strains which were starting to show in the world economy. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam was committed to a nationalist form of productivism, and saw a community of interest between labour and industry, which he expressed in this way:

'I believe there is no section of the section of the Australian business community which shares greater common interests, more common ground with the present Australian government than Australia's manufacturing industries. It is an historical fact that the strength of Australian manufactures and the strength of the Australian Labor movement have grown together. This has been no accident. It is of the essence of the political and industrial development of this nation; and this community of interest between Labor and industry was never greater than at this time in our history when we have an Australian Labor government.' (Whitlam in Johnson, 1989, 55)

Co-operation between business, industry and the state was essential to the Whitlam government's method of achieving increases in social welfare, which was based on surpluses to be derived from national economic growth. Carol Johnson summarises the three central flaws in this approach as the following assumptions 'that a capitalist economy would function smoothly as long as it was properly managed; that high levels of economic growth, necessary to Labor's plans for social reform,
could be achieved; and that a massive expansion of public expenditure would have no detrimental effects on the private sector.’ (Johnson, 1989, 54).

It would also have helped to have had an economically literate Prime Minister capable of taking an interest in and guiding the process, rather than one who was more interested in foreign affairs. Whitlam turned managing the economy over to a rapid succession of Treasurers, (three in as many years), all of whom had some bona fide qualifications for the job but none of whom retained Whitlam’s confidence and support for long. It is therefore no wonder that the Whitlam government is remembered chiefly for its non-economic achievements, such as its progressive foreign policy, its reforms to the education system, its extension of medical care, and its elevation of the status of women and Aborigines.

It was certainly not up to dealing with the assaults on national economies that began to occur in the 1970s, of which the most visible symbol was the series of ‘oil shocks’ or crises of the early 1970s. In a bizarre but telling series of blunders based around the efforts of Rex Connor, the arch-nationalist Minister of Minerals and Energy, to secure cheap loans of the petrodollars that were sloshing around the world economy, the Whitlam government lost all credibility as sound economic managers. Bill Hayden’s relatively conservative 1975 budget, which ‘...attempted to find a “middle way” between the two extremes of “excessive” government spending and an “excessive” cut in government spending’, was offered after Hayden had concluded that Keynesian policies could not be simply applied in a world which no longer operated according to Keynesian principles (Johnson, 1989, 75). Despite this, the budget was still blocked by the Opposition in the Senate. Further, the ‘loans scandal’
was kept before the public, both by the Opposition and by a hostile press, as a reason for denying confidence in the government.

While this was not the only factor contributing to the downfall of the government, it was a major catalyst, and peculiarly apt. To unsuccessfully attempt to use an artefact of globalisation (loans of petrodollars) to fund economic nationalist goals, and to thereby precipitate the loss of governmental powers to achieve those goals, is one of the major ironies of Australian Labor history.

Out of government for a further eight years in Australia, (and nine in New Zealand), when the labour parties returned they were determined to do things differently. While ostensibly still committed to traditional labour social goals, they began to use radically different economic means. Such means began with floating the dollar - something that was contrary to previous labour economic management principles and a major departure from nationalist labour ideology - but certainly didn’t end there.

*Making work for the workers*

One of the major goals the labour governments of the 1970s and 80s were still committed to, at least according to their election manifestos, was full employment. Even where particular state-sponsored employment schemes failed, the principle of the creation of employment via the creation of state owned or subsidised enterprises
remained valid as far as both social democrat/labour and even their successor
conservative/liberal governments were concerned right through to the 1970s.
If anything it became more salient once the post-war boom went bust in the early
an increasingly unsuccessful strategy of attempting to stimulate economic growth,
and hence reduce the rising unemployment rate, by pouring millions of dollars of
state money (much of it borrowed) into state-owned and operated energy projects,
and associated private projects. These ‘Think Big’ schemes were supposed to
generate 160,000 jobs in the first few years, while the whole National growth
programme promised 410,000 new jobs by the end of the 1980s (New Zealand
National Party, 1981). They were also supposed to develop electricity and natural
gas supplies to fuel industrial expansion by foreign-owned companies (Wilson,
1982, 60-96).

A similar situation had existed in Tasmania for much longer, where the Hydro
Electric Commission which was set up in 1930 had virtual carte blanche to plan the
industrial development of Tasmania, with active support from the Labor
governments in power from 1934-1969 and 1972-1982 (Thompson, 1981). The
consensus on the desirability of this approach to development did not start to crack
until the early 1970s, when Lake Pedder was about to be sacrificed to another hydro
scheme. Public outrage and the efforts of the world’s first Green party, the United
Tasmania Group, were easily quashed by Labor in the 1970s, but by the 1980s and
the Gordon-below-Franklin dam dispute Labor in Tasmania was on shakier ground,
with Doug Lowe, (Labor Premier 1977-1981), unsuccessfully opposing the Franklin
scheme. Labor at federal level was persuaded to act against the hydro-electric
development paradigm and stop the scheme - which was a popular move with the Australian environmental constituency.

With forestry resources in Australasia, as with energy resources, there was an equally huge gulf between those who advocated state 'development' and subvention as a route to economic growth and full employment, and those who wanted the state to play a conservation role. The green opposition did not say categorically (as New Right critics would later say) that the state had no valid role to play in creating employment or developing resources. However, it did object strongly to the way in which Australasian labour governments in the 1970s and their conservative/liberal successors interpreted this role. This was indicative of the new political and economic thinking that emerged with the Greens.

Perhaps it was 'wrong' of social democrat/labour parties in the twentieth century to interpret the socialist maxim 'socialisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange' as meaning nationalisation of the same, and to give such a large role to the state. This was certainly argued by the 1980s labour governments in Australasia, which claimed to have a better way of doing things. Historically, however, when it was first promoted nationalisation was seen as the solution to chronic, endemic unemployment. The New South Wales Political Labour League Fighting Platform of 1896 had as a foundational principle '7. Abolition of the Unemployed' and in more specific terms as 'Absorption of the unemployed by the establishment of State farms and labor colonies.' (Ebbels, 1965, 217-219).
Although still in name and form the party which had been founded to secure state power for the working class because the unionist approach to guaranteeing work for the workers was inadequate, the Labour Party in New Zealand in the 1980s abjured its belief in and practice of this role. It not only started to sell off productive and profitable state enterprises, it also made drastic cuts in genuinely 'public' employment, by shrinking the public service both directly (by abolishing some departments of state and cutting budgets and staff in others), and indirectly (by cutting health and education spending). Traditions were cast aside in other areas too, as we shall see below.

_A fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay?_

Another major goal of the first labour parties was higher incomes and better working conditions for wage workers. With the 1980s abdication of a state role in providing employment came a new attitude, which in New Zealand amounted to an abdication, of the state's role in supporting a negotiated approach to better wages and conditions. A foundational demand of the ALP - Point 2 on the 1905 Federal Platform - was compulsory arbitration for industrial disputes and wage claims (Ebbels, 1965, 222). Interestingly, while Australian laborites were fighting for this demand, militant labour in New Zealand was fighting against it - specifically in the form of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894, enacted by the Liberal government. While the application of the Act was initially satisfactory to labour, which was in a demoralised state after its defeat in the great maritime strike of 1890, its disadvantages soon became obvious. By 1902 a delegate to the Wellington Trades
Council could describe the Act as ‘the biggest curse Labour has ever had put on it.’ (Roth and Hammond, 1981, 62), and the Federation of Labour formed in 1908 (a radical organisation popularly known as the ‘Red Feds’) advocated that unions should not compromise their right to strike by registering under the Act (Roth and Hammond, 1981, 79).

At the heart of labour ambivalence to compulsory arbitration or other wage-fixing mechanisms as a way of improving wages and conditions is a problem which labour parties have not been able to overcome. The problem is that the desirability of the mechanism to labour is entirely dependent on the level of employment prevailing at the time. In times of full or high employment arbitration systems act to slow down wage rises, while in times of high unemployment they can similarly retard wage falls. Thus workers seeking to maximise their wages would not want full employment and compulsory arbitration at the same time. The ALP therefore acted in accordance with labour tradition in negotiating its 1983 Accord with labour at a time when it knew that its policies of removing government support and tariff protection were going to reduce employment and cause other stress to workers.

The NZLP, on the other hand, took a legislative approach to controlling labour. In 1985 it restored compulsory unionism, which had been abolished by National in 1983, but its Labour Relations Act of 1987 ended the state’s role as an enforcer of industrial awards and abolished second tier bargaining. The aim of the latter change was to shift workers off national awards and on to enterprise agreements. Whenever unions managed to achieve the opposite of this intention it merely increased pressure from the strong business lobby to deregulate the labour market, which was secured
with the Employment Contracts Act introduced by National in 1991 (Walsh, 1992). That this result was not achieved earlier was not due to Labour government ministers and their Treasury advisers not trying for it. Margaret Wilson provides details of the struggle within the Labour Party by senior members to wrest some say in making industrial relations policy back from New Right ministers and senior bureaucrats (Wilson, 1989, 100-104).

While the enthusiastic embrace of economic rationalisation and globalisation policies by the labour parties in the 1980s has probably been the main cause of the fall in real wages and the social wage in Australasia in the 1980s and 90s, the labour parties must take responsibility for ensuring that the industrial relations mechanisms needed to pursue the policies were in place. The Australian Accord may seem to be - and certainly promised to be - a much more pro-union, pro-workers and their families arrangement than the New Zealand Labour Relations Act. However in practice what was promised was not delivered, and ‘...conservative elements of the Accord such as wage restraint were strengthened while many other reforms were watered down or not introduced.’ (Johnson, 1989, 98). Treasurer Paul Keating boasted in his 1986 budget speech of a cut in real labour costs of 7% under Labor, and promoted Labor and the Accord to business as preferable to what the Opposition would offer with its wages ‘free for all’ policy (Johnson, 1989, 98-99).

By the 1990s, then, the Australasian labour parties in government had reversed the original social democrat rationale for state-supported mechanisms for wage fixing, and were even, in the Australian case, prepared to force workers into worse deals
than they may have obtained in a non-managed system. Another foundational principle had been stood on its head.

Welfare to workfare?

The establishment of the bare bones of a welfare state in Germany, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand preceded the election of social democrat/labour parties. Yet those parties were most strongly identified with the concept, and can take most of the credit for developing and strengthening ‘cradle to grave’ welfare provisions. These include not just the payment of social security benefits to the obviously needy but also the ‘social wage’ provisions of ‘free’ public health and education systems.

There were, however, differences between European and Australasian social democrat/labour parties in the way in which the welfare state was conceptualised and developed. In Australasia the financing of welfare provision came primarily from income tax paid by employees. The difficulties this poses as unemployment rises are obvious, and are part of the explanation for the speed with which Australasian labour governments abandoned the goal of full welfare provision in the 1980s. It also provided the justification for the imposition of other forms of taxation. The introduction of a Goods and Services Tax in New Zealand in 1985 was a joint exercise between the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Social Welfare, with the latter minister putting out a Green Paper supporting GST as a means of filling emptying welfare coffers. Arguments from the labour movement that GST is a regressive tax that impacts more heavily on low-income people were not heeded in
New Zealand. However they played a major role in securing Labor one more term in office in Australia in 1993 when the Liberal Party proposed introducing this unpopular tax.

In Germany there had always been a greater emphasis on the role that capital (in the form of the large employer) was expected to play in ensuring social welfare. Hence conservative as well as social democrat governments enforced significant employer contributions towards superannuation savings and unemployment insurance, and used heavy company taxes for social ends. In Germany and in Sweden there have also been serious (although partial) moves towards worker ownership of major industrial concerns, which have provided some perks for employees. Such moves were never even contemplated by labour governments in Australasia.

When the global economy entered a new and disturbing phase in the 1970s, therefore, the Australasian labour parties were faced with a tough call. How could they protect the high standard of living that their welfare state and full employment policies of the 1930s and 1940s had helped to construct, which were now jeopardised by the economic ‘crisis’? As Roger Douglas, architect of the economic about-face of New Zealand’s fourth Labour government expressed it in his book of the same name ‘There’s got to be a better way!’ (Douglas, 1980).

The way chosen by the Australasian labour parties was already being promoted by the governments of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the USA. A clutch of measures was at the core of this economic ‘reform’ process. Smithin summarises the four main routes taken to strengthen the role of market forces as
‘...privatisation (that is, the sale of formerly state-owned industries to the private sector), deregulation, changes in labour and trade union legislation, and a reduction in the scope of the so-called ‘welfare state’. “ (Smithin, 1996, 33). (These general headings cover the specifics already given in the list derived from Chossudovsky (1998) that can be found in Chapter Two.) Not all members of the labour governments and parties in Australasia endorsed this approach, and a majority of the party rank and file in New Zealand appears to have been opposed to it. It must surely be a major reason for the 61% drop in NZLP membership between 1981 and 1990 (Vowles, 1999, Table 4). However the disaffected failed to mount a substantive challenge to the economic reforms juggernaut (Oliver, 1989). The NZLP President (who had reservations about the pro-market approach) was deliberately not invited to the important Economic Summit convened by the Labour government in September 1984 to try and build a consensus among major players in the economy on the need for economic reforms (Wilson, 1989, 45-46).

The shrinking of the welfare state prescribed by the economic reformers in the ascendancy in the 1980s therefore proceeded apace in Australasia, with social welfare spending in Australia declining throughout the decade, while in New Zealand the increase per capita reduced to 0.25% per annum. In both countries there was an increase in the targeting of provisions, and steps towards ‘user pays’ for previously free services (e.g. medical prescription charges in New Zealand) (Castles and Shirley, 1996, 95-97).

In a detailed and relatively kind comparative assessment of the Labour government welfare measures in the 1980s Francis Castles and Ian Shirley show that New
Zealand had more to lose in the first place so that its losses appear to be greater, whereas Australia, which started from behind, appears to gain in this period (Castles and Shirley, 1996). (Australia, for example, extended health care and education provisions that were behind New Zealand's, whereas New Zealand cut back its superior provisions.) However, both governments set the policy framework for further cuts to welfare and social wage provisions by subsequent conservative governments. The National government elected in New Zealand at the end of 1990 followed through by slashing welfare benefits by up to 12% and bringing 'user pays' to the public hospital system.

The greater severity and 'commercialist' style (Easton, 1997) of the New Zealand Labour government, which contrasted with the gentler, more 'corporatist' approach of Australian Labor, was less successful in realising the promised goals of economic growth. It also failed to deliver the increased employment which was supposed to stem from this growth (Castles et al, 1996, 18-20). The greater size and complexity of the Australian bicameral federal political system made change harder to implement swiftly than New Zealand's unitary unicameral system, and the wider ideological diversity within the ALP compared to the NZLP also constituted something of a brake on the reforming zeal of the economic rationalists. Yet economic rationalism was as alive and well in Canberra as in Wellington (Pusey, 1991), and was the lodestone for economic and social policy formation by the Labor government. In both countries top policy makers in the 1980s believed that society existed to serve the economy, not the other way round, and that ensuring low inflation, economic growth and a good return on investments were the top priorities for government managers. Full employment, good wages and social welfare were no
longer the primary goals of government, but would either be ensured by the achievement of the primary economic goals or not at all.

Economic nationalism was thus moribund in Australasia - killed by the very parties that had first promoted it and practised it. This had huge implications - not just for the labour and welfare policies of the Australasian labour governments of the 1980s, but also for their policies in other areas. At first glance the upside of labour abandoning nationalism in the economic sphere would appear to be its move towards a more progressive, pacifist, egalitarian form of internationalism. The Whitlam government epitomised this shift, while the Kirk government in New Zealand at the same period was still socially conservative at home although stronger on human rights abroad. By the 1980s, however, the labour parties in both countries had gained significant support from the ‘new social movement’ constituencies that formed the backbone of Green parties. Labour parties/governments were expected to pay more attention to women, the environment, peace and other new social movement concerns, and in New Zealand a tendency for women to favour the National Party seemed to have shifted to a preference for Labour - or at least for some of Labour’s policies. (For studies of the ‘gender gap’ in New Zealand electoral politics, which seems to be more apparent than real, see Catt and McLeay, 1993.)

It is worth examining the environmental and peace/security policies and programmes of the Australasian labour governments in greater detail to see what happened with the shift from economic nationalism to globalism. The tension between nationalist and internationalist positions becomes further exacerbated by the shift to globalism, and highlights the difficulties in trying to find nationalist solutions to global
problems - difficulties which may have led some erstwhile labour politicians to abandon nationalism in good faith. Looking at the struggles of social democracy with this sphere of politics also throws the spotlight on to whether the Green approach of 'thinking globally, acting locally' is adequate to meet the challenges of achieving those goals - a theme to which I return in Chapter Eight.

National security

Socialist internationalism had an important influence on the defence and national security thinking of the early social democratic parties. The slogan 'Workers of the world unite' was in part an exhortation to fight the abuses of capital, and not each other. However, there was no foundational commitment to non-violence as a political principle, despite social democratic parties generally abjuring the violent, revolutionary road to socialism in favour of parliamentary gradualism. On the pacifist side the 1891 Erfurt Programme of the SPD included abolition of a standing army (Tegel, 1987, 21). The platform of the New South Wales Labor Party of 1890 also included the 'abolition of the present Defence Force', and 'the establishment of our military system upon a purely voluntary basis.' (Ebbels, 1965, 212). In New Zealand the short-lived Social Democrat Party included the principle of a voluntary defence force in its 1913 platform, and the more conservative United Labour Party also opposed the 1909 Act which made military training compulsory. Militant labour was opposed to compulsory military training on three main grounds - that it was a
weapon of capitalist imperialism, that it would be used in internal class struggles, and that it created a militaristic class psychology. (Brown, 1962, 21)

On the other side, however, even a leading social democrat ‘pacifist’ such as Eduard Bernstein, a founding father of German social democracy, believed that workers should take up arms in certain circumstances - such as defending the fatherland against imperialism, or bringing ‘civilisation’ to ‘backward’ peoples (Fletcher, 1987, 49). The 1905 Federal Platform of the ALP called for a Citizen Military Force (Ebbels, 1965, 222) and Australia’s first Labor Prime Minister, J.C. Watson, was a supporter of compulsory military training as the only method of giving effect to this plank of the platform (Ebbels, 1965, 239).

The outbreak of international conflict in 1914 mercilessly exposed the divisions within social democratic parties on this issue, and led to the SPD and the ALP literally falling apart. SPD deputies in the Reichstag had to decide whether to vote for war credits or not. Influential ‘right-wing’ social democrats saw support for the war as an opportunity to wrest pro-labour concessions from the government, and initially the SPD voted en bloc for the necessary credits. But as the war went on opposition to it increased both inside and outside the SPD, and by 1916 internal differences were so great that deputies who refused to vote for credits were expelled from the SPD Reichstag caucus. In 1917 these deputies and their supporters, numbering roughly one-third of the SPD, set up the USPD (the Independent Social Democrat Party) (Childs, 1966, 155).
Although opposed to the war the USPD was by no means a pacifist party, as it contained leading members who were not averse to revolutionary violence (Eley, 1987, 66-67). The USPD and SPD were not reunited until 1922 - by which time the Communist Party formed in 1918 had taken up the 'revolutionary' position and was splitting the socialist/labour vote.

In Australia conflict over the ALP position on conscription was deeply divisive and traumatic to a party which could pride itself on having produced the first state and federal level labour governments in the world. Labor Prime Minister William Hughes introduced two referenda on conscription during the course of World War I, despite strong opposition within cabinet, caucus and the party at large. Hughes was expelled from the New South Wales Labor Party in 1916, but refused to leave national office. After the first referendum failed to endorse conscription he set up a 'National Labor' minority government of pro-conscriptionists. The ALP lost a lot of support at state level, with only Queensland remaining in Labor hands. Hughes and his non-Labor government remained in office for seven years after his split with ALP, and it was to be thirteen years all told before Labor was to form another federal government (McMullin, 1991, 104-114). The enormous contradictions inherent in the 'patriots' being 'imperialists', and the 'nationalists' being 'pacifists', in Australia at this time led to much social turbulence. Xavier Herbert provides an excellent account of what it did to him, his family and the people in his hometown in his autobiography (Herbert, 1976, 135-153).

In New Zealand, things were much simpler. Contemporary pacifist Labour leaders are under the impression that Labour has always taken a principled stand against war
(see, for example, Wilson, 1989, 56). However, the facts about World War One are that in New Zealand, which had never had a labour government to this point, the conscription issue served to unite rather than divide the labour movement. The belief among labourites that opposition to conscription would prove to be electorally popular served as an incentive to bring together the various New Zealand social democratic/labour organisations to form a united Labour Party in 1916. Labour historian Bruce Brown notes that it is remarkable that the issue that so bitterly split the ALP should have been the one that created the NZLP (Brown, 1962, 21-26).

These differences between ‘sister’ parties show that there was no universal analytical framework adopted by social democracy on issues of war and peace. There was no international platform, nor were there nationally or internationally consistent positions. Differences in the stand taken continued to surface between and within social democrat/labour parties and governments. Anti-conscriptionist during World War I, New Zealand’s second Labour Prime Minister Peter Fraser was responsible for ensuring peacetime compulsory military training from 1949 until it was abolished by the third Labour government 1972-1975. Similarly, John Curtin was a leading anti-conscriptionist in Australia in World War I, and a leading promoter of conscription while Prime Minister during World War II.

After the Second World War the explicit defence/security issue which split social democrat/labour parties was not conscription and compulsory military training but nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The nuclear issue was located within a wider and more complex context of the Cold War, the ‘Western’ policy of the containment of the Soviet Union, and the nationalist (and militarist) aspirations of some of the
de-colonising states of the Third World. Nuclear deterrence via staying ahead in the nuclear arms race could be (and was) presented as an acceptable and positive alternative to the threat of Soviet imperialism and further outbreaks of conventional war, and as the 'modern' way of protecting national borders.

That social democrat parties were prepared to go along with this analysis became obvious in Europe in the 1960s. One important effect of the major revision of the SPD programme that took place at Bad Godesberg in 1959 was an acceptance of the principle of national defence. At the time this implied embracing the NATO nuclear deterrent and the stationing of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems on West German soil (Carr, 1987, 197). The British Labour Party, on the other hand, went through years of debate on its defence policy in general and its nuclear policy in particular. There was a major split between those advocating unilateral British nuclear disarmament (as promoted by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament from its inception in 1955) and those preferring a multilateralist approach. The multilateralists retained the upper hand both within the parliamentary wing and the party at large (Hinton, 1983, 184-185; Howell, 1980, 225-227).

In New Zealand and Australia the labour parties supported the ANZUS military alliance formed between Australia, New Zealand and the USA in 1951, when a National Party government was in power in New Zealand and a Liberal Party government ruled Australia. The ANZUS alliance has a strong nuclear component. Australia and New Zealand were expected to provide berthing for American nuclear powered and/or armed warships cruising 'America's Lake' (the Pacific Ocean) and to house communications stations which are part of the American nuclear weapons
delivery system (Hager, 1996; Harford, 1985; Hayes, Zarsky, Bello, 1986). This willingness and capacity to support the USA has generally been of strategic rather than practical importance to the parties involved, which means that it tends to wax and wane in political significance according to strategic considerations. Nevertheless it has been seen as a key obstacle to a peaceful, non-nuclear Pacific by the green and peace movements (Harford, 1984), and has reduced the ability of labour governments to manoeuvre towards this end.

So despite withdrawing New Zealand army volunteers from Vietnam in 1972, taking a pro-active role against French nuclear testing in the South Pacific, and promoting a South Pacific nuclear-free zone (McIntyre, 1992, 534; Wilson, 1989, 58), the New Zealand Labour government 1972-1975 did not follow through by disengagement from the war-making capacity of the global intelligence system. It remained committed to the intelligence and communications dimensions of ANZUS. This meant that peace movement attempts at persuasion to the contrary had no influence on New Zealand continuing to provide facilities for the American military (Wilkes, 1973).

This remained the case both before and after the passage of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987 (McIntyre, 1992). The Labour government made every effort to maintain the ANZUS connection immediately after it was elected. New Zealand-based facilities remained part of the American military intelligence and communications network, and there was conflict between the Labour Party and the Labour government over the ANZUS alliance,
with the government trying hard to hold on to the alliance (Dann, 1985a, 3-4; Hager, 1996; McKinnon, 1993, 278-301).

In Australia there was a similar history of Labor support for withdrawal from the Vietnam war, and especially - once again - opposition to conscription, and opposition to French nuclear testing. Labor delivered on both of these issues when it was in government between 1972 and 1975. There was also a parallel acceptance of American intelligence and communications bases, and less willingness to jeopardise the ANZUS alliance by banning nuclear warships in the 1980s. During the successful 1983 election campaign the ALP leadership stressed its support for the US alliance and Australia's role within it (Falk, 1983, 220). This was consistent with Australia maintaining its general support for the USA as the leader of the anti-communist camp, even though it did not support every US military venture.

Australia has an additional potential contribution to make - or refuse - to global security. Its incredibly ancient rocks hold the element of global nuclearism, uranium, and whether it should be mined and exported has been on the political agenda since the 1970s. The Whitlam government appointed an inquiry into uranium mining, which eventually released reports in 1976 and 1977 raising scientific doubts about the wisdom of such mining. In the late seventies the ALP (out of office) was in tune with the National Uranium Moratorium Campaign which was formed in 1977. At its 1977 conference the ALP passed a motion in favour of an indefinite moratorium on uranium mining. However in 1981 it changed to supporting a one mine policy and in 1984, after one year in office, it escalated to a three mines policy, which was reconfirmed by the 1991 conference (Burgmann, 1993, 195-198).
The Nuclear Disarmament Party was formed in June 1984 by activists who were frustrated by the failure of the ALP to meet the central demands of the huge Australian anti-nuclear movement (Prior, 1987, 5-6). It recruited openly and successfully among anti-nuclear delegates at the July 1984 ALP conference (Burgmann, 1993, 216), and polled 7.2% of first preference votes in elections to the Senate and gained one senator (Jo Vallentine from Western Australia). Despite a very high vote in New South Wales it failed to secure a second seat in the Senate - this was directly due to unfavourable distribution of preferences by the ALP (Papadakis, 1993, 181). The NDP fell apart within a year, split by policy and process disagreements. However Jo Vallentine went on to become Australia’s first Green senator in 1990, thus exemplifying a foundational connection between anti-nuclear/pro-peace politics and Green politics which is absent from labour politics.

Opposition to nuclear militarism was also a salient difference between the SPD and the emerging Green party in Germany. The Schmidt SPD/FDP coalition government of the 1970s had allowed the stationing of nuclear missiles in Germany (and was also committed to nuclear power developments). The failure of the SPD to support the large and dynamic nuclear peace movement in Germany left that movement looking for another parliamentary political vehicle - which indeed it helped to create in 1979/80 in the form of Die Grünen. High profile peace campaigner Petra Kelly continued to attract attention as a leader of Die Grünen and one of the first Green members of the Bundestag (Kelly, 1983; Parkin, 1994). She was merely the most prominent of the German peace movement/Green activists who adopted a global anti-nuclear approach to security issues. (See, for example, Maier, 1985, Europa auf
In review of social democrat/labour party positions on peace and national security issues, it can be seen that a commitment to non-violence was never at any stage a foundational principle. Thus social democrat/labour parties have felt free to make policy on the issues in order to maximise pragmatic political advantage. Sometimes they achieved the desired advantage (the NZLP in 1916) and sometimes they lost it (the ALP during World War I). Sometimes they won in the short term (the SPD in the 1970s) only to leave themselves vulnerable in the long-term to a party with a principled anti-nuclear platform.

The Australian and New Zealand labour parties seem to have made careful and effective calculations regarding the consequences of their stands on nuclear matters - and come up with different policies as a result. Labour Prime Minister David Lange was not a supporter of nuclear ship bans before taking office, and actively worked to water down party policy from a ban on nuclear armed and nuclear propelled ships to a ban on nuclear armed ships only. Public opinion polls eventually persuaded him that the party was right to promise to ban all nuclear warships and would gain votes as a result, and he gained great personal kudos in the international arena for promoting a stance which he only half-heartedly supported at home (Wright, 1984, 131-133). Labour President 1984-1987 Margaret Wilson has given some indication of the lukewarm commitment of the Labour government to the nuclear-free policy. In her account of her time as Party president she describes the lobbying of Labour MPs by party members which she and two MPs orchestrated when it seemed
possible that the government would allow a visit by a nuclear warship in 1985 (Wilson, 1989, 64).

In contrast the ALP leadership correctly calculated that despite strong feeling within the party and among the public against continued participation in nuclear alliances and for a uranium mining moratorium, a continued commitment to those alliances and a shift to a three mines policy would not damage its electoral prospects. This was especially so in an electoral situation where green and peace movement preferences were directed to Labor, which in the 1980s and early 1990s they generally were (Papadakis, 1993, 174-178).

After the passage of the Nuclear Free Zone Act 1987 the NZLP ceased to pay much attention to the wishes of the New Zealand peace movement. Thus in 1989 the Labour government signed the contract with Australia which committed New Zealand to $2.6 billion worth of expenditure on the ANZAC frigates (Tizard, 1989). This was despite a strong campaign by the Just Defence organisation and Peace Movement Aotearoa against doing the deal, and public opinion running against the project.

The peace movement, therefore, has never found a consistently reliable ally in social democrat/labour parties. In some cases it has been able to use these parties - but in the case of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy it could also be characterised as a labour party using the movement. A party with a foundational commitment to peace principles should therefore have some appeal to the hundreds of thousands of New Zealanders and Australians who supported the anti-nuclear movement - but whether
they also support other Green objectives and in particular Green economics is another matter.

**National Environment**

Neither the socialist nor the liberal traditions that fed into the formation of social democrat/labour parties provided a secure philosophical basis for the protection of the natural environment. Despite good attempts to find a philosophical grounding for socialist environmentalism in the spirit, if not the letter, of Marx (see, for example, Benton, 1989) not even all socialists (for a contrary view see Grundmann, 1991), let alone environmentalists, are convinced. Honest ‘red-greens’ (Dunkley, 1992) admit that the environmental practices of the communist states, which were/are as wedded to the goal of industrial economic growth as capitalist ones, were in most cases as bad, and in some cases much worse, than their capitalist peers.

The liberal tradition may be an even shakier foundation for an environmental ethic, because of its emphasis on individual rights and economic liberties, at the expense, if necessary, of public goods, which include collective resources like air and water.

In practice within the social democrat/labour tradition there was a heavy emphasis on promoting industrial ‘development’ and economic growth which was identical to the national goals of the conservative/liberal parties. The main difference between left
and right on this issue was over how large a role the state should play in pro-actively pursuing these goals. From the 1950s to the 1970s this gap was not huge, with conservative/liberal governments also accepting a large role for the state. The NZLP and the ALP were both keen to develop manufacturing industries in New Zealand and Australia (with taxpayer subsidies if need be), and to replicate the developmental processes of Western Europe and the USA.

The environmental impacts of such an industrial development programme focussing on secondary manufacturing industries did not become apparent until the 1960s, when the first thing to be noted in Australasia was the visual impact which development was having on local landscapes. This was starting to add up to a desecration as profound and problematic as the pollution and congestion which was choking European and American cities. Much more salient, however, were the environmental effects of the application of a century of industrialised primary production techniques. In Australia and New Zealand farming was constituted on an industrial basis almost from the beginnings of white settlement, and the participation of the two countries as nation state contributors to the world economy was dependent upon the mass production first of wool, then of meat and dairy products.

The language of Australasian farming is crudely industrial - large farms are 'stations' or 'runs', meat for export is processed in 'freezing works', and butter and cheese is made in bulk in 'dairy factories'. Labour on the large stations in the nineteenth century was organised in industrial hierarchies, and in the twentieth century largely replaced by energy-intensive machinery. On-farm (shearing) and off-farm (meat and dairy) processing work was unionised very early on, and the labour itself was
organised along 'Taylorist' lines long before the word was coined (Dann, 1995a; Martin, 1990).

The environmental consequences of farming in this way were and are severe. The almost total destruction of native forest and grass cover (New Zealand retains only 14% of its original pre-human settlement forest cover, most of it on steep mountains) has led to widespread soil loss and degradation. Under intensive pastoralism in New Zealand hillsides have literally slipped into valleys and been washed out to sea, while in Australia intensive agriculture has led to soil loss through massive salination. The restoration and maintenance of sustainable landscapes is a billion dollar problem in both countries. Native species in both countries came under threat early on, and began to decline and/or disappear due to loss of habitat and displacement or predation by introduced species. Some of the introduced species have become noxious in their new environment, requiring millions of dollars to be spent every year in unrelenting attempts at eradication or control.  

In the 1960s and 1970s a new generation of environmentalists in New Zealand began to speak of 'Heritage Destroyed' (Salmon, 1960), 'Rush to Destruction' (Searle, 1975) and 'Who killed the Clutha?' (Powell, 1978), as native forests were logged, hydro dams swallowed up wild rivers, roads and power pylons marched across formerly pristine landscapes, noxious animals munched their way through forests, pastures and native species, dangerous pesticides came into frequent agricultural usage, artificial fertilisers were spread from aircraft, and pollution of waterways became a serious problem. Their voices were particularly strident in the late Sixties and early Seventies - in Australasia they were part of an international frenzy of
communication on the ‘environmental crisis’ which arose in 1968 and had peaked by 1972 (Bührs, 1991, 92; Sills, 1975).

In Tasmania the Labor Party would not be deflected from its pursuit of hydro-electric development by the new environmental critique, but in New Zealand and mainland Australia the labour movement and its parties were willing to listen. The NZLP, which was in government in 1960, had signed the deal that gave Comalco access to cheap power, and hence encouragement to set up an aluminium smelter in New Zealand in the first place (Bertram and Dann, 1981). But twelve years later it was prepared to oppose a scheme to raise Lake Manapouri to help provide that power. It gained temporary electoral advantage by doing so, winning the November 1972 general election with a swing which was very pronounced in the south of the South Island where the lake is situated, and was attributed by both sides to the Manapouri issue (Peat, 1994). This was despite the National government taking the first steps towards formal governmental recognition of the importance of the environment. These included appointing a Minister for the Environment in 1972 and setting up a new central government agency, the Commission for the Environment, which was charged with co-ordinating advice to the government on environmental policy (Bührs, 1997, 288).

One commentator on the federal election result in Australia in 1972 said that ‘The Labor victory seemed to be most significant for women and native fauna.’ (Griffiths, 1977, 143). In the case of the latter this was because trade in kangaroo products and thirty-seven other indigenous animals was banned. Labor did however have a wider environmental platform, which was first developed in 1969, and elaborated on in
1973. There was a strong emphasis on conservation e.g. greater protection of indigenous animals, the creation of new national parks, and setting up a national parks and wildlife service, and there were some good achievements in these areas (Papadakis, 1993, 188).

A strong lead from the labour movement at large, in the form of the historic and effective 'Green Bans' imposed by the progressive New South Wales Builders Labourers Federation between 1971 and 1975, (which resulted in over thirty sites with cultural and/or natural significance being saved) (Burgmann, 1993, 192-195), was impressive, but insufficient. Even less progress was made on the critical urban environmental issues of the 1970s, such as energy conservation and the transition to renewable forms of energy.

The distance between labour activists and others who were concerned about environmental issues, and the ALP leadership in the 1970s, can perhaps be gauged by further consideration of what was behind the loans scandal which contributed to the downfall of the Whitlam government. The Minister for Minerals and Energy, Rex Connor, tried to obtain major loans from a shadowy figure who claimed to have access to petrodollars. Connor wanted the money in order to 'develop' Australia along energy intensive lines. His programme included a transcontinental natural gas pipeline, a petrochemical plant, three treatment plants to convert uranium to yellowcake, the electrification of major railways, the redevelopment of coal ports, and the purchase of a year's supply of oil as a stockpile against future emergencies (Bolton, 1996, 232). The unorthodox negotiating for and approval of the loan is shocking to those who expect a Labor government to show more respect for due
democratic process and financial prudence. However what is just as shocking from a green perspective is what the Prime Minister and Treasurer so casually signed up to - namely a programme of increasing Australian dependence on non-renewable and/or environmentally unacceptable energy sources. The Treasurer who did the signing was Jim Cairns, a man whom of all the federal ALP politicians at that time seemed to be the one most understanding of and closely identified with the 'new politics' (see, for example, Cairns, 1972). Yet he was prepared to compromise due process and his career to provide support for a programme which no environmentalist could be expected to greet with enthusiasm. He may well have justified his actions in terms of the pursuit of that important Labor goal of full employment, but the contradictions in this method of creating jobs should have been apparent.

In the 1980s the Labor government continued to have a mixed record on environmental matters. Elim Papadakis (Papadakis, 1993, 189-194) characterises the positions taken by the Hawke government as based on careful calculations of the electoral consequences of supporting the environmental over the industrial lobby. Initially the environment was not of interest, with its importance to the Labor government signalled by the portfolio going to a minister outside of cabinet with little support from senior ministers. Labor subsequently lost ground with the growing environmental lobby over its weak stand on the protection of Queensland rainforests, and after input from environmental groups the position was upgraded to cabinet status in 1987. Senator Graham Richardson was given the job and was able to realise the strength of the environmental lobby and to play to it. Although still regarded as a 'dealer' by environmentalists there is no doubt that his pro-active approach earned
votes for Labor and contributed to the so-called 'greening' of Australian politics at the 1990 federal election.

At state level there also seemed to be possibilities of a green/labour rapprochement, and Peter Christoff discusses the way in which conservation groups were able to make use of consultation processes established by the federal and state Labor governments to make some conservation gains. However, he also notes that these consultations were largely tactical on Labor's part, generally occurring only after a public outcry on an issue, and frequently had the effect of saving face for Labor while draining the resources and energy of community groups (Christoff, 1993, A04). In Tasmania Labor was given a chance to promote green concerns in 1989, when Green candidates campaigned strongly and achieved 18% of the vote and five seats in parliament. With Green support Labor could govern, and so an historic Labor-Green Accord was negotiated, which contained strong pro-environmental provisions. However, eighteen months on, when Labor had dragged the chain on delivering most of these policies, and had actually breached some of them (e.g. it had increased not decreased wood chip quotas) the Greens left the Accord in disgust (Burgmann, 1993, 217-219).

The 1970s possibility that social democracy in Australasia could move to incorporate the ecological critique of industrial development and economic growth and change its programmes and policies accordingly was to fade in the 1980s. As the recession of the 1970s deepened jobs were lost, and organised labour wanted government to deliver employment. For those still locked in a modernist, industrial mind set, this meant large scale 'development' projects such as hydro-dams and irrigation
schemes, heavy industry, and mass manufacturing i.e. working on or against rather
than with the resources of nature. Paradoxically, the logic of increasing economic
globalisation, espoused by both the NZLP and the ALP, means basing national
economic development on export-led growth within a ‘free trade’ global economy.
This approach gives a low priority to species and resource conservation, while it also
makes it harder to protect or create jobs within national boundaries.

Nevertheless, the New Zealand Labour Party went into the 1984 general election
promising significant changes in environmental policy, and the reform of
institutional arrangements, in response to heavy lobbying from environmentalists
(Bührs, 1997, 289). The reform of institutional arrangements included the setting up
the Department of Conservation in 1987. However the Labour government’s agenda
in creating this department is now understood by conservationist critics in the
context of the radical government restructuring which followed. This included the
privatisation and sale of state assets, including those formerly administered by two of
the departments of state which were disbanded to form DOC, the New Zealand
Forest Service and the Department of Lands and Survey (Molloy interview,
2.10.1990).

Labour also established two new environmental agencies in 1986 - the Ministry for
the Environment and the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment. The
Ministry, under its Act, does not have an advocacy role for the environment. The
Parliamentary Commissioner does, but according to Ton Bührs ‘...the effectiveness
of the office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment is hampered by
extremely meagre resources, rising demands, a low public profile and vague
constituency, and some ambivalence with regard to what its role should be.' (Bührs, 1997, 291). Bührs also notes that overall the effectiveness of the three new agencies was and is reduced by the ‘New Right’ political climate. Hallmarks of this regime include economic goals being given precedence over environmental values and budgets being kept very tight. The legitimacy of government ‘intervention’ is continually questioned, and the commitment and performance of public servants is undermined by persistent claims that government officials and agencies are ‘self-serv­ ing’ and cannot be trusted (Bührs, 1997, 291).

Bührs concludes that a significant result of the reforms since 1984 has been to largely remove the government from the processes of decision-making involving the allocation and management of resources, such as land, water, minerals and energy resources. It has abdicated policy in these matters to ‘their efficient allocation via the market’. Since the market has become increasingly global, this has made it more difficult for local environmental advocates to obtain information about resource decisions and to participate in making them (Bührs, 1997, 290-291).

The other major element in Labour’s environmental management initiatives, the Resource Management Act, did not become law until 1991. However it was initiated by Labour with a ‘zero-based’ review of environmental law, the Resource Management Law Reform process. The act was intended to rationalise and simplify environmental planning in New Zealand and to promote sustainable management of resources. In practice it has been found somewhat wanting. It has been criticised by environmentalists for its lax definitions of key concepts like ‘sustainable’ and ‘ecosystem’ (Grundy, 1995; Round, 1995), which have not been improved by case
law interpretations. Another problem associated with the act are the frequently
insurmountable financial barriers faced by objectors, which have recently come to
include heavy costs awarded against bona fide public good objectors (Bührs, 1997,
292; Chapple, 1995; Ministry for the Environment, 1996). Brendan Gleeson (1996,
251) notes that from its inception the Act has been ‘...an uneasy legislative
compromise between environmentalist demands for a more holistic approach to
resource management and the agenda of neo-liberal interests who have long wanted
greater flexibility in planning practice to facilitate investment’. Gleeson also
considers that to date the neo-liberals have had the better deal. However, this was
obviously not the view of the Minister for the Environment when he embarked on a
review of the Act in 1998, beginning with commissioning a report from a known
neo-liberal, and then another one from a group of private sector consultants.
Environmentalists, as individuals or representatives of organisations, were not
invited to contribute to the reports, which predictably enough advocated weakening
the ecological definitions in the Act, limiting its coverage, and privatising some of its
procedures (Fitzsimons and Burtt, 1998). The net effect of the environmental
‘reforms’ therefore, seems to be a decreasing rather than an increasing amount of
citizen participation in environmental decision-making. This is compounded by an
increased amount of corporate influence, and a failure to make significant gains in
environmental protection or sustainability, as the critical 1996 OECD report on New
Zealand’s environmental status points out (OECD, 1996).

The efforts by the Labor government in Australia to present a more dynamic
environmental stance between 1987 and 1990, which Peter Christoff characterises as
‘a romance with lively environmental reformism under Labor in power’ (Christoff,
1993, A03), certainly paid off in the short term. Especially when the two major conservation organisations advised their supporters to direct their preferences to Labor at the 1990 federal election, and thus ensured its re-election (Burgmann, 1993, 220-222).

However this much touted 'greening' of Australian politics (Bean et al, 1990) was to have little lasting effect. Aynsley Kellow claims that winning the Franklin campaign, which was a tactical success, led to entrenching a government with minimal regard for environmental values. It was therefore a strategic defeat. It also led to the environment movement narrowing its concerns rather than broadening them (Kellow, 1990, 201-205). Senator Richardson was replaced by a less dynamic environment minister, Green candidates began to attract greater support in 1993 and 1996, and by 1993 the romance with environmental reformism was over and a 'narrowly defined economic developmentalism' was dominating Labor's political agenda (Christoff, 1993, A05). Finally, in the Queensland state election of 1995, the 'natural' direction of Green preferences to Labor was dramatically and controversially abandoned (Curran, 1996).

Thus despite sterling efforts to be - or at least seem - 'green', the Australasian labour parties in the 1980s were unable to fully satisfy even the large, but narrowly focussed, conservation constituencies in both countries. When it came to the wider environmental issues of the late twentieth century, such as resource and energy conservation, population limitation, climate change, biotechnology, and pollution and waste reduction, there were difficulties in reconciling the goals of export-led economic growth and associated trade liberalisation with the green demand for
ecological sustainability as the new priority of good government. This dilemma led to double-talk and double-think on important environmental issues, an example being the Australian government’s backsliding on the issue of controlling CO2 emissions (Rosewarne, 1996). Amidst a welter of green critiques of first GATT and then the WTO, the Australasian labour parties remain firmly attached to globalist trade and finance policies. They are reluctant to take on board environmentalist arguments against increasing the volume of world trade (for New Zealand examples of such critiques see Fitzsimons, 1996; Porter, 1991).

Thus in reviewing the record of labour on the environment it can be seen that so long as the parties had a commitment to economic nationalism it was possible to implement some positive environmental protection policies in a way which was consistent with social democratic economics. There was always the danger, however, that the environment would be seen as mere ‘resources’ to be used for national economic growth. With the abandonment of both the theory and practice of economic nationalism, and the conversion to support for economic globalisation, it has become much more difficult to set and maintain independently high national environmental standards, as these entail, or are believed to entail, a loss of international competitive advantage. In a world where countries with no ‘natural’ advantages except an abundance of cheap labour are prepared to sacrifice environmental quality as well as their citizens on the altar of ‘economic development’, then this turns out to be ‘true’. However, it is still regrettable that it is the position argued by the Australian government as the grounds for not reducing carbon emissions (Rosewarne, 1996).
As this position is indistinguishable from that adopted by conservative/liberal parties, there seems to be a space for a Green position which differs from the labour position, both in the higher priority it gives to environmental protection, and in the means by which it pursues this priority.

The death of social democracy?

Although the social democrat/labour parties are not yet formally deceased, in many ways they may be considered to be walking shells of their former selves, having long since abandoned any pretensions to socialism and having severed or severely reduced any meaningful connections with the labour movement. Studies in Australia (Scott, 1991) and New Zealand (Jesson, 1989) document the divorce of labour politicians and labour party membership both from the working class and from sources of egalitarian and ecologist social and political radicalism. This process began in the 1960s and intensified in the 1970s and 80s, and was accompanied by a growing attachment to the new middle class milieu of political and economic liberalism. Comparisons of the (fairly consistent) international decline in voter support for social democrat/labour parties across twenty-three countries (Piven, 1992, 10-11) show that the British Labour Party experienced the largest drop in support (-12.3%). Is it therefore surprising that going into the 1997 general election British Labour leader Tony Blair promised that the Labour Party would not support
or condone labour movement militancy, and the ‘Third Way’ which he now promotes is recognisable as globalist politics? 5

After this metamorphosis in membership and leadership, it is also not surprising that social democracy suffered a crisis in theory and practice. By the mid-1980s the non-partisan Australian left was ready to contemplate what could or should happen ‘After Social Democracy’ in a special issue of the journal *Arena* (1986, #77) and to debate critiques of the sort offered by Camilleri (cited at the head of this chapter). Not everyone was ready to accept Camilleri’s analysis. Indeed Bob Connell took Camilleri to task for focussing on the European decline of social democracy. Connell argued that ‘Its application to the histories of colonies of settlement like Australia is almost nil.’ and that ‘The shape of the economy here was fundamentally different, and so was the shape of labour and radical politics.’ (Connell, 1987, 177).

In retrospect, however, it can be seen that Camilleri was correct in focussing on global similarities rather than national differences, and his approach offered a sounder basis for answering the key question under debate, which was whether the left should still support labour parties. Did their progressive record in other areas mean they still deserved leftist support? Or did their conversion to economic rationalism and globalisation negate their social liberalism? This raised the further question, of whether the labour parties were just giving the now-altered ‘working class’ electorate what it wanted. This is the interpretation of the 1983 victory of the ALP given by New Zealand Labour leader David Lange. In his words - “...they did not say ‘Look, this is what Labour is going to give you. They listened to what...the electorate wanted and sent it back to them as Labour policy.” (Wright, 1984, 135).

Whether Lange is correct or not, his attitude shows that he saw the NZLP operating
from a pragmatic rather than a principled basis - just like his counterparts in the ALP.

This was an electorally dangerous thing for Labo(u)r to do, because once it ceased to have an economic position which differentiated it from the conservative/liberal parties it had to fall back on the promotion of significantly different policies in other areas. Brian Easton notes that as the social democrat economics practised by Labo(u)r in the 1930s, 40s and 70s were also nationalist economics, labour parties were able to increase their electoral attractiveness by appealing to other forms of national achievement. When Labo(u)r abandoned the theory as well as the practice of the protected economy in the 1980s it was still able to trade on national pride in other areas, principally the nuclear-free moves in New Zealand and the espousal of republicanism by Australian Labor leaders (Easton, 1997a, 28-29). In both Australia and New Zealand the labour parties were able to gain electoral support when they appeared to be meeting the wishes of the ‘new social movement’ constituencies, particularly those of the women’s movement and the environment movement.

However by the 1990s most of the economic rationalists in the conservative/liberal parties were as comfortable as their counterparts in the labour parties with talking the talk (if not walking the walk) of feminism, gay liberation, land rights, republicanism, nuclear disarmament and ‘sustainability’. This left only a genuinely conservative rump (mainly among rural dwellers and the elderly - who could be sidelined in small potential coalition parties, such as the National/Country Party in Australia and New Zealand First in New Zealand) to squirm and protest at such betrayals of ‘traditional values’. The social movement jargon was, after all, the argot of the urban liberal
middle class milieu which both Labor/Liberal and Labour/National had come to represent. Now the only thing left to differentiate the parties was economic policy - and here there was no difference. Easton castigates Labour for failing to put any intellectual effort into envisioning what social democracy in an open economy might mean, and how it could be implemented (Easton, 1997a, 32).

There was a vacuum in social democrat policy - and by the 1990s the impacts of the new right ideology which Labo(u)r had adopted in lieu of developing social democratic alternatives to suit the times were hitting hard on Labo(u)r's traditional constituency of urban workers, taking their toll via high unemployment, poor housing and decreased access to health care and higher education. The negative effects of economic rationalism were also becoming apparent to the new social movement constituencies. These had started to realise that whatever headway they had made with regard to legal and managerial reforms for their interest groups had to be set against the losses they had suffered in achieving equitable, sustainable livelihoods for people and other species. It was within this context that Green parties revived in Australasia in the 1990s, and set about reconstructing their earlier critiques of global industrial growth to include an additional critique of 'more market' economic policies and 'free' trade.

In Australia Labor was trounced at the 1996 federal election, while in New Zealand Labour won only 28% of the total vote (a decrease of 6% since 1993). It was also not the preferred coalition partner of New Zealand First, despite a greater (pre-election) match of policies and the preference of Maori voters for a Labour/New Zealand First government. It has clearly been floundering without gaining a new vision since its
1990 defeat (Easton, 1997). The SPD was out of power in the Bundestag for longer than the Greens had been represented there, and on its return to power in 1998 was able to form a government only with the assistance of the Greens. Labour in Britain made a significant and controversial shift in choosing Tony Blair as leader. This was a shift which finally paid off electorally, but one which was considered even by some of the newly returned Labour MPs to be at the expense of traditional Labour policies and directions, and especially of any vestiges of leftism in the party.

Australia, New Zealand and most other 'western' democracies are currently in the curious position of still having two 'major' parties claiming the 'centre' ground. They even continue to describe themselves as 'Centre Left' and 'Centre Right', despite the fact that the old criteria for determining how left or right a party was - their economic policies - no longer apply. Equally committed to globalisation, the policies of the 'centre' parties differ in degree rather than kind. It is also difficult to know how to characterise these policies on the old Left/Right scale, which was heavily associated with national endeavours. However most of the theorists behind them clearly belong to the neo-liberal or New Right camp, and financial and moral support for them comes primarily from powerful vested economic interests, both nationally and globally. (See, for example, Jesson, 1989 for details of big business subvention of the NZLP in the 1980s; Roper, 1992 on business political activism and state policy formulation in New Zealand in the 1980s; and Korten, 1996 for information on such activities on a global scale.)
A space for Green parties?

This is the situation into which Green parties attempt to insert their economic and social alternatives. Their electoral successes to date seems to depend largely on the peculiar and specific electoral opportunities offered in certain polities at certain times, (especially times when the environmental ‘crisis’ is perceived to be salient), rather than on any widespread public understanding or endorsement - or even awareness - of Green economics. Despite evidence from Australian and New Zealand voter behaviour studies that some Labour voters will transfer their support temporarily or permanently to the Greens, to date this has not been sufficient to get Greens into coalition governments or electoral accords anywhere in Australasia except Tasmania. Tasmanian participation has been possible due to its electoral system of multi-member electorates operating under the Hare-Clark form of single transferable voting for the lower house. In July 1998 the Liberal and Labor parties in Tasmania collaborated to introduce a bill to reduce the size of the lower house from thirty-five to twenty-five members, which effectively raised the threshold required to return Green members from 12.5% to 16.7% of the vote. At the snap election held two months later only one Tasmanian Green managed to pass that threshold. The Greens therefore appear to have been effectively leveraged out of playing a significant role in Tasmanian politics.

In March 2000 the New Zealand Green caucus of seven members elected in December 1999 negotiated a protocol with the Labour/Alliance coalition government, which commits it to supporting the government on matters of confidence and supply, and both sides to sharing information to advance mutual policy goals.
In New Zealand the Green Party received almost 7% of the nation-wide vote in 1990, but as the election was conducted under ‘First Past the Post’ constituency based voting this meant no parliamentary representation. Three Greens came into Parliament as part of the thirteen-member Alliance caucus in 1996. In 1997 the Greens decided to separate from the Alliance and contest the 1999 election as an independent party. Initially this seemed like the wrong move, with the Party polling below 1% until mid-1999. However, it began to make a meteoric rise in September 1999, and finished with 5.2% of the vote, gaining it seven MPs – the first Green caucus in New Zealand history. In a curious twist of fate, the Greens had to wait ten days before special votes were counted and their election night loss was transformed into victory. This was plenty of time for the Labour and Alliance parties to formalise the coalition agreement they had been working on for over a year, which had no place for the Greens. The Greens are therefore excluded from government, yet hold the balance of power.

This is perhaps a better position to be in than that of the German Greens, in formal coalition with the SPD in the Bundestag. It is hard to say, since it seems very likely that national level politics in democracies will continue to operate with a simulacrum of the ‘two mass parties’ system for some time to come. Changes in form and content in politics are frequently out of sync. For a good example of this one need look no further than the paradox and oddity of the constitutional monarchical form of the state in Australia and New Zealand. This is a form which no longer directs or reflects the day to day conduct of affairs of state or governance in either country, yet is still both theoretically and practically capable of influencing or even overturning
democratically elected governments, as we saw in the case of the Whitlam government.

It is perhaps too early to say whether the era of ‘left’ and ‘right’ mass parties is finally coming to an end. But as this system was closely associated with nationalist democratic politics, if it does survive in a globalist era it may be only by becoming unrecognisable as its former self, as social democrat/labour parties have already become. (Parties of the right are also distinctly different from what they once were, but that is not within the scope of this study.)

Showing that labour politics is not what it was, and how it is not what it was, and considering how that provides an opening for Green politics, (as I have done in this chapter), does not of course demonstrate what Green politics will or can be. That requires specific attention to where Green politics in its turn came from, and therefore in the next chapter I focus on the New Left and the new social movements, which failed to turn labour politics around, but provided a fertile seedbed for the Greens.

Notes

1. Navigation laws may seem a trivial anomaly in the list, but when spelled out in detail this represented a complete overhaul of maritime legislation. It included protecting Australian shipping against unfair competition, ensuring proper safety standards on all vessels, regulating hours and conditions of work, ensuring that vessels were properly equipped and efficiently manned, and so on. In other words, the navigation law reform was oriented towards securing and advancing Australia’s place in the world economy without sacrificing the workers on whom it depended.
2. See Smithin (1996) for a discussion of the extent to which social democrat economics as practised by post-war labour/social democrat governments was actually based on Keynes, and where it departed from or ignored his work. Smithin also provides plenty of opportunity for reflecting on the neo-liberal canard on social democrat economic governance, namely that it is 'interventionist'. It is difficult to see how intervening in monetary policy to keep employment rates up is any different in degree or kind than intervening in monetary policy to keep inflation rates down. The Reserve Bank Act 1992 of New Zealand requires the governor of the bank to keep inflation below 2%, and prohibits him or her from managing the nation's money to ensure higher employment outcomes. If this is not 'interventionist', it is hardly 'laissez faire'.

3. The ALP floated the Australian dollar in December 1983. Commenting on it in the National Times on December 16, 1983, Geoff Kitney wrote:

'It is not overstating the daring nature of the decision to say that Keating has placed his political future in the hands of the intermediaries and the traders who operate in the cut-throat world of the international financial markets. It was an action which was completely at odds with Labor's platform commitment to government control of the economy, and Labor's long and deeply held suspicions of the market place and its belief that market forces do not share resources equitably.'

(Wheelwright, 1984)

The New Zealand Labour government which came into office in July 1984 had an immediate currency crisis on its hands, caused largely by its about-to-be Finance Minister, Roger Douglas, advocating a twenty percent devaluation. This was a promise that precipitated a foreign currency crisis as speculators took money out to the economy in the hope of cashing in after the devaluation. They got their profits - and the New Zealand dollar was floated later that year (Jesson, 1989, 63-64).


5. At the highest level - genetic engineering corporates have met with British Labour government officials 81 times since it was elected (Flynn and Gillard, 1999, 1), and Bill Clinton called Tony Blair in 1998 to insist that nothing be done in Britain to restrict the expansion of Monsanto and other biotech corporates (Monbiot, 1999, 12)
Chapter Four

Greening antisystemic politics

From the New Left to the Greens

The third critical world-scale phenomenon that must be examined in some detail before we can complete a picture of the origins of Green politics is the so-called ‘new politics’. ‘New politics’ was first developed by the New Left in the early 1960s, and was then taken up by the new social movements from the late 1960s through to the late 1970s. Like previous forms of leftism and progressive politics (as we saw in Chapters Two and Three) these movements were organised, and communicated within and between each other, on an international scale. Unlike those movements, however, they had both the opportunity and the inclination to use - and critique - the new technologies of globalisation, and to operate as genuinely global actors i.e. as part of networks operating in real time across the planet. The technological capacity grew in parallel with the movements, so that when the first Green parties were formed their networking ability was more of an attitude than an actual real-time capacity (more on this in Chapters Five and Six. But the global orientation was and is as important as the physical machinery.

Yet networking machines do not necessarily make a networking politics. Just as important as the global orientation in the creation of Green politics was the local or
community orientation. This shows itself not just in politics aimed at defending the ecological and social integrity of particular geographical spaces (i.e. environmentalism), but also in ways of doing politics. In particular, in ways of doing democracy which are egalitarian, participatory and consensus-oriented, based on the metaphor of the web rather than the pyramid.

All the characteristics that we now think of as typically ‘Green’ can be found in the new politics of the 1960s and 1970s. In this chapter I trace the intellectual and activist genealogy of the Greens, both globally and in the forms in which it came to/was developed in New Zealand and Australia, and was incorporated in the first Green parties.

**Pushing back the dates and defining the participants**

‘Perhaps the Green political advances can be seen as the political concretization, however tenuous, of new-left goals and themes that for two decades were confined to the margins of political life...’ (Boggs, 1986b, 870).

This tentative view, advanced by Carl Boggs in a review of five books published in 1984 and 1985 by several prominent Greens (Rudolf Bahro, Petra Kelly, Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak, Jonathon Porritt, Kirkpatrick Sale), has been substantiated by further research, including that of Boggs’ himself. As he goes on to
note about the Greens he reviews, they resemble each other, and the New Left, more than they resemble other political tendencies, in the following ways:

‘Despite some sharp disagreements, they share in common a great number of interests and priorities: a holistic restructuring of the environment, transformation of daily life in the direction of “human-scale” communities, grassroots democracy, a self-sustaining and communally-based economy no longer shaped by growth for its own sake, the overturning of patriarchal social relations, and a shift away from nuclear politics tied to the competitive system of nation-states and superpower blocs. Underlying these aims is a strong commitment to peaceful methods of struggle and, ultimately, a non-violent order characterised by harmony and equilibrium.’ (Boggs, 1986b, 870).

Where did the Greens get this politics? A view held by some Greens, and also by some of those who study them, is that Green politics is derived from the science of ecology and/or the study of Nature. This is a view which is deeply problematic from a theoretical perspective, involving as it does certain debatable and unprovable assumptions, for example that nature has historical agency, and that politics (a human activity the very name of which derives from the Greek term for those very human creations the city and the state) is somehow involved in, or can be read off from, ecological data.

After deciding to take this hypothesis seriously (given that it has important implications for anyone purporting to write an account of the origins of Green
politics) I went to considerable trouble to see whether it could be proven or substantiated, and reached the view that it could not (Dann, 1996). (The results of my investigation are summarised in Chapter One.) Further, I came to concur with Neil Levy (1998), that it is both unlikely and unprovable that Nature is an independent agent of history. As Levy has demonstrated via his comparison of the different political positions on Nature taken by Heidegger and Foucault, it is also a philosophically suspect position. Levy concludes, and I agree, that it is neither necessary, nor even desirable, to hold this position in order to be effective as a political ecologist.

A much more sophisticated and plausible account of the connection between ecology and Green politics is given by Robyn Eckersley (1992a) in Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach. While acknowledging that the New Left made a major contribution to Green political theory and practice, she chooses not to expand on this contribution, but rather to enter new territory in examining the differences between 'anthropocentric' and 'ecocentric' approaches to environmental politics. She pays special attention to recording and discussing emancipatory forms of political ecologism, especially the work of eco-socialists and eco-anarchists, and critiques this work from the perspective of ecocentrism.

Emancipatory political ecologists like Bookchin, Roszak and Bahro have certainly had far more influence on the theory and practice of Green parties than pessimists who come to anti-democratic conclusions such as Heilbroner, Hardin and Ophuls. Their strong associations with other emancipatory movements, such as anarchism, socialism and the counter-culture, may in fact be said to be more important to their
politics than their knowledge and promotion of ecology - and indeed Eckersley notes their shortcomings from this perspective. However, Eckersley's work does not go on to give an account of the key theorists of ecocentrism, and in particular whether they are - or are necessarily - emancipatory. Proponents of the 'deep ecology' position, which is a major strand of ecocentric thought, have been heavily criticised by emancipatory political ecologists, including some ecofeminists, for failing to see how androcentric their 'ecocentrism' is. (An account of what this has meant in political practice is given in Seager, 1993, 222-236; while Val Plumwood, 1993, 173-189, provides a philosophical critique of the claimed emancipatory nature of deep ecology, and Salleh, 1993, also takes issue with its claims to be inclusive and emancipatory.)

It is not difficult to find ecocentric theorists whose claims outrage the sensibilities of emancipatory greens - a good example would be Paul Shepard. In his 1992 essay 'A Post-Historic Primitivism', for example, he advocates for 'wildness' rather than 'wilderness' - a wildness which has no truck with even small-scale organic horticulture and agriculture, with vegetarianism, with animal liberation, and with feminist challenges to traditional sex roles - all in the name of 'ecology' (Shepard, 1992). This form of extreme 'ecocentrism' has had almost no influence on Green parties, which remain firmly within the emancipatory tradition, which they derive in the first instance from New Left and counter-culture predecessors.

For this reason I concentrate on recording the actual historical development of the contemporary political ecology movement, and its documented historical contribution to Green politics. There is no need to devote any further effort to
developing an argument that Green politics is, has been, or can be derived from 'nature', or 'ecology', or even from ecocentric thought alone.

Eckersley made a beginning on tracing this particular genealogy, with her paper The 'New Politics' of the Green Movement' (Eckersley, 1992b), and in this chapter I seek to provide further historical depth and breadth to our knowledge about these roots of Green politics. While it may seem cavalier to dismiss the 'Nature' debate in four paragraphs and two footnotes, (especially given the dominant position it assumes in current Green theorising), I have two additional and much stronger reasons for prioritising an examination of the origins of Green politics in the New Left activities of the 1960s.

Firstly, there is ample evidence, (including thus far unanalysed and unpublished evidence from Australasia) for these origins. Secondly, the New Left positions on how to do politics which Green parties took up in the 1970s were similar to those espoused by the political ecologists, who also adopted them and organised politically around them, after they had been trialled and promulgated by the New Left. Chronologically, therefore, the New Left takes priority, and is a genuine ancestor of Green politics. Thus it warrants a proper examination for what it contributed.

To do so will clear up a lot of confusion, including that unavoidably experienced by Juan Martinez-Alier in the 'Political Epilogue' to his comprehensive analytical history of ecological economics (Martinez-Alier, 1990). He gives the matter of Green political origins some consideration, and confesses that he is puzzled by the fact that left-wing ecologism grew in the 1970s, and that it grew more among the
youth of the most over-developed countries than in the Third World. He notes that
the key elements of the ecological economics critique were available from the Sixties
(1966), and others. Yet he remarks that 'It is a fact that the ecological critique only
started to bite politically shortly after the student rebellion of 1968 which spread
from Berkeley to Berlin.' (Martinez-Alier, 1990, 237). This was despite the fact that
in the USA (and in other anglophone countries) there had been a longstanding and
dedicated conservation movement since the early twentieth century, and that
European radical activists of the 1960s '...were still unaware of the basic principles

In fact, Martinez-Alier concludes that the strictly ecological analysis, based around
phenomena such as the perceived 'energy crisis' of 1973 and the work of scientific
ecologists in the 1960s and early 1970s, was not enough to start a movement of
political ecology. In his view libertarian leftists thinkers like Murray Bookchin,
Herbert Marcuse and André Gorz were much more important to kick-starting the
new politics.

Martinez-Alier's puzzlement on this issue is solely due to the unavailability of works
which take the trouble to make the actual historical and theoretical connections
between New Left and Green politics. He has correctly identified the sequence of
relevant developments. This makes him less confused (and confusing) than later
commentators like John Ferris. Ferris dates the origins of political ecology from the
'Malthusian' debates of the 1970s and claims that 'What changed political ecology
after 1980, was the coming together of the peace movement and feminism with green concerns.' (Ferris, 1993, 150-151). As we shall see, this is not a correct dating for the origins of Green politics, which theoretically and practically date back to the 1960s, not the 1980s. Further, the feminist and peace movements were foundational to, not merely influential on, Green politics, and were certainly not a 1980s add-on to 'green' (i.e. environmental) concerns.

The chronological sequence from New Left/new social movement to Green, and the transfer of eco-activist personnel from the New Left into political ecology groups was quite apparent to those using survey methods to study 'value change' (cf Inglehart, 1977; Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980) as well as to the few commentators familiar with both movements. Stephen Cotgrove's study of Sixties and Seventies environmentalism, *Catastrophe or Cornucopia* (1982) collates most of the then available sociological data about pro and anti environmentalists, and environmental activists. It starts out with a clear statement that

'The new environmentalism of the 1960s drew much of its support from the young, and especially in the U.S.A. It emerged in the wake of the civil rights and anti-war movements, which swept the campuses of American universities. It provided an expression for the emerging radicalism of the period, the so-called counter-culture. This was profoundly anti-industrial, with its decisive rejection of the work ethic, its condemnation of consumerism and material values, and its questioning of the rationality of a society which harnessed science to what were seen as the inhuman atrocities of the Vietnam war, and the ecological damage wrought by insecticides and industrial waste.' (Cotgrove, 1982, 12).
Kirkpatrick Sale makes the same point with regard to where the environmental activists of the Seventies came from (cited later in this chapter).

Scholars of the New Left, who approach the question from the angle ‘Where did the New Left go?’ rather than ‘Where did the Greens come from?’ concur with Cotgrove and Sale. George Katsiaficas, considering the political legacy of the New Left, notes that after the dissolution of the New Left in the early 1970s there arose ‘...alternative models for the organisation of a political avant garde in economically advanced societies...’ (Katsiaficas, 1987, 207). He discusses two of them - the Greens in Germany and the Rainbow coalition in the USA. He describes the German Greens as

‘...the product of a diverse but unified constituency whose needs and aspirations stand in opposition to the anti-ecological and militaristic functioning of the present system....they do not use charisma, huge amounts of money, or celebrities to win votes. Rather they attempt to involve thousands of people in creating a political force within the government as part of a larger movement aimed at qualitatively transforming the entire society.’ (Katsiaficas, 1987, 208).

In considering the German Greens lack of political/ideological unity, Katsiaficas sees this from a New Left perspective as a positive rather than a negative, because

‘As much as the divisions in the Greens reflect the decentralized nature of the party and its ability to conduct regional campaigns in accordance with local needs, the diversity of political viewpoints strengthens the organization,
makes participation possible by a wide variety of people, and provides for
daily political discussions among a broad public.’ (Katsiaficas, 1987, 209).

He also sees the Greens as having a spiritual dimension and a utopian vision of
qualitative economic and political transformation - ‘...a type of change which
traditional political parties have long abandoned because of its “impossibility” or
“undesirability”.’ (Katsiaficas, 1987, 210). He stresses the internationalist dimension
of Green politics, cementing the connection which he sees between Left and Green
politics with the view that ‘As happened before in history, it could very well be ideas
crystallised from the experiences of the German movement which provide the context
for a new International.’(Katsiaficas, 1987, 212). (Emphasis added.)

Carl Boggs looked at the Greens in Germany specifically, and also at the global
Green movement. From studying the German Greens he concluded that ‘The Green
vision of democracy - and of politics in general - probably owes more to new-left
radicalism than to any other ideological current...the theme of overcoming
alienation, the ideal of a countersociety, the emphasis on internal party democracy,
the dynamic role of feminism, the commitment to nonviolence, an open and eclectic
theoretical style’ (Boggs, 1986a, 184). He then goes on to elaborate the way in which
each of these New Left themes has been developed in Green practice in the German
context.

These characteristics of Green politics are not restricted to Germany, and in his
review of Green thinkers Boggs looks at the transfer of not just personnel, but also
political theory, in the transition from protest movement to Green parties.
He summarises the content of the shift to the Green vision of an ecologically-balanced, non-hierarchical society as a profound departure from both the liberal and the Marxist traditions, '...neither of which has ever posed viable solutions to the pervasive crisis of industrialism in the West. Liberalism finds solace in mythical appeals to individual freedom and pluralist democracy that leave the corporatist power structure intact, while Marxism (in its politicised forms) is increasingly wedded to an Enlightenment faith in technological progress linked to material growth as the basis of social transformation.' (Boggs, 1986b, 871).

In rejecting both liberalism and Marxism, and in attempting to balance individual liberation on the one hand and collective responsibilities on the other, Green politics is certainly the successor in content (as well as in style) of the New Left (youth, 'protest') politics that swept the globe in the 1960s. This politics is epitomised in both its 'new' and its 'global' character by the series of student revolts which began in France in May 1968 and were followed by others right around the world later in 1968 and early in 1969. Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein, in their study of antisystemic movements, record that there have only been two world revolutions. The first occurred in 1848, the second in 1968. 'Both were historic failures. Both transformed the world.' (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1988, 97).

The transformative power of the second lay not in the brief student revolts themselves (sometimes supported by workers or peasants - for documentation of these revolts see Katsiaficas, 1987, 37-70) - but rather in the theorising and organising that led towards and away from them. 'We cannot understand 1968', say Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein, 'unless we see it as simultaneously a _cri de coeur_
against the evils of the world-system and a fundamental questioning of the strategy of the old left opposition to the world-system.’ (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1988, 101).

What happened to this revolutionary impulse? Katsifacos outlines what needed to be done to consolidate and continue the passionate desire for change in a more sustainable, committed form in a passage which could read as guidelines for a Green party:

‘In contrast to traditional views of revolution as a change in elites or the destruction of existing economic and political structures, however, the New Left had raised the idea of the transformation of power into a decentralized and self-managed form. Such a revolution, unlike a revolt, would be more than a struggle against inherited injustices and irrational structures and would not culminate in the mere seizure of national power, but in the transformation of centralized power through the building up of dignified processes of life and alternative structures for the expansion of the democratic rights of the individual. Such a transformation would depend upon the continual liberation of the sensibilities and needs of the vast majority of the people, not simply the seizure of power by an armed vanguard. The leap which would be the real “leap into history” would be prepared by the aesthetic and cultural transformation of individuals and groups, whose new needs would prefigure the political and economic transformation of society.’ (Katsiaficas, 1987, 182).
By 1995 Carl Boggs had also considered where the revolutionary, transformative impulse went, after the 'implosion' of the New Left in the late Sixties and early Seventies. He rejected the view that there was a complete break between the New Left and subsequent political developments like the new social movements and Green parties. He states that 'The themes that permeated and galvanized the New Left - participatory democracy, community, cultural renewal, collective consumption, and the restoration of nature - have been typically carried forward into the modern ecology, feminist, peace and urban protest movements that have proliferated since the early 1970s.' (Boggs, 1995, 331).

Boggs gives several reasons for the failure of the New Left to build an ongoing radical opposition, including:

'...the inability to create durable forms of organisation, the absence of a coherent ideology that could link together the disparate groups and movements, a focus on momentary, demonstrative actions at the expense of building alternative forms, a fetishism of Third World liberation movements and their theories and a base of support largely confined to university campuses and college towns....Underlying the fiery rhetoric was a spontaneity so strong that strategic thinking about social change (as opposed to mere tactical manoeuvring) was impossible.' (Boggs, 1995, 337-338).

This is an elaboration of the criticisms of the New Left provided much earlier by Christopher Lasch. Lasch was scathing about the American Old Left's mindless adoption of foreign models of 'socialism', and the New Left's failure to develop theories and strategies of working in genuinely new, democratic, and anti-
bureaucratic ways. These new ways of working would have prevented the descent into hysterical, autocratic and violent militancy and carried the struggle against capitalism into the realm of ideology, where it '...becomes a demand not merely for equality and justice but for a new culture, absorbing but transcending the old.' (Lasch, 1970, 212).

Boggs also criticises the New Left collapse into violent, alienated, Leninist-style vanguardism, which represented a return to Old Leftism in rhetoric and style, but without the Old Left emphasis on discipline and commitment to participation in wider society. The traditional left, he reminds us,

'...extolled the primacy of parties, unions, manifestos and programs; a search for ideological certainty cloaked in the garb of “scientific” theory; faith in social progress through economic growth fuelled by science and technology; and attachment to conventional social and cultural norms.' The New Left, before it imploded into quasi-communist sectarianism, was very different. It was '...anarchistic in its quasi-existential desire for free self-expression and creativity, in its attack on elitism, personality cults and bureaucracy, in its passion for alternative life styles and in its willingness to break with established patterns and experiment with new social arrangements.' (Boggs, 1995, 345).

Green politics also exhibits the latter, New Left characteristics, as do the new social movements. Boggs believes that the new social movements had fewer revolutionary pretensions than the New Left, but were more deeply oppositional in theory and practice. In his view the Green movement in Western Europe in the 1980s
...achieved a dramatic breakthrough of sorts...laying the basis of a radical strategy that had always eluded the New Left (and the diffusion of social movements that followed). Constructed on a unique convergence of citizens’ initiatives and local movements, the Greens movement has sought to incorporate essentially New Left themes within a coherent party structure and electoral framework.’ (Boggs, 1995, 351).³

In the remainder of this chapter I provide documentation from the archives and experience of the first two Green parties (especially the Values Party, which had more fully developed manifestos and working papers), and from the contemporary political history of the USA, Australia and New Zealand, to explicitly demonstrate the connections between New Left, new social movement, and Green thinking and practice. I also examine the relatively minor role of the theory and practice of political ecology in the initial development of Green parties.

The New Left, non-violence, and anti-nuclearism

Although the New Left was a truly global phenomenon (as are Green parties) the focus is on the USA, Australia and New Zealand, for the reasons given below. The USA is chosen because it provides the first and purest examples of student/youth New Left organisations. Particularly important are the Student
Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee, Students for a Democratic Society, and the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, which were all formed in the early Sixties. It also provides the first examples of new social movements relevant to the formation of Green politics, especially the women’s liberation movement and the anti-Vietnam war movement - which originated in the USA and then gained global counterparts. Australia and New Zealand also had strong student, women’s liberation and anti-war movements - and the first Green parties. They were also, in the geopolitical realm, within the political, economic, military and cultural hegemonic sphere of the USA. However, the USA can not be considered to be globally hegemonic in the development of New Left politics, and still less so in the case of Green politics, and European examples and comparisons are given where appropriate.

The role of political ecology as a praxis or ideology in the development, content and style of Green parties will also be considered, insofar as it was influential. Political ecology as a theory and practice post-dates both the beginning and the end of the New Left, and the radical ecology movement was the last of the major new social movements of the 1970s to develop. Hence it will be seen that in practice its influence on the first two Green parties was indirect, and came via the methods and ideas it had inherited from the New Left, rather than directly. The record of the first Green parties shows that Green politics as it is actually practised cannot be seen as something that is derived solely or even principally from ecology. Further, an understanding of the specific socio-political origins of the practices and processes characteristic of Green parties can only be found by analysing the Green progenitor organisations and movements of the 1960s.
This will necessarily involve a consideration of what is meant by 'left' - a debate that exercised the theoreticians of both the new and old lefts mightily during the Sixties. It was also of extreme salience to the first two Green parties, and their consideration of it is given in detail in Chapter Seven. But first let us explore how these debates came into being.

Although the writing was on the wall for the Old Left as early as 1956 (Lynd, 1972, 119), the first signs of an organised break came in the late 1950s. In 1957 the Situationist International (SI) was formed in Europe - the first of the ‘new politics’ organisations. The SI developed a critique of everyday life in general, and of the monotony, futility, alienation and wastefulness of the consumerist society and lifestyle in particular (Gombin, 1975, 60-62; Knabb, 1981). This critique was to resonate throughout the New Left and become a cornerstone of Green politics, with the Values Party 1972 manifesto referring to New Zealand as being in the grip of a new depression - a depression arising from too much affluence - and suffering from a new malady - spiritual poverty. (New Zealand Values Party, 1972, 1) This manifesto was the first to include specifically anti-consumerist policies, such as removing tax-deductibility for display advertising. This was very small beer compared to the radical rejection of consumerist society advocated by the SI (see Knabb, 1981, for original SI documents, such as ‘The Decline and Fall of the Spectacle-Commodity Economy’). However, within a context in which every other political party was doing its best to make things easier for consumers and producers it was a step in the opposite direction.4
In 1959 in Britain the *New Left Review* was formed from a merger of the *Universities and Left Review* and *The New Reasoner* (Jacobs and Landau, 1967, 17-18). One of the founders of the *New Left Review*, the historian E. P. Thompson, was to become a leading activist and theorist in the nuclear peace movement. Thompson typifies the radicalism (as opposed to the liberalism or Marxism) of the New Left - a theme that Thompson himself developed in both his professional and his political work (Thompson, 1978, 1980, 1982). Anti-nuclear war initiatives in Great Britain in the late 1950s came together in February 1958 as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), while by a similar process of coalition the New Zealand anti-nuclear initiatives came together and adopted the CND name in 1960 (Locke, 1992).

In Australia in the 1960s peace activism was focussed on the Vietnam War, and especially on the issue of conscription for that war. It was not until the 1970s that the uranium mining issue heightened concerns about nuclear war, which fed into the strong and active nuclear peace movement that came together in the early Eighties.

In the USA the first signs of a break with national ideological and practical adherence to a policy of nuclear 'security' came in the form of a typically New Leftist total opposition to nuclearism, with the formation of a Student Peace Union in Chicago in 1959. As well as refusing to join one of the Cold War camps on 'the bomb' (a feature of Old Left peace organisations), the SPU was also a forerunner of the student New Left organisationally. It was the first nation-wide student political organisation, (and the largest before the formation of SDS), with some 3,000 members across America. (Teodori, 1970, 125-127).
The nuclear peace movement was a genuinely global movement. The first anti-nuclear war group was formed, understandably enough, in Japan in 1954. European initiatives were co-ordinated as early as 1959 by the European Federation Against Nuclear Arms, which began with the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and West Germany as constituent members. Within two years it was organising conferences which included representation from anti-atomic bomb organisations in Denmark, Norway, France, Italy, Brazil, Yugoslavia, the USA, and Australia (Falk, 1982, 97-98).

The movement in Europe and the USA waned somewhat after the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. In the Asia-Pacific region, in contrast, it grew stronger throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This was in reaction to French and American testing of bombs and missiles, and to the presence of nuclear-powered and armed submarines and warships and the bases to service them (Harford, 1985; Hayes, Zarsky and Bello, 1986; Locke, 1992; Wilkes, 1973). While not everyone who was a member of the nuclear peace movement in Australasia considered themselves to be a radical engaged in antisyemtic activity, the leaders and key activists were typically leftist in orientation. The majority of the younger activists were New Leftists of various persuasions (Boraman, 1997; Falk, interview 11.8.97; Hutton, interview 9.8.97; Rootes, 1988).

Between 1965 and 1975 the movement against the Vietnam war also took on an increasingly antisystemic character, in the USA in particular, and was the main focus of opposition to American economic and military hegemony over other nations.
The linkage of the anti-war and student movements was particularly important in the USA in the late Sixties, while the two movements were almost synonymous in Australia at the same time (Rootes, 1988). (Australia and the USA were the only countries to conscript young men to Vietnam.)

The nuclear peace movement was not solely a New Left movement, yet it came to have all the main features of the ‘new politics’ that characterised oppositional movements in the 1960s and 1970s. These in turn were fed into Green parties as anti-nuclear activists helped create and lead Green parties in the 1970s and 1980s (Kelly, 1984; Vallentine, 1987, 1990).

The first of the features of the anti-nuclear war movement that resembled the New Left and the Greens, rather than the Old Left, was its refusal to align with the pro-American or the pro-Soviet camps. Instead it developed an anti-nuclearist analysis which was hostile to the claims of both authoritarian communism and liberal democracy to be providing ‘security’ via the Bomb. This was in marked contrast to the Old Left, in both its communist party and trade union forms, which remained committed to the concept of ‘the Worker’s Bomb’ (and to the nuclear power industry). It also differed from the liberal technocrats and defenders of the capitalist way of life who supplied rationales for nuclear policies like MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) (for examples of the latter see Teller & Latter, 1958; Kahn, 1960 and 1971). This ‘a plague on both your houses’ approach, and the search for a third way which would be both peaceful and just, was characteristic of the New Left in its strongest phase. Its influence on the Greens is epitomised in the Green slogan ‘Neither right nor left, but in front.’
Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit typify the New Left disillusionment with the supposed alternatives - and especially 'the alternatives within the alternatives', offered by contemporary society and the Old Left. They claimed that the lack of real choice had destroyed politics as far as youth was concerned. They made fun of the situation thus:

'If lack of political understanding means the rejection of bureaucracies big (e.g. the Communists and the Social Democrats) and small (e.g. the Trotskyist splinter groups), and the denial that the workers must be led by a revolutionary elite; if lack of political interest means being bored with platform rhetoric, with theories that have no practical application, with resolutions, petitions, marches, congresses and annual dinners; if lack of political interest is the rejection of all the phoney alternatives (Communists vs Social Democrats; London vs Paris; Mendes-France vs Mitterand; Mali vs Guinea; gin and tonic vs tonic and gin; the King in his palace vs the palace in King St; the Six vs the Common Market) - if lack of political interest means all this, then indeed most young workers and working intellectuals have become eminently apolitical.' (Cohn-Bendit, 1969, 78).

In offering the real alternative of a non-aligned, non-nuclear world, the nuclear peace movement was genuinely 'new political' for its times. Its second new politics attribute was its preference for non-violent direct action (NVDA) rather than bureaucratic forms of opposition. While much effort certainly went into collecting signatures on petitions, and researching and writing papers, submissions and letters to politicians, the actions that are more typical of the anti-nuclear movement are
public protests. These include the huge Easter marches (in Britain, West Germany and Australia in particular); the protest boats sailing into Pacific nuclear testing zones and against US warships in New Zealand and Australian ports; the women's peace camps at Greenham Common in the U.K. and at US bases in Australia and New Zealand; and the Hiroshima Day vigils held year after year.

Anti-nuclear activists may also be said to have pioneered the political application of the slogan 'Think globally, act locally' - nuclear war was a global threat which required a global response built up from thousands of local initiatives. Many initiatives were set up independently of each other, and only later came together in national and international coalitions and federations. Some (like the municipal Nuclear Free Zone Movement) began as an idea in one country and then snowballed across the globe. This initiative was most successful in New Zealand and Australia, where peace activists had begun pushing for a nuclear-free Southern Hemisphere ('No Bombs South of the Line') from the early Sixties (Locke, 1992, 180-184; Magnusson, 1996, 115-116, 263-272). The emphasis on local, direct, grass-roots action - literally 'citizens initiatives' - found in the nuclear peace movement is typically New Left, which preferred the anarchist confederation of equal, autonomous groups approach to building a political movement/structure to the centralised, bureaucratic, hierarchical Old Left model. Jim Falk (1983, 245) gives an account of how the peace movement in Australia began to grow spontaneously in 1981 from a proliferation of small scale initiatives which then linked together. Such linking did not necessarily amount to antisystemic organisation, however. George Katsiaficas, (1987, 190-192) provides a critique of the way in which leaders of the American nuclear disarmament movement sought to ensure that the movement
remained single issue rather than antisystemic by suppressing political speakers at the enormous peace rally in New York City in 1982.

Forming a political party, which is under constraints to fulfil certain legal structural requirements in order to contest elections and so on, would seem to inhibit the adoption of the informal, peace movement approach by Green parties. Nevertheless it was one with which they were in great sympathy, and sought to emulate.

In the case of the Values Party, there was sometimes confusion over which hat the members were wearing. Suzanne Mackwell's study of the Values Party in 1976 notes that Values members were so heavily involved in the anti-nuclear movement at both a grass-roots and organising level that they were on some occasions obliged to play down their party affiliations. Some even resigned from an anti-nuclear ship campaign committee in case the movement was characterised negatively as a 'Values front' (Mackwell, 1976, 88). The anti-nuclear power organisations and campaigns in New Zealand in the 1970s were also organised and supported by significant numbers of Values members, including several political candidates. (The most prominent of these, Jeanette Fitzsimons, went on to become foundational Co-Leader of the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand in 1995.) Although the Values Party was electorally unsuccessful, its efforts to keep nuclear power out of New Zealand via other political means were completely successful, and it thus achieved one of its major political planks without becoming government. This helped reinforce the value in practice as well as in principle of the 'movement' approach to politics that has been typical of Green parties. Not that Greens could necessarily capitalise on this close association during election campaigns – Jeanette Fitzsimons in particular has expressed her disappointment that the sterling extra-
parliamentary work of Values/Green candidates who are also active members in the new social movements has never been readily exchangeable for votes come polling day (Fitzsimons, pers comm.). A case in point which is well documented is the failure of the organisers of the Repeal petition (calling for the repeal of a draconian abortion law) to acknowledge the Values Party as the only party with a pro-choice policy. It was also the only party that had worked for the petition, yet Repeal refused to advise pro-choice voters to support Values (Abortion strategy a bitter blow, 1978).

A third major parallel between New Left, anti-nuclear and Green politics is in the process of the movements - the consensual, egalitarian ways of making decisions and organising activities. The nuclear peace/anti-war movement was not the only new social movement to use the Non Violent Direct Action (NVDA) model of facilitated consensus decision-making for meetings and shared leadership roles - this was also typical of the Women's Liberation Movement. However the high proportion of activists in the movement who were familiar with this process (especially those from Quaker backgrounds) meant that it was strongly applied and well modelled in the movement. The Greenpeace style of direct action protest can also be directly attributed to Quaker influence, with an American Quaker who was part of the forerunner of Greenpeace - the Don't Make a Wave Committee - introducing '...the group to the Quaker tradition of bearing witness, which focussed on passive resistance.' The group then chose to bear witness via sending a boat to the Amchitka test site, and to make sure that the world could witness to the wrong being done by nuclear testing by attracting media attention to the protest (Davis, 1997, 711).
Explicit training in NVDA was given in New Zealand in 1971 by a British Quaker, and in 1972 by George Lakey, an American Quaker from the New Life Centre in Philadelphia (Locke, 1992, 286). The philosophy and practice of NVDA, as taught by Lakey, can be found in Oppenheimer and Lakey (1965). Three-time Values Party candidate and gay liberation activist Robin Duff was among the Greens trained by Lakey (Duff, pers. comm.), while New Zealanders trained by Lakey later went to Tasmania and passed on the techniques to Tasmanian Greens in the UTG (Harries, pers. comm.). Others trained included members of the Progressive Youth Movement, New Zealand’s major New Leftist organisation, of the anti-conscription organisation OHMS (Organisation to Halt Military Service) and of the anti-apartheid movement, HART (Halt All Racist Tours) (Cumming interview, 27.10.90). The training was used later by activists in the Save Aramoana Campaign (details below), as well as in the peace movement.

The overlap between the parties and the movements meant that there was no question of the first Green parties adopting hierarchical, majoritarian styles of organisation, even though they were required to register relatively formal constitutions to qualify for electoral activity.

Why and how things should be done in this new way is not well documented for the first Green parties. However an undated (almost certainly 1973) two page manuscript by Graham Butterworth of the Palmerston North branch of the Values Party discusses meeting process and how the Values Party should build on the new style which it tried to use at election meetings (‘...no ranting...maximum opportunity of audience participation...’). Butterworth’s suggested process draws on the Maori
tradition of *korero* (speech, discussion) inside the *whare nui* (traditional meeting house), where all are encouraged to speak and are given an uninterrupted hearing. It is also based on the process used by the Society of Friends [Quakers], especially in their business meetings, where ‘...decisions are made by the sense of the meeting not by taking votes.’ Butterworth urges the party to ‘...search for a form that encourages the maximum participation.’

A discussion paper on decision-making in the Values Party commissioned by the National Executive in December 1975, and prepared by Wellington members of the party for circulation in March 1976, contains an account of what making decisions by consensus means in practice. It refers the party to the 1975 *Annual Handbook for Group Facilities* for guidelines on the consensus process (Wellington Region, 1976, 9). Party Chairer Dave Woodhams summarised and elaborated on why and how the party made decisions this way in an article aimed at all members in the party paper (Woodhams, 1977, 4). Thus there is no doubt that the new politics approach to decision-making and organising was understood and adopted by the first Green parties, and was in marked contrast to the practices followed by both the Old Left and liberal democracy.

A fourth and final parallel between the organising style of the nuclear peace movement, the New Left and the Greens also pertains to where power resides and how it is articulated. The nuclear peace movement, in its heyday in Australasia in the late Seventies and early Eighties, and in Europe and North America in the Eighties, consisted of literally thousands of small, autonomous groups organised at state and/or national level into alliances or confederations. Peace organisations that were
set up and organised from a central, national headquarters were the exception rather than the rule. Peace Movement New Zealand (now Peace Movement Aotearoa) is a typical example of such a confederation, set up to share information, link activities, and provide services such as research and a magazine (aptly named *Peacelink*), which small neighbourhood groups could not provide for themselves. Nuclear peace confederations typically make decisions regarding national or regional direction by consensus at large gatherings, the primary focus of which is information-sharing and 'networking' (making and strengthening personal/political contacts with counterparts from other parts of the country or sectors of the movement). There may be an executive which services the confederation by maintaining an office, and so on, but it is never given the powers of directing or 'leading' the movement - rather spokespersons are chosen according to their expertise and media flair.

This model of organising was pioneered by the New Left in the USA in the 1960s, particularly in the SNCC (Student Non Violent Co-ordinating Committee) and SDS (Students for a Democratic Society), both of which were formed in 1960. These organisations provided a model for other autonomous groups working on issues of civil rights and liberties, peace, draft resistance and so on, until eventually the political formation which resulted became known by its varied participants simply as 'The Movement' (Goodman, 1970). The Women's Liberation Movement, which began organising itself on this basis from 1967 onwards (beginning in the USA) is perhaps the purest example of this style of organisation, with most of its national level groups forming after the establishment of local groups. These national level groups also tended to restrict themselves to specific issues, such as health, sexual violence, or pornography, rather than attempting to be all-purpose lobby groups.
Particularly vigorous local groups, such as the Boston Women's Health Book Collective, or the New York based group Redstockings, could have a national influence and set a national tone or style by virtue of the strength of their publications and personal contacts alone. Women's Liberation writers provided theoretical justifications for this style of organising (and also discussed some of the problems and dangers associated with its informality). It was a style that the feminists who helped found Green parties were familiar with, and they took with them into the parties. It was certainly a style that was wholly familiar to Catherine Wilson. Wilson was the first national secretary of the Values Party (1973-1974) and became the first female Deputy Leader of a New Zealand political party in 1974. She was an active feminist and a Quaker, and put a lot of effort into seeking a form of organisation which would be egalitarian (especially as regards to gender) while also being efficient.

In establishing a first Green party, therefore, the founders of the Values Party sought to follow the 'New Left' model as closely as was consistent with operating an effective nation-wide party. After experimenting with radical decentralisation and no national leadership for 18 months in 1973 and 1974, the Values Party reconstituted itself in the second half of 1974 with a clear statement of principle in its 1974 (and subsequent) constitutions. The principle was that 'No decisions should be assigned to higher levels in the organisational structure if they can be made just as efficiently at the lower level.' The 1976 review of decision-making in the Values Party mainly consisted of a discussion of how this principle was (or was not) working in practice, and what needed to be done by way of better definition of areas of accountability and responsibility to put it into effect.
Thus Green parties from the beginning have explicitly used (and further developed) New Left principles of organising style and process. It is not possible to understand why Green parties take the organisational forms that they do without a closer examination of where these ideas about process and style came from.

The peace movement was only one of the new social movements to have a major influence on Green praxis. It would be possible to trace similar genealogies of influence from the Women’s Liberation Movement and movements against racism and for Third World liberation. Similar influences came from — and spread to - a host of smaller but still powerful groupings focussing on citizens rights and responsibilities, especially in the areas of homosexuality, mental health, prison reform, drug reform, and so on. These movements in their turn derived their ideas on organisation from the New Left, since with the exception of the global nuclear peace movement (and then only just), New Left structures pre-dated or were exactly contemporary with new social movement organisations. The Black Power movement, for example, which grew directly out of the New Left civil rights organisation SNCC after Stokely Carmichael became president of SNCC and started promoting the Black Power line, dates from 1966. The origins of the Women’s Liberation Movement in the New Left have already been noted - the usual dating for the beginning of the WLM is 1967. ‘The Resistance’, the anti-Vietnam war movement organised along New Left lines, also began organising in 1967. Finally, the Gay Liberation Movement is usually dated from the Stonewall riots in New York in 1969, as previous homosexual rights organisations in America e.g. the Mattachine
Society and Daughters of Bilitis, were neither radical in aim nor militant in style, and had no connections with the New Left.⁹

The rise of radical environmentalism

By the time the radical environmentalist David Brower (Executive Director of the Sierra Club since 1952), was dropped from the board of the Club in 1969 and resigned from his job to found the first of the ‘new’ environmental organisations (Friends of the Earth), the ‘new politics’ model was firmly in place. The first sign of the extent and power of the new environmental movement (which was also organising in small grass roots groups across America) came in 1970. In that year the anti-war movement tactic of the ‘teach-in’ was deliberately and consciously copied for the first Earth Day (April 22), and according to Time magazine as many as 20,000,000 people went to lectures, rallies and other environmental education and action events (Sale, 1993, 24). A major difference between Earth Day and initiatives by the New Left and other new social movements, however, was that it was initiated from the top (by Senator Gaylord Nelson). It also received approval from leading establishment politicians, and even federal funding for staff to organise events in tertiary and secondary colleges across America (Lewis, 1997; Sale, 1993, 24). Thus there was scepticism in the wider ‘Movement’ about the new ecology movement, with a comment appearing in the Movement paper the Spokane National in February 1970 entitled ‘ECOLOGY SUCKS!’, which stated that ecology ‘...sucks the life out
of social reform. It sucks the energy out of campus movements. It sucks irritants out of capitalism. It sucks change out of politics. It sucks reason out of thought...' and went on to insist that if the ecology movement was to succeed it must 'oppose the police state', and oppose capitalism in the form of the military-industrial complex - i.e. it must be antisystemic in character and practice. The article was cynical about the support for the aims and methods of the ecology movement being evinced by mainstream politicians, including Nixon cabinet members, and concluded 'It is madness to believe that an unresponsive, undemocratic government and corrupt economic system will or can save the earth. Just as it is madness to participate in a popular ecology movement that is endorsed by the very people who make the movement necessary...' (Goodman, 1970, 519).

Friends of the Earth may have countered some of these objections by its uncompromising anti-nuclear stance (which was one of the major differences Brower had with the Sierra Club). Its radical credibility may also have been enhanced by its mode of organising internationally via autonomous national organisations linked in a global International, and by its willingness to engage in confrontational actions like boycotts and rallies (Yearley, 1997).

Although parts of 'The Movement' may have been suspicious of the new ecology movement, most of the new political ecologists drew explicitly on Movement ideas, style and rhetoric. Even the Sierra Club was prepared to countenance publishing the thoughts of young activists (more than half the contributors were under thirty) in a book called *ecotactics* (Mitchell and Stallings, 1970). The book begins by 'setting the scene' with contributions entitled 'Notes on the Conservation Revolution' and
"The Ecology of Revolution", and then goes on to describe and endorse non-violent direct action methods for raising ecological awareness and bringing about change, in language which is recognisably familiar as Sixties 'Movement' language. In 1972 Environmental Action, one of the new environmental organisations which sprang up to help organise Earth Day, published the even more militant Ecotage!, which was a compendium of very inventive (and often quasi-legal) direct action suggestions for environmentalists (Love and Obst, 1972). This ferment of environmental militancy did not go unnoticed by the far Right in America, which began to attack environmentalists with a characteristically loony bile and vigour previously reserved for the civil rights movement and the anti-war movement, while the centre Right was suspicious (Lewis, 1997, 765-766).

Despite the early revolutionary rhetoric applied to ecology, and some early but sporadic militancy, organised militant ecologism was slow to develop in the USA, not appearing until the early 1980s. Christopher Manes sees Earth Day as the high point of the reformist environmental movement which had been slowly building during the Sixties, with American mainstream conservationist and environmentalist organisations experiencing a substantial growth in membership (Sale, 1993, 23). The Sierra Club, for example, experienced a sevenfold increase in membership between 1960 and 1970, from 16,066 in 1960 to 114,336 in 1970, and continued to grow dramatically throughout the Seventies and into the Eighties (Manes, 1990, 49). Similar patterns pertained in Britain, New Zealand and other countries with established conservation/environment organisations. See, for example, McCormick (1989, 133) for a table showing the significant increase in the membership of environmental organisations in the UK and USA between 1968 and 1984. Also
Dalmer (1983, 62) for a graphic illustration of the gradual but steady growth of the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society - New Zealand’s oldest and largest conservation organisation - from 6,000 members in 1960 to 8,500 in 1970, and then a dramatic quadrupling in nine years to 32,000 by 1980.

This dramatic increase in interest and activity was not necessarily welcomed by the leadership of conservation organisations. Manes cites Sierra Club president Philip Berry expressing his concern about the burgeoning membership of the Club in 1970 - he feared that ‘...the popularity of our cause has attracted some whose motives must be questioned...’, and among those whom Berry suspected were ‘...anarchists voicing legitimate concerns about the environment for the ulterior purpose of attacking democratic institutions.’ Statements like these merely served to confirm the view of Earth First! founder Dave Foreman and other militant environmentalists that ‘The early conservation movement in the United States was a child - and no bastard child - of the Establishment.’ (Manes, 1990, 49-50). This was the conclusion which was reached more soberly and with historical documentation by Samuel Hays in 1959 in his study of the American conservation movement (Hays, 1959). It is also well summarised by Humphrey and Buttel in their overview of the historical roots of the American environmental movement (Humphrey and Buttel, 1982).

Kirkpatrick Sale, who has written a large study of the SDS, as well as his shorter history of the Green movement (Sale, 1974; 1993) is clear that rather than contributing ecological politics to The Movement, the new environment movement brought Movement politics to environmentalism, in this way:
...the protest generation itself became the essential support base of environmentalism, joining the old-line conservationists first in trickles, then in waves...The “graduates” of the sixties supplied not only the shock troops for political demonstrations and anti-corporate actions but a good many of the publicists, lawyers, scientists, and other professionals in the civil rights, antiwar, feminist and labor movements. This led to the growing influence of a younger set in most organisations, providing not only new ideas and styles but also new tactics, ranging from innovative methods of raising money and lobbying Congress to cutting down billboards and other forms of what was called “direct action”. ’(Sale, 1993, 13).

Accounts of the origins of Earth First! agree that in the 1970s, ‘In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, with counter-cultural influence on the wane, the environmental movement remained an issue that could unite both political activists and people of less liberal backgrounds.’ (Schulte, 1997) and Earth First! founders included a former Yippie as well as employees of conservation organisations, who regardless of political origins were committed to a radical anti-industrialism (including primary industrialism on the ‘rangelands’ of the South Western USA), and a very personal approach to politics (Pendleton, 1997). Further connections between Sixties rebellion and the new environmental politics have been traced by Robert Gottlieb (1993). He looks at the writers and theorists who provided the ecopolitical grounding for the radical new environmentalism (especially Rachel Carson, Murray Bookchin, Paul Goodman and Herbert Marcuse), and at the transition and overlap from New Left to environmental activism.
Direct environmental action in America, however, was slow in coming compared to Australasia. It was New Leftists in the labour movement in Australia who launched one of the most comprehensive and successful forms of environmental direct action in the early Seventies - the Green Bans. Beginning in 1971 with Hunters Hill, an area of urban bush land in Sydney, within three years the New South Wales branch of the Builders Labourers Federation had prevented the destruction of over thirty sites of natural and/or cultural heritage value. They did this simply by banning demolition or 'development' work on the sites by its members (Burgmann, 1993, 192-195).

Leader and spokesman for the NSWBLF, Jack Mundey, developed and defended his position in leftist journals such as *Australian Left Review*, not in environmentalist media. (See, for example, his account of the connections between capitalism, communism and ecology - Mundey, 1976). While regarded with suspicion by some of the middle class environmentalists and NIMBYists his union assisted to save important sites, he was regarded with much greater hostility by the national leadership of the BLF, who opposed his democratisation of the NSW branch and its support for ecology. An unholy alliance of leading Communists in the union and building trade proprietors eventually succeeded in getting the NSW branch of the union de-registered, thus smashing Mundey's career and the Green Ban movement together.

Other early forms of environmental direct action in Australia included a 'People's Pilgrimage' of over 1,000 people walking the 20 kilometres of rough track into Lake Pedder in Tasmania in 1971. Jack Mundey came to Hobart to urge workers to place a 'Blue Ban' on dam construction - though without success (Kiernan, 1990, 23, 32).
The origins of the first of Australia’s ‘forest occupation’ protests, at Terania Creek, NSW in August 1979, go back to the early 1970s. At that time ‘...numerous young, idealistic and well-educated new settlers, many of whom had been participants in or strongly influenced by the anti-war activities on university campuses in the late sixties and early seventies’ became aware that virgin forest near their new homes was under threat of logging (Hutton, 1999). For the first time in Australia NVDA methods (blockading forestry road construction with vehicles and people, sitting in front of bulldozers, sitting in trees marked for felling) were used for an environmental cause. Drew Hutton (1999) describes the way in which the people who flocked to support the occupation participated according to ‘new politics’ rules, organising themselves via facilitated meetings and conflict resolution and consensus decision making. He also covers the awareness the ‘new politicians’ had of their actions as theatre, citing Ian Cohen (who subsequently became a Green member of parliament in New South Wales) to this effect. This theatrical media orientation was to be a feature of militant environmentalism in the USA in the 1980s - but first it was pioneered in New Zealand.

At dawn on December 12, 1977, five years before Earth First! ‘cracked’ the Glen Canyon dam in Arizona (Manes, 1990, 3-5), a helicopter lifted a geodesic dome on to a site just below the proposed Clyde high dam on the Clutha River in Otago. ‘Clutha Rescue’ had been carefully planned for some months before the action - with everything from a solar water heating system for the dome to good relations with local opponents of the dam taken care of. The action consisted of an education and protest centre based in the dome. This continued throughout the summer, although harassment by hostile locals and the threat of arrest by the police meant that after
eleven days the dome had to be moved to another site (Johnston, 1978; Smith, 1978; Wilson, 1982, 64-65). The Clutha Rescue team did not give up the fight after their summer camp. They went back to Wellington and Auckland to continue to research, lobby and protest via the Values Party, Friends of the Earth and a new organisation dedicated to more democratic policy making, on energy and other issues, the Coalition for Open Government.

A year later, one year before Terania Creek and seven years before the first American tree sitting protest (Manes, 1990, 14) tree sitters began occupying 1,000 year old totara trees in Pureora Forest in the centre of the North Island. This forest was a nationally significant habitat of the rare and endangered kokako or wattle crow. While the sitters sat in the totara, logging of other ancient podocarps that provide food for the birds commenced around them (Wilson, 1982, 120-123).

In December 1980 the largest and longest of the New Zealand direct action environmental protests was launched with the occupation of the proposed site for an aluminium smelter at Aramoana near Dunedin, and the declaration of the 'Independent State of Aramoana'. Border posts were established on the one road leading into the tiny settlement of Aramoana, and 'passports' were issued to residents and sold to supporters of the campaign. Special Independent State of Aramoana postage stamps, designed by leading New Zealand artists, were also produced, and their sale to philatelists and supporters helped raise money for the cause. In 1981 a travelling embassy (a caravan staffed by two 'roving ambassadors') set off to travel the length and breadth of New Zealand, raising funds and support. 'Save Aramoana' groups were formed in other parts of New Zealand, sometimes as
part of existing environmental organisations, and sometimes under other names, such as Campaign Power Poll in Wellington, which concentrated on researching hydro-power statistics (aluminium smelters use vast amounts) and lobbying politicians.

The Save Aramoana Campaign was conceptualised from the beginning as a ‘new politics’ initiative. One of the founders of the campaign, Allan Cumming, had received training from George Lakey at his 1972 Christchurch workshop. Just prior to the formation of the S.A.C. he had been brushing up his NVDA skills, along with other environmental activists in Dunedin, at workshops led by Australian anti-nuclear activist Peter Jones and New Zealand peace activist Rachel Bloomfield. Cumming was active in several new social movements (peace, people’s sovereignty, environment) in the 1970s, and describes his politics as anarchist. The organisation of the Campaign rested on two principles that were foreign to the more formal and conventional Aramoana protection organisations that preceded the Campaign. These were that all decisions had to be made by consensus, and meetings had to be open to everyone. Cumming recalls that there were initial difficulties in establishing these principles (which were enshrined in the constitution of the S.A.C.), but once in place they worked well, with a pool of around twenty trained facilitators available to ensure that meetings were properly run. There was only one major illegal direct action at the site (the occupation of a newly erected site tower). Nevertheless the commitment of hundreds of people willing to occupy the site if necessary to permanently prevent work on it was stressed in letters to the company and face-to-face meetings with company directors in Auckland and Australia, and it appears to have been believed (Cumming interview, 27.10.90). The Save Aramoana Campaign also had a sophisticated approach to police, media and community relations, which
meant that it was able to mobilise widespread support and achieve a lot - including its ultimate goal of the cancellation of the smelter project - without 'going to the wire'.

This was in contrast to the most dramatic of the Australasian militant ecological protests, which was undoubtedly the campaign against the Franklin dam in Tasmania. In a carefully organised non-violent blockade of the dam site, beginning on 14 December 1981, and involving thousands of people (with 1440 arrested), it was the biggest conservation protest ever held in Australia, and a significant act of civil disobedience (Burgmann, 1993, 199). It was organised (by the Tasmanian Wilderness Society) only after six years of conventional lobbying and participation in electoral politics had failed to convince Labor and Liberal politicians of the necessity of protecting the river as part of the South West Heritage area of Tasmania (Hutton 1999).

Organised along NVDA lines, it was within the tradition inherited from the New Left and the student and peace movements of the 1960s, and therefore 'Green' not only in the environmental substance of the protest but also in the style of action. One of the leaders of the Franklin campaign, Bob Brown, was soon afterwards elected to the Tasmanian Parliament as an independent Green. Just before being elected to the federal Senate in 1996 (the fourth Green to become an Australian Senator - the first one, Jo Vallentine, came from the nuclear peace movement), Brown co-authored a book with another prominent Green and fellow senatorial candidate, the philosopher Peter Singer. As well as discussing the environmental crisis and a 'green ethic', the two Green authors pay considerable attention to a 'new
politics' and a 'new economics'. Their vision of the new politics allows for grass roots political participation, sees an end to party machines, and aims to ensure 'fair shares' for everyone in the new polity - including access to both material resources and to legal guarantees of human rights (Brown and Singer, 1996).

Brown has always taken a strong public stand on human rights issues, especially homosexual and Aboriginal rights, regardless of whether these are supported by the environmental/conservation constituency or not. This total Green package, as espoused and practised by Brown and other Green politicians, has been something that the environmental and conservation pressure groups in Australasia have generally refused to endorse. Indeed, they have usually sought to dissociate themselves from it, starting with the conservationists' suspicion of the United Tasmania Group (for details see Chapter Five). Leading Australian Green Drew Hutton, an anarchist New Leftist in the 1960s, was not tempted to join the Australian Conservation Foundation (now Australia’s largest conservation organisation) when it was set up in 1965. It appeared to him at the time to be just another Establishment ‘old boy’s club’, with a Chief Justice (Garfield Barwick) as the first President and Prince Phillip as the second one, and Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser on the Council of the Foundation (Hutton interview, 9.8.97).

New Zealand’s Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society had similar, albeit much earlier, Establishment origins in 1923, with MPs, lawyers, retired army officers and the like founding and leading the organisation (Dalmer, 1983). Thus the criticisms levelled at the American conservation establishment by the radical ecologists were also true for Australasia.
In Chapters Five to Seven there is a more detailed account of how the large (and growing) conservation organisations and campaigns in New Zealand in the 1960s were not responsible for the creation of the Values Party (or even connected to it). On the contrary - it was to be leading figures in the Values Party who turned their attention to environmental campaigns after they had founded/organised the party - who were to make a major contribution to environmental politics in New Zealand. Examples include Norman Smith, first organiser of the Values Party, who was chief organiser of the Clutha Rescue action, in association with other Values members including founder member Gary Williams, Campaign Half Million organiser Raewyn McKenzie, and Margaret Crozier, the first woman Leader of the party (1979). Crozier’s Deputy Leader, Richard Thompson, played a leading role in the Save Aramoana Campaign. Other Values members were heavily involved in, and played leading roles in, the anti-nuclear movement in both its anti-war and anti-nuclear power wings (Fitzsimons interview, 1990; Hocking interview, 1990; Melhuish interview, 1990; Smith interview, 1990; Thompson interview, 1990). (And in a counter example, one of New Zealand’s leading environmentalists of the 1980s was not a member of Values in the 1970s, but rather a founder of what was probably New Zealand’s first libertarian Right party - Wallace interview, 1990).

In Australia The Wilderness Society, Australia’s second largest conservation organisation, had its beginnings in a meeting in Tasmania in 1976 at which 80% of the attendees were members of the United Tasmania Group - an example of a conservation organisation coming out of a Green one, rather than vice versa. (See Chapter Five for details.) Thus while radical environmentalism may often be ‘Green’ politics, this is not always or necessarily the case, and an investigation of the
specific connections between particular manifestations of radical environmentalism, and actual Greens and Green theory and practice, as I have done here, is necessary.
Rebels in retrospect

Chronologies for New Left/new social movement and then Green activity that parallel those of the USA can be documented for Australia and New Zealand. Toby Boraman (1997) records the first New Left group in New Zealand as the Socialist Forum, which formed in 1958 and consisted of those disaffected with all strands of the Old Left, from the Labour Party to the Communist Party.

In New Zealand, as in Great Britain, there were close connections between the New Left and nuclear peace activism; and most of the New Left groups were founded by students and other young people. The Christchurch Progressive Youth Movement (PYM) (1969-1973) was the clearest example of this type, and is described by Boraman as the New Zealand equivalent of the SDS. By 1970, when the second Radical Activists Congress was held in New Zealand, the New Left 'anarchist/hippy/yippie/jesus freak' coalition was in the ascendancy. Members of this grouping disrupted a debate between Trotskyists and Maoists over who held 'the way forward for the New Zealand revolution' with music, shouting, paper darts and other missiles. Leading New Leftist (at that time - and an early member of the Values Party) Tim Shadbolt summed up the situation thus:

'...they are trying to tell us that “radical” means Mao or Trotsky, that “activist” means talking about them...if this is going to be a public debate, then let’s show that radicals are involved in numerous possibilities of revolution. Let’s have an anarchist, let’s have a Christian, let’s have a yippie, let’s have an artist.' (Boraman, 1997, 12).
The video *Rebels in Retrospect* (Campbell, 1991), which deals with the Christchurch and Wellington PYMs, is another source of evidence of the flamboyant ‘youth’ style which was also apparent in the early Values Party. Street theatre was a popular way of spreading the message (and creating some havoc). Participants recall that while one was expected to study the socialist canon, and there were (heated) debates on the ‘correct line’, in any room of ten people there would be eleven different opinions, and no actual enforcement of a ‘line’. Counter-culture attitudes and styles were also much in evidence, from tie-dyed clothing and rock music to political poetry and sexual libertarianism. Chris Kraus recalls on the video that the PYM ‘ideology’ was to show off, to be playful, to use metaphors. She says that ‘Ideology was like a costume you could try on and walk around in.’ Her summation of the PYM experience was that being a ‘yahoo’ was more radicalising than being a Marxist-Leninist. In her view it had a more lasting effect, and those who were part of it never re-entered the mainstream of society.

It was from this radical youth ferment that the Values Party was to draw many of its early members and ideas. Tony Brunt’s original name for his new party was the ‘New Zealand Youth Party’, and while the somewhat frivolous 1970s style has gone, the deeper principles of the acceptance of alternatives and diversity, and of living as well as preaching politics, remain part of the bedrock of Green politics.

The heterogeneous origins of the European Green parties, especially *Die Grünen*, have been well-documented (Boggs, 1986; Hülsberg, 1988; Parkin, 1991). By the time *Die Grünen* formed the German New Left as a movement (like its US counterpart) had largely degenerated into ideological sectarianism on the one hand
and terrorism on the other. The transmission of New Left theory and practice was therefore principally through the new social movements, especially the peace movement, the women’s movement, and the BürgerInitiativen, rather than directly through the remnant New Leftist groups that were involved in founding Die Grünen. New Zealand provides a clearer as well as an earlier example of the transition from New Left to Green.

If the theory and practice of Green parties in particular, and Green politics in general, owes more to its New Left predecessors than to its ecological contemporaries, then what are the principal features of the New Left parent that enable us to recognise the Green child?

Massimo Teodori presents five theses that he believes characterise the core of the New Left. Each one is recognisably an identifying feature of Green politics, and each one of them is exclusively political i.e. it is a product of the power dimension in human affairs, rather than ecosystem interactions. In summary, they are as follows:

(1) individual moral revolt expressed in terms of an analysis of the way in which the economic system and social institutions exert power over every aspect of life, restricting fundamental rights to self-realisation and self-expression; and a corollary emphasis on personal as well as political liberation;

(2) a focus on opposition to the system, whose racist, sexist, violent, authoritarian, destructive, exploitative, technocratic, elitist elements are seen as interdependent and closely connected;
direct action as a primary means of democratic political expression;

participatory democracy as both an essential means and a major end of political activity;

decentralisation, diversity, self-government, inclusiveness, and abolition of bureaucracy and hierarchy as primary political organising principles.

(Teodori, 1970, 36-37.)

It is easy to find examples of all these theses in both the New Left and early Green theorising and practice - in fact one is struck by the parallels. For example the 1962 Port Huron Statement of the SDS, which is probably the definitive American New Left document, begins with a substantial discussion of values. It places personal authenticity and meaningful participation in human relationships at the centre of political endeavour, rejects the separation of means and ends, advocates replacing ‘...power rooted in possession, privilege or circumstance by power and uniqueness rooted in love, reflectiveness, reason and creativity...’. It finishes with an outline of a participatory democratic approach to politics, economics and other major social institutions, and the advocacy of non-violent conflict resolution at all levels (Jacobs and Landau, 1966, 157-161).

In less eloquent and developed form, but with similar substance, this is what Tony Brunt, founder of the Values Party, says in his speech which launched the party in May 1972. He speaks of Values being a ‘quality of life’ party, responding to the
need to breathe warmth and humanity into society and stop the decline in our sense of community. He talks of the ‘real Kiwi’ [New Zealander] wanting to renew his [sic] links with nature and enjoy relaxed and warm relationships with other people, and questions why we live in this way only during the three summer holiday weeks of the year. He claims we can live this way all year round if ‘...we have the courage to say “no” to the system...if we put men before machines, if we are prepared to place people before production and profits.’ (Brunt, 1972, 2). He concludes his speech by criticising the New Zealand government for choosing to import $96 million worth of new cars in 1972, at a time when the economy of Bangla Desh was collapsing and the United Nations was appealing for increased aid. He asks ‘Where is its sense of values? This is why we have chosen to call our party the Values Party. It stands for correct values in our society.’ Brunt then claims that the ideas the Values Party is promoting constitute a new political synthesis, almost a new ideology, with a common thread, and ‘...the common thread is...humanism. We simply want to meet the needs of the people and not the needs of the system.’ (Brunt, 1972, 12)

In the light of the fierce condemnation of ‘anthropocentrism’ coming from deep ecologists (and also some Greens) a decade later, Brunt’s advocacy of humanism as the foundation - and at the foundation - of a Green party may seem anomalous. However, unlike latter-day Greens influenced by deep ecology, Brunt and the first Greens did not see a contradiction between meeting human needs and respecting the environment. In fact they advocated environmental protection and conservation in order to meet human needs conceived in the widest possible, non-material sense i.e.
not just the need for economic resources but also the need for spiritual development and aesthetic re-creation.

This is certainly the position taken by the United Tasmania Group in its 1974 manifesto statement ‘The New Ethic’. The third clause of ‘The New Ethic’ begins thus: ‘Concerned for the dignity of man and the value of his cultural heritage while rejecting any view of man which gives him the right to exploit all of nature’. It then goes on to outline how a harmony between man and nature (and man and man) could be achieved via creating social and political mechanisms for valuing individuals, and for creating communities in which all can participate equally. (See Appendix B for the full text of ‘The New Ethic’.)

As Brunt’s speech and ‘The New Ethic’ make clear, there is a rejection of ‘the system’ and its moribund values and a desire to set up new and better alternatives. The means by which this will be done were also firmly in the New Left tradition covered in the third, fourth and fifth of Teodori’s theses. Further details on the Values Party and UTG ‘direct action’ style of election and issue campaigning are given in Chapter Five.

Style and process similarities between the New Left and the Greens, and the antisystemic critique, are readily observable - the emphasis on personal liberation and individual moral revolt is somewhat more subtle. Yet the new Green departure in this area was readily discernible in the first study of this dimension conducted in New Zealand in 1972. Stephen Levine scored all the major parties contesting the 1972 general election on Rokeach’s scale of political values (which is derived from
analysing party manifestos and other political materials). He concluded that the Values Party ‘...transcends Rokeach’s scheme classifying political movements solely according to the relative priority of the values of freedom and equality.’ (Levine, 1975, 120). The 1972 Values Party platform placed a strong emphasis on ‘existential values’ like beauty, pleasure, harmony, happiness, love, wisdom and so on, characteristics which it linked with a secure and equal society on the one hand and personal freedom on the other. Levine’s analysis concluded that ‘...data pertaining to the Values Party indicates that Rokeach’s approach may be more applicable to the political choices of the ‘old politics’, in which struggle for basic rights and economic well-being are dominant, than to the ‘new politics’.’ (Levine, 1975, 122)

Democrats with a difference

Theorists of the American New Left were well aware of the novelty of their politics, and that an important new element was the seeming contradiction between the desire for personal liberty on the one hand and social equality on the other. Dick Flacks (1966) characterised the two conflicting extremes as ‘existential humanism’ and ‘radical transformation of the social order’. The New Left tried to achieve both goals simultaneously, and Flacks was positive that it must ‘encompass both sets of orientation’, and be aware of the dangers in privileging one position over the other, saying:
'It is clear that a politics apart from an existential ethic becomes increasingly manipulative, power-oriented, sacrificial of human lives and souls - it is corrupted. The danger involved in a social movement that is apolitical is, perhaps, less obvious...it seems to me [it] is that of irresponsibility: of a search for personally satisfying modes of life while abandoning the possibility of helping others to change theirs; of placing tremendous hope in The Movement of the immediate community for achieving personal salvation and gratification - then realising that these possibilities are, after all, limited, and consequently suffering disillusionment.' (Flacks, 1966, 168)

Flacks also saw problems in trying to achieve both goals at once:

'The obvious difficulty with trying to encompass both existential humanism and radical politics is that they are not only plausibly independent, but sometimes incompatible. Thus the effort to be politically effective can involve one in efforts at manipulation and compromise. The effort to be morally consistent can radically separate one from effective communication with others.' (Flacks, 1966, 168).

He felt that SNCC and SDS had done a reasonably good job thus far (from 1960 to June 1965) of maintaining the necessary tension between the two orientations.

He also thought that the fact that such a tension existed was an important difference between SDS and SNCC and other 'left' organisations (Flacks, 1966, 169).

It is also a difference between Green organisations and most left organisations, now that the New Left has gone. A defining characteristic of Green politics is the
foundational principle of participatory democracy (often rendered as ‘grassroots democracy’ in English, *Basisdemokratie* in German). It appears in the first principles of every party using the name Green - with some significant exceptions.

The Ecological Democratic Party in Germany, formed by ex-Christian Democrat politician Herbert Gruhl and others, who departed from *Die Grünen* because that party was in their view too leftist, is one of the exceptions. It is a good example of a party where environmental concern is matched with conservative social and economic policies - with no electoral success. The New Zealand exception discussed below is an even better example of a party that arose out of an environmental organisation, yet failed to adopt any of the other Green principles, or a Green economic policy.

The Progressive Green Party was a ‘blue-green’ party formed in 1995 to contest the 1996 general election, New Zealand’s first election using the MMP voting system. (This is the system used in Germany, with MPs coming from both geographical constituencies and party lists - it allows parties which can achieve over 5% of the total vote on their party list to enter parliament via the list vote). The Progressive Green Party had a ‘free-market’ economic policy, and did not place any emphasis on gender equity, non-violence, consensus decision-making or other Green principles. In a comparison of the three parties using the name Green in New Zealand John Prince judged the Progressive Greens to be the ‘least Green’, with the major differences being over economics and democratic process (Prince, 1995).

The Progressive Green Party was set up by leaders of the Maruia Society, a conservation organisation that was formed in 1988 by a merger of the Native Forest
Action Council (NFAC) and the Environmental Defence Society. NFAC had once been a leading campaigner for forest conservation (Wilson, 1982, 108-115; Anon., n.d.), and the Environmental Defence Society was an Auckland-based group of lawyers and scientists who formed the society in 1971 to take public good environmental cases. While NFAC at its inception was a radical ecology organisation, with tens of thousands of members nation-wide, and hundreds prepared to take direct action (such as tree-sitting), the Maruia Society at the time of the formation of the Progressive Green Party had an on-paper membership of around 1,000. None of those were prepared to take direct action. It was also engaged in acrimonious exchanges with the rest of the environment movement, whose leaders were highly critical of the Maruia position on a range of issues. These included Maruia support for the West Coast Forests Accord, (which allows for continued logging of virgin native forest), and the sale of mountain lands to foreign owners.\textsuperscript{11}

The Progressive Green Party (while predicting that it would achieve at least five percent of the vote, and being tipped by the National Party Environment Minister Simon Upton as a potential coalition partner), in actual fact received only 0.24\% of the total vote in the 1996 general election. In contrast, three members of the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, standing as part of the leftist Alliance of five parties, were elected to parliament. In 1998 the party formally disbanded, and its president and some of its members set up the Blue Greens, a lobby group working within the National Party.

The Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand has a more impressive track record with regard to the practice of Green democracy. It is the genuine descendent of the Values
Party, both legally insofar as the formalities of the New Zealand electoral system are concerned, and morally insofar as it derives its policies and practice from the Values legacy. With regard to its personnel, a significant proportion of its current leaders and activists were members of the Values Party. The Green Party’s first female Co-Leader, Jeanette Fitzsimons, was a leading Values campaigner on energy and related environmental issues in the 1970s and strongly represents that strand of Green politics. The first male Co-Leader, Rod Donald, is an equally good exemplar of the participatory democracy strand, having begun his political career as a (voluntary) community organiser in an inner-city neighbourhood of Christchurch, where he founded a whole-food store owned and operated by a co-operative, and a community land trust. In the 1980s he became active on electoral reform issues, and in the early 1990s he fronted the successful campaign for changing the voting system to MMP. His politics are heavily influenced by communitarian anarchist thinkers, such as Kropotkin and Bookchin, and by eclectic social critics like Illich and Schumacher, and radical activists like Saul Alinsky, (Donald, pers. comm.), who were also influential in the New Left.

Central to the New Left/Green concept of participatory democracy is that it is both a means and an end. This is discussed by Teodori (1970, 50-52) and Flacks (1971, 27-35) who both comment on the ‘end of ideology’ hypothesis which was first advanced by Daniel Bell (Bell, 1960). Bell was criticised by Noam Chomsky for his contention that there was now a consensus of political and social ideas in the West, and that politics from now on would be merely a technical activity of making minor adjustments to the system, rather than fighting over fundamentals (Chomsky, 1969, 272-274). The New Left agreed with Bell that Marxism as an ideology was dead
(humorously proclaimed with slogans like 'God is dead, Marx is dead, and I'm not feeling too well myself' and 'Je suis marxiste: tendance Groucho'). But this did not mean that the debate over fundamentals had been or should be replaced by technocratic management of the status quo. In fact, it was precisely this substitution of liberal corporatist management for democratic politics that the New Left was in revolt against.

The New Left posited a new way of doing politics which was an alternative to both authoritarian communism and corporate liberalism, and participatory democracy applied on a nation-wide basis was one of its goals as well as the means by which it conducted its own affairs. Dick Flacks concludes his essay on participatory democracy thus:

'The virtue of "participatory democracy", as a basis for a new politics, is that it enables these new sources of social tension to achieve political expression. Participatory democracy symbolizes the restoration of personal freedom and interpersonal community as central political and social issues. It is not the end of ideology: it is a new beginning.' (Flacks, 1971, 35.)

It was a new beginning enthusiastically adopted by Green parties at their beginning. Some documentation of this has already been given in this chapter, and more is given in Chapter Five. The 1972 Values Party manifesto advocated political decentralisation and 'community government' by neighbourhood councils, beginning in the areas where the need was greatest, i.e. in new housing sub-divisions inhabited by working class and immigrant Polynesian populations (New Zealand Values Party, 1972, 29). The 1975 Values manifesto has a section entitled
'Community', which expands on the community development and political control theme. Under the heading 'Government Reform' there is a section entitled 'Participatory Democracy, which states that

'In a truly democratic society any citizen should feel that he or she can influence government.' and that the current situation, where the majority are powerless in the role of spectators of political games, is a situation which "...cannot be changed except through a strong and active movement of people "at the grassroots level". Such a movement has emerged in New Zealand in recent years. It is still scattered, largely inarticulate, not very well organised, nor very confident of itself...Manapouri [the campaign to save the lake], Aro St [inner city 'alternative' Wellington], Otara [new suburban Polynesian Auckland] are places where some of its battles have been won. It is a movement towards participatory democracy, and the Values Party is only one part of it. In its role as a social action movement, the Values Party seeks to demonstrate that the ordinary citizen is not powerless...The Values Party does not need to become the government to enact its policies. Many can be enacted in their daily lives by members.' (New Zealand Values Party, 1975, 85).

This personal approach to politics is quintessentially New Left, and shows that the Greens are the true heirs of the New Left, albeit in attenuated electoral form.

The other New Left/new social movement themes that reappear in Green politics are many, and would require a separate volume to trace and analyse. I am able to list only the best sources that set out the arguments and/or make the links. They include...

It is possible to find examples of New Leftists moving into prominent roles in Green parties, of whom Daniel Cohn-Bendit, currently a Green Euro MP, is probably the best-known. There are also plenty of examples of new social movement leaders making the shift (Petra Kelly being an excellent example). One can also find specific instances where New Left sources have been used to build Green platforms, and where New Left organisations shade into Green ones (an excellent example of this being the origins of francophone Green politics in Belgium in Démocratie Nouvelle). However, proving the genealogy in such strictly 'genetic' terms is unnecessary. The extreme similarity and congruity of New Left and Green programmes and practices speaks for itself. When it is stripped of the remnants of socialist rhetoric, which in any case was a feature of the later and moribund New Left rather than the New Left in its formative phase, most of the New Left platform is recognisably 'Green'. A typical example of this is the emphasis on community and participation. Or it was to be contested to become more 'Green' e.g. the women's liberation critique that led to the Green party emphasis on gender equity.

In conclusion, while Green parties undoubtedly derive most (although not all) of their conservation and environmental policies from the analysis and practice of the radical wing of the environmental movement, they derive their politics from the New
Left and the new social movements. This is either via direct transmission of personnel, ideas and policies, or by indirect influences from shared processes, styles and goals. A more detailed description and analysis of the origins and political orientation of the first two Green parties, provided in the next three chapters, will show how this happened in practice.

Notes

1. A typical example of this is Denis Owen's statement that 'The first important lesson to learn is that man is part of nature and that the rest of nature was not put there for man to exploit...'. (Owen, 1991, 23). Owen then goes on to discuss the way in which ecosystems are 'self-regulating', and claims that unless humans learn to limit their energy usage and population growth we will overshoot our resource base and perish. Andrew Dobson explicitly endorses this 'laws of nature' approach to politics. He says 'We want to live according to universal laws rather than redesign them ... The science of ecology teaches us that we are part of a system which stretches back into an unfathomable past and reaches forward into an incalculable future, and that the whole interplanetary community is bound by ties which make a mockery of mastery...There is solace to be had once we realize that the wisdom of God passeth all understanding. Green politics responds to an age of uncertainty by teaching us to know our place.' (Dobson, 1991, 8) (Emphasis added). Without wishing to labour the point, this is clearly a normative and not a descriptive statement. It is not a view shared by many Greens (including this author), who would certainly not dispute the value of ecology as a science which can help us understand, protect and sustain the diversity of life on this planet.

2. An example of the way this assumption works is encapsulated in Andrew Dobson's statement 'In the same way in which our personal lives are political for feminism, and our economic lives are political for Marxism, so our dealings with the natural world have a political dimension for ecologism. In this respect, green politics makes an original contribution to a fundamental theme of political theory: the question of 'the scope of politics as a practical activity' (Dobson, 1993, 231). Insofar as this statement is true it is trivial. The political history of the second half of the twentieth century could be described as the era of enlarging the scope of politics as a practical activity. This it now includes all sorts of non-parliamentary activity, including sports, arts, prisons, health care, food, and so on. Every sphere of human endeavour has a power dimension, and hence a politics. There is now a trend in critical political thought which questions this expansionism and seeks to apply a more rigorous and narrow definition of political even within these new spheres of politics (see, for example, Beyme, 1996). What is problematic about Dobson's statement is not that it draws our attention to another new sphere for politics but rather that it begs the question of who conducts the politics in any given sphere, and in this respect the analogy with feminism and Marxism does not stand up. Feminism and Marxism both identify clear historical actors or agents on both sides of their respective political divides, namely men and women, wage workers and capitalists. While a few ecologists, such as Lovelock (1979) have asserted a bona fide personalised identity for 'Earth', most do not claim that nature has historical agency equivalent to that possessed by human beings. Most would accept that while humans
may do politics with, by and through nature, nature does not do politics with, by and through humans. One of the earliest critiques of political ecology, by Hans-Magnus Enzensberger (1973) drew attention to this very point, arguing that much of what political ecologists were representing as 'universal truths of nature' was in fact an artefact of the politics of class. Feminist critics have followed on to consider the extent to which environmental destruction springs from the politics of gender (Lloyd 1984; Merchant, 1982; Plumwood, 1993; Seager, 1993). Others who are interested in the environment as a political battleground have considered the religious roots of the exploitation of nature (White, 1967). What all these critics of political ecology have in common is an understanding of the politics of nature being more truthfully described as a politics about nature. Hence the fierce criticisms of the 'of nature' position espoused by deep ecologists and 'Earth First!'ers, which come not just from liberal or 'shallow' environmentalists but also from those who consider themselves to be political radicals, such as social ecologists on the one hand and ecofeminists on the other.

3. This brief summary of the move from New Left to Green may give the erroneous impression that this was the only option open to New Leftists who wanted to move from the heady but short-lived excitements of street revolt to a less thrilling commitment to a quotidienne politics of reform. This was not the case. In Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s there were some significant left parties which were well to the left of social democracy, but were not authoritarian communist sects. In France the PSU (Unified Socialist Party) attracted New Leftists, as did similar parties in Italy, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Holland (Kagarlitsky, 1990, 119, 154). The absence of such socialist and communist parties in Germany (due mainly to their suppression, via outright bans and measures such as the Berufsverbot) undoubtedly facilitated the development of the Green party alternative. In other countries there was some degree of co-operation between libertarian socialist parties and Green electoral tickets.

In France, for example, the first 'Green' presidential candidate (René Dumont, 1974), was definitely an eco-socialist, and there was considerable co-operation between the PSU and political ecologists, until the 1988 presidential elections. Here the PSU decided to support a former Communist Party candidate, running a 'Red and Green' campaign supported by a variety of political groups, while the Greens ran their own candidate. The Green candidate polled 3.8% in the first round, and the socialist candidate 2.1%. Bennahmias and Roche (1992, 81) comment on this: 'L'électeur écologiste a choisi, il préfère majoritairement le Vert au Rouge et Vert'. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the Groen Links (Green Left) party was formed by the amalgamation of the Communist Party of the Netherlands, the Pacifist-Socialist Party, the Political-Radical Party, the Evangelical People's Party and various independents in 1989. All of them had been slipping electorally. Together as Groen Links they have been more successful electorally than the 'pure' Green party, De Groenen. (Voerman, 1995). But both examples show that it is probably the Green rather than the socialist label which has more appeal today, and makes Green parties a better electoral bet for those who may still have leftist hopes or ambitions. Finally, while these small leftist and 'alternative' parties have managed some 'rainbow' forms of co-operation (e.g. the GRAEL group in the European Parliament), they are not part of a global network in the way Green parties are.

The failure of libertarian socialist parties in the West to make the running on anti-capitalist environmentalism is certainly not due to a failure of its proponents to produce thoughtful, critical work on 'eco-socialism'. See, for example, Bell (1987), Benton (1989), Dumont (1975), Dunkley (1992), Ryle (1988) and Weston (1986, and the journal Nature, Capitalism, Socialism. The question of why eco-socialism has not been able to excite the same interest and support is an important one, which deserves more attention than I can give it here. For an interesting discussion of how the new social movement form has eclipsed the old socialist party form, and hence compromised the propagation of socialist analysis, see Probert (1986).

4. Anti-consumerism was not the only connection between the Situationists and Green politics as practised by the Values Party. An awareness of making creative use of the media in order to subvert the status quo and proclaim the alternative is another common thread. (For more on this see Chapter Five – especially the Values Party production of state-of-the-art TV ads and print manifestos, and Dave Woodhams on 'Politics as Drama.') However, the true inheritors
and propagators of the Situationist project, now gone virtual and global, would seem to be the members of the Canadian-based group The Media Foundation, which has been publishing its quarterly ‘Journal of the Mental Environment’ *Adbusters*, and hosting a website, since the early 1990s. The front page of their website (adbusters@adbusters.org), when visited on 3.3.99, opened with the Situationist slogan ‘*Vivez sans temps mort!*’ scrawled graffiti-style across it. They also practice the Situationist technique of détournement (subtly altering an event, artefact or artwork to make it subversive rather than normative). Their mission statement is ‘We are a global network of artists, activists, educators and entrepreneurs who want to build the new social activist movement of the information age. Our goal is to use guerilla media tactics to catalyze resistance against those who would destroy the environment, pollute our minds, and diminish our lives.’ (The Media Foundation, 1997, 64). The Media Foundation thus provides the best English-language exemplar of contemporary resistance through the media.

5. Butterworth’s ideas on appropriate meeting process were not acquired in the ecology movement. In the late 1960s he was a member of both YCND (Youth Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) and of the Victoria University Anarchists Association. The latter organisation was formed in 1961, and engaged in direct action anti-war and anti-apartheid activities, including digging up a test cricket pitch in 1964 as a protest against New Zealand playing South Africa (Boraman, 1997, 6).

6. Details about the origins and early development of the Women’s Liberation Movement in the USA, including its foundational connection with the New Left and the civil rights movement, can be found in Evans (1979) and Echols (1989). For the New Zealand development and style of Women’s Liberation see Dann (1985). Redstockings (1979) provides examples of theorising around feminist styles of organising.

7. Wilson’s thoughts on these matters can be found in the issues of the party’s national newsletter *Linkletter*, which she edited (and largely wrote) in 1973 and 1974, and in her correspondence with other members of the party (all of which is archived in the Alexander Turnbull Library Values Party collection). In her opening address to the Values Party’s 1974 Conference she discusses the experiment with decentralisation and no national leaders which Values had been conducting for the previous eighteen months, and what had been learned from it. She was personally in favour of stronger leadership and organisation at the national level, but said that even if this happens ‘...we shall still be primarily a network of small, independent groups each with an egalitarian internal structure. The continuing autonomy of these local branches will ensure that the Values Party will remain mindful of the influence of structures on us as persons and that it will never exhibit the authoritarianism that we seek to cure in the wider community.’

She quoted Bertolt Brecht’s lament on would-be revolutionaries ‘...who sought to build a caring world, but could not themselves be kind.’ and said that ‘We must nourish in each other the roots of a just loving world order. And it is the ordinary branch members of our party who will make it a working model of what life in the new society can be like, where men [sic] will live in harmony with each other and with their environment.’ She stressed that members must remember that the party is just one vehicle for this vision. Also that ‘We who comprise the party are more than the vehicle; we are a social movement concerned as much with the reorientation of society by the re-education of people and the changing of their basic attitudes as we are with conventional political machinery.’ (Wilson, 1974). Wilson’s speech contains much more which clearly differentiates the new from the old ‘progressive’ politics, and is a good example of how the first Greens conceived of their type of party and politics.

8. The national executive of the party commissioned a group of Wellington region members in December 1975 to produce a paper on decision-making, which was circulated in March 1976. A typical example from that paper of the ‘new politics’ approach to defining responsibility and leadership is this ‘checklist’ -

‘The concept of defined responsibility involves therefore:
- a rejection of rank or status
- a rejection of both autocratic and anarchic structures
- the concept of ‘hats’ or particular roles

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- the idea that each function carries its own responsibility to its own area
- a fluid idea of leadership - it is present but the leader changes according to the function and the area and action...

(Wellington Region, 1976, 6)

9. The Mattachine Society was founded by a Communist Party organiser and structured along secretive and hierarchical lines. The first signs that there would be some cross-fertilisation between New Left and gay politics occurred with the growth of the counter-culture in San Francisco in the 1960s. Some key figures there, such as the poet Allen Ginsberg, spanned the old Beat and new hippie counter culture and the gay 'scene'. For further details on the old and new styles of homosexual political organisation in post-war America see D'Emilio (1983) and Miller (1995). A similar pattern of conventionally organised and 'respectable' homosexual rights organisations and homosexual clubs preceding the Gay Liberation movement was followed in the UK and in New Zealand. One such New Zealand organisation, the Dorian Society, even threatened to sue Gay Liberation for stating publicly that the Society was a club for homosexuals (Martin Oelderink, pers. comm.)

10. Hutton's quote from Cohen reads 'With the backdrop of river and ocean, police blue and forest green, gaudy boat and technicolour bulldozer, one has an exceptional setting for theatre. Theatre of the environment uses the vulture of the media (usually a tool of the establishment) to present the story; we dangle and perform, often in precarious circumstances, making ourselves and our act irresistible to the press. It is a play, an irreverent game, yet at the same time it provides a vital conduit for messages otherwise unable to be transmitted in a monopolistic realm. Lacking financial resources, we penetrate this powerful field as if by magic and in doing so create an alchemy for change.' (Hutton, 1999)

10. Further documentation of the huge differences between the Maruia Society and the rest of the environment/conservation movement in New Zealand is contained in a paper (Anon., n.d.) distributed in late 1997 to politicians and the environment movement. Prepared by former office holders of the Maruia Society, it was written in response to information that Guy Salmon, the Maruia Society Chief Executive, had been privately lobbying government against the rest of the environment movement's campaign to end the logging of publicly-owned native forests on the West Coast. This paper is merely the latest - and most developed - of the increasingly acrimonious differences between Guy Salmon and his organisation and the rest of the environment movement. These have included threats by Salmon to sue the former chair of the Canterbury/Westland branch of the Maruia society (David Round, pers. comm.) for publicly criticising him and the Society. Salmon attempted to characterise his politics as 'post-modern' at the 1994 Ecopolitics conference held at Lincoln University. However his participation in the Mont Pelerin Society conference held in Christchurch in 1989, his work for Australasian right-wing think tank the Tasman Institute, and his advocacy of free market economics in the Progressive Green Party's manifesto would seem to put him clearly in the New Right political camp - a long way from Greens in the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand. Additional information on Salmon's divergence from the rest of the green movement can be found in Secrets and Lies by Hager and Burton (1999).

12. Issue No. 10 of Démocratie Nouvelle, a special issue for Spring 1975, consists of a report written by Gérard Lambert and Georges Trussart for the Economic and Social Commission of the organisation Démocratie Nouvelle [New Democracy], developed from the principles given in the organisation's February 1973 manifesto.

It begins with a critique of the social and environmental abuses of private capitalism, moves on to criticising state capitalism, and then develops a vision of a new society which would be opposed to growth for growth's sake. This new society would use democratic and self-governing methods of rational planning for social, economic and environmental needs.

The bibliography given at the end of the report shows a typically eclectic 'Green' range of sources, from libertarian socialists to technocratic environmentalists (Lambert and Trussart, 1975).
Chapter Five

‘From Earth’s last islands’

The development of the first two Green parties

Completely independently of one another, and without knowing of each other’s existence until they had been going for some two years, the United Tasmania Group and the Values Party were founded within two months of each other in 1972. Their origins were quite different, yet they developed in remarkably convergent ways, and in retrospect they are clearly Green parties in the contemporary meaning of the term.

In the origins and development of these two parties we can see the key themes of the new Green politics developing. These include:

(1) the reaction against labour parties and politics for being (initially) pro-growth and (latterly) pro-globalist;

(2) a continuation of the ‘new politics’ of the new social movements (including both policies and styles of activism);

(3) the critique of industrialism and consumerism;

(4) developing global awareness and connections, and participation in global networks.
In this chapter I present the first comparative history of the origins and initial development of the United Tasmania Group and the Values Party. I ground their stories within the specific histories of the two nation-states concerned, but in asking why Green parties first appeared in Australia and New Zealand I reject explanations based on any alleged environmentalist superiority of these places (Hay and Haward, 1988), or on any comparable environmental campaigns (Rainbow, 1992). Especially as Rainbow's account is historically inaccurate. A more thorough historical investigation of the origins of the two parties, given here, provides an accurate genealogy. However, I do not restrict myself to setting the local historical record straight, but also endeavour to show how the specific recent histories of both Australia and New Zealand, and the first Green parties in both countries, are illustrative of the global themes given above.

The scene and the spark

*Drowning Tasmania*

The state of Tasmania enjoys a more mountainous topography and a more consistent rainfall than the rest of Australia. It is ideal for wilderness tourism and for horticulture - and for generating hydro-electric power. As early as 1914 the Hydro-Electric Department 'adopted a policy of encouraging large power-consuming
industries to Tasmania' (Thompson, 1981, 15). In 1930, by Act of Parliament, the Hydro-Electric Department became the Hydro-Electric Commission (HEC). The minister administering the HEC Act was made responsible to parliament for the activities of the HEC, but the HEC was not directed by nor answerable to the minister, as is usual with government departments (Thompson, 1981, 16). Tasmania embarked on a programme of hydro-electric industrialisation, spending the bulk of its loan funds (70% in 1954, 54% in 1969-70) on hydro schemes. (This compared with an average of 18% for the other Australian states.) This excessive spending on hydro power distorted the development of the state, with the construction and modernisation of railways, ports, town water supplies and so on falling behind the rest of Australia. This in turn put Tasmania at the top of the queue for handouts from the Commonwealth of Australia government. Nearly 70% of new jobs in Tasmania between 1971 and 1976 were created by government instrumentalities, and the Commonwealth government returned to Tasmania double the per capita financial assistance received by Victoria and New South Wales (Thompson, 1981, 23).

Why was Tasmania able to persist on this path for so long? There was a rock solid consensus at the top of the political system, with the two key players being Eric Reece, Labor premier of Tasmania for fourteen almost consecutive years (1958-1969, 1972-1975), and Sir Allan Knight, the HEC Commissioner 1946-1977. Between them the two men had the will and the means to drown Tasmania (Thompson, 1981, 31), and the means of publicly promoting their schemes as necessary and desirable.
For some thirty-seven years the HEC planning and construction of hydro schemes continued unopposed. Then in 1967 the South West Committee (a watchdog organisation formed by bushwalkers and others concerned about the preservation of wilderness in South West Tasmania) became aware that the HEC’s proposed Middle Gordon power development would involve the drowning of an extraordinarily beautiful lake, Lake Pedder. The lake was situated in a national park named after it. Public reaction was swift, with a petition against the move collecting 10,000 signatures, the largest number of any petition to that date in Tasmanian history (Kiernan, 1990, 21). Government reaction was equally swift and forthright. On June 14, 1967 the Legislative Council (Tasmania’s upper house of parliament) accepted the suggestion by the South West Committee that it set up a select committee of enquiry. However the Legislative Assembly (the lower house of parliament) passed authorising legislation for the scheme on June 29, and the Legislative Council waited a mere two days after receiving the committee of enquiry’s report before passing the same legislation itself on August 24 (Thompson, 1981, 19).

A Save Lake Pedder National Park Committee was set up by conservationist organisations and individuals. It lobbied quietly and un成功fully. In March 1971 Louis Shoobridge, a Member of the Legislative Council, spoke at a meeting organised by Brenda Hean (later a UTG candidate), which packed the Hobart Town Hall. The meeting called for a referendum on the Lake Pedder issue. However when Shoobridge put the motion for a referendum to the Legislative Council a few nights later, it was overwhelmingly rejected (Kiernan, 1990, 23-24).
Public opinion, though, was running against the flooding of the lake and in favour of an alternative, less damaging scheme. This was made clear by opinion polls, letters to the Prime Minister of Australia, and by the 'Pedder Pilgrimage' of March 1971, a walk in to the lake organised by the Hobart Bushwalking Club in which over 1000 people participated (Walker, 1986, 5-6). In April 1971 Brenda Hean joined Dr Richard Jones and other independent conservationists in setting up the Lake Pedder Action Committee (LPAC), which took a more activist stance. For nine months they campaigned hard, collecting signatures on a petition, lobbying, and organising a major symposium on 'The HEC, the environment and the government in Tasmania', which was held in November 1971. Over a quarter of a million signatures were collected on the petition. However, when it was presented to the Tasmanian parliament the Attorney General refused to accept it, giving as the reason that it was '...in conflict with government policy...' (Walker, 1986, 20). At this point all normal avenues to bring about change seemed to have been exhausted.

Then in March 1972, for reasons unrelated to the Lake Pedder issue, a Member of the Legislative Assembly who was the sole representative of his party resigned. His party held the balance of power, and his resignation precipitated a general election that was held on 21 April 1972. The LPAC saw this as an opportunity to put Lake Pedder on the ballot paper. At a large public meeting on March 23, 1972, it was resolved that 'In order that there is a maximum usage of a unique political opportunity to save Lake Pedder, now an issue of global and national concern, and to implement a national well-researched conservation plan for the State of Tasmania, there be formed a Single Independent Coalition of primarily conservation-minded candidates and their supporters.' (Walker, 1989, 162).
Dick Jones, chair of LPAC, became the inaugural leader of the UTG, and the group fielded 12 candidates in four out of the five Tasmanian seven member electorates. Most of them stood in the two Hobart-based urban electorates of Denison and Franklin. With only a month to organise policy and process, the UTG did not emerge as a fully-fledged party at this time. In fact it did not become a formally constituted political party until 1974, and it was then that it developed an electoral platform entitled ‘The New Ethic’ (see Appendix B). Dick Jones made it clear from the outset that the UTG was a movement for social and political change as well as for environmental conservation (Jones, 1990, 37-40; Jones, 1974, 1-2).

For the 1972 election the UTG produced two key policy sheets, one on conservation and one on economics. The eight point economic policy (see Appendix D) was published for the UTG by the Australian Union of Students, and it stresses conservation of natural resources, economic diversification and improved research and marketing. In retrospect the policy does not seem particularly radical, but the thinking underpinning it was a departure from received economic wisdom, and the UTG moved easily into the promotion of ‘steady state’ economics at a later date. It must also be remembered that the UTG was providing a policy for a state within a diverse national federation, and wished to emphasise the particular part Tasmania should play within that commonwealth. The conservation policy was also quite specific to the Tasmanian context, listing actual sites to be protected and local environmental concerns to be addressed, although again it was easy to develop a ‘new ethic’ which applied to local and global environmental issues from this specific stance.¹
The UTG did very well for an ‘instant’ party in its first election, achieving 3.9% of the vote overall in the state, and nearly 7% of the total vote in the Denison and Franklin electorates, where it had concentrated its efforts. A UTG candidate just missed out on being elected in Denison (Walker, 1986, 24). Later in 1972 the UTG put up a candidate for the federal House of Representatives seat of Denison, and won 4% of the total vote, exceeding the vote of longer established minor parties such as the Democratic Labor Party and the Australia Party.

Despite such electoral support, the UTG was no closer to achieving the immediate goals of the Lake Pedder Action Committee, let alone a ‘green’ change in Tasmanian politics. The HEC had taken out an advertisement in all Tasmanian newspapers on the eve of polling day, warning of a steep increase in electricity charges if the Middle Gordon scheme was altered or delayed. The UTG call for a commission of inquiry to investigate this blatant attempt to influence the outcome of an election by a government-owned enterprise (using taxpayers’ money) fell on deaf ears in the newly elected Labor government (Thompson, 1981, 27). More petitions were presented - and rejected (Kiernan, 1990, 26). In July 1972 LPAC sought a writ from the Attorney General to begin a Supreme Court action challenging the validity of the legislation which authorised flooding a national park. When the Attorney General referred the matter to cabinet and was refused permission to grant the writ he resigned. This was a pragmatic rather than a principled resignation, since while as Attorney General he could not deny access to the courts, the Premier who replaced him in the role felt that he could - and did. Parliament was convened and the HEC (Doubts Removal) Bill was rapidly passed - to remove any doubts regarding the
powers of the government to authorise the destruction of the lake and to prevent court action against it. The Attorney General was then reinstated. (Thompson, 1981, 32).

Despairing of influence through Tasmanian channels, LPAC and the UTG looked for federal backing. On September 8 1972 LPAC founder member and UTG candidate Brenda Hean set off for Canberra in a Tiger Moth plane to lobby federal politicians and to skywrite over the capital. Hean and the pilot are still missing, their fate unknown. Despite the extremely suspicious circumstances of the disappearance (which included threatening phone calls to Hean and a break-in at the hangar where the plane was kept), and despite the UTG placing a newspaper advertisement urging the government to set up an inquiry to investigate the incident, the government refused to act (Kiernan, 1990, 27). Public efforts to see the police files covering the incident have been consistently rebutted right up to the 1990s (Bob Burton, pers. comm., 4.7.96)

The HEC certainly left no legal stone unturned in its efforts to silence its critics. In 1972 it threatened legal action to prevent the publication of Pedder Papers, a critical review of the decision-making process within the HEC which led to the proposal to flood Lake Pedder (Thompson, 1981, 28).

The election of the Whitlam Labor government later in 1972 seemed to provide a window of opportunity for the Lake Pedder campaigners. A federal investigation into the issue in 1973 was favourable to saving the lake, but the recommendation of the
committee to save the lake was rejected by the Labor cabinet. But this was not the end of the matter.

In October 1973 the federal Labor caucus agreed to underwrite the costs of a moratorium on flooding Lake Pedder (Kiernan, 1990, 28-30). However within hours of the federal caucus decision the Tasmanian Labor Premier Eric Reece was restating the Tasmanian government's intention to flood the lake. Nor were environmentalist attempts to get support from the labour movement at large any more successful. The inspirational environmental lead given by the New South Wales Builders Labourers Federation with its successful 'green bans' on inappropriate developments was not supported or copied by labour unions elsewhere in Australia, and efforts to get a 'blue ban' placed on Lake Pedder failed (Kiernan, 1990, 32).

The specifics of the battle to save the lake, which make dramatic and disturbing reading, can easily obscure the significance of this struggle. With the benefit of hindsight we can see that this was the moment when a new dimension opened up in Australian - and world - politics. The two great political groupings which had structured Tasmanian, and Australian, politics for the past 70 years were challenged by a third force, which emphasised the similarities rather than the differences between the Labor and Liberal parties. The UTG coined the term 'Laborials' to refer to both these parties, as a way of symbolising how closely their policies and philosophies were intertwined as seen from the new, Green perspective. The UTG refused to identify itself as 'Left' or 'Right', claiming to draw a little from each but to stand on a totally new platform which was neither left nor right - a platform which proposed an alternative to heavy industrial development and economic growth for
growth's sake (Jones, 1974, 1-2). Central to this new dimension in politics was an emphasis on ethics and aesthetics as the basis of its political vision. (See Appendix B.)

The same emphasis on ethics and aesthetics, the same opposition to industrial growth and economic 'progress', the same difficulties with the labels 'left' and right', and the same challenge to the two major parties was to be offered in New Zealand at the same time. However, it was in quite a different way in quite a different context.

Opening up New Zealand

In contrast to Tasmania, New Zealand in the 1950s and 1960s was governed for most of the time by a traditional conservative party, the National Party. The brief Labour government 1957-1960 did little that was economically or social innovative, unless one counts raising the taxes on alcohol and cigarettes, which was an unpopular move. It attempted to diversify New Zealand’s industrial economic base by encouraging manufacturing (which could also be perceived as a way of strengthening its own electoral base among urban workers), but in this it differed only in degree rather than kind from the National Party. It also signed an agreement with the transnational company Conzinc to supply electricity to an aluminium smelter at Bluff from a power station to be built at Lake Manapouri. To provide for the power station it introduced the Manapouri-Te Anau Development Bill to parliament, where it passed without opposition into law on September 1, 1960

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Thereafter the National Party supported the power scheme, despite growing conservationist opposition.

Here the story diverges from that of Tasmania, for New Zealand was in better democratic shape than Tasmania, and it was eventually possible to save the lake by using the normal democratic channels. There was no need to set up a new party in a desperate bid to further the cause. The Labour Party gave its support to the save-the-lake campaign and made electoral mileage out of being conservationist, which helped it win the election. Apart from an imperilled lake, there are few parallels with the Tasmanian experience. Long established conservation groups organised the three Save Manapouri petitions and did much of the lobbying. The popular movement to save the lake, the Save Manapouri Campaign, was initiated in 1969 and acquired impetus from normally conservative quarters. Its founder was a Southland farmer with no prior (or subsequent) political experience, and it included a soon-to-be-prominent National Party politician, Norman Jones. Other senior political figures, including a former National Party Speaker of the House, publicly supported the campaign, and Establishment figures including doctors, lawyers, senior academics and knights of the realm were all outspoken in support (Cleveland, 1972; Peat, 1994)

The Save Manapouri Campaign was a populist movement which touched a nerve in New Zealanders raised to believe that the possession and appreciation of pristine lakes and mountains is a significant part of their cultural heritage and national identity, and therefore not to be sacrificed lightly. While most of the 27,600 people who voted for the Values Party in 1972 would have signed the Save Manapouri petition, they represented only 8% of those who did so. Whatever else the Save
Manapouri campaign was, it was not a direct forerunner or progenitor of the Values Party. Nor was there any personnel overlap whatsoever between the founders and leaders of the Save Manapouri Campaign and the founders and leaders of the Values Party, as there was between LPAC and UTG.

Unlike Tasmania, New Zealand was a state that was slowly groping its way towards an institutionalised environmental politics throughout the 1960s. While there was certainly a strong emphasis on hydro-electric development, the state of New Zealand was not diverting the majority of its resources towards electricity development to the detriment of other forms of industrialisation, nor was it devoid of awareness of the downside of industrial growth. In 1959, ironically just before it signed the deal with Conzinc, the Labour government convened a conference on the Conservation of New Zealand’s Scenic Attractions, and in 1962 the National government set up the Nature Conservation Council, a quango charged with advising the government on conservation issues. An Urban Development Association was formed in 1964 by professionals (engineers, planners, etc.) working in the ‘environmental’ sphere, and the Association successfully lobbied the National government to set up an environmental quango, the Environmental Council, and to appoint a Minister for the Environment. In 1970 a Physical Environment Conference was organised by a committee which had been formed at the 1968 National Development Conference. The 1970 conference was attended mainly by professionals, with few environmental activists present. Indeed, the first of the ‘new wave’ environmental groups to appear in New Zealand, Ecology Action, had not yet been founded. The professionals were supported in their approaches to government by an influential group of ‘conservation
academics', professors of natural sciences at several universities (Bührs, 1991, 57-63).

There was thus a recognition of environmental issues at the highest levels, and by the late 1960s both the National and Labour parties were offering environmental protection policies to the electorate for the first time ever. However the approach taken to the environment by both Labour and National and their advisors has been described by Ton Bührs as 'technocentric'. The key features of the approach are

'(1) A belief in the possibility of continued economic growth for human purposes;
(2) A belief that difficulties arising from economic growth can be solved by scientific and technological means; related to that is an emphasis on rationality and expertise in the formulation of solutions and an avoidance of debate about values or principles;
(3) Suspicion towards greater public participation;
(4) A belief that environmental problems can be “managed” within the context of the existing political and societal order.'


All these elements were to be savagely questioned on the first pages of the Values Party 1972 election manifesto, *Blueprint for New Zealand. An Alternative Future*. Concern for environmental quality and conservation was not the only - or even the main - issue motivating the Values Party. More fundamental was a critique of the way in which modern society was organised, managed and controlled in all its aspects, including the environment. Some of this critique came from the new breed of political ecologists (as is hinted at by the use of the word 'blueprint', with its
echoes of the very popular political ecologist text *Blueprint for Survival* which appeared in the same year and was cited in the manifesto). But more of it came - more loudly and in a more developed form - from the new social movements which had developed in the industrialised democracies, including New Zealand, in the 1960s.

News of global antisystemic events, organisations and ideas as diverse as the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, the civil rights summers of protest in the southern USA, the daily life critiques of the French Situationists, the Miss America freedom trash-can and the hexing of Wall St guerilla theatre by the Women's Liberation Movement, the anti-Vietnam mobes and teach-ins and draft card burnings, the Stonewall riots that sparked the Gay Liberation Movement, the definitive 'flower power' concert at Woodstock, the student/worker strikes and the street fighting in France, and the Aldermaston marches against nuclear weapons in Britain, had all reached New Zealand via the electronic and print media. The proliferation of 'free press' publications facilitated by the development of cheap off-set printing, and the development of rural and urban 'communes' as an alternative lifestyle, overseas and in New Zealand, were all part of a kaleidoscope of dissent, resistance and the promotion of alternatives.

Young New Zealanders also travelled widely in the Sixties and Seventies. Mackwell (1977) found that 30% of the New Zealand-born membership of the Values Party had lived and/or travelled abroad (mostly in First World, English-speaking countries). When this 30% is added to the 17% of members who were born
overseas it can be seen that the Values Party was a party which was better placed than most to ‘think globally and act locally’.

The increase in foreign travel phenomenon generated its own joke - a post-war New Zealander’s education was said to be incomplete without first U.E. (University Entrance - a qualification usually obtained at age 16), and then O.E. (Overseas Experience). The global mobility of young New Zealanders was of course dependent on the rapid deployment of new transport technologies, principally civilian jet aircraft. Along with faster transport came faster verbal and visual communications technologies. What political impact did these have?

When I asked Norman Smith, first organiser of the Values Party, for his personal explanation of why New Zealand had the world’s first national-level Green party I was initially taken back by his reply, which was only one word - ‘Databank.’ Smith (who worked for IBM for several years prior to his Values Party job) explained that New Zealand was the first country in the world to have nation-wide overnight electronic cheque processing i.e. Databank. In other words, here at the bottom of the world was one of the world’s first nation-wide electronic networks. This openness to innovation in communications and networking was characteristic of the ‘new guard’ in society, which included the Values Party. Obtaining and using the new communications technology in New Zealand is (relatively) expensive, as most of the hardware is imported, and the lines were formerly a real (state) and are currently a virtual (foreign transnational corporate) monopoly. Despite these barriers, New Zealanders acquire information technology with rapidity and avidity.4 The many and varied political implications of moving into an ‘informational’ mode of production
(which go far beyond Green politics) are thoroughly canvassed by Manuel Castells in his three volume work *The Information Age* (Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998), and I consider what they mean for the twenty-first century development of Green politics in Chapter Eight.

To return to the 1970s, it is sufficient to note that through heavy applications of energy and technology, on both a national and a global scale, New Zealanders were confounding both their 'Earth’s last island’s' geopolitical location, and their relatively challenging local topography. This was politically significant, both as regards reacting rapidly to the global tenor of the times, and in spreading new political ideas throughout New Zealand and then out into the world.

The first signs of this process at work were visible in the peace and human rights organisations set up in the 1960s. These organisations preceded the political ecology groups by almost a decade. They began with small protests against the Vietnam War and nuclear war in the early 1960s. These built up to large anti-war mobilisations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with a record (for the time and place) 4,000 people attending a lunchtime demonstration in Christchurch in 1968 against a proposed US nuclear submarine navigation system to be sited in the mountains nearby (Wilkes, 1973). The Progressive Youth Movement was formed in Auckland in 1965, and in Wellington and Christchurch in 1969. The first Women's Liberation groups began meeting in 1970. Gay Liberation was founded in 1972 and urban ‘communes’ were a normal part of life for young New Zealanders in a country where there were lots of big, old, stand-alone houses with plenty of bedrooms (but only one kitchen) which could be rented cheaply by those wishing to live collectively. Even established
institutions, such as the Christian church, were not immune from the ferment of the times, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s the Student Christian Movement functioned as a conduit for progressive political ideas and actions.

Racism was tackled via Maori land and language rights campaigns and groups, including the radical Maori youth group *Nga Tamatoa Tuatoru* (‘the young warriors’), which was formed in the early Seventies, and in Auckland a group modelled on the American Black Panthers called the Polynesian Panthers started in 1971. There was also an active anti-apartheid movement, Halt All Racist Tours (HART) formed in July 1969, which focussed mainly on stopping sporting contact with South Africa as a means of forcing it to field integrated teams and move to end apartheid. (New Zealand could - and eventually did - have more impact than most countries in this regard since the premier sport of both countries is rugby football.)

Student protestors picked up all these issues and more. A representative selection of protest activities in New Zealand in the 1960s and 1970s is covered by Rik Tindall (1994) in his brief history of a century of student protest at the University of Canterbury. This history includes an excellent visual example of Sixties style applied to a Seventies issue, in the form of a photo-poster of a long-haired, bearded youth wearing bush gear and holding a rifle, standing in a forest clearing, with the handwritten message superimposed at knee height ‘*leave our forests alone*’. (Tindall, 1994, 22).

The ‘protest movement’, broadly conceived, was thus very much alive and kicking in New Zealand in 1972. It was from this rich ferment of ‘alternative’ or ‘new politics’
activity being driven by young people (many of them barely old enough to vote) that political science student and erstwhile journalist Tony Brunt drew much of his inspiration when he put together a platform for a new political party. When he came to present it to a crowd of some ‘sixty curious souls’ in the Student Union Hall at Victoria University, Wellington, on the evening of May 30, 1972, he made it clear in the first few minutes of his address that Values was a ‘quality of life’ party. He did not mean that in the sense of being anti-pollution. ‘Fighting pollution and preserving nature are key planks in the Values Party platform and I don’t think the Government is taking strong enough action in this area’, he said, ‘but reducing pollution is only a small part of the attempt to increase the quality of life.’ (Brunt, 1972, 1). (Interestingly enough, when polled on the issues that concerned them most before the 1972 election 14% of voters said ‘pollution’ - which was 3% more than the 11% who were concerned about ‘protesters’) (Roberts, 1975, 103).

In order to restore quality of life, Brunt argued, it was necessary to restore or create a sense of community, and to stop over-emphasising ‘...economic growth, technological advance, the importance of consumer goods in our lives, increasing productivity, competition between people, individualism and increasing profits.’(Brunt, 1972, 1). The common thread connecting the Values philosophy was humanism, which Brunt defined as meeting ‘the needs of people and not the needs of the system’. He claimed that this was the new political synthesis that was forming in society, especially among young people (Brunt, 1972, 12).
The rest of the speech largely focussed on the actual changes that a Values government would introduce to New Zealand society to give form to this philosophy. These included:

- improving industrial relations via job enrichment programmes;
- bulldozing the country’s latest maximum security prison and re-thinking law and order policy from scratch;
- getting off the economic growth treadmill;
- setting up a government technology surveillance committee to examine and if necessary ban or control the introduction of unnecessary or harmful new technologies;
- restricting the use of cars in cities;
- restricting display advertising (which Values saw as feeding the consumerist frenzy which in its turn fuelled economic growth);
- reducing the hours in the working week;
- paying more attention to regional development;
- beautifying cities with better architecture, more greenery and more Maori decorative arts;
- decentralising government;
- instituting youth representation in parliament and lowering the voting age;
- severing diplomatic relations with France if it persisted with nuclear testing in the Pacific;
- stopping the proposed 1973 South African rugby tour of New Zealand;
- increasing total foreign aid from 0.2% of GNP to 5%; and
- increasing the proportion of aid going to the Pacific Islands.
The speech devotes only four sentences to the environment - but these are in the section on economic growth, and are at the heart of what was to become the Green critique. In running through the reasons why people should question the goal of industrial growth, Brunt comes to the most important reason - the ecological consequences of growth.

‘Growth is just not sustainable - or sustainable only at great cost to mankind. A study on the future of the environment at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in March of this year predicted that unless we take action to halt growth the life support systems on earth will collapse within 130 years. So we are growing now at the expense of the lives of our great grandchildren.’ (Brunt, 1972, 6)

Brunt then dropped the subject, and went on to devote much more attention to advertising, urban beautification and even to a critique of autocracy and inequality in Tonga. Yet in retrospect it is clear that this condemnation of economic growth, because of the harm it is doing and will do to people and planet, with the associated vision of a more caring and community-based way of life, is the Green equivalent of Labour Party foundational demands for full employment, industrial arbitration and a living wage.

In April 1997, almost twenty-five years to the day after he founded the Values Party, Brunt addressed a symposium at Auckland University on the Values Party and twenty-five years of Green politics in Australasia. He chose to stress again that he saw Values as a ‘humanist’ party, concerned more with quality-of-life rather
standard-of-living issues. He said that in 1972 he ‘...desperately wanted a politician and a party to break out of minimalist, materialistic debate of the old left and right parties. The new concerns about the havoc being wreaked by unquestioned and ill-directed economic growth, population growth and technological change owed nothing to the old left/right definition of politics.’ (Brunt, 1997, 1)

At first he thought of calling the new party the New Zealand Youth Party. He himself was twenty-four years old, and he couldn’t imagine that the ideas the party was promoting would be of any interest, let alone comprehensible, to anyone over thirty. This is an interesting reflection of the significance of the youthfulness of those engaged in the new politics of the 1960s and 1970s. This is a phenomenon that appears to be unique to this time in the twentieth century. It is also one that was certainly salient to the participants, as indicated by their slogan ‘Never trust anyone over thirty’. That this particular era of ‘youth unrest’ was indeed new and different from previous youth activism of the twentieth century is confirmed by Klaus Mehnert, a scholar of youth in America and the Soviet Union, and himself a participant in the German youth movement of the 1920s (Mehnert, 1978). Some participants stayed true to the principles they were promoting then and some betrayed them. But they all lost their youth, and the importance of being young to the new politics has been lost by later analysts.

Yet much of what happened at that time can only be understood by the light of Wordsworth’s comments on an earlier ‘revolutionary’ period - ‘Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, But to be young was very heaven!’ (Wordsworth, 1809).
The membership of the Values Party and the UTG (see Chapter Six for details) was markedly younger than that of other parties. The fact that the politics was new precisely because the participants were as new to politics as they were to the rest of life must be kept in mind.

Brunt was dissuaded from using the youth label by a persuasive young woman met by chance at a party (of such quirky details is history made), and went back to the drawing board to come up with the name Values. He is adamant that he never conceived of the Values Party as

'...primarily an environmental or green party in the generally accepted sense of the term as it's now applied. It only became that in retrospective analysis, because the broad philosophical issues I started out talking about were too intangible and abstract to categorise in any alternative way. Emotional talk of the economic and technological juggernaut that seemed to be impersonally steamrolling society, community, the environment, tradition and the very amenities and civilities of life was pretty fuzzy stuff. Boiling off all this angst and existential unease left a residue of ecological concerns that has enabled much easier classification for academics and news media. My idealism was mainly a Values-driven one, and when I started the party and stepped over the precipice into the void, the ecological crisis and its emergent doctrines rose up to meet me. I had a soft landing on solid issues that I could use as actual illustrations.' (Brunt, 1997, 2)

When it came to providing local illustrations Brunt was scratching, as by world standards New Zealand was not an over-populated or heavily polluted country.
He had to make reference to the unsustainable nature of global economic and population growth as described in the *Limits to Growth* (Meadows et al, 1972) report. His main example of how this was manifesting itself in New Zealand was the way in which the demand for electricity was doubling every ten years, with widespread environmental impacts. He claims that

'...environmentalists - or the early examples of the breed - did not particularly like us. They regarded us as usurpers with no track record in specific environmental fights (such as the Save Manapouri Campaign) and felt that we’d compromise the work they were doing with the two main parties to gain environmental commitments.' (Brunt, 1997, 3)

So if Values was a Green party, its initial formation was very different from that of the UTG. It was not an ad hoc coalition of 'conservation-minded' candidates; it based its ecological concerns on a more radical philosophical analysis of the malaise of modern society. This meant it took issue with the core tenets of social democracy (which had a better environmental track record in New Zealand than it did in Tasmania), and it also considered the appropriate means by which its radical changes were to be achieved. Later Green parties were to take up these matters too, and this is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven.

*Green Values on the campaign trail*

In the meantime for Values there was the matter of the 1972 general election, to be held a mere six months after the formation of the party. It is clear from Brunt’s first
speech that he regarded the main opposition for Values as being the Labour Party, not the National Party. He characterised the Labour Party as ‘dying’ several times in his speech. He also scoffed at its proposal to hold a referendum over the 1974 Springbok tour thus: ‘Do you believe that a party which is a prospective Government could send a whole nation to the polls - not over a declaration of war, not over union with Australia, but over a Rugby tour? These are the death throes of a dying party.’ (Brunt, 1972, 11) and predicted that Labour would never succeed to power again.

However the Labour Party did win the 1972 election. It also called off the rugby tour, sent a New Zealand navy frigate to the French nuclear testing zone to protest the testing, petitioned the International Court of Justice seeking an injunction against the tests, prevented the raising of Lake Manapouri, set up a Select Committee on Women’s Rights, and passed the Treaty of Waitangi Act. These are all moves that would have been approved of by the ‘new social movement’ constituency.

The Labour Party was able to make progress in these areas, albeit slowly and partially. However, what it was not prepared to do was to question economic growth, to see the social negatives among the material positives.

It was to be another two years before Values set about developing a Green economic platform that would provide an alternative to social democrat economics, and then candidates had to be chosen who could put forward the new Green approach. In a memo to branches in January 1975 Party Chairer Dave Woodhams stated firmly that ‘We are a party dedicated to the fundamental restructuring of our basic social framework, not just a bunch of conservationists. The candidate should be
familiar with this wider perspective and able to discuss it logically both in
general terms and personal terms.’

Woodhams (who was and is a professional engineer) recommended that they should
be familiar with the works cited in the bibliography of the 1972 manifesto, and
especially with Erich Fromm’s 1968 work *The Revolution of Hope: towards a
humanised technology*. This was the approach advocated by Brunt in his inaugural
speech. It was also the approach adopted by Woodhams when he was recruited as a
1972 candidate on the basis of reading the manifesto and making a phone call to
Tony Brunt from Wellington airport as he passed through town (Woodhams, 1997,
1).

Not everyone hearing Brunt’s inaugural speech was so enthusiastic, and he recalls
that he was attacked by ‘...a nasty young marxist and an equally nasty young
environmentalist’ (Brunt, 1973, 88). Others present at the meeting defended Brunt
from the attacks, and some signed up as early members of the party. Brunt
announced his intention to stand for the Island Bay electorate, where he lived, and
held two successful political meetings there. In the next few months small, informal
policy formulation meetings were held in Wellington, and branches were set up in
the three other main centres (Auckland, Christchurch and Dunedin). Chief organiser
at this point was Norman Smith, an ex-journalist colleague of Brunt’s. The media
experience of Brunt and Smith stood them in good stead when it came to publicising
the new party, and a former colleague on the *New Zealand Herald*, Alison Webber,
founded the Auckland branch. Also valuable was the experience of Bob Overend as
chair of Values meetings in Wellington and spokesperson for the party - Overend
gained his first political experience when he started and organised a citizens group, the Wadestown Residents Association. Despite the talents of the founders, the party grew slowly and by October 1972 only nine candidates had been announced. When Smith told the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation (the state broadcasting authority) that the party would require television advertising time during the election because it would be fielding twenty-five candidates, the Wellington members thought it was a great joke (Brunt, 1973, 89).

However the first manifesto, *Blueprint for New Zealand An Alternative Future*, was rolling off the press, and Values was invited to be the subject of a party profile on the premier television current affairs programme, Gallery. The twelve-minute documentary was screened on primetime network television on October 17, and the response was immediate and overwhelming. The trickle of correspondence that the party had been receiving grew to a flood. The 1972 correspondence file offers interesting insights into the formation of a Green party.

In June 1972 Geoff Neill, a Ph.D. student and an assistant lecturer in economics and industrial relations, wrote to introduce himself. He had read an article about Values in the Otago University student paper, *Critic*, and thought he could get support for Values in Dunedin from disillusioned Labourites and younger people. Before too long he had been made Deputy Leader and was writing to advise on the content of the manifesto. Sue Clough wrote to Tony Brunt in July to say that she had lost faith in Labour and that her husband Reg, who was formerly a National supporter, ‘...thinks that you are about the only one in the country talking sense.’ Reg Clough
was soon the candidate for Remuera (Auckland), where he was the third highest polling Values candidate in 1972. In 1974 he was elected Leader of the Values Party.

Edmund Hillary, first conqueror of Mt Everest (with Tensing Norgay), and one of New Zealand's most famous and respected citizens, wrote to Tony Brunt on 24 July 1972 to say '...I do agree with many of your contentions. As to whether there is the interest and will in New Zealand to carry out such programs time alone will tell.' (Hillary, 24.7.72) A month later Aynsley Kellow, who became the candidate for St Kilda in Dunedin, told Brunt that the Values abortion law reform and homosexual law reform policies were 'damn near perfect', and explained why and how he thought the drug law reform policy could be improved. After confessing that he used to think that the Vietnam war was right, he added that he thought it would be '...a good idea to establish a liaison with groups like ecology action, law reform societies, etc. Co-operation with them should prove quite fruitful. Also, although it will almost certainly be knocking our heads against a brick wall, why not send some guff (especially the industrial policy) to the union branches. It will at least plant the seeds when Labour craps out.' (Kellow, 21.8.72). (The secretary of the Auckland Clerical Workers Union wrote seeking information of his own accord, but this is the only union contact in the 1972 file.)

The president of a youth group in Westport, a small town on the West Coast of the South Island (New Zealand's 'scenic' province due to its thick rainforests and high mountains) asked for copies of the manifesto. He thought that '...many of the policies ...would be very relevant to young West Coasters'. Tama Eruera, of Nga Tamatoa (the radical young Maori organisation) wrote to advise of Wellington
members who might be available to attend Values' first conference, though he warned 'In order to be fair to you, don't be surprised if they express lukewarm interest. Not because of any animosity to you personally but simply because we feel somewhat suspicious of pakeha [non-Maori] organisations or motives. This may seem unfair but then, this is basically how it is, and that’s how we like to tell it. Then again, they may pile in behind you boots’n’all. In the meantime, kia kaha tonu koutou - let you always be strong.'

Numerous groups and organisations got in touch, including the editors of university student papers (most of which ran features on Values), and the wonderfully-named Malcolm Gramophone of the Counter Culture Free Press (who dated his letter 3 A.W. - After Woodstock). The Abortion Law Reform Association of New Zealand, Project Paremoremo (a prisoners aid and prison reform society based on the maximum security jail that Brunt wanted bulldozed), Action for the Environment Wellington, the Homosexual Law Reform Society (Brunt was invited to their AGM), the Student Christian Movement, the Women's Liberation Movement, the Youth Action Centre, the Wellington Tenants Protection Society and the United Nations Association also got in touch. So did the Labour and Social Credit parties who were interested in Values policies and wrote asking for copies.

An analysis of the General Correspondence in which individual correspondents indicated their interests or views (rather than simply requesting information) shows the following hierarchy of concerns. The population issue (Zero Population Growth and abortion) and issues to do with rights and liberties (divorce law reform, drug law reform, homosexual law reform, rights for women and the disabled) were of most
concern to correspondents. They constituted 20% each of queries/comments. Next came economics and environment, with 16% each. There was definite interest in the Values anti-consumerist stance. Social issues, like lifestyle, psychological fulfilment and alternative futures were next in importance, followed by women's issues (especially equal pay), education, and defence.

In the correspondence with other groups there was a similar pattern, with half the queries/comments being in the area of civil rights and liberties (especially abortion and homosexual law reform), followed by population issues and economics. There was only one contact with an environmental organisation.

Wherever they came from, candidates rushed to the party after the Gallery programme, and the manifesto sold out in Wellington within a week, while the remainder of the first print run of 1500 copies was soon snapped up in the other centres. A second run of 2000 was ordered before the first 1500 had been paid for (Brunt, 1973, 91). A best-seller election manifesto was a first for New Zealand. Another first was clocked up when professional filmmakers enthusiastically volunteered to donate their services and worked into the wee small hours to put together a sixty second television advertisement in less than a week, at a cost (materials only) of $NZ50. The first Values national conference held in Wellington on the third weekend in October was big news, and forty-two candidates eventually got their deposits in by the closing date of November 2, and began campaigning in earnest for the election to be held on November 23.
The candidates were all completely new to parliamentary politics. Some of them were new to politics full stop - the youngest was twenty-one, and the average age of the candidates was twenty-nine. This was also unprecedented in New Zealand politics, where members of parliament and parliamentary candidates were traditionally drawn from those who had reached senior ranks in farming, business, professional and labour organisations and/or political parties, who had some experience of taking representative positions within those organisations (Forster, 1969).

Youth, political inexperience and a lack of centralised control (which the fledgling Values Party could not have exerted even had it wanted to) meant that Values candidates were a departure from the mould. So was the campaign itself. Candidates and delegates at the first national conference on the weekend of October 21/22 got off to a fun start by taking a field trip to the Motor Show being staged in Wellington's big show buildings. Here they satirised devotion to the automobile by 'worshipping' the cars on display - prostrating themselves before the vehicles, kissing the tyres, and so on (Smith interview, 2.4.96).

Deputy Leader Geoff Neill opened his campaign for Dunedin North with a rock band in the Octagon (Dunedin's central civic plaza), while supporters wearing 'Values Guerillas' T-shirts ran around smiling at people and handing out leaflets. In Porirua Helen Smith had a pop choir performing at the local shopping centre, while in Auckland the Values candidates drew six hundred to a lunchtime meeting in a hall designed for three hundred. Wherever he went Tony Brunt spoke to packed houses, including nine hundred in Auckland's Intercontinental ballroom and one thousand
eight hundred in the Wellington Town Hall (a larger crowd than Prime Minister John
Marshall drew to the same venue). In provincial Hastings one hundred came to the
closing of the national campaign, held in the Valhalla discotheque.

The policies the new candidates advocated were also startling to some and refreshing
to others. In the area of sexual politics Values differed radically from the other
parties, advocating Zero Population Growth, a liberal abortion law and
decriminalisation of homosexuality. It was critical of consumerism and not afraid to
condemn it. The campaign in Nelson featured a guerilla theatre stunt in which a
human fifty-cent coin chased a human dollar note down the main street. Values also
wanted to reform industrial relations for good and all by promoting worker
ownership of enterprises. It had major plans for reforming government too, to make
it more open, accountable and decentralised. It advocated a pacifist foreign policy
(foreign troops out of Vietnam, no more nuclear testing and an end to compulsory
military training), and wanted a reform of the drug laws, including decriminalisation
of the possession of cannabis.

The policies were underpinned by the philosophy hinted at in Brunt’s inaugural
speech, and in the introduction to the first manifesto. It was a philosophy not just of
a political party, but also of a social movement. Brunt expressed the difference
between the social movement character of Values and the narrow interest base of the
older political parties as follows:

‘As the campaign drew towards its peak it became clear that Values was
something more than a political party; it was also, to a certain extent, a social
movement. It differed from Labour and National in that its compass was not
solely matters political, nor its cement an organisational form. Its ideal of a stable population followed by a no-growth economy demanded as much a change in Values as a change in Government. It spoke to the growing need of young people for such things as friendship, peace, community and job satisfaction. Implicitly, though not explicitly, it pointed to a simpler life style, one that would accord with a society in which commercial expansion was not a goal, one in which there would be new motivational bases - idealism, fulfilment a sense of supportive community, creativity, and service. Competition, consumption, prestige, power and financial gain did not figure large in the priorities of those who were our keenest supporters. Rock groups, guerilla theatre and other diversions were used at many meetings to make politics fun again...It came close to providing what the 1971 National Youth Congress had advocated: “A redefinition of politics which is integrated with, and not separated from, our lives.” ’ (Brunt, 1973, 92-93).

Four years later Dave Woodhams saw fit to reinforce the social movement basis of Values in his chairman’s address to the 1977 National Conference. He reminded delegates that Values was rooted in the social movements of the 1960s which were concerned about the direction of society, with creating community, and with human liberty. He claimed that Values was a special interest group within that wider movement, and that

‘Its special interest is to be a political focus for the wide ranging concerns of the movement, to develop a viable political synthesis of these concerns and to use the opportunities that come our way as a political party to advocate these policies and the reasons for them...The political commitment of the Party
takes on an added importance because it is our unique contribution to all the activity of the movement and if we fail, we let down not only ourselves but the rest of the movement as well.’ (Woodhams, 1997, 4)

The ideas espoused by Values were not entirely new, as the reading list at the back of Blueprint for New Zealand shows. Although most of the books cited were very contemporary (published in 1970 and 1971) there were classics such as Lewis Mumford’s Technics and Civilisation (1934), Erich Fromm’s The Art of Loving (1970) and Edmund Leach’s (1967) A Runaway World. There were also critiques of modern technocratic society and workplaces by Berkley (1971) and Townsend (1970). Tony Brunt recalls that he was particularly influenced by Charles Reich’s (1970) The Greening of America, Alvin Toffler’s (1970) Future Shock, and the work of J.K. Galbraith (1967; 1971) (Brunt, pers.comm.). Nor were the ideas unique to New Zealand - on the contrary they were part of an international trend that had flared into revolt in many places in 1968. The main thing that was new and different about Values was that for the first time these ideas were put together as a political party platform and offered to a national electorate.

The other factor that set Values apart from political parties to that date was the way in which it presented its ideas. Its street theatrical campaign style has already been mentioned. The other side of the novel Values communications strategy was its consummate use of national media. Here it made full use of the then single-channel television network in New Zealand, obtaining fifteen minutes of free television time to run an advertisement described as ‘...the most sophisticated political ad ever produced in New Zealand’ (Luff, 1974, 22). This advertisement, along with the
Gallery documentary, screened in October, and they both provided such positive publicity for Values that support in the opinion polls went up from 5% pre-October to 24% post-October.

Bill Luff thought that unlike the other minor parties, which were lacking in media skills, Values fully exploited '...most of the immense possibilities that the New Zealand media provides, to the extent that the Values Party is justifiably referred to as a "media party". (Luff, 1974, 23). Luff also - rather presciently - notes that national media coverage was vital to Values because it aimed at reaching sectional rather than geographical constituencies. It was aiming at the educated, the young, and the socially and politically progressive, who were not confined to any particular geographical electorate. (Although there were of course some electorates - in the 1970s principally the better-off urban seats with younger voters - where Values did best.)

Values activists themselves were acutely aware of the importance of the media to their politics. As we have seen, their campaign style was theatrical, and aimed at attracting media attention. Just prior to the annual party conference in 1978 Party Chirer Dave Woodhams reflected on theatre, media and politics in his summation of what Values had achieved and where it needed to go next. In a paragraph headed 'Politics as Drama' he opined:

'It if there is one area of the development of the party over the past five years that we have lost ground in, I would say it is our ability to treat politics as the high drama that it is. The Auckland Peace Squadron and the Native Forest Action Council have both made a dramatic impact on the political life of the
country this year. Political action is theatre on the grand scale. With the right script, the right setting and the right issue, a creative group of people can command the attention of the media, and bring to life an issue that would be dead if handled by the usual “press statement” routine. The May annual conference of the party has been planned to remedy this situation.’ (Woodhams, 1978, 6).

Whether it was the ideas, or the dramatic way they were presented, or both, at its first general election in 1972 the party appealed to some 27,600 voters who voted Values on November 23. Values took 1.96% of the total vote (out of eighty-seven seats) and 3.7% of the vote in the forty-two seats where it stood candidates. It was the third party in terms of numbers of votes cast in thirteen electorates (Luff, 1974, 5-6). It was a promising start for a brand new party in a political ‘tradition’ which was so new the paint had yet to dry. Where could it go next?

Party structure and development

Before going on to discuss the actual historical development of the first two Green parties, and how they were structured, perhaps we need to ask why it was that New Zealand and Tasmania were so willing and able to start political parties based on Green principles and praxis. Why not just continue with pressure group and movement politics?
The UTG appears to be clearly a case where there was no other option in terms of exercising political influence. The pressure group and legal routes had failed, therefore forming a party that contested elections seemed to be the only way of getting a democratic bridgehead in a situation of almost total political close-out. Once it was formed, the party proved an appropriate vehicle for bringing together like-minded people and providing them with more support for each other, and more publicity for their ideas, than they had otherwise been able to find in a small polity which did not look kindly on non-conformists.

But the New Zealand situation was rather different. New Leftist and new social movement organisations were active nation-wide, and attracting a lot of attention via their demonstrations, street theatre, media stunts and so on. Student protest was the ‘in’ thing, and the youth branches of both the National and Labour parties were inspired by all this activity to ginger things up within their parties. So why was a new party felt to be a good idea?

Norman Smith (Smith interview, 9.7.91) claims that Tony Brunt wrote an essay on the new politics for his political science course. In it he argued that the proliferation of new politics among young people in New Zealand, which was largely being ignored by the National and Labour party hierarchies, provided the basis for a new party to plug the gap in the political spectrum. His professor rubbished his argument – so Brunt went out and started the new party to prove him wrong. Whether literally true or not, the story certainly encapsulates the historical moment of opportunity that Brunt grasped so firmly.
But was forming a Green party merely due to the whim of that particular person at that particular time and place, or was there some 'deeper logic' impelling the first Greens towards forming parties in Australasia? On the one hand, the egalitarian, participatory, networking approach to political organising, put to work in relatively small societies, doubtless made it easier to set up parties there than in more populous nation-states. On the other hand, in New Zealand’s case the first-past-the-post electoral system was an enormous barrier to third party participation, with only one third party (Social Credit) getting more than one (and then only two) seats at any one time in any post-war parliament. The European nation-states, most of which had and have proportional electoral systems, were and are much more rewarding places in which to start a new party than Australia or New Zealand, where majoritarian systems have been largely favoured over proportional ones.

So it is not easy to fathom exactly why Green politics first took party form 'Down Under', and answering the question will certainly require a much more exacting and comparative analysis of electoral opportunity structures and national political cultures than was within my 'globalisation and the Greens' research brief. What was of more interest to me, which I turn to below, is the extent to which the development and structure of the first two Green parties are recognisably and typically Green, and provide the first examples of the type.

_Tasmanian experiments_
Although the UTG had its origins in a conservation campaign, it would be wrong to describe it as simply a conservation organisation with a party label. Pamela Walker notes that few of the UTG/LPAC activists had backgrounds in well-established conservation organisations such as the Field Naturalists or the National Trust, and older conservation groups, such as the Tasmanian Conservation Trust (TCT), questioned the radical behaviour of LPAC. In 1973 Sam Lake of the TCT said that '...a significant proportion of Tasmanian conservationists are loath to indulge in political means to achieve environmental ends. This tendency has led to the somewhat unfortunate situation whereby both of the major parties view the UTG as being the political wing of the conservation movement.' (Walker, 1986, 60). The Australian Conservation Foundation, Australia's largest and strongest conservation organisation (founded in 1965) decided not to get involved in actions to protest the destruction of Lake Pedder '...for fear that such activity would be “too political” ' (Burgmann, 1993, 205).

In fact, far from being the existing conservation movement in political guise, the UTG was to actually create the contemporary conservation movement in Tasmania. Nineteen out of the twenty-three activists (82%) at the inaugural meeting of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society (TWS) in 1976 were active members of the UTG (Walker, 1989, 167). Walker (1986, 66) also notes that some ten years after the formation of the UTG, one third of conservation activists operating in Tasmania had had their initial political socialisation in the UTG.

Between the end of 1972 and the setting up of TWS in July 1976, which marked the effective end of the UTG as a campaigning organisation, the new political grouping
set about creating a *bona fide* political party with a constitution, structure, set of policies and a budget. It began addressing the task seriously in 1974, when a member (who had been expelled for the Labor Party) drafted a constitution that was modelled on the ALP constitution. (Not much new politics there!) The UTG was branch based, with each branch meeting monthly or two-monthly at the local level. Branches had a committee consisting of a President, one or two Vice Presidents, a Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor and Delegates to Divisional Council and State Conference. There was one Divisional Council for each of the five Tasmanian electorates, and they met quarterly (Horne, n.d., 8-9). The state conference elected a state executive, a policy committee and a rules committee, and a state council was appointed ‘...to direct and control the State executive on matters of administration and finance and to direct and control all election campaigns (Walker, 1989, 166). A State Secretary was employed full time and attended all branch meetings (Walker, 1986, 40).

The first state conference was held in Launceston on 22 June 1974 - forty people were present. The conference set up policy committees on Agriculture, Education, Social Welfare, Local Government, State Resources, Transport and Energy and National Parks/Conservation and Wilderness (*UTG Newsletter* No 8 1974). This provides a clear indication of the UTG’s intention to be a political party in the full sense.

Given the later Green emphasis on alternative forms of political organising - the present day Tasmanian Greens make all decisions by consensus and have never had an internal election for a party position - what are we to make of the very formal and
traditional structure of the UTG? Did they get it ‘wrong’ because they were the first off the blocks, and had no Green party models to follow, or did they perhaps find a way to operate a conventional, formal structure in a consensual, participatory manner? Party founder and leader Dick Jones certainly spoke of the need for egalitarian rather than hierarchical forms of organisation, seeing hierarchy as a component of the ecological problem and ‘...advocating participatory decision-making and decentralisation within a network of co-operating groups rather than a hierarchical party machine’ (Jones, 1990, 39). Similarly, Chris Harries advises that although the UTG was structured this way on paper, in practice ‘our constitution was breached virtually every day’, mainly because the party was not big enough to carry out all the functions and roles prescribed therein. In addition, Tasmania was behind New Zealand in terms of ‘new politics’ styles of organising, which were not widely known until the late 1970s. Harries describes Tasmanian UTG and Green decision making methods in practice as ‘informal’ — ‘More like friends, making decisions by ad hoc and convivial interaction.’ (Harries, pers.comm., 16.6.97).

Further, despite its seemingly conventional form the UTG was not too conventional. A list of possible fund-raising activities printed in the newsletter, which included mannequin parades and car rallies, received a blast from a reader who condemned these activities because they waste resources (UTG Newsletter No. 9, September 1974). However the Radical Ecology Conference barbecue advertised in the UTG Denison newsletter of 15.3.75 advised people to bring their own grog, meat and beer mug. The UTG was perhaps not in the mainstream of Australian culture, but it was not that far way from it. Its fundraising was largely centred on folk music concerts, bush walks, slide evenings featuring wilderness images, wine and cheese evenings,
and barbecues. The fundraising was well supported and lucrative - the accounts for the UTG financial year ending 30.6.74 showed that only $358 of the party’s income that year came from subscriptions - the rest of the $3276 raised came from donations and fundraising events.

Some inspiring green speakers chose to visit Tasmania at this time. The American environmentalist and pioneer of environmental education Joseph Sax came in 1972, and in 1974 the founder of Friends of the Earth, David Brower, also came to speak. UTG candidates stood in local body elections, and by September 1974 three had been elected to councils (UTG Newsletter No. 9, September 1974). In 1975 in a campaign for the Legislative Council seat of Newdegate the UTG candidate secured 9.9% of the vote, despite the sitting Labor candidate advising his supporters against giving their preferences to the UTG (UTG State Newsletter June 1975).

In 1976 there was a strong debate over whether the party should change its name, with preferences being expressed for ‘UTG - the Conservation Party’ or just ‘The Conservation Party’. The State Secretary saw electoral advantage in such a move, and argued that it would be a more accurate label. Those against, such as the president of the University of Tasmania branch, stressed the wider policy range of the UTG, and the need to educate the electorate on how the relationship to the environment must inform all policies (UTG State Newsletter, July 1976). Policy development also continued in 1976, and in October the UTG announced that it was the first and was still the only party to adopt an Aboriginal policy for Tasmania. The seventeen-point policy was printed in the newsletter (UTG State Newsletter, October 1976).
Although by the end of 1976 the UTG had lost its organisational impetus, and much of the energy of the party had transferred to the newly formed Tasmanian Wilderness Society (Walker, 1989, 167), the UTG continued to campaign. It mounted nine electoral campaigns in all, with declining levels of success. The emergence of the Australian Democrats, in August 1976, as a competitor party for the environmental and socially liberal vote posed another problem for the UTG. The party went on developing policy and building links with other environmental and political groupings (including the Values Party) after 1976; however by 1979 its ‘We told you so!’ ad in the Tasmanian press signalled the formal end of the UTG (Walker, 1989, 167).

The UTG was down, but the Green movement in Tasmania was not out. In 1983 one of the UTG’s last candidates, Dr Bob Brown, became the first Green Independent Member of the Legislative Assembly. By 1989 he had been joined by four other Greens. Greens held the balance of power in the lower house and they negotiated an historic Accord with Labor. In 1992 Tasmania’s second Green party was formally established, with five MLAs already in parliament, and in 1996 Bob Brown became Tasmania’s first Green Senator in the federal Senate.

New Zealand innovations

In New Zealand the first Green party (Values) was stronger than the UTG, but it took longer for the second one (the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand) to achieve
success. However the Values Party almost didn’t survive its first year. Once the
election night euphoria was over and they had recovered from their exhaustion, the
members of the new party had to consider what should happen next. New Zealand
went into its usual summer shut-down mode, but some Values people put out a
December newsletter reporting on the campaign and advising that a national
conference would be held in Wellington on Feb 24/25, 1973. Christchurch and
Dunedin had already held post-election debriefing meetings; regional conferences
were to be held in the Auckland region and in the lower North Island/top of the
South Island region. The February national conference was to discuss ‘organisation,
constitution, future directions, local government elections, proposals for a party
newspaper, etc.’

In the event, the February conference almost caused the end, rather than the
consolidation, of the Values Party. Guy Salmon, who had originally attacked Tony
Brunt after his inaugural speech, but who made contact with Values in his capacity
as a representative of the Youth Action Centre in Wellington, wrote a lengthy (eight
foolscap pages, single spaced) proposal on party organisation. It was entitled
‘A Blueprint for Participation’, and was prefaced with five more foolscap single-
spaced pages entitled ‘Organisation: A personal view’. The gist of both papers was
to argue against setting up a party structure with leaders, branches and a national
executive, and to advocate a totally decentralised, leaderless organisation. Such
arguments were consistent with the anarchist strain running through most of the
‘new politics’ groupings of the time. They were acceptable to Tony Brunt and Geoff
Neill, who endorsed Salmon’s proposal to do away with leaders and devolve all
policymaking, decision-making and publicity to the regions, leaving only an
administrative secretariat in Wellington. This secretariat was not to have a spokesperson role and was not to be able to lead or bind the party on policy or organisational matters.

The debate on party structure recorded in the minutes of the conference shows that on the one hand there was a strong will to believe in and endorse participatory, community-based structures, which place a heavy emphasis on trust, power-sharing, spontaneity, personal integrity and enthusiasm. On the other hand there was also a significant concern expressed that a stronger organisational and democratic framework, with elected rather than self-appointed leaders, was necessary to avoid destructive anarchy and to get the Values message across effectively.

The ‘anarchist’ tendency won the day, and the party entered what was to be a seventeen-month experiment in radical devolution. Reflecting on the 1973 conference twenty-four years later, Dave Woodhams was still critical of the process by which the decision was made, and its outcome. Salmon’s motion was moved without notice, and in Woodham’s view the chair should have referred the decision to electorate committees. Since Salmon was never seen again at a Values Party meeting, Woodhams considered that the party was left with anarchy without the anarchist, and that this was the first of a number of self-inflicted wounds endured by the party. However in his view this anarchy led not to chaos but to stagnation, and the first long-term effect of the lack of leadership and national co-ordination was a loss of momentum due to loss of members and loss of confidence. The second and more positive effect was that having experienced the limits of decentralisation the newly established Green party made it part of its collective understanding and had
the lessons of the experience in mind when it approached creating a new decision-making structure from the bottom up (Woodhams, 1997, 1).

An independent survey of nearly two hundred party members in Canterbury and Otago in mid 1973 (Luff, 1974) showed that complete decentralisation, and especially decapitation of the party, was not the preferred choice of rank and file members. Luff found that while a large majority (85%) supported the re-organisation of the party into thirteen autonomous regional bodies, an equally large majority (84%) believed that leadership was necessary, and 60% of those in favour of leadership felt that it was necessary all the time, not just in election year.

For all of 1973 and half of 1974, however, one person was to carry the responsibility of keeping the party together without having the title or the power of 'leader', 'chairperson' or 'president'. Catherine Wilson (now Catherine Benland) became the sole functionary of the 'National Secretariat' set up to carry out the central administrative functions of the party as defined in the Guidelines for Organisation approved by the 1973 conference. In May 1973 she put out the first party *Linkletter*, the newsletter that was to keep regions informed about each other, and about national level issues. In the very first issue Wilson had a complaint about the effects of 'decentralisation' - specifically the lack of Values Party comment on the cancellation of the proposed 1973 Springbok rugby tour, an issue which Values had campaigned hard on and deserved to get some credit for.
Despite the gap at national level, branches were creative to begin with, with Invercargill developing alternative transport ideas; Dunedin holding a 'Greenprint for Dunedin' meeting; Wainuiomata replanting trees after a native forest fire; Napier organising a well-attended public forum on development plans for the Ahuriri estuary (which according to the *Dominion* reporter quoted in the newsletter was '...one of the liveliest and possibly most effective exercises in democracy this city has seen in years...') and doing a documentary survey of historic and interesting buildings. (Was this the beginning of Napier's subsequent career as architectural Art Deco capital of the Southern Hemisphere?) Thames was recycling glass and doing creek clean-ups; while Auckland was co-sponsoring a seminar with Ecology Action, marching against nuclear war on Hiroshima Day, and objecting to a proposed dumpsite beside a beach. Members of the North Shore branch set up a women's group which met in the day time, a transport group and a local body group, and attended a course on public speaking and running meetings.

Timaru was involved in supporting a proposal to create a community centre, and with a road safety campaign. However, Linkletter chose to excerpt a particular quote from the Timaru newsletter, about the relative roles of community level and national, level organising, which went as follows:

'The Values Party has two inter-linking parts - the social activities and the political section. What has to be realised is that the community projects, essential as they are, will only achieve so much. To undertake such things as Zero Population Growth, penal reform, homosexual law reform and abortion law reform, we need to gain power or to exercise enough power to get one of
the other parties to do what desperately needs to be done.' (Linkletter, No. 3, August 1973).

Two months later (Linkletter was delayed for several reasons, including the late return of branch survey forms and Wilson being involved in starting a feminist group) it was estimated that total membership of the party was about six hundred, of whom only one hundred and twenty eight were financial. By January 1974 Wilson was editorialising thus:

'...as I see it, the problem of whether we are a decentralised collection of environmental activists and liberal idealists or whether we are a viable political party, which harassed our last national conference, remains unresolved. Many whose eloquence was influential at the last conference have since deserted our ranks - those with more stamina and faith must reassess the decisions made at conference in the light of a year's further experience.' (Linkletter, No. 6, Jan-Feb 1974, 10-11).

In the March-April 1974 Linkletter Wilson advised that it might be the last one due to lack of support for the secretariat from the major centres. She then jettisoned the Guidelines for Organisation rule regarding the impartiality of the secretariat to advise that only one third of the thirty-six branches extant in mid-1973 were still functioning, and she gave her analysis of why that was. This largely centred on the power structure set up by the 1973 conference, with its lack of clear and effective roles for the regional and national levels of the party. She also concluded that "The party in its infancy was heavily dependent on the "charisma" and labour input of Tony Brunt. The former was deliberately dispensed with by the intrepid
anarchists at the last National Conference...who may not have appreciated how much of the party’s success with the non-intellectual man on the street was due to this aspect.’ (Linkletter, No 7, March-April 1974, 2). It was at this time that a wry joke on the leadership issue began to circulate, expressed by Dave Woodhams as ‘It was widely rumoured at the time that a visiting Martian, wanting to contact the Values Party, was overheard saying ‘Take me to your Post Office Box.’ (Woodhams, 1978).

In April 1974 Wilson and Dave Woodhams, after consultation with Tony Brunt, took it upon themselves to further contravene the 1973 Guidelines for Organisation. These allowed for conferences to be held only if a region wanting to host a conference obtained support for doing so from over two thirds of the other regions. They called a national conference to be held at Massey University in Palmerston North on August 24/25 1974. The conference duly took place, and Reg Clough was elected as Leader of the party, and Cathy Wilson as Deputy Leader - the first female deputy leader of a New Zealand political party. The party was restructured with a national executive and a regional organisation based on the provinces and main cities of New Zealand, processes for a more participatory style of decision making were discussed and agreed to, and a national newsletter/paper was decided upon. (The first issue of Values - later Turning Point - came out in September 1974.) Working committees at the conference produced remits which were voted on - these remits provided broad principles and a few specific details to guide the various policy and other working groups and committees which were set up. Perhaps the most important group set up at Palmerston North was the Working Group on Economic Policy - its achievements are discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.
This time the reorganisation of the Values Party was to prove effective, and to enable Values to lift its profile, increase its membership to around 2,000, raise sufficient funds to employ two full-time staff. (There is no state financial assistance to political parties in New Zealand.) It also conducted two more energetic and full-scale election campaigns (1975 and 1978). The first official party organiser was Norman Smith. He was appointed by the National Executive after the 1974 conference. Values achieved this degree of efficient organisation while still operating a less formal and more participatory discussion and decision-making style than the other parties, and without losing its community activist role. Members continued to be heavily involved with, and often to play a leading role in, community initiatives. These ranged from Campaign Half Million, the national campaign to collect 500,000 signatures on a petition against introducing nuclear power to New Zealand, through to countless local level recycling schemes, tree planting projects, day-care centres and the like. This community activism was entirely in line with Objects of the party stated in its 1976 constitution, which began with the statement that ‘The long-term objective of the Values Party is to build a just, sustainable, community-based society.’ (Emphasis added.) The style of the party also continued to be more exuberant and publicity-focussed than that of the other parties, with street theatre events still playing a large role in getting the message across. Examples include a mock funeral procession in Wellington on the proposed route of the new motorway (which cut through an historic cemetery), and ‘lead mining’ on the car exhaust polluted streets of Christchurch. Christchurch also sold ‘dirty’ postcards to raise funds and draw attention to Christchurch’s smog problem - the cards showed pictures of the city under a typical blanket of smog.
The second election manifesto, Beyond Tomorrow, was another first in political communication in New Zealand. A substantial document (90 pages) it was more of a book than a manifesto, with its full colour cover of children on a rocky shore and its liberal illustration with black and white photographs, cartoons and line drawings. Also different and unusual were its pithy quotes from Values gurus like Gandhi, Martin Luther King, E.F. Schumacher and J.S. Mill. There were also quotes from pop songs and folk songs as apposite as Joni Mitchell’s ‘Big Yellow Taxi’ (‘So it always seems to go that you don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone They paved paradise and put up a parking lot.’). The manifesto sold for $NZ1.65 retail - and so many were sold, lots of them by members going door to door, that the sales financed the 1975 Values election campaign. It undoubtedly helped secure Values 5.3% of the vote in that election.

If the Values Party had been in Germany, this vote would have won it over twenty seats in the Bundestag. However, under the New Zealand first-past-the-post electoral system, without a concentrated geographical support base in any electorate, Values had an impossible task. The party’s membership, funds and organisation grew between 1975 and 1978, and it reached a polling high of 12% with candidate Gwen Struik in the Nelson by-election of 1976. It also mounted a strong 1978 election campaign under its very personable leader Tony Kunowski. But ultimately it was the victim of negative voting to try and oust conservative National Party Prime Minister Robert Muldoon. Even financial members of the Values Party voted strategically for Labour in an (unsuccessful) attempt to get National out, and some left the party for Labour for pragmatic reasons. One departing member explained her desertion to the Leader as follows: ‘It’s not that I’m wrapt in Labour’s policies or vision for the
future - but because I think there's more chance of actually being part of a power
structure and able to influence events. Again, my apologies for deserting you.'
(Kunowski correspondence).

The Values vote dropped to 2.8%, and the post-election conference at Rathkeale
College in the Wairarapa in 1979 was thick with recriminations, proposals for radical
reform, and personality clashes. There was heated debate over whether, or how, the
Values Party was 'socialist'. A motion proclaiming that it was socialist was won -
but the chief proponents of the motion, a group of prominent Christchurch activists,
lost their campaign to get Tony Kunowski re-elected as leader. The leadership went
to Aucklander Margaret Crozier. The shine of being the first female leader of a New
Zealand political party was somewhat dulled by having to cope with the split in the
party that followed. It was the 'socialists' who withdrew their energy - a big loss to a
party already demoralised by election defeat. Having chaired a conference in which
the anarchist left leaving anarchy behind, Dave Woodhams now chaired a conference
in which he saw a 'socialist' party devoid of socialists come in to being.
(Woodhams, 1997, 5).

Crozier did her best to take a conciliatory approach and bring the party together
again, but it was not possible. Membership dwindled throughout the 1980s, and by
the end of the decade it was down to two hundred or so. Values was not able to
mount a full electoral slate in any of the three 1980s elections, and in 1990 those
remaining in the party agreed to merge with the newly formed Green groups which
had contested the 1989 local body elections with some success. The current Green
Party of Aotearoa New Zealand was born, and contested the 1990 general election,
obtaining 6.9% of the national vote from the 71 seats (out of 97) where it fielded candidates (Vowles, 1991, 8). The genealogical connection between the two parties was formally recognised in 1990, when the Green Party applied for - and got - a full entitlement to state broadcasting time for party advertisements. This was on the basis that it was not a new party formed less than a year before the poll, but rather an old one that had contested six previous elections. (The same genealogical/institutional link was established between the UTG and the Greens in Australia when Greens in Tasmania wished to contest the 1990 federal election and needed a party registration to run under - thus the last election technically contested by the UTG was the 1990 federal election.)

Global connections

The Values Party and the UTG had therefore been born, had flourished and had declined before Die Grünen in West Germany came into existence. Values' heyday was well over before Die Grünen brought the concept, policies and practices of Green party politics to world attention after its accession to the Bundestag in 1983. Attention has focussed (not unreasonably) on the German Green parliamentary pioneers. Most observers of Green politics are therefore unaware that it was in New Zealand - a country which is historically low on intellectual debate, but one which has high levels of education, a passion for O.E. (Overseas Experience), and a tradition of innovative and practical DIY (Do It Yourself) approaches to all spheres
of life (from house repairs to the House of Parliament) - that a new political philosophy received its first full articulation in party form.

Word that this was happening was to get to Australia in the early 1970s, and to Europe a little later, and to have some influence (impossible to assess how much) on Green politics there. The first Australian party with which Values made contact was not the United Tasmania Group, but the Australia Party, which was set up in 1969, largely on a civil rights and anti-Vietnam war platform. By mid-1973 the Australia Party was sending copies of its fortnightly magazine Reform to the Values Party, and in August 1973 Linkletter stated ‘Happy fourth birthday to the Australia Party, our counterpart across the Tasman Sea.’ It was not until mid-1974 that Linkletter recorded a query about Values from the chairman of the University of Tasmania Students Association. In the July/August 1974 issue there was a synopsis of a letter from Geoff Holloway, State Secretary of the UTG, who wrote to say that Values had more in common with the UTG than with the Australia Party, ‘whose ecological awareness is debatable.’ Holloway informed Values that the UTG had taken on the ideas expressed in The Ecologist’s Blueprint for Survival. It was setting up a state-wide, structured organisation. He enclosed UTG newsletters and other literature. This was to be the beginning of regular UTG/Values exchanges.

The UTG was also receiving reports from foreign groups, mostly environmental ones, and the UTG State Newsletter of June 1975 gives some details and also comments ‘Note: the Values Party doesn’t get a mention in the FOE (NZ) report.’ In 1976 Beyond Tomorrow was on sale for $A3 in the Tasmanian Environment Centre in Hobart, and the UTG newsletters lifted quotes and cartoons from it.
The UTG did a round up of green politics elsewhere in the world early in 1977, and stated enthusiastically if over-optimistically ‘New Zealand - the Green Party is the third party!’ It went on to say that Values had a programme very similar to the Green group ‘Écologie et Survie’ in Alsace (UTG State Newsletter Feb/March 1977). Tasmanian green activist Kevin Kiernan had visited New Zealand and seen Values ads on billboards, plus a display of UTG literature in the Environment Centre in Christchurch. The same newsletter also corrected misinformation given in The Ecologist that the UTG had changed its name to the Values Party of Tasmania. (There had been an unofficial approach to Values asking if it would mind if the UTG took the Values name - in the end, however, the newsletter editor informed readers, it was the Australia Party which joined with the New Liberal movement and changed its name to Values). The Values Party International Secretary’s report on the subject states that the Australia Party’s economic policy is ‘to the right of ours’ and their support declining. When the executive of the Australia Party wrote to ask if Values would mind if it took the name it was decided to spell out the differences between the two parties and leave it to the Australians to decide.

Values made contact with the People Party, (established in the United Kingdom in February 1973), very early on. This was through Britons who had experienced Values in New Zealand returning home and spreading the news. In 1975 when the People Party decided to change its name the two main options considered were ‘Values’ and ‘Ecology’ (Parkin, 1989, 219).
By the time a list of Values Party international contacts was typed up (there is an
undated contact list document - it was probably made in 1976) it was in touch with
sixteen groups in the UK, including the Ecology Party and Friends of the Earth.
The contact with FOE was especially strong as the then FOE director and
Ecology/Green Party candidate Jonathon Porritt is the son of a former Governor
General of New Zealand, and makes regular visits to New Zealand. There were
thirteen contacts with Europe, including France, Belgium, West Germany, Sweden,
Cyprus, Italy, Greece and Denmark, twenty-seven with the USA, nine with Canada,
eight with Africa/Asia/South America and nine with Australia and the Pacific.
Most of these contacts were with environmental organisations of various kinds, some
were with 'new politics' groups, and the rest with individuals (often expatriate New
Zealanders) in those places. The penchant of middle class New Zealanders for living,
working and travelling overseas for a few years (generally before returning home to
raise a family) was important not just in bringing 'green' information back to New
Zealand, but also in spreading 'Values' politics abroad. (1990s Green Party
Co-Leader Jeanette Fitzsimons was living in Switzerland when she cast her first
Values vote.)

Values appointed an International Secretary at Easter 1976, and the first incumbent
in the job, Dave Straton, began reporting back on his contacts via the party
newspaper, Vibes. In April 1977 the paper ran a cover story headlined 'Values-type
movements gaining ground in Europe', in which Straton reported on the actions and
successes of political ecologists in France and Germany. He led with the success of
Mouvement Écologie in the March 1977 elections in France (an average vote of 2% acro
straight politicians are falling over each other to kiss trees instead of babies’. Other news was that Teddy Goldsmith had been appointed ‘ecological editor’ of the French news magazine *L'Express*, and that one of his first moves was to commission an article on the Values party (Straton, 1977, 1).

In June 1977 Straton made a formal report to the party on his activities as International Secretary. He entitled it ‘Whole Earth Values’, and it was a roundup of green achievements elsewhere in the world. These included the successes of ‘Écologie et Survie’ in Alsace in getting an average 10% of the vote, and of the Ecology Party local body candidates in Great Britain, where two out of the six who stood were elected. According to Straton ‘One of them specifically referred to Values in his election leaflet, as proof that ecology parties can be successful.’

Straton comments ‘This is the very sort of thing that justifies us spending $500 on international correspondence. Whenever a new movement is starting, numbers are small, and the knowledge that others have had some success elsewhere can give people courage to keep going in spite of empty meetings and other setbacks. We can benefit too: donations from overseas are starting to trickle in as people realise what a boost ecological politics will get world-wide when we win an election. Rather like the boost that state socialists got in 1917.’

To make sure that knowledge of the ‘Values Movement’ spread beyond the shores of New Zealand Straton was busy pushing *Beyond Tomorrow* out into the world. The Ecology Party considered air-freighting 200 copies over to use as their manifesto, but rejected it as too expensive. However, a class at the University of
Calgary, Canada, was reportedly using it as a text, and Straton didn’t have enough copies to fill the bulk orders he received from bookshops in Calgary and Hobart. Seventy-five copies had been sold in the U.S.A., and a group of supporters was ‘translating’ it into ‘American’ for wider sale. A New Zealand feminist working at the United Nations in New York (who was later to become a Green city councillor in Wellington, and then a Green MP) was sent a stock of *Beyond Tomorrow* to distribute. Straton reported that he was also investigating the feasibility of someone like John Lennon releasing the *Values* 1975 election song, ‘It’s a Question of Values’, which had been quite a hit when released by a local pop star in New Zealand. In Straton’s correspondence file (Box 1, Acc 85-11, 10/1, Alexander Turnbull Library) we find that he contributed articles on Values to the US magazine *Environment Action Bulletin*. Also that an article in the US Friends of the Earth paper *Not Man Apart* had generated lots of requests for more information. Straton noted that references to Values were starting to turn up in the most amazing places—he had just received an Italian book entitled *Spiritualismo e criminalita* that mentioned Values. In just two months in 1977 he sent seventy-seven copies of *Beyond Tomorrow* to nineteen different countries, namely Finland, Iceland, the Cook Islands, Belgium, France, Japan, San Salvador, Yugoslavia, Germany, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Ghana, Northern Ireland, Eire, Thailand, Holland and the UK.

France was not spared the Values message - the first contact was with French political ecologist Brice Lalonde who joined the crew of the Fri, a boat protesting against French nuclear testing in the Pacific in 1973. Also in the crew was a member of the Values Party, who allegedly persuaded Lalonde that a political party was
needed to bring about ecological reform. On his return to France Lalonde convinced *Les Amis de la Terre* (Friends of the Earth) to contest elections, and stood himself in the Paris by-election of 1976, receiving 6.6% of the vote. (Values Party, Acc 85-11, Box 1, 10/13, Alexander Turnbull Library). Straton’s report records that an expatriate American who was a member of Values was living in Paris and was translating *Beyond Tomorrow* into French. Copies of *Beyond Tomorrow* were sent to the French Mouvement Écologie when it formed. Heinz Dessau, the International Secretary who followed Straton, says that Professor Jean Chesneaux, a French historian with an interest in the Pacific region, was one of his most invaluable contacts (Dessau, pers comm, 17.10.91). There was also contact with Germany - initially with group called ‘Work Group Alternative Development’ and with a German branch of the World Citizens’s Party.

Virginia Horrocks succeeded Dessau as International Secretary in November 1977. She also had a busy schedule of responding to foreign queries (including one from Puerto Rico on how to set up an ecology party), receiving foreign publications that mentioned Values and providing articles for same, and receiving foreign visitors (including the president of the Australian Democrats.)

In 1978 the Values Party decided to send its own ambassador out into the world, in the form of party Deputy Leader Margaret Crozier. A special appeal for funds for this purpose was made, and Crozier set off on a whirlwind three-week tour of the USA and the UK. Her activities overseas included: speaking to two hundred at a Friends of the Earth party in San Francisco; a lunch meeting with staff of the California state government; addressing fifty environmental lobbyists in
Washington D.C.; meeting with New Yorkers wanting to set up a Values-type party; interviews with alternative media; small group discussions with people interested in appropriate technology, economic alternatives and other green subjects; and attending three conferences.

She summarised the significance of her trip and the Values connection thus:

'New Zealand is back pioneering for the world, incorporating changing social and economic understandings into a political programme with the Values Party...The conviction of party members that Values has an international role to play has been justified...right round the globe there are groups of people working with similar aims: to involve the public in more satisfying and sustainable directions within a decaying world economy.'(Crozier, 1978, 3).

The record thus shows that the first Greens were aware of their pioneering, global role – and that they were eager for contact and confirmation. The highly educated members of the UTG and Values were strongly motivated and very able when it came to getting the latest in information from overseas and sending out their own in return. They were also aware that they had something to offer which was new and unique, namely party platforms based on ecological values and party processes based on new definitions of democracy. There was a consciousness of international relations now being established on a new dimension, characterised by the metaphor used by Dave Straton in his first report - ‘Spaceship Earth’. This sense of the connectedness of world problems and the need to work across national boundaries with a global consciousness has been a hallmark of Green politics ever since.
By the 1980s European and American Greens were visiting New Zealand and Australia to share their experiences of the new politics (Petra Kelly came in 1983), and by the 1990s (as advances in communications technologies allowed) they were able to do their networking in real time, on a global scale. But before the means, and driving it, came the will. The story of the origins and development of the first two Green parties clearly demonstrates the strength of that will to make global alternatives and the solutions to global problems.

Who were the people who exhibited such determination to tackle the world’s problems? In the next chapter I examine what is known about the first Greens as people, and how this may have affected their political orientation.
Notes

1. UTG and Tasmanian Greens activist Chris Harries sums up Jones’ contribution to original green thinking and practice as ‘...it should be noted that Dick Jones’s most important contribution was his recognition that Tasmania’s environment was being wrecked owing to the state’s ill-conceived economic path. His primary focus on changing the economic direction of the state was critically important to our eventual success...Jones was also professionally an ecologist and therefore espoused the concept of interconnectedness and thus the need for broadband policies, including social policies.’ (Harries, pers. comm., 14.6.97).

2. New Zealand’s major conservation organisation, the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society, organised three petitions to save Lake Manapouri. The third one, which was presented to Parliament in 1970, attracted 264,907 signatures - a New Zealand record to that date.

A Committee of Inquiry was set up to look at the raising of the lake, and presented its report to Parliament in October 1970. While it confirmed conservationist fears that raising the lake would cause serious and permanent damage to the shoreline, it also held that the government might be bound by its contract with Conzinc. The petition then went to a select committee, which in June 1971 recommended that the lake not be raised ‘in the meantime’. On September 7 the Prime Minister announced that the raising of the lake would be postponed. In 1972 Labour made saving the lake a major election policy and this was highly popular, especially in the south of the South Island, where the lake is situated. Two ‘blue ribbon’ seats that had always gone to the National Party went to Labour for the first and last time. The seat of Invercargill went to Labour for three years, to be recaptured for National in 1975 by Norman Jones, the founder and leader of the Southland Save Manapouri Campaign (Peat, 1994).

3. The extent to which New Zealand as a whole ‘opened to the world’ in this period can be judged by the information given in Plate 100 in the New Zealand Historical Atlas (McKinnon, 1997). Prior to 1961 no more than 100,000 people, including foreign visitors, entered or left the country in any one year. That began to change in the 1960s, until by 1991 the numbers exceeded two million per year. (The total population of New Zealand in 1991 was around 3.5 million.)

4. The New Zealand Web Directory (1999) (www.webdirectory.co.nz) claims that New Zealanders now have the highest per capita Internet usage in the world. No comparative figures are given to support this claim, but it is plausible - and there is obviously an enthusiasm on the part of suppliers of services and their users to make it so.

5. Considering this summation of his political philosophy twenty five years later, Brunt was at pains to point out that he ‘...did not mean ‘humanism’ in its atheistic sense’, as he has never been an atheist.’ (Brunt, pers comm., 12.5.97)

6. Not only did Salmon cease forthwith to participate in the Values Party, he then quickly switched his political allegiance. The non-executive ‘National Secretariat’ set up in line with his re-organisation proposal consisted of one woman, Cathy Wilson. In the second newsletter which she sent out after the conference, she noted that ‘...Guy Salmon, prominent at the 1973 national conference and the originator of the plan to do away with a national leader, has been elected to the executive of the youth-oriented National Party “ginger group”, Pol-Link...’(Linkletter No. 2, 1973, 5).

Within two years of this about-face Salmon had obtained a position as the first full-time paid employee of the Native Forest Action Council, an executive and leadership role which he has retained for over twenty years. He carried it on into the Maruia Society that was formed from a merger of NFAC and the Environmental Defence Society. During this time he has acted as
a consultant and contributor to New Right societies and think tanks, including the Mont Pelerin Society and the Tasman Institute. In 1995 he became a founder and leader of the Progressive Greens party, which contested the 1996 general election with a 'more market' approach to solving environmental and social problems. With a small list and no constituency candidates it won 0.24% of the vote.

Given the tenor of Salmon's post-Values career it is reasonable to ask whether his proposal to the 1973 conference was a deliberate (and very clever) attempt at sabotaging the new political party. Alternatively, it may merely have represented the terminal point of a very brief left/green phase in his political development.
Chapter Six

Who were the Greens?
First members and activists

Where did Green activists come from? Who exactly were they?
Did their origins and characteristics affect the politics they created; and if so, how?

In this chapter I examine the sociological data on the members of the first two Green parties, to see if generalisations made about the connections between the new social movement activists and the Greens are valid. I pay particular attention to the community roots of Green politics, since a focus on community-based economic and social development, and community-based political activity, (as opposed to state-oriented actions) is a distinguishing feature of Green party theory and practice, then as now. I conclude with a brief discussion of the three sociological variables which were of most interest to the first Greens themselves - their endorsement of their youth and their status as 'human beings', and their rejection of class ascriptions - which are relevant to the politics they developed.
Political and social individuals

Surveys of Greens (including supporters/voters as well as members of Green parties) in Europe in the 1980s confirmed intuitive and anecdotal impressions that the first European Greens shared the same social profile as the new social movement activists of the 1960s and 1970s. The salient factors were that they were young (born post 1945). Also that they were, or were aspiring to be, members of the ‘new middle classes’ - i.e. they were people with higher education, mostly employed in skilled occupations in the tertiary sector of the economy, or else studying to become so employed.

Tim Tenbensel (1994) provides a review of the studies which came to this conclusion, some of which, such as Ferdinand Müller-Rommel’s ‘The Greens in Western Europe Similar But Different’ are collected as reprints in Müller-Rommell and Poguntke, (1995). Hülsberg, (1988, 108-118) summarises German studies on who the German Greens are and what they believe in, which also support this conclusion. The information available on the sociological profile of UTG and Values Party members, given below, is consistent with the European data.

It shows that the first Green party members were no different socially from the majority of people who were politically active in ‘left’ or ‘progressive’ politics in the 1970s and 1980s. This suggests to me that the new social movement/Green political phenomenon is better analysed for its social roots and dimensions within a wider context of changes in the education, employment and leisure activities of the post-
war ‘baby boom’ generation which was largely responsible for generating the new politics.

There is an extensive literature on this, much of it stemming from or in reaction to Ronald Inglehart’s ‘Silent Revolution’ thesis (Inglehart, 1977), which stresses the ‘post-materialist’ values of the post-war generation, which include a concern for the environment. However, while such values may be a necessary condition for a Green politics (although, as Tim Tenbensel argues, it is not entirely clear what these core ‘Green values’ consist of, nor what relation, if any, they have to actual political practices) (Tenbensel, 1995), they are certainly not sufficient. Hence the emphasis in this study on historical specifics rather than social generalisations.

There is also a danger that by focussing on the characteristics of individuals who are Greens, and seeking an explanation for why they behave in the way that they do based on those social and personal characteristics, we may lose sight of the fact that politics of any kind is essentially a collective activity. Political beliefs and cultures do not develop in isolation - there is no necessary connection between fitting the ‘Green’ social profile and being or voting Green (or vice versa). Therefore in this chapter I pay attention not just to who the first Greens were as individuals, but also to who they were in collectivity. This is especially relevant with regard to their belief in and practice of community-based politics, which seems to me to be the most salient difference between Greens and other types of party-political actors.
Tasmanian Greens

So just who were the members of the world’s first Green party, and what collective characteristics distinguished them from other political formations? The only survey information available on the United Tasmania Group comes from an unpublished and undated (probably 1975) study conducted by Beryl Horne as part of her political science course work. At the time she conducted the study the party had two hundred and sixty-one financial members, of whom two hundred and one divulged their occupations on membership records. The membership pattern discernible in the United Tasmania Group was to be repeated by subsequent Green parties.

Compared to the social democrat/labour and conservative/liberal parties the Green members were younger, better educated and more likely to be engaged in a professional occupation. There was also a much higher proportion of active female members. The single largest sub-group of the UTG was students, who made up 32% of the sample. Housewives were the second largest sub-group at 15%, followed by 11% in the education sector (teachers, tutors and lecturers) and 8% in the medical sector (doctors, nurses, pharmacists, etc.) Other professional occupations included engineers, technicians, artists and craftspeople, journalists, accountants, a surveyor, a computer programmer, a metallurgist and a research scientist. 7% worked in blue or pink-collar jobs, and 4% were farmers. So although heavily weighted towards the professions, the UTG was not exclusively a ‘middle class’ party. The exceptionally high student membership may be due not only to the appeal of Green politics for young people as the time, but also an artefact of the relative dominance of the education sector in the life of Hobart, the capital of Tasmania, where most of the
UTG membership lived. It is the only university town in Tasmania, and the university is a major employer. Nevertheless, other early Green parties also attracted students in large numbers. Werner Hülsberg documents the way in which the SPD in West Germany lost ground with youth, who subsequently found the Greens more appealing (Hülsberg, 1988, 50). Also particularly characteristic of Tasmania, although echoed elsewhere in ‘New World’ Green parties, is the strong participation of members in outdoor forms of recreation - in Tasmania’s case this consisted of active membership in bush-walking clubs.

With regard to gender, the June 1974 UTG Newsletter gives information on the one hundred and twelve members current at that time. 37.5% were female, which is a high female participation rate for the period. In the UTG Denison newsletter of 29/3/75 Patsy Jones notes that she is a founder member of the Women’s Electoral Lobby (WEL) (a cross-partisan women’s lobby organisation which originated in Melbourne in February 1972). A number of other women members of the UTG were also WEL members. She urged women members to overcome their apparent reluctance to appear in the newsletter as ‘UTG personalities’.

Horne claims that although the UTG membership was not large ‘...the UTG can probably claim that relatively it has more active members than any political party in Tasmania...Labor and Liberal...branches usually have few active members other than office holders. UTG members, on the other hand, have good records of attendance at branch meetings and other activities.' (Horne, n.d., 16). This high level of activist participation also seems to be characteristic of Green parties, at least in their formative stages. This may be partly a function of the great diversity of activities
engaged in by Greens, many of which do not fit standard definitions of 'political activity' as they are not focussed on parliament or parliamentary election campaigns. They include community-based projects like recycling schemes, tree planting initiatives, community gardens, food co-operatives, beach clean-ups and pollution studies. In 1974 the Huon Valley UTG branch drafted a catalogue of resources (plant, machinery, etc.) for the 'mutual benefit of organic farmers in the group' (*UTG Newsletter* No. 8., July 1974, 8). This is typical of the 'personal is political' approach of Green politics, which strongly emphasises practising what is preached and not divorcing means and ends. This is encapsulated in a phrase used by Greens - 'living the future today'.

When this personal lifestyle dimension is added to the conventional political activities of lobbying, submission writing, petitioning, policy formation, campaigning, etc. it may seem that members of Green parties carry a heavy political burden. Conversely, though, activists can move between hands-on domestic and neighbourhood activities and more conventional politics according to their personal preferences. Further, as well as believing that the 'micro' politics is as important as politics further up the chain, members find it can also provide more sources of personal support and satisfaction.
Greens in communities

It is in community initiatives that the 'culture' of Greens can be said to be rooted, in a parallel to the original formation of labour 'culture' within unions and workingmen's clubs and pubs, and conservative/liberal 'culture' in farmer and businessmen's associations. The New Left in America was committed to community-level organising from the early Sixties onwards, from voter registration in towns in the Deep South through to community kitchens, gardens, law centres, child-care centres, etc. in the cities of the north. Coming closer in time and space to the formation of Green parties, Germany in the 1970s provides the clearest example of the proliferation of BürgerInitiativen (citizen's initiatives), many of them around pressing environmental issues, which fed into the formation of Die Grünen (Hülsberg, 1988, 54-58).

The same process, in an understated way, was going on in Australia and New Zealand in the early 1970s. Tasmanian examples include the Lake Pedder Action Committee, the Battery Point Society (an organisation to protect the historic character of Hobart's oldest inner city settlement) and the Save the Derwent Committee (the Derwent is the major river which flows into Hobart's harbour). Dick Jones saw these initiatives as

'...the defence by the community of their own collective interests against attacks from industrialists, planners, speculators and politicians...' and as

'...examples of defensive confrontation by a working-class community as an
alternative to the protection of the environment by politicians and bureaucrats who respond on the basis of their own priorities, reinforcing their own over-centralised structures.' (Jones, 1990, 38-39).

The most celebrated Australian example of green community initiatives is the ‘Green Bans’ on ‘development’ imposed between 1971 and 1975 by the New South Wales Builders Labourers Federation, (which were described in Chapter Four). The Lake Pedder Action Committee/UTG attempted to import the Green Ban concept to Tasmania by inviting BLF leader Jack Mundey to address a public meeting in Hobart, where he proposed that Tasmanian unions place a ‘blue ban’ on constructing the dam which would drown Lake Pedder. But the unions in Tasmania, and also the Australian Council of Trade Unions hierarchy, would have none of it, and the last citizen-based hope of saving the lake was lost (Kiernan, 1990, 32-33). The lesson learned by the UTG, and by its successor the Tasmanian Wilderness Society, was to work more assiduously at community level to build up community support for environmental protection measures. This was a strategy which was used and was ultimately successful in the Gordon-below-Franklin dam dispute, and which paid off in terms of providing an electoral base for Green politicians in the late 1980s.

The significance of community organisation to Green party political formation in Australia had become apparent to leftist political commentators by the late 1980s. In an Arena editorial entitled ‘From Barcaldine to Wesley Vale’ Doug White (1989) notes that Christine Milne was elected spokesperson for CROPS (Concerned Residents Opposed to Pulp Mill Siting - the citizen’s initiative opposing the proposed pulp mill at Wesley Vale in north-western Tasmania) in March 1988.
This was the beginning of a political career which took her into Parliament as a Green Independent a year later (Curran, 1989, 13) and on to the leadership of the Tasmanian Green Party in Parliament. One year after Milne and her community group fought - and won - the Wesley Vale issue, White commented ‘Nearly a century ago, striking shearers in the camps at Barcaldine and Clermont confronted squatters, police and the courts. Out of that confrontation the Australian Labor Party was born, and political life in Australia took a new shape. It remains to be seen whether Wesley Vale is the beginning of a new shaping of Australian politics, or whether it is a preliminary skirmish to such a reshaping.’ (White, 1989, 6).

White may have been wrong about whether Wesley Vale was the definitive moment in such a reshaping, as he was probably unaware of the basis of earlier UTG activities, which were not documented at the time he wrote his editorial. Yet he was certainly correct in identifying a key characteristic of the Green political support base, which was significant in the 1970s and 1980s.

He also identified some of the difficulties of the ‘community’ approach. In summary, the communities that Greens seek to work in and for do not have the clear geographical or occupational boundaries of the traditional social democrat/labour and conservative/liberal parties. These include unions, big work sites and working class neighbourhoods for social democrats/labour, and farmers and rural districts, business people and wealthy suburbs for the conservatives/liberals.

In fact a typical Green community initiative crosses class boundaries, redefines geography according to ecological rather than cadastral criteria, and seeks to breach gender, ethnic and other barriers. In 1973 Dick Jones spoke of the desirability of
having political groups ‘...organised for infiltration, confrontation, or the creation of alternatives ...sharing a general style and basic principles of analysis and strategy.’ (Jones, 1990, 39). Such groups would also share a willingness to take up issues and campaigns raised by each other, and would share information widely. Jones favoured the small group approach because it ensured flexibility and adaptability to local situations, spread the capacity to take initiatives and avoided the danger of losing the critical abilities of people by submerging them in an enormous movement. However he felt it might be necessary for the movement to take on a formal organisational identity and that what would sustain such an organisation was co-operation in action. It should be a network of small groups, with links between members of a personal basis, rather than everyone identifying with a common centre or leadership. He thought this was about to happen in Tasmania, and the UTG was conceived as such an organisation.

The UTG exemplified the ‘new community’ approach to party politics, and it was a theme that was carried on by the Values Party. As was noted in Chapter Five, the primary Object of the Values Party, as stated in its constitution, was to build a just, sustainable, community-based society, and the many community-based activities engaged in by the party (recorded in Chapter Five and here) show that this was not just empty rhetoric. The first Green party in the United Kingdom, formed in 1973, explicitly picked up on the community theme by taking the name ‘People Party’. This was reprised again in Germany with the emphasis on ‘citizens’. Environmental health, protection and sustainability was a concern which citizens of all classes, races and religions could relate to in some way, and the challenge for Green parties was to
link this concern with a participatory and egalitarian way of achieving ecological results.

New Zealand Greens

The Values Party drew its members from much the same socio-economic milieu as the UTG. Of the first batch of forty-two Values candidates for the 1972 general election nearly one quarter (21%) were full time students. Those employed in the education sector were next equal (12%), with company executives and managers. Journalists, engineer/scientists and accountants took nearly 8% each, and there were two farmer candidates. Other middle class occupations among candidates were civil servant, lawyer, economist, budgetary officer and youth worker. A tailor, a plumber, a postal worker and a builder’s labourer represented the lower rungs of the occupational ladder.

This occupational spread is not remarkable for New Zealand political candidates, especially those who are successful. The Labour Party has always attracted education sector candidates, and its ‘working class’ candidates have generally been professional unionists rather than unskilled workers or trades-folk. The National Party has appealed more to business, professional and farmer candidates, resulting in parliaments containing MPs who are better educated and/or higher in class status than the majority of the population (Forster, 1969). Values obviously drew from all
these groups, but not on the basis of 'class-interest' identification. (Tony Brunt recalls a 'fiery Marxist' accusing him of being a traitor to his class because he came from a blue-collar background.) (Brunt, 1997, 4) What is a departure from previous political parties (as is also apparent with the UTG) is the level of involvement and support by young people. The candidates had an average age of 29 years, which was unprecedented then and still is today.

A 1973 survey (Luff, 1974) of the membership of the Canterbury and Otago branches of the Values Party \((n = 191)\) showed that 59% were aged 29 or under. Fifty-five per cent were in the twenty-thirty age group - this compared with only 12% in the general population at this time. So Values was genuinely a youth party. It was also a party of the educated (as one would expect from the high number of students). Sixty-three and a half per cent had or were getting university education, which compares with only 2.2% of the general population who had a university qualification at that time. This involvement in tertiary education shows up in the occupations pursued by Values members. Twenty-four per cent of the male members and 15% of the female members were students, while 32.5% of the men and 25% of the women worked in professional occupations. As with the UTG, there was a high number of (educated) housewives (35%), and the next largest grouping for both men and women was office and sales workers (13.5%) while 12% of the males but no females were proprietors and managers.

The religious preferences of the early Canterbury and Otago Values members are consistent with subsequent findings on the religious orientation of New Zealand
Greens (Dann, 1995b; Miller, 1991). The majority in the Luff survey (72%) espoused no religion, with 22% of these describing themselves as humanists. Of the remainder 16% described themselves as agnostics, 9% as atheists, 4% as rationalists, and 12.5% as 'Other'. The 'others' included the usual range of inventive and exclusive Green 'philosophies' – some of which may have been intended as jokes. Luff's sample came up with 'Chariot of the Gods', 'Cosmic Existentialists' and 'being myself'. The 22% who describe themselves as humanists are interesting in view of Tony Brunt's use of the term to characterise the Values Party.

Initially the youthful protestors of the 1960s and 1970s were described as alienated from society, probably because they advocated a radical rejection of what they saw as the dominant values underlying the politics and culture of the industrialised democracies, which included racism, sexism, militarism, imperialism and environmental exterminism. However, further investigation of the 'new politics' groups (Parkin, 1968) showed that far from being social outcasts or isolates, the members of these groups were actively involved in all sorts of civil society organisations, both political and non-political. Values Party members were no exception. Of the one hundred and ninety-one people in the Luff survey 43% belonged to between two and five groups which attempted to influence social and political thought and practice, and 76.5% belonged to one or more groups.

These groups were as various as the Woodcraft Folk (a non-religious, non-establishment alternative to Boy Scouts and Girl Guides), the Mental Health Association, the Yippies, and the Hillsborough Residents Association. The highest percentage (28%) belonged to one or both of the two anti-racism groups active in
New Zealand at the time - the Citizens Association for Racial Equality and Halt All Racist Tours. Eight per cent belonged to the Committee on Vietnam, which campaigned against the war in Vietnam, and 6% to Ecology Action. Forty-nine percent of the Values membership had written letters to government or non-government members of parliament, and Luff notes that Values members were political activists in all senses of the word, with active participation in the ‘new politics’ groups being as important as party membership. He quotes Julia Park, spokesperson for the Otago branch, as saying ‘The Party is neither a political group nor a social movement, but a dynamic combination of both’, and Geoff Neill (Deputy-Leader, 1972) saying ‘The Values movement is bigger than the party.’ (Luff, 1974, 7).

The next study of Values membership corroborated Luff’s findings. Jenny Heal (1976) took a representative sample of 100 members (5% of Values membership in 1976 - 47 from the North Island and 53 from the South Island). Thirty-one percent of her sample had university education; 52% had tertiary education of some kind, including university education. Of occupational groups the largest was teachers (19%). Only 7% were students, which is a big difference from the Luff sample, but is probably accounted for by the sample not being restricted to branches in university towns. Ten percent were clerical workers, and another 10% were in the higher echelons of business, especially computer systems and management. Farmers and scientists (6%) each, were the next biggest groups, followed by tradesmen and engineers (5% each). Four percent were doing research, while 3% each were homemakers, technicians, draughtsmen and storemen. The range of occupations included a shearer, train driver, airline pilot, manufacturing jeweller, psychologist,
lawyer, nurse, photographer and union organiser. Despite the variety of occupations the highest percentage (49%) were employed by local or central government either directly e.g. as a civil servant or council officer or indirectly e.g. as a teacher or hospital worker, 21% were employed by private business and industrial concerns, and a high 20% were self-employed.

Like the 1973 sample, the 1976 members were not involved with mainstream religion. Sixty-eight percent were rationalists, humanists, agnostics, atheists or 'other'. Alienated from the concept of God they may have been, but not from the concept and practice of society. Only 18% of the sample did not belong to another organisation, while 42% belonged to two-three groups and 27% listed 5 or more. Of the joiners, 52% held or had held elected posts in their organisations. Protest and reform groups were the favoured types of organisation (58%), community and family groups came next with 44%, and then came environmental groups (41%).

Membership was not confined to 'do-gooding' organisations - sports and hobby groups attracted 56% of the respondents, and 26% were involved in cultural and ethnic community activities. Heal therefore endorses the conclusions of Frank Parkin in his study of the members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Great Britain (Parkin, 1968) that Greens are the 'integrated alienated'. They are alienated from dominant social values and institutions like monarchy, religion, private property, militarism and nationalism, but are integrated into alternative value and meaning-making structures, such as non-conforming families, and political and social groups.
Suzanne Mackwell (1977) also surveyed Values members in mid-1976. Her sample was much larger than Heal’s, with 753 valid survey forms returned - this represents about two thirds of the total membership at that time. Three years after the Luff study the Values membership was still young, with 51% under 40 years of age.

Mackwell asked race and nationality questions, which Luff and Heal did not. These showed that only 1.6% of Values members were Maori - less than one quarter of the percentage of Maori in the total population at that time, while Pacific Islanders were also under-represented with 0.4%.

The majority of the members (83%) were born in New Zealand, while of the foreign-born the largest number (12% of the total membership) were born in the United Kingdom. However a 17% foreign membership was higher than the percentage of foreign-born New Zealanders in the general population at that time.

Overseas influence on Values could also have come from members travelling abroad. Mackwell found that in addition to the 17% who had been born overseas an additional 30% of the membership had lived or travelled abroad, mainly in First World, developed countries. There was especially strong contact with the UK and the USA - unsurprising in view of the common language and related cultures of these places. When asked why they came to New Zealand, 14% of those born overseas cited ‘the physical environment’ as a major reason - this compares with 2% of the New Zealand-born who gave it as a reason for returning home.

This data on the foreign connections of Values members may go a long way towards explaining why and how the party had a global orientation from the beginning, and indeed why Green politics started in New Zealand, rather than in countries which are
more 'politically self-sufficient'. The actual firsthand experience so many of Values members had of the effects of industrialism, consumerism, pollution, racism, etc. overseas may also have been more important in shaping their political orientation than anything that was received through the 'alternative' media. In trying to discover where Values members got their 'alternative' ideas from, Mackwell concluded that it was not from reading 'alternative' magazines and journals. Less than one in ten in her sample read New Zealand environmental magazines, and the women in the sample were more likely to read conventional women's magazines than New Zealand's feminist magazine, Broadsheet. However, a large majority read daily and weekly news and current affairs papers, including foreign ones. Fourteen percent read the Guardian Weekly from the UK, and 8% read the New Statesman. A quarter had read Limits to Growth, and 22% had read Charles Reich's 1969 book The Greening of America. However, by far the most popular piece of proto-Green literature (62.5% had read it) was Alvin Toffler's Future Shock.

Once again other social and political groups seemed to be the main source of inspiration and information. Environmentalist organisations, including local urban lifestyle groups as well as nation-wide organisations like Friends of the Earth, assumed more importance (26% belonged to them) than they did in the Luff and Heal studies, while anti-racist groups were less important at 8%. (The high percentage in the Luff sample may have been due to Christchurch being the national headquarters of Halt All Racist Tours.) However, the other new social movements are well represented, with members also belonging to women's groups (12%), peace and anti-nuclear groups (12%) and population control/abortion law reform groups (7%). Cultural and sporting organisations had more support from members than civil
liberties or gay liberation groups, and animal protection organisations made their first appearance with just 0.9%. Most members had participated in direct action political activities via their political organisations, with 42% having been on an anti-nuclear war demonstration and 26% on an anti-Vietnam war demonstration. Only 6% had taken direct action on an environmental issue.

With regard to educational levels, Mackwell found the same patterns as Luff and Heal. Eighty-one percent had some form of tertiary education - 45.5% had university education. Occupational categories also paralleled the earlier findings, with lots of professionals, plus white and pink-collar workers and housewives. Sixty-five percent of the total was working for local or central government, 16% were self-employed and only 12% were employed by the private sector. As one would expect from this occupational profile, the average income of members was higher than that for the total population of employees, with the Values average being $3,840 above the national average for 1975.

Political origins and orientations

What direction of the political compass did the Values members come from? Heal and Mackwell asked their respondents which party, if any, they had previously belonged too. Most had not belonged to any party - 82% for Heal and 86% for Mackwell. Of those who had belonged to a party, the most popular one was Labour, followed by the National Party. Socialist parties were the next most popular.
Aynsley Kellow (1975) corrected and re-worked the figures supplied by Luff (1974) about previous party affiliations and where Values votes were most likely to come from, to contest Luff's view that Values did not appeal to past Labour voters, and that Values was more likely to pull votes from National. On the contrary, Kellow demonstrates (1975, 75) that Values members were more likely to have voted Labour in the past. Opinion polls since 1972 also showed Values attracting two voters from Labour for every one from National. (My own small survey of 1990s Green Party members (Dann, 1995b) showed a clear pattern of 1970s Values voters switching to Labour in the 1980s and back to the Green Party in the 1990s.)

When Mackwell asked who they would vote for if there was no Values candidate in their electorate 48% said Labour and only 7.6% favoured National. Heal found a similar pattern, with 46% opting for Labour and 30% preferring not to vote for anyone rather than support National (4%). So the impression given by both political scientists (Levine, 1975) and political commentators (Simpson, 1973; Tanner, 1973) at the time of the 1972 election that Values voters were 'limousine liberals' or 'green Tories', who came from and would return to the National fold, seems to be inaccurate. The preferences of the members themselves show that they felt more comfortable with the left end of the political spectrum. The reasons for this were investigated by Kellow (1975) in his study of policy making developments in Values.

When the party's first organiser, Norman Smith, was asked to characterise Values members and supporters he drew a circular diagram (Figure 2). The new social movements are clearly represented - women's liberation, ecology, the anti-nuclear
movement and the ‘globalists’ who promoted international aid and human rights. There are also the single-issue campaigns - in Values case the most significant of these were the campaigns for drug, homosexual and abortion law reform. Then there are the would-be politicos who were disenchanted with the other parties, plus leftists, including ex-communists, who saw Values as a more holistic and/or realistic approach to left politics in New Zealand. The ‘lost, lonely and wretched’ category will be recognised by anyone who has had much to do with ‘alternative’ politics - ‘lost souls’ who were especially attracted to a party which placed such an emphasis on human values and promised a kinder way of doing politics. Most importantly there is the group of ‘new evangelists’, which includes Tony Brunt and Smith himself (probably significantly they were both brought up in religious homes - Smith’s was Methodist and Brunt’s Christian Scientist). These people were the ‘prophets’, the ones who felt that everything was wrong, and needed to be changed from the base up. They were not merely synthesising the demands of the different issue groups into a potentially incoherent package - they were basing their calls for reform on a re-prioritising of political means and ends, a re-prioritising which put quality of human existence before quantity of material goods and company profits.

Smith’s categorisation fits closely with the survey data, with the addition of the psychological elements of the ‘lost’ and the ‘prophets’ - who would have shared the class, race and other characteristics of the majority of party members. (Although Brunt and Smith were both from blue-collar homes, they had immigrant parents or grandparents - in Smith’s case from Britain and in Brunt’s from Samoa - and they both fit the education and occupation ‘Green’ profile.)
The Values Party -
' a unique meeting ground'
From all this data about the first Greens, are there any especially significant trends, which are relevant to the development of Green politics, which require further exploration? Three specific factors were extremely salient to the first Greens themselves. One of them (youth) no longer seems to be relevant. The second one (class) has undergone significant changes in actuality and in analysis since the 1960s. The third one (humanity) is the one that has been used as a Green rallying point and basis for global political analysis. I conclude this chapter with a brief description of each of these factors, and an indication of how they may (or may not) affect the future development of Green politics.

Youth, class and humanity

The youth of the participants in the New Left and the new social movements was an issue of extreme interest and constant comment at the time. In a publishing bulge which parallels the passage of the ‘baby boomers’ through the institutions of tertiary education in the 1960s and early 1970s, the social scientists and commentators of the time produced book after book and paper after paper on the ‘youth revolt’ phenomenon.¹ As we have seen, the first Greens were much younger than the members of other parties. The founder of the Values Party was self-consciously aware of the significance of this.
By the late 1980s the works on the ‘youth revolt’ were utterly passé and gathering dust. They no longer seemed relevant to a world in which books about youth focussed largely on the problems young people themselves were experiencing (suicide, crime, unemployment, sexual ill-health), rather than on their efforts to address the problems of the world. Even for those who lived through the time it is hard to recall the feeling that youth were the leaders, rather than the victims, of social and political change, and to assess the significance of this phenomenon.

The conditions that facilitated youthful political activity in the 1960s and 1970s have certainly changed. Tertiary education in New Zealand and Australia is no longer free to the user at the time (with costs recouped for the next generation via taxation at a later date). Since the 1980s there have been substantial up-front study fees, little or no assistance with living costs, and loans schemes which leave students heavily indebted by the time they finish studying. The vocationally oriented faculties (law, commerce, management, nursing, education, etc.) have grown substantially while enrolments in arts, humanities and pure sciences have shrunk in comparison. The significance for this in terms of political activity by the young is not being studied, since ‘campus revolt’ is no longer a reality, and nor are young people off-campus any more likely to be politically active. (With the possible exception of young people being socialised into neo-liberal politics via the commerce, management and law faculties, and the firms and government agencies where they obtain employment post-university.)

At any rate, young people as a group are no longer ‘interesting’ politically, since they no longer appear to have much ability to influence political outcomes (at least at
Green parties today draw most of their members from the middle-aged sector of society, and in this respect they no longer differ from other political parties. With regard to voters, however, there is some evidence from both Australia and New Zealand (George et al., 1997; Donald, pers. comm.) that first voters (i.e. young voters) favour Green parties. At the 1999 New Zealand general election, 30% of the Green vote came from first voters, including previous non-voters. Both the Australian and New Zealand Green parties set up youth wings in 1997 and 1998 respectively. Called ‘Wild Greens’, they aim to appeal to those more interested in direct action than conventional politics.

The second salient factor that comes from the sociological studies is of course that of class. Much ink has been spilled on the significance of the class origins and allegiances of political actors in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The class ascriptions of members of the UTG and Values Party given by those who researched them have already been recorded here. But how did the first Greens see themselves in class terms?

Conscious that this was an issue for both activists and commentators at the time, Heal asked her sample to state which class they put themselves into. Forty-three percent replied ‘I do not recognise classes’, 44% said they were ‘middle class’, 9% described themselves as ‘working class’ and 3% were ‘other’. (Heal, 1976, 12). The significance of this I must leave for others to investigate. There is recent work (see, for example, Pakulski and Waters, 1996) on the increasing redundancy of the category of socio-economic class as a descriptor and predictor of political allegiance and activity in the late twentieth century. Other ways of conceptualising what is
going on (Beck, 1995; Giddens, 1991) pay attention to cross-class factors, such as environmental risks and personal identity. Much of this work looks at other power dimensions in society (such as race, gender, sexual orientation, physical and intellectual ability) which appear to determine political and social outcomes for whole groups of people in a way analogous to class status.

This 'de-centering' of class in favour of a broader approach is the third significant theme that one picks up from the Values and UTG membership data. The whole tenor of Green politics to date has been to identify risks that apply to human beings as individual or collective bodies. Risks such as nuclear war and radiation, environmental pollution and destruction, resource depreciation and loss, extinction of other species, ozone depletion, acid rain, climate change, over-population and so on. The simplistic version of this approach has been criticised by socialists (Enzensberger, 1988) and feminists (Salleh, 1997) for failing to recognise the power of capital and of patriarchy which distribute the risks to 'humanity' along class and gender lines. However even a severe critic like Enzensberger is well aware that nuclear radiation is no respecter of class privilege, and that the concept of 'the workers' bomb' is as stupid and dangerous as 'the bosses' bomb'.

Therefore Green politics has disrupted the century-old focus on parties representing class interests as the most significant political actors, and has contributed to a breakdown in the salience of the concept of class in the interpretation of political behaviours. This is not the same as saying that Greens, because they arose from the middle class, were or are oblivious to the class dimension. On the contrary, the first Green attempts to construct a model of a sustainable economy were mindful of the
fact that a large gap between a few rich and many poor would be a destabilising and therefore ‘non-sustainable’ factor, as well as undesirable on ethical grounds.

The relationship between the class status of the Greens and their political programme has already been canvassed by Robyn Eckersley (1989), and the sociological data from Australasia further supports the European data she used to ground her analysis. Whether more work needs to be done on this will depend on whether the social basis of Green membership changes. Are there any indications that this is happening?

The only factor that we can be sure has changed is that of age. A quarter century after the creation of the first Green parties, most of the first Greens are still alive, albeit with more wrinkles and greying hair. Theodore Roszak, whose writings did much to contribute to the development of ‘green consciousness’ in the late 1960s and early 1970s, predicted when being interviewed on New Zealand radio about the re-publication of his book, The Making of a Counter Culture, that when this generation retires, and gets back some of the ‘free’ time it had when its members were students without employment and child-rearing responsibilities, the world will see another surge of political activism. This may be the test of whether this was a genuine generational phenomenon in twentieth century politics. Alternatively, we may find that other more obviously political factors, like the escalating nature and awareness of the ecological crisis, which happened to occur at the same time, were more significant driving factors for the new politics.

With regard to class, and identification with ‘the community’ and ‘humanity’ rather than workplace-based social groups, it is likely that the significant changes in social
structures consequent on 'structural reform' in the First World have already impacted on the Green party membership base. My 1995 study of sixty-five New Zealand Greens found that the average income for this group was below and not above the national average. This is in marked contrast to the above-average incomes of Values Party members in Mackwell's 1977 study (Dann 1995b; Mackwell, 1977), but confirming and analysing this possible trend requires much further research, which is not within the purview of this work.

In summary of the global relevance of what I have been able to determine by canvassing the social origins and characteristics of the first Green party members, I have discovered that there is ample evidence to connect them both with the global new social movements, and to show that they had more-than-average contact (both first-hand and mediated) with events and issues of global political significance. This meant that they had ready access to the building blocks of unique new party programmes, as I discuss in the next chapter.

Notes

Chapter Seven

Green economics and Green politics

Left, right, both or neither?

Once the first Green parties had established a social and political basis for their activities, what was distinctively new and distinctively 'Green' about the policies and programmes they developed? Further, in what ways did the new Green programmes represent a significant shift from the ideals and practice of socialist internationalism towards a praxis of global Green politics?

In this chapter I take a close look at both the content of the economic policies of the first Green parties, and at their formation process. In each instance we see attempts to develop policies for local conditions which are informed by an understanding of the global limits to growth. This goes hand in hand with an awareness of both local and global inequities in the distribution of wealth. As I will argue below, it is the economic policies of Green parties which are unique, and which distinguish them definitively from social democrat and any other parties which may have strong pro-environmental and social policies.

Fundamental to the first Green economic policies (although not particularly well-articulated as such, since the first Green parties lacked the word 'globalisation' just
as they lacked the word 'Green'), is opposition to economic growth predicated on
globalist over-production, distribution and exchange of material goods. Hence the
line from the economic positions espoused by the first leaders of the Values Party
(Tony Brunt and Geoff Neill) to the one taken by the current leaders of the Green
Party of Aotearoa New Zealand and Green MPs (Jeanette Fitzsimons and Rod
Donald) is direct and consistent. Fitzsimons and Donald, however, have to take into
account the greatly changed conditions of the global and national economy when
discussing the Green economic programme. (For what that programme looks like
today see Green Party, 1999.)

The other major contribution which Green politics makes to shifting 'progressive'
politics from an international to a global discourse and practice is its confounding of
the old political categories of Left and Right. It should be obvious by now that Left
and Right are political categories that developed both with and from the conduct of
politics at the nation-state level. The nation-state’s prime function was managing the
economy. Parties could take a Left or Right position on how this should be done,
with the Left seeking to limit the power of capital to direct the nation’s affairs, and to
redistribute wealth more equitably. The Right, on the other hand, was generally in
favour of empowering capital, and sought to rationalise rather than eliminate or
ameliorate social inequities.

When globalism replaces nationalism as the preferred geo-ideological level of
operation of the erstwhile Left parties, the once-definitional political polarity of left
and right is destroyed. While the social democrat/labour parties may say that they
still stand for the redistribution of wealth, they have compromised their power to do
so via the nation-state, without gaining any ability to do so via global or local means. Hence the convergence of economic policy between ‘opposition’ parties which is apparent in all the First World democracies, with the Right position in the ascendency, and forming the basis of the ‘new consensus’ within and between both ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ parties. The salient division at nation-state level politics is not between Left and Right, but (in the coinage popularised by Margaret Thatcher’s government) between ‘wets’ and ‘dries’ i.e. between those within any particular governing party who are more or less ‘hard line’ on enforcing the structural reform agenda.

When the first Green parties were formed these developments in the major parties were still to come, and yet it was apparent to the Greens from the beginning that something was badly wrong with the parliamentary Left (and much of the extra-parliamentary ‘old’ Left too.) In the second half of this chapter I cover the discussion which was held at the time on whether the Values Party and the UTG were left, right, both or neither. Most of the thinking behind the pro-Green position was derived from the New Left and the new social movements, and hence this debate provides a good example of the Green genealogical developments that I began to trace in Chapter Four.

The Left/Right debate was extremely important at the time in helping to clarify what was new and different about Green politics. It remains important in a world in which the why and the how of the collapse of the traditional Left becomes more and more obvious as globalism advances apace. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that much of what was puzzling to the protagonists of the debate in the 1970s has had
light shed on it by the global developments of the 1980s and 1990s. The first Greens were still struggling for the vocabulary with which to express their new insights into the way the world was going, and they had to rely on old expressions used in new ways. Nevertheless, the debate retains its salience, although for different reasons, and I therefore cover its first emergence as fully as I can.¹

A new economics for a new politics

The New Ethic of the United Tasmania Group

'...We know that we are living in a period of imminent breakdown – social, economic, political and psychological and spiritual...We believe in reconstruction; the radical regeneration of our dying society... The study of history shows not a single just society, in any place at any time. But individual injustices have been successfully fought, and more vigorously today than ever before. We belong to this tradition...We do not believe that modern society is specially good or specially bad. We do not believe that our own time is the best time ever, but it is our own, and we owe it our prime duty and affection.' (Jones, 1974, 1)

Dick Jones, a founder and first leader of the United Tasmania Group, was a man with a new political vision. In answering the question 'Does the UTG align with the
Left or the Right?’ in the June 1974 UTG Newsletter he carefully considered what both the Left and the Right had added to society, and what they had subtracted from it. He then advocated a new political philosophy which was based on substituting the unrestrained pursuit of quantity in material production and consumption, (which both the Left and the Right were now advocating), with a focus on approaching the question of the quality of life directly. This was preferable to assuming that life would get ‘better’ as a result of expanding economic activity.

In the frantic one-month campaign that preceded the April 1972 Tasmanian election, there was little opportunity for Jones or the other UTG candidates to develop this new vision. Instead, the protection of one particular pristine lake became a symbol for a much wider and more general political orientation towards a conserver economy and a just, sustainable society.

The UTG went into the snap election of 1972 with very little formal policy. But the policy it did have covered the two critical areas – economics and conservation. The conservation programme was, as might be expected, wide-ranging. It included the retention of Lake Pedder, the protection and extension of national parks and reserves and historic buildings, a reform of public lands administration, the reduction/elimination of water pollution, an enquiry into the wood chip industry, environmental education via film, and a helicopter service to fight forest fires.

The economic programme (see Appendix D), which is discussed in greater detail below, barely hints at the radical revision of mainstream economics which was later
adopted by the UTG. It was not until 1974 that the UTG took 'The New Ethic' as the founding manifesto of the new party (See Appendix B).

'The New Ethic' is a genuine novelty among Australian political platforms to that date, not the least for its focus on ethics as the basis for the platform. 'The New Ethic' flagged all of the issues that were to become the four founding principles adopted by Die Grünen in 1979. With regard to ecology it said

'...rejecting any view of man which gives him the right to exploit all of nature; [and] Moved by the need for a new ethic which unites man with nature to prevent the collapse of life support systems of the earth; [we] Undertake to regulate our individual and communal needs for resources, both living and non-living, while preventing the wholesale extraction of our non-replenishable resources for the satisfaction of the desire for profit; [and we] Undertake to husband and cherish Tasmania's living resources so that we do minimum damage to the web of life of which we are part while preventing the extinction or serious depletion of any form of life by our individual, group, or communal actions.....'

On social justice 'The New Ethic' is equally explicit

'Concerned for the dignity of man and the value of his cultural heritage...[and] Shunning the acquisition and display of individual wealth as an expression of greed for status or power; ...[we will] Provide institutions for the peaceful and unimpeded evolution of the community and for the maintenance of justice and equal opportunity for all people;...Prevent alienation of people in their social and work roles and functions while
making scientific, technical, and vocational knowledge and practice free and open to all; Create a new community in which men and women shall be valued for their personal skills, for the material and non-material worth of these skills to groups and the whole community, and for their non-competitive achievement in all aspects of life; Live as equal members of our society to maintain a community governed by rational, non-sectional law...

On the third Green party founding principle of democratic participation in decision-making 'The New Ethic' promoted group participation and private liberties as follows

We shall ...Create new institutions so that all who wish may participate in making laws and decisions at all levels concerning the social, cultural, political, and economic life of the community;...[and] Preserve specific areas of private and group life where private thought, speech and action is of individual or group importance and does not interfere unreasonably with others; And vest our individual and communal rights in a parliament of representatives chosen by all to enforce our law for as long as that power is not used unfairly to advantage or disadvantage any individual or group in the community.'

On the fourth Green principle of non-violence, 'The New Ethic' is clear that physical violence is unacceptable -- and so are other forms of illegitimate force 'Condemning the misuse of power for individual or group prominence based on aggression against man or nature; [we shall] Change our society and our culture to prevent a tyranny of rationality, at the expense of values, by which
we may lose the unique adaptability of our species for meeting cultural and
environmental change...’

‘The New Ethic’ also contained a fifth element, which is unusual in the political
context, but which was consistent with the emphasis on quality of life. This is a
concern for and commitment to beauty. It was expressed in this way

‘While acknowledging that Tasmania is uniquely favoured with natural
resources, climate, form and beauty; [we] Undertake to live our private and
communal lives in such a way that we maintain Tasmania’s form and beauty
for our own enjoyment and for the enjoyment of our children through
unlimited future generations; [and we] Undertake to create aesthetic harmony
between our human structures and the natural landscape where our individual
and communal needs demand modification to the natural environment;...’

This parallels the passionate concern for beauty in the urban environment expressed
by Tony Brunt in his first political speech. Both the first Green parties were
concerned that unrestrained industrial growth was not only unsustainable and
accompanied by gross injustices, it was also ugly, and that enough people cared
about this to make remedying it a viable political plank. While this has not been a
major focus point for Green parties then or now, it has been inherent in Green
environmental and social policies, which have concentrated heavily on preserving
natural beauty and cultural heritage, and encouraging and supporting human artistic
creativity.
The UTG was supportive of efforts to preserve or enhance attractive built environments (such as Battery Point in Hobart), but its main focus was on the protection of ‘wilderness’ – uninhabited areas of pristine old growth forest, unmodified landforms, wild and unpolluted rivers, and so on. The significance of wilderness as a mobilising factor for the Tasmanian Green movement can scarcely be over-estimated. It must not be assumed, however, that this was an idealist form of motivation, a romantic enthusiasm of jaded urbanites with little actual experience of wild places. Hobart is no harsh metropolis – to the contrary, fringes of forest push into the suburbs and native birds, reptiles and amphibians are plentiful in urban streets. Geoff Holloway notes that bush walking, tertiary education and political activism were overlapping categories in Tasmania in the 1980s – around half of the members of the major bush walking clubs had tertiary education and were active in environmental/Green organisations (Holloway, 1991, 87). Most of the activists were personally familiar with the wild habitats they sought to protect, and could speak knowledgeably as well as enthusiastically in their support.

The UTG Programme was therefore underpinned and complemented by an Economic Programme (see Appendix D) that sought to move Tasmania away from the ‘gross over-emphasis on hydro-economics’ towards industrial diversification, which included promotion of the tourist industry. It wanted conservation-based management and sustainable development of the natural resource based industries that are significant to Tasmania (forestry, marine fisheries and agriculture), and diversification of public works away from the concentration on hydro-industrialisation.
These are very specific policies, devoid of new economic theory, although consistent with a move towards a 'steady state' economy. Two years later, when Dick Jones stood for a senate seat, he presented the UTG's first policy speech. He began with a critique of economic management, and the failure of existing political parties to address impending resource shortages and to see beyond economic growth. He insisted:

'It is no longer sufficient for Labor to justify endless economic growth by dream of eliminating poverty. Poverty in Australia is on the increase, as it is in the United States and other rich nations. Economic growth does not eliminate poverty, it simply modernises it. Mr Whitlam's advocacy of a 6% growth rate in the national economy is the advocacy of the ultimate suicide of our society. But the Liberals would not have it any different. Their devotion to laissez-faire capitalism is based on an unlimited attack on resources backed up by the exploitation of publicly owned goods such as clean air, fresh water and environmental amenities. Both our big political parties, and, as far as we can see, all the independent candidates in this election, regard industrialisation and endless economic and population growth as inevitable and desirable for Tasmania.' (Jones, 1974, 1-2)

Jones was not only critical of the way the economy was run – he was also critical of its purpose. He said:

'We need a new society with a proper community spirit – we need to care more for each other. We must reject materialism in favour of making people individually important; we must recognise that materialism only encourages stress, loneliness, and inequality...Material satisfactions are no substitute for
spiritual content; and spiritual content will be denied any society which has lost the ability to live in harmony with its environment.' (Jones, 1974, 3, 4)

He noted that young people were the first to notice how dehumanising the urban-industrial society had become, and to protest against it. Their protest had been taken up by the UTG in Australia, the Values Party in New Zealand, and the People Party in Great Britain. Jones then went on to use the wood chip industry in Tasmania as a specific example of economic, environmental and aesthetic bankruptcy. He was at pains to point out that the destruction of their natural resources was not earning Tasmanians anything – it was costing them in terms of pollution and other 'externalities', as well as direct and indirect subsidies to the companies engaged in resource extraction. Nor was there a pay-off in terms of increased employment. Jones' economic alternative was labour-intensive, light manufacturing industry with a high design content, employing local labour and material, requiring much less capital investment per job, and shifting government support towards the tertiary training of designers. He also wanted proper valuation of the 'National Estate' (publicly owned lands and other material assets) and a requirement for developers to pay the 'National Estate' price for land/assets so as to ensure that any development was really in the community's interest. This early foray into 'Green' accounting was supplemented with a call for establishing an Ecological Research Institute for Tasmania which (among other things) would do the studies upon which natural resource accounts could be based.

The economic points in this speech were edited to produce the seven page
'United Tasmania Group Economic Policy for Tasmania' offered at the 1975 general election, along with a supplementary three page 'Economic Policy' which expanded on the sustainable development of forestry, tourism, fishing and industry as outlined in the 1972 'Economic Programme'.

A variety of policy groups were set up at the first UTG state conference in June 1974, and eventually developed a full range of policies. However the fact that the Jones speech on which the 1975 policy was based was made in May 1974 suggests that there was not a great interest in developing economic policy. This is the view of Chris Harries, a founder member of the UTG, who was active in the party for its whole life. (Harries, pers comm.)

Compared to the effort the Values Party put into developing economic policy, the salience the subject had at the 1975 Values conference, and the leading position it occupies in the 1975 Values election manifesto, for example, UTG economic thinking must be seen as minimalist. There is no development of alternative economic theory and no application of 'steady state' principles to the national economy. Nevertheless, the specific policies advocated are consistent with a 'Green' approach to economics as developed by Values and later Green parties. They are also consistent with the philosophical orientation that is apparent in 'The New Ethic'.
Values-based economics

The Values Party did not produce a single clear statement of philosophy like 'The New Ethic'. However, it did spend some time discussing its basic orientation, and a lot more time debating how 'Left' or 'Right' it was. Both of these strands of thought were important when it came to formulating policy, and especially economic policy.

The 1972 Values manifesto began with a stirring introduction by Tony Brunt, which set out the raison d'être of the new party (See Appendix C). It is possible to read the 'Introduction' as the negative side of 'The New Ethic', for it sets out the problems which 'The New Ethic' restates as potential positives. It emphasises the spiritual poverty, alienation, destruction of environment and community, and mindless pursuit of material goals that 'The New Ethic' addresses with constructive alternatives.

It is followed directly by strong advocacy for two utterly novel policies, policies that had never been promoted by any previous political party. They are Zero Population Growth and Zero Economic Growth. The two policies are linked, as part of an attempt to develop an 'Economics of Enough'. Economic growth was said to be the 'chief cause of pollution and damage to the environment' (New Zealand Values Party, 1972, 11). Its once positive social role in promoting recovery from the 1930s Great Depression had become a negative environmental role, 'identified with global disaster' (New Zealand Values Party, 1972, 12).
The Blueprint then moved on to critique the role of uncontrolled technological developments in facilitating economic growth, environmental destruction and unemployment; to examine the alienation of workers under the current economic regime; and to reject growth-oriented mass consumerism and associated growth in production as a 'solution' to rising unemployment.

This critique of the economy and of conventional economics is common to subsequent Green parties (see, for example, Die Grünen, n.d., Program, 6-7), and is what serves to definitively differentiate them from other 'alternative' parties with a leftist orientation which were extant in the 1960s and 1970s. What it might mean in terms of concrete policies to place before an electorate, however, had to be slowly and painfully worked out – a process that took about a year of often-heated debate in New Zealand.

When the 1972 manifesto was analysed for specific economic policies, as part of the development of economic policy for Values which began in 1974, only five were found. These were

1. More steeply progressive taxation of personal income and a heavier tax on unearned income.
2. A thorough inquiry into land and property speculation for capital gain.
3. Newspaper and magazine display advertising and television advertising by profit-making bodies to be non-tax deductible.
4. Support and encouragement (would) be given to efforts by workers to achieve a significant degree of worker ownership.
5. In order to maintain full employment without unnecessary economic growth...there should be a movement to a shorter working week and a channelling of resources into areas of greatest social need.’ (Kellow, 1975, 76)

An analysis of the 1972 manifesto using Rokeach’s method of content analysis (Levine, 1975) seemed to indicate that the Values Party was more focussed on a ‘liberty’ rather than an ‘equality’ dimension (compared, for example, to the Labour Party). But in fact its first economic policies show a strong egalitarian bent. There is a concern for directing both financial resources and proprietorial power towards productive workers. In this respect Values shared a welfare orientation with the left of the Labour Party. However the central role of worker control and management of productive enterprises (mainly via co-operative ownership by the workers), which Values went on to develop in explicit detail, was genuinely new within the New Zealand context. It became another factor separating Values from the Labour tradition of trades unionism as a route to worker power and control.

When the party regrouped at the August 1974 conference, it convened policy committees at the conference to consider remits that would provide guidelines to subsequent policy working committees. The committee considering economics at the conference was provided with an ‘Econopak’ prepared by Jennie Wrightson and Doug Wilson of the Kapi Mana branch of the party. It consisted of summaries of ‘current economic thinking which seems to us to be consistent with Values philosophy’ (Econopak, 1974, 1). It was prefaced with brief and apt quotations on economics by thinkers as widely spread in time and space as Hannah More, Plutarch,
Barry Commoner, J.S. Mill and E.F. Schumacher. It also threw in a quote by Shakespeare ("So distribution would undo excess and each man have enough.").

It then moved on to a seven page summary of E.F. Schumacher's *Small is Beautiful*, four pages on E.J. Mishan's 1969 *Growth: the price the pay*, and one page from The Ecologist's *Blueprint for Survival*. It concluded with two pages on 'How to stabilise the economy', an article by Herman Daly published in *The Ecologist*.

With these words in mind Working Committee Three passed three resolutions on economic policy, as follows:

3/1 Nature of Economy:
Resolved that the Values Party abandon the terms "No-Growth" and "Zero-Economic Growth" to describe the type of economy it is trying to achieve and replace it with the term "Steady-State Economy".

3/2 Economic Emphasis:
Resolved that this conference adopt as a basis of economic and social policy the assertion that social growth in the areas of health, education, and welfare is a greater priority than industrial and economic growth.

3/3 Economics Policy:
Resolved that the Values Party affirms its belief that neither private enterprise nor state monopoly is a viable economic lifestyle for New Zealand and asserts that it would seek to establish a steady-state economy incorporating the following features.
a) The elimination of G.N.P. growth as the measure of the strength of the economy.

b) Social service rather than profit to be considered the responsible goal for an economic enterprise.

c) Community and worker ownership in enterprises in every economic field.

d) Worker representation on boards of management.

e) A more equitable distribution of incomes and wealth.

f) Delegation of administrative decisions to the lowest possible level of operation.'


Two related resolutions, on classification of industries and resource management, and on land policy, were then passed, and these became the basis on which the Economic Policy Working Committee (EPWC) set up by the conference began work. Convened by Kaz Wier, a Manawatu farmer, the EPWC originally had sixteen members (and later co-opted several more), who were distributed the length and breadth of New Zealand, from Auckland and the Coromandel Peninsula to Dunedin and Central Otago. It contained one academically trained economist (Geoff Neill), and one self-taught one (John Perkins, who had written a book entitled

*Understanding money, unemployment and inflation: why New Zealand is a modern Utopia* shortly before emigrating from the USA to New Zealand in 1964). Wier set out the working procedure for the committee one month after the conference, in a round robin letter of 30 September 1974. It was a system of circulating
correspondence and background papers to all members, with annotations and recommendations. A different topic would be addressed each month, and Wier suggested starting with Allocation and Distribution of Resources, Pricing System, and Ownership and Means of Production. The letter included quotes from an interview that the newly elected leader of Values, Reg Clough, did with the Massey University student paper Chaff, in which Clough emphasises the Values preference for individual responsibility and worker/community ownership rather than the ‘Big Brother State’ approach to social and economic equality.

Wier was to return to this issue in his third round robin to the EWPC of 1 January 1975. By this stage papers had come in from all round the country. They included a three page paper from a Wellington sub-committee of the EWPC which called itself ‘Eco-work’, five pages on economics from John Veitch in Invercargill, a paper on ‘Finance and the Steady State Economy’ by J.A. Bartram, ‘Some Observations on the New Zealand Economy’ from Richard Belton in Blenheim, and several letters from John Perkins in Alexandra critiquing the work to date. Geoff Neill had written two (very similar) articles on economics for party newsletters (Values, September 1974) and Turning Point, November 1974). Wier was moved to note that some of the suggestions sent in carried a subtext – ‘...New Zealanders [are] very keen to hand over responsibilities to Central Government...’ and he asked the EWPC to remember that ‘...the Values Party is against establishing huge bureaucratic organisations to do the work of the community’ !!’.

Geoff Neill’s articles were the most comprehensive and most distinctively ‘Green’ of the 1974 economics documents. The Values September 1974 article began by raising
two central concerns of Green parties – allocation of resources/wealth within the economy, and the impact of economic activity on the environment. The latter concern is the one that is principally associated with Green parties, so it is interesting to see Neill giving primacy to the former. He considered that 'To date Values has made only two major statements on its economic philosophy', and that the most important one was made in the form of two motions passed at the Wellington Regional Conference as follows:

1. "That this region of the Values Party believing that all aspects of economic activity should be subservient to the needs of social justice, asserts that the organisation of New Zealand economic structures toward a fairer distribution of wealth is necessary. This is despite the fact that there will be a generally lower material standard of living."

2. "That this region of the Values Party deplores the Labour Government’s apparent belief that a policy of increased productivity without a simultaneous redistribution of wealth can solve New Zealand’s social problems."

'Our other statement', Neill continues, 'was made in [the 1972] election manifesto i.e. "...economic growth is the chief cause of pollution and damage to the environment."' The implications of the two statements, Neill went on to say, are that 'The second statement is the one associated with our electoral success and herein lies the decision for members of the Values Party. For if we are to have a real go at achieving a good society we must begin work on some things which will not be popular with some people; perhaps even some of the
people who have supported us previously. For some of the things we must do are plainly anti-capitalist and anti-power-concentration (for example totalitarian socialism). “Let us make no mistake about it, the Values Party is a genuine radical party or it is nothing.”

Neill then went on to discuss a steeper, more progressive tax system. This included the concept of a national minimum income scheme – the first time this is raised as potential party policy. Also discussed was a reform of production which went ‘...beyond worker participation to industrial democracy based on a decentralised socialisation of production’, distribution via ‘community co-operative wholesaling enterprises’ and a reform of finance which would see all banks become community based trustee banks. Neill favoured a shifting of trade in favour of poorer countries which produce goods that are not easily produced in New Zealand, and controlling inflation via linking economic contracts (e.g. wage agreements and pensions) with the Consumer Price Index. He also advocated allowing the New Zealand dollar to float, and a redefining of the role of central government in the economy. Finally he discussed an ecologically sound economy, and advocated closely policed regulations relating to air, water, soil, and food pollution, plus three ‘eco’ taxes. These would be a raw materials tax proportionate to the availability of the resource, a depreciation tax proportionate to the life of the product, and an energy tax to penalise energy intensive processes. He concluded by emphasising the creative and democratic tendencies of people, and the necessity for self-empowerment via co-operative action. His last words were:

'Part of the solution is co-operation and this is the heart of the above policy suggestions. If we learn to co-operate with nature, with others and with
In retrospect Neill’s economic vision seems to combine anarchist and utopian socialist features, containing elements of both individual empowerment through community-based co-operative activity, (the anarchist dimension) and enlightened social and economic planning by government (the socialist dimension). Neill was more impressed by Guy Salmon than the other 1972/73 leaders of Values were (see Values Party MS Papers 1430, 2:10, Otago Region) and strongly supported his February 1973 anarchistic reorganisation proposals. In 1977 he wrote a heavily critical article for the party paper *Vibes*, in which he was scathing about Values’ ‘...No. 1 aim...to achieve political power as the government of New Zealand.’ He asked whether this was ‘...so that the new world may be administered into being? A new world of decentralised, largely self-sustaining communities, of participatory democracy, of minimum central government, of self-actualisation, co-operation, love, freedom, health, joy, etc. – administered in?’ (Neill, 1977, 9).

Although Neill may have been the strongest advocate for the ‘anarchist’ economic position, his actual proposals were strongly supported by the majority of the EPWC. Most of the committee met for face-to-face consultation for the first time in Wellington on 15/16 February 1975, and this gathering produced an initial three page report. The report was expanded into a six page article (‘Towards a Co-operative Economy’) for the party paper *Turning Point* (Vol. 1, No. 5, April 1975). This was published just before the fourth party conference that was held in Christchurch on April 25-27, 1975.
Acrimonious debate (by correspondence) on whether this was a ‘majority’ report (and if so, what the views of the ‘minority’ were) then ensued. Party Leader Reg Clough made critical remarks about the report, and also inserted his own opinions (‘Some Views on Our Economic Directions’) in the April 1975 issue of *Turning Point*. His economic thinking and departure from constitutional policymaking process were hotly criticised in turn by EWPC member John Perkins. 1975 Conference Organiser Ivan Finlayson then sought to advise and be advised on how to structure economic policy debate and decision-making at conference, and there was more confusion and plenty of cross words exchanged in letters which were usually signed ‘love and peace’.

By the time the 1975 conference came round, Values economics had been distilled into eight key points (see Appendix E). These were presented to Conference, and were then referred, along with specific remits, to an Economics Remits Committee. Only when the E.R.C. had passed a remit was it presented to full Conference for ratification. Aynsley Kellow (1975, 16-17) was present at the conference and attended all E.R.C. and plenary sessions. He records that by two clever expedients (obtaining consensus or strong majority support for remits in the E.R.C. before presenting them to Conference; and dividing the remits according to their probable time frame into ‘immediate’, ‘transitional’ and long-term’ policies), decision-making on economics went very smoothly. Most remits that were accepted went through with full or near consensus, with only one card vote being called for.
The conference was unanimously in favour of general remits that advocated a more even distribution of wealth in society. The conference also agreed that the government has a major role to play in the economy, especially in promoting regional balance, and ensuring that economic enterprises support positive social purposes (albeit subject to independent, research-based advice on technological, environmental and social consequences). However, when it came to the mechanisms by which equality of income should be pursued there was division. The first motion put forward on a national minimum income (to supplant existing social security benefit and superannuation schemes) was withdrawn while its sponsor (Geoff Neill) lobbied and rewrote it into two more carefully worded remits which passed with strong support (Kellow, 1975, 19-20). The other contentious matter was a proposal to equalise wage rates regardless of the nature of the work – the conference was not prepared to accept this, however, and when it went to a card vote the remit was lost.

The decisions made at Conference were the basis for the economic policy presented in the 1975 manifesto *Beyond Tomorrow*. Before a manifesto committee began the task of collating the decisions and packaging them with explanatory prose Geoff Neill provided further elaborations of the principles involved via two articles. (‘A New Economic Recipe’, *Turning Point*, Vol. 1 No. 6, May/June 1975 and ‘Values Economics’, *Turning Point*, Vol.1, No. 8, September/October 1975).

He repeated the initial eight key principles (see Appendix E) and concluded ‘A New Economic Recipe’ with an epilogue that once again drew attention to an understanding basic to Green economics. While everyone must have enough (the emphasis on equality), people can be happier with less and the world will be a more liveable place as a result (the emphasis on ecology). 2
'Epilogue (What It’s About)

A stable state world economy based on equitable distribution of resources and co-operative community control of the means of production, finance and distribution.

An economic base enabling the satisfaction of the basic material needs of all, through people working at safe, satisfying jobs.

An economic base which supports the satisfaction of non-material human needs.

An economic base for our new way of life – a way of life that knows that people are more important than property, and ecology more important than being ‘rich’.

An economy based not only on the physical necessity of limiting our material expansion and humanist ideals of sharing what we have, but also on the realisation that many wise people have chosen what we have called poverty as part of their path to happiness.’ (Neill, 1975, 6)

This definition of ‘Green’ economics would seem consistent with the characterisation of Greens as ‘post-materialist’ (Inglehart, 1977). Such a characterisation only holds if one accepts the definition of ‘materialist’ as referring to personal material advantage, to striving after personal wealth and possessions at the expense of aesthetic, spiritual, and other non-tangible gratifications. In this sense then Green economics could be called ‘non-materialist’. There is another commonly used meaning of ‘materialism’, however, and that is the philosophical antonym of ‘idealist’. In this sense a ‘materialist’ approach is one which has reference to the material basis of life which grounds all other endeavours, including spiritual and
aesthetic pursuits. Using this definition a strong case can be made for Green economics as being more materialist than any previous forms of economics.

Certainly the 1975 Values manifesto *Beyond Tomorrow* devotes 40% of its space to materialism in this sense, with the first section of the manifesto consisting of topics grouped under the theme of 'Survival'. It starts with an explanation of the stable-state economy and moves on through population, economics, agriculture, fishing, forestry, industrial relations, consumerism, technology, environment and energy to cover most of the material basis of social life. (A similar format was followed by *Die Grünen* in their first programme, again with roughly 40% of the programme devoted to survival issues, and with the economics issues put first – *Die Grünen*, n.d.)

Over twenty years after the first Green economic programme was articulated, it is still a matter of some annoyance to Green politicians in New Zealand that Green parties are seen primarily as environmental pressure groups, lacking in economic policy or direction. New Zealand Green leader Jeanette Fitzsimons expresses the environment/economy relationship as 'Tell me what your economic policy is and I will tell you what your environmental policy will be.' (Fitzsimons, interview, 4.4.90). She also expresses her frustration at the failure of other parties, including social democrat and libertarian left parties, to recognise that environmental values can not be protected by 'clip-on' environmental policies, which fail to understand the finite and/or fragile nature of most natural resources. These genuine physical constraints are what neo-classical economists quaintly call 'externalities'. Fitzsimons wants the economics profession to face up to the detrimental environmental and social impacts of much industrial production and consumption, and the necessity of
confronting the question of just allocation directly rather than deferring it to the mythical redistributive character of economic growth.

Twenty - or even fifty - years may well be too short a time for a new economic paradigm to become widely known and understood, let alone accepted. Nowhere in the world have Green parties been in a majority in any national legislature and thus in a position to implement a full Green economic programme. Twenty-five years after Values first produced such a programme the acceleration of economic globalisation and the consequent compromising of national sovereignty would seem to make it much more difficult to put into practice, even if Greens were given an electoral mandate. Perhaps the biggest problem facing Green economists today is not the remaining contradictions and omissions in the programme, but rather the lack of a political route to implement it.

Looking for a label on the wrong dimension?

In the first five years of Green party formation and political development, however, the debate was focussed not on how different the Green platform was from other platforms, but on how similar it was (or was not) to other political tendencies. This was particularly acute in Germany, a country with a rich heritage of political intellectualising, and a Green party which in its formation stages included
representatives from both the extreme Left and the extreme Right (Hulsberg, 1988; Markovits and Gorski, 1993; Parkin, 1989).

Whether *Die Grünen* is or was a Left party is still of interest to some academics (Markovits and Gorksi, 1993), and within Green parties themselves the debate waxes and wanes. It was an issue that plagued the Values Party, and it came to an acrimonious head at the 1979 Conference at Rathkeale. This conference marked the beginnings of the transition from a small but strong party of some 2,000 members and two full-time paid staff to a much smaller (two hundred members) and weaker group. This attenuated group nevertheless kept the spirit of Green politics alive in New Zealand until merging with new Green formations in 1990. Before the 1979 blow up, however, there had been seven years of debate.

*Is the UTG Left or Right? – Jones*

It was an issue addressed head on by Dick Jones in Tasmania just prior to the first UTG state conference in June 1974. ‘Our struggle to save Lake Pedder pushed us into the political arena’, he said, ‘Our values were so threatened that we were forced to seek political power. Along the way, we rapidly gained knowledge about society and the condition of the community that had become hung up on material well-being.’ This forced the UTG into an examination of the Left and the Right answers to political questions. Jones thought there was something useful to be found – and much that was useless to be rejected – in both traditions. He said:
'The traditional fault of the Left is to believe that everything always gets better; the traditional fault of the Right has been to believe that everything always gets worse. The "tough" left-wing posture leads to a dehumanising progressivism, a modernist arrogance. It leads to contempt for the past; man's origins and personality are subordinated in favour of the planned society. The "tough" right-wing posture leads to a hatred of every hopeful element in the present for fear that it will upset the conservative's psychological and material comfort.'

What was the UTG ('Green') position on modernity? Jones went on to say:

'We believe, with the Left, that rapid change is inevitable and that it can be a change for the good. We believe, with the Right, that a great deal of recent change has been for the worse and that, if the world is to be saved from galloping self-destruction, we need to recover certain lost wisdoms of the past. We are not so idiotic as to sneer at science, nor do we despise or seek to discredit religion and the arts. We know there has to be a retreat from an economy of indiscriminate growth, but this will be accomplished by many new feats of technology rather than by reverting to prescriptions concocted by some romantic medievalist.'

With regard to the role of government, he identified the 'Green' view as:

'A central government is necessary to deal with the great central problem of economic resources and their just distribution. But man is naturally at home only in a small and largely self-governing community. Within the framework
of central economic allocation, each small community must have the greatest possible freedom to decide how it wishes to live and administer itself.'

Jones then abandoned his relatively even-handed approach to Left and Right to claim a position for the UTG to the left of the Left, thus:

'But there is one vital respect in which the United Tasmania Group can not balance the virtues and the enlightenment of Left and Right. We see the need for equality in terms that place us to the left of almost the whole existing Left. Even if we do not believe this by nature and on principle, we have been forced to adopt this position by the sheer dangers and demands of the present economic situation. The imminent economic breakdown demands that we should aim at a genuine equality of living standards at least within our Australian community to start with...In the face of universal and drastic shortages, man must learn to share the available resources with absolute justice between them...the only conceivable alternative to a determined policy of radical equality is a totalitarian rule by the wealthy. We can safely predict that its life would be nasty, brutish and short. A radical social revolution is an urgent necessity.'

Jones advocated that this revolution should treasure and honour the past or it would be as psychologically intolerable as previous attempts at revolution, and would fail accordingly. New attempts at living in community should be encouraged, and above all:

'...we have to make our governments take drastic action to preserve and regenerate our small scale communities. Our task, over the next two years, is
to produce policies for this purpose. We seek political power to ensure their implementation. The squabbles of Left and Right are irrelevant to the need for reconstruction...The United Tasmania Group can be the instrument for achieving the first worthwhile community reconstruction in the developed world...Traditional politics has little place in the minds of those who would reach such goals.' (Jones, 1974)

*Is the Values Party socialist or radical?* – McDavitt

Early Values Party statements show a similar ‘leftier than Left’ commitment to social and economic equality, combined with an identical rejection of the Big Brother bureaucratic state means to this end, and an endorsement of co-operative, communitarian alternatives. Three pages of the 1972 Values manifesto were devoted to ‘Fostering Community’, and the economic principles enunciated by Geoff Neill (see above) and supported by the Economic Policy Working Committee show an equally strong commitment to this approach. If equality is seen as the salient marker of ‘Leftism’, then Green parties have always been left on this issue. In this matter the first two Green parties were (and still are) much closer to the 1968 stance of Daniel Cohn-Bendit (currently a Green EMP), with his proclamation of the left-wing alternative to obsolete communism, than they were or are to the social conservatism of Teddy Goldsmith and his fellow ecologist writers/supporters of *Blueprint for Survival.*
However, 'Left' is not only a matter of goals but also of means. Directly after the 1975 election Terry McDavitt (a member of the Wellington 'Eco-work' group in 1974, and later General Secretary of the party) wrote a long reflection entitled 'Beyond Socialism' (McDavitt, 1975). He started from the point that during the election campaign many political commentators and voters had labelled Values 'socialist', and that a lot of campaign energy had gone into answering questions on whether this was or was not the case. Noting that Values had addressed important questions such as 'Do you need to change ownership and management of economic and political structures in order to achieve your view of how society should be, or are existing structures capable of achieving this?' McDavitt conceded that the manifesto, Beyond Tomorrow, had failed to give a full justification for the answers it came up with. He therefore saw that Values would have to do more work to provide answers to the current (inconsistent) charges being levelled against it - that it was idealist, or that it was socialist.

Going on to define socialism as 'scientific, materialistic and deterministic', McDavitt contrasts Values with socialism to show that Values is 'unsocialistic' thus:

'Where traditional socialism proposes centralism (in the economy, in social services, for example) Values proposes decentralisation; where traditional socialism proposes material economic growth (to 'prove' that socialism is better economics, per Krushchev, or to pay for expanded social services, as per orthodox economists) Values proposes a stabilised population and economy; where traditional socialism proposes the end of capital power, Values actually proposes that it should form 25 percent of Direction; where traditional socialism ignores, or if true to working class Tory prejudice,
opposes liberalisation of legal restraints in the areas of individual freedom, Values espouses this as policy; where traditional socialism ignores the question of limits, Values takes this as a central theme; and where traditional socialism promotes sectional (workers') interests, Values espouses the co-operation of all interests in the process of decision-making at community levels. There are, of course, socialist countries and even stray socialists who would agree with some of these ideas. To that extent, I would say, they are not being true to traditional socialism.’ (McDavitt, 1975, 17)

Speculating on why there were these differences between Values and socialism, McDavitt decided that there had been two watersheds in history since the creation of socialism. These were the 1930s Great Depression and the late 1960s ‘revolution’. The significance and relevance of these events had passed socialism by, so that it had become ‘...rigid as an ideology, incapable of recognising new historical conditions...’ (McDavitt, 1975, 17). Values, in contrast, was new and refreshing and non-dogmatic, according to McDavitt – although he conceded that this brought problems of uncertainty and inconsistency.

McDavitt also saw a second fundamental difference between socialism and Values, one that he saw as more significant. McDavitt saw Values as being part of the Radical, not the Socialist tradition, and he identified William Blake, Theodore Roszak, E.F. Schumacher and Ivan Illich as key exemplars of this tradition. He quoted extensively from another radical, the anarchist ex-Marxist Dwight MacDonald. MacDonald believed that radicals, unlike socialists, ‘...reject the concept of Progress...judge things by their present meaning and effect [on human
affairs], ...think the ability of science to guide us has been overrated, and ...seek to redress the balance by emphasising the ethical aspects of politics. [Radicals] feel that the firmest ground for that human liberation which was the goal of the old Left is the ground not of history (or science) but of those non-historical values (truth, justice, love [sharing, conservation, co-operation] which Marx has made unfashionable among socialists...’.

McDavitt seconds MacDonald by reiterating the ethical rather than the ‘scientific’ basis of the Values (Green) quest for social justice, and insisting that ends must not be divorced from means. He then discusses the way in which Kiwi [New Zealand] radicals could and should do what Kiwi socialists have failed to do, namely to develop a Kiwi radicalism where they failed to develop a Kiwi socialism. This would include rejecting the assimilation of the Maori people into Pakeha culture and society and instead supporting, fostering and actively identifying with the Maori Renaissance.

However, an ethics-based radicalism does not add up to a total political philosophy, and McDavitt identifies other questions that must be addressed e.g. the question of scale (decentralist/centralist) and government (participation/representation). He also insists that ‘We can not go beyond socialism until we have mined its riches, and there are many of them’, and these include its analysis and rejection of capitalism, and its methodical and consistent approach to practical problems. The latter McDavitt saw as a valuable corrective to the utopianism apparent in much of Values (Green) thinking. After offering a chart which acknowledged what was radical in socialism and defined what wasn’t, (see Appendix F) McDavitt concluded:
'Values transcends socialism. It aims not at the socialist society but at a better society. In accepting the humanising aspects of the socialist legacy, Values is placed on the left of the socialist-capitalist continuum; in rejecting the dehumanising aspects of mechanism, Values is placed on the radical side of the radical-mechanist continuum. It is precisely this extra dimension that makes Values relevant to New Zealand here and now, and the alternative political philosophy while at the same time making socialism irrelevant, not really an alternative because it is entrenched in the mechanistic status quo.'

(McDavitt, 1975, 20)

**Economic radicals**

Radical was also the word used by John Perkins to characterise the Values position. In letters to John Stewart, editor of the Christchurch Values Party newsletter *Out-Spoke*, Perkins insisted that the Values Party was a genuine radical party (as proclaimed by Stewart), but wanted Stewart to drop the word socialist because it was out-dated, an electoral handicap, and did not describe what Values really was. The Otago region organising conference, according to Perkins, ‘...unanimously declared ourselves to be radical. We decided that the classifications ‘left’ and ‘right’ applied to old ideas and did not fit us.’ (Perkins, 1974, 3) In an (unpublished) February 1975 letter to Stewart (by then editor of the national Values paper *Turning Point*, Perkins claimed that ‘...the radical element won all the votes at the February meeting of the Economic Policy Committee. The endorsement of the most radical concrete actions were for a wealth tax and social rent. These were proposed and

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advanced by two old men who are strongly imbued with the individual freedom
hopes of nineteenth century liberalism...Such tax and rent are the means of breaking
down the very strong remains of capitalism. They fitted right in with the young
idealism of Terry McDavitt...and Geoff Neill’s proposal of a minimum income for
everyone as of right. The danger is that old men such as...may think this is a victory
for socialism...There are many who do not understand that socialist theory is a
branch of materialist orthodox economics....’

Perkins then went on to critique Marxian economics specifically, and classical
economics generally, ending ‘The Values Party must supply the economic thinking
which fits the new views of population, pollution and quality of life. We have no
monopoly on recognising those problems. So far no one else has made even a start
on the new VALUES ECONOMICS.’ (Perkins letter, 20.2.75).

Perkins was happy to endorse the nineteenth century socialist thinkers for their
analysis and criticisms of the concentration of power and wealth. However he was
utterly opposed to their solution of concentrating power and wealth in ‘public’
(i.e. government) hands, arguing that this leads to abuses like the ‘new class’
bureaucracy in socialist states, and to further abuses like the jailing or execution of
those who oppose these bureaucracies.

Although party leaders Reg Clough (1974-1975) and Tony Kunowski (1976-78) did
not express their sentiments on the subject as thoroughly as McDavitt, nor as often as
Perkins, their reactions to suggestions that Values was like, or should join with, the
Labour Party were based on similar perceptions of difference. Clough was harshly
critical of Labour, saying 'It says it's for the ordinary working people and it's telling a complete lie', citing as an example of this 'The economic measures it brought in recently [which] hit solely on working people on wages and salaries.' (quoted in Ray, 1974).

In February 1976 Clough hotly denied that talks that he and other Values leaders held with Labour leader Bill Rowling and three former Labour ministers were designed to forge links between the two parties, but said that ‘...he explained some basic Values policy which the Labour members did not understand.’ (Mail, 3/2/76, ‘Values man says no links talk’)

When the secretary of the Sumner-Redcliffs branch of the Labour Party wrote to Tony Kunowski sounding out the likelihood of exploring the ‘possibility of some kind of co-operation’, Kunowski replied at some length to point out how difficult this would be. He explained that such a decision could only be made by consensus among DELEGATES (Kunowski’s emphasis) at a quarterly Values General Delegates Meeting. This was a structural difference between Values and Labour (where such decisions were made by a National Executive) which Kunowski said ‘...reflects...the philosophical and ideological difference between our two parties.’

Further,

'We believe that the Values Party is the only party facing up to the realities of rapid resource depletion and environmental degradation, to human alienation and community breakdown. Pre-supposing to represent the interests of the working people of New Zealand the Labour Party has and still is prepared to tolerate monopoly capitalism and the profligate growth that it
needs for its own survival. [Labour] will attempt once again to 'con' the New Zealand voter that they can manage the irrational capitalist system better than the capitalists themselves.’ (Kunowski, 1977)

Kunowski responded in much the same way to a letter from Bruce Beetham, leader of the Social Credit Political League, suggesting that Values, Social Credit and Labour should hold talks with a view to forming one new party. The idea had been discussed at the Values General Delegates Meeting of August 1976, and delegates felt that neither Social Credit nor Labour understood the 'core' concept underlying the Values philosophy, which was ‘...a just, co-operative, sustainable, 'steady-state' economy in which decision-making is decentralised at the lowest possible level.’ (Kunowski, 1976)

In November 1978 Kunowski was required to defend Values against a pre-election charge made in a Christchurch Star editorial ('Values on the road to socialism', 7.11.78), that the party was 'socialist’. Commenting on the 1978 Values election campaign opening in Christchurch on November 6, the Star described Values proposal that investment funds must be used in a socially responsible manner, and that the major banks, finance houses, insurance companies and stock and station agents would be converted into co-operative enterprises, as ‘the most revolutionary proposal ever put forward by Values’. In the Star’s view it was tantamount to proposing a 'completely Socialist state.’ Kunowski responded that ‘Socialism as popularly defined means the complete public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange – and that is not what Values stands for.’ If Values was a socialist party in that sense, said Kunowski, it would be supported by the Socialist
Unity Party and the Socialist Action League – which in fact support Labour

(Christchurch Star, 8.11.78, ‘Values denies Socialism’).

This public rebuttal of socialism by Kunowski seems ironic (albeit politic) in the light of what transpired at the party’s 1979 conference five months later. Kunowski was strongly associated with the ‘socialist faction’ within Values, which was based in Christchurch (where Kunowski lived) and which supported his bid for re-election as party leader. In his re-election ‘statement of intent’ Kunowski said

‘We must recognise that currently State power, either Labour or National variety, is wielded in the interests of private capital, domestic and foreign. To achieve a just, sustainable and co-operative economy this power must be challenged, overcome and redistributed. The stock of non-renewable resources must be socially controlled. The major economic institutions must be co-operatively owned and controlled and operate within the framework of a democratic plan. This is incontrovertibly a position of the Left. Call it New Left, Libertarian Socialism, or whatever – but this fact must be openly acknowledged in Party literature, speeches and action. We can hide no longer.’

Kunowski lost his bid for party leadership to his erstwhile deputy leader Margaret Crozier – but the conference also passed a remit declaring Values to be a socialist party. Despite this success, the socialists in the party began to put their energy elsewhere, and the party suffered a rift from which it never recovered. Party Chairer Dave Woodhams, who had chaired the 1973 conference at which Guy Salmon’s anarchistic organisation proposals were accepted, and had reflected that Values was
left in a position of ‘anarchy without the anarchist’, once again had the dubious honour of chairing a conference divided along ideological lines. This time he presided over a ‘socialist party devoid of socialists’ (Woodhams, 1997, 1, 5).

Some members of the socialist group, which named itself Socialist Network, put out several issues of a small journal called *Straight Left*, which attempted to develop a ‘green socialist’ line and organisation – but this fizzled after about a year.

Commenting on what this confusion over ‘socialism’ meant in a 1978 article which was reprinted in *Vibes* (Jesson, 1978), Marxist political journalist Bruce Jesson analysed what he saw as the ‘leftward drift’ in Values, and he emphasised the differences identified in Terry McDavitt’s ‘Beyond Socialism’ article between ‘Leftism’ and ‘radicalism’. (Although unlike McDavitt he saw ethics-based radicalism as inferior to scientific socialism.) He also noted that radicals of the right – true conservatives – could be ethically opposed to capitalism, and that there were a number of such people within Values (he named names), which accounted for the difficulties in developing a consistent economic platform. However, he saw Values as a ‘much more authentic expression of the politics of the protest movement’ than other Left groups in New Zealand, and definitely as a party of the Left. In fact, it had ‘established itself as New Zealand’s largest and best-known left-wing organisation; although it differs from the other left-wing organisations in that it belongs to the libertarian rather than the Marxist tradition.’ Libertarian Socialism – or ‘anarchism’ – were poorly developed (almost unheard of) political trends in New Zealand, and this (according to Jesson) was the cause of much confusion for (ignorant) political commentators trying to categorise the Values phenomenon.
By concentrating solely on the strengths (or otherwise) of the ‘socialist’ component of the Values platform, Jesson and other critics failed to fully investigate the ecological as well as the social rationale for Values ‘leftism’. There is still debate within Green parties (including the current New Zealand Greens) over whether, or which, ‘left’ or ‘right’ economic and social mechanisms are most appropriate to reach Green goals. Nevertheless, there is one obvious and vital point on which Green parties are united and clearly differentiated from left parties.Crudely expressed, they do not believe (with Marxists, social democrats, and other socialist tendencies) that the way to improved material well-being and increased social equality is to bake a bigger cake i.e. to increase the sphere of economic production. On the contrary, Greens continue to insist that economic growth is part of the problem, not part of the solution, and it is definitely not the solution to social inequality and injustice.

Environmental problems created by accelerating industrialised production and consumption have gone stratospheric, let alone global, in the last decades of the twentieth century. Greens are therefore not about to abandon basing their politics on their unique political/material assumption, expressed in the 1990 ‘Green Charter’ developed by the New Zealand Green Party as: ‘This world is finite, therefore unlimited material growth is impossible’. It is from this assumption that Greens derive their second principle, the principle of social justice. This is expressed by the 1990 New Zealand Green Party ‘Green Charter’ as ‘Unlimited material growth is impossible, therefore the key to social responsibility is the just distribution of social
and natural resources, both locally and globally.' (For the full charter, see Appendix A).

Some political ecologists have criticised this derivation of equality from sustainability as a non sequitur, and possibly prejudicial to the sustainability goal, and have discussed the possibility that conservative, hierarchical, authoritarian, non-egalitarian ways of ensuring sustainability are likely to be more effective (Ophuls, 1977). Socialists who are in sympathy with both the sustainability and equality goals of Green politics are still at odds with the Green prescription for achieving these ends, namely a rejection of the pursuit of material well-being via mass production and consumption. The conservatives are prepared to accept that a high standard of living can be had by only a few under sustainability conditions; traditional socialists want everyone to have a 'high' standard of living and either ignore or rationalise away the sustainability consequences.

Greens shift the goalposts by insisting that quality of life, not standard of living, is the aim of the sustainable economy and the just society. This stance can be interpreted as both Right (value conservative) and Left (fair shares of both private and public, material and non-material goods). While not unique as a political position, being strongly advocated within the British tradition, for example, by politicised artists such as William Blake and William Morris, and associated groups of radicals, anarchists and utopian socialists, it has had little traction within parliamentary politics before. It is recognisable as the orientation of the New Left and associated new social movements of the 1960s, and as we have seen there is a
clear transmission of personnel and policies from the New Left into Green parties.

But how 'left' does this make Green parties?

As is clear from the debates canvassed above, Green politicians and commentators on the Values Party and UTG in the 1970s could not decide just what this new politics was. Was more left than right, more left than left, neither left nor right, left but not socialist, radical but not left, left in aims but not in means, or some other combination or permutation? No wonder, then, that the German Greens advanced the bold slogan 'Neither left nor right, but in front.' Unfortunately it has never been clear exactly what this means. Some have chosen it to mean that Green parties must be interpreted on a separate environmental scale, according to how 'deep' or 'reformist' they are on environmental issues. This is the line taken by Hay and Haward (1988) in arguing that the Tasmanian Greens, with their heavy involvement in wilderness issues, were 'more Green' than either the mainland Australian or West European Greens who were more concerned with nuclear issues. But since Green politics is not purely environmentalism, it seems to me to be unhelpful to judge Green parties solely on this criterion. Some Australians came to Green politics via the conservation movement, and some via the peace movement, yet leading conservationists (Brown, 1987) and peace activists (Vallentine, 1990) have spoken of the need to 'Green' their respective movements. Further, both Brown and Vallentine have been Green senators espousing a full Green platform and not simply conservation or disarmament.

Perhaps the quality of life dimension - which encompasses the material standard of living measured in terms of food, shelter, and essential possessions, plus free
enjoyment of public environmental goods, plus access to non-material satisfactions (from educational opportunities to aesthetic experiences) - is just too complex to be used as a yardstick in political debate. In a political universe dominated by the concepts and practice of hierarchy and scarcity, a discourse based on 'either/or' seems 'normal', and the Green insistence on 'both/and' appears to be 'deviant'.

Green policies and implementation mechanisms therefore appear to be ideologically eclectic if a Left/Right scale is applied. This makes them easy game for critics from the Right who exaggerate the 'leftist' character of Green policies. An extreme example of this is the New Zealand National Party Energy Minister Max Bradford describing Green leader Jeanette Fitzsimons' Energy Efficiency bill as 'Stalinist' because it contains provisions for a statutory national energy efficiency and conservation authority (New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 10.9.98). Critics from the Left choose to highlight supposedly 'rightist' elements in Green policies, such as the concern for personal and community responsibility for meeting basic needs, rather than reliance on the state.

There does not appear to be a means of resolving this debate and the seeming 'contradictions' using existing yardsticks. It remains to be seen whether a new 'Green' dimension of analysis has formed or is forming. Or whether it will be possible to judge other political tendencies with a Green yardstick. One thing that is clear, however, is that the debate highlights the increasing irrelevance of the left/right labels. Until or unless the Left can reformulate a politics which addresses the concerns of scarcity and distribution raised by the Greens on a global scale, rather than a national one, the Greens will adopt the 'left' position on the spectrum.
by default rather than by design. Similarly, until or unless social democrat/labour parties or their like can formulate an economics which addresses the environmental destruction and social inequities which result from the unchecked growth of the global economy, the Greens will continue to be regarded as a ‘Left’. Not least in the eyes of the New Right globalists who need no longer fear opposition from the parliamentary labour/social democrat parties. It is to how these questions may – or may not – be resolved in favour of Green outcomes that I turn in my concluding chapter.

Notes

1. At this point the reader may be asking – why am I focussing on Green party policies and positions to describe and analyse ‘Green’ economics and politics? The question may seem specious, but it is important to answer it fully, since there are distinct differences between the actual policies historically advocated by Green parties, and presented by them to electorates, and the positions and policies advocated by Green theorists.

For example, in the introduction to his *Green Political Thought*, Andrew Dobson (1990, 3-7) makes careful distinctions between environmentalism or small g ‘green’ politics, and ‘ecologism’ (or political ecology), which he says is big G ‘Green’ politics. He then considers whether all Green parties are truly Green in this definition, and suggests that *Die Grünen* might therefore not be a ‘real’ Green party.

In examining the actual policies of Green parties, I reject this purist philosophical approach to defining ‘Green’, to allow the first Green parties and politicians to speak for themselves. The debate on what is or is not ‘Green’ is an important one, but it must be recognised that a debate at the level of political theory is a very different exercise from an investigation of the actual historical beliefs and practices of political parties and activists.

For who gets to define what is ‘Green’ in the end? Philosopher Robert Goodin says we should ignore the ‘sillier’ and ‘crazier’ aspects of Green politics (in which he includes alternative lifestyles, and New Age beliefs/practices, which he names ‘green heresies’) (Goodin, 1992, 17). In contrast, the philosopher Arne Naess, originator of the concept ‘deep ecology’, actively promotes a very frugal lifestyle as an essential part of being ‘Green’. (Naess, 1995, 259-261) Political philosophers can only do what political philosophers can do, which is debate and advocate normative positions.

Political activists may or may not make use of the work of the theorists as they develop definitions of ‘Green’ through practice. In this chapter, which sets out actual policies of the first two Green parties, it can be seen that there is considerable consistency in the approaches
adopted by parties which had no substantive contact with each other for nearly three years. Both parties were drawing on ideas already developed by the theorists of political ecology, but they were also reacting to circumstances in their political and material environments.

Goodin might consider that far too much effort was devoted to participating in and promoting ‘alternative’ communities; Naess might think that there was too little emphasis on this aspect of Green politics. Neither criticism can invalidate what actually happened, or the label ‘Green’. In this chapter I focus on what the first Greens actually said, wrote and did to develop the first Green policies and positions, in the belief that the historical record of party positions is at least as important as philosophical debate in determining what Green politics ‘really’ is. It is also arguably more important in determining what gets translated into political practice as ‘Green’ politics.

2. Neither of these documents are dated, but the use of content from the 1974 speech in the ‘United Tasmania Group Economic Policy for Tasmania’ and the reference to Labor being out of power for three years in ‘Economic Policy’ means that they were not earlier than 1975. The only other material dealing with economic policy in the UTG archive is a newsletter report on the UTG policy speech, State elections, 1976, which gives the same economic specifics.

3. Ivan Illich’s books were popular with Values readers. In her 1978 report to Values conference International secretary Virginia Horrocks reported that when Illich visited Auckland he had a breakfast meeting with Values Leaders Tony Kunowski and Margaret Crozier, and other leading Values members, and he visited a Values commune. In a letter to Tony Kunowski (McDavitt, 18.8.79) Terry McDavitt wrote ‘Ivan Illich picked up a copy of Critical Issues [a 1978 Values election booklet] …while here, and read it and raved about it.’
Chapter Eight

The future will be Green – or not at all?

Research questions re-visited

What does knowing where Green parties came from tell us about where they might be going, and how they might get there? In this concluding chapter I re-visit the four fundamental questions I raised in Chapter One, and then go on to briefly examine the extent to which the forces which created and shaped Green politics are still operating, and what this means for the future of the Greens.

The cause behind the causes

My first question was ‘What was causing the global environmental and social degradation and destruction that Greens were reacting to in their distinctive fashion, and when did it start operating?’

The answer to this question was of course economic globalisation, defined as the world-wide expansion of profit-seeking economic enterprise, based on industrialised
methods of production and consumption. Lacking the term 'globalisation', which was not coined until the late 1980s, the first Greens spoke of industrialism as an ideology as well as a practice, of over-consumption, and of economic growth, as 'the problem'. But at the core of these facets of the problem was the fact that this economic model was being applied *globally*, with negative social and environmental consequences (outlined in Chapter Two) appearing right around the world, and often far from their original source. Geographically, New Zealand and Tasmania appear to be isolated islands; politically and economically, this is not the case.

The implications of this displacement of the geographical concepts of centre and periphery, as political and economic networks form unevenly across the globe, I discuss further below, as one of the external challenges facing Green politics.

*The parties behind the cause*

The second question was 'Why were no other party political tendencies coming up with a 'Green' response?' As we have seen, the other parties, including (most significantly) the social democrat/labour parties, were enthusiastic and largely uncritical supporters of economic growth, industrial production, mass consumption – and globalisation. *Why* the social democrat/labour parties changed so dramatically (that is, the internal and external dynamic that caused them to abandon the nationalist route to their policy goals), was not within my research brief, and requires separate investigation. For the purposes of demonstrating that a space in the parliamentary political spectrum was opened up for Green parties it is sufficient to show that the
change did in fact take place, and that far from adopting the Green critique and
programme the labour parties opted for globalism.

In the intervening years, there have been no signs of the Australasian labour parties
either making a return to nationalist economic management, or developing a critical
response to globalisation. Indeed, they are now implicated in the suppression of
anti-globalist political activity, as I outline below. While the outward form of the
mass left-of-centre party is therefore still retained by the labour parties, the content is
sadly lacking, and it is both a symptom of and reason for the drop in party
membership and overall political participation, which is discussed in greater detail
below.

The movers and shakers

In answering the third question ‘Who (which individuals and groups) actually
created Green politics, and who were their direct political antecedents?’ I began with
the global political antecedents, in the form of the New Left and the new social
movements on a world-wide scale, and I concentrated on theorists and practitioners
who it seemed to me were the most authentic ancestors of the Greens in thought and
deed. It was relatively easy to demonstrate the connections between the global
beginnings of Green politics and the first Green parties in Australasia. Indeed the
first New Zealand Greens, (as the comments by Dave Woodhams, Margaret Crozier
and Dave Straton cited in Chapter Five show), recognised them at the time.
Subsequent Euro-based interpretations have ignored or obscured them. The 1960s
political base and legacy of the Greens may be both a help and a hindrance to doing politics in the twenty-first century, and I look at how and why under 'Internal Difficulties', below.

**Thinking locally, acting globally**

The hardest question to answer has been the fourth one – 'What were the connections between the locally specific creation of the first Green parties and the global factors which give rise to Green politics?' In this regard I have given an account of how individuals, practices and ideas crossed national boundaries with far greater ease and frequency in the latter half of the twentieth century than was possible in the first half. However demonstrating these historically specific connections, while important to proving the case, is also in some ways beside the point. Behind the actual connections lies the more significant capacity for connection, and even more importantly the will to connect.

As capital followed its expansionist imperative across the globe, it made use of and further developed capacities to connect and conduct business in faster, denser and more extensive ways than ever before, while backing this increased operating capacity with the relentless will to increase profits. An effective oppositional politics, therefore, has to develop the same capacity, and be driven by an equally strong will, albeit to different ends. Whether Green politics exhibits that will and that capacity, or can develop them, is another key question for the future of Green
parties, and I briefly consider some of the relevant factors affecting it in the coverage of challenges facing the Greens given below.

**Time and change**

On the eve of the second millennium, then, Green parties have been in existence for over a quarter of a century – or is it a mere twenty-seven years? Whether they are old or young in world historical terms is hard to judge, as the experience of living in a globally mediated world includes the feeling that there is an accelerating succession of historically significant events. But perhaps this feeling is more of an impression gained from daily banner headlines, hourly radio news bulletins, and continuous ‘news’ channels like CNN than a reality based on truly significant changes, which may be happening more slowly. Making the case for a genuine acceleration, one can point to the big differences between the political, economic and social circumstances in which the first Green parties were formed, and the ones in which they find themselves today. For although I have argued that the underlying logic of globalisation connects the consumption boom and alienated lifestyle protests of the 1960s with the global financial chaos and basic survival protests of the 1990s, nevertheless the times both feel and are very different, and seem to require a re-thinking of political strategies.
In the rest of this chapter I therefore explore the ways in which the times have changed to give us globalisation as we know it today, thus presenting a set of what I call *external challenges* to Green parties; and I then look at whether and how Green parties have been aware of the changing circumstances and have adapted or are adapting their political principles and processes to suit – the *internal difficulties*.

From both sides I see a convergence of problems and issues, which can be characterised as a *crisis of democracy*. The first Green parties were reacting to what they saw as deficiencies in democracy in their respective nation-states, and calling for and practising greater participation. Twenty years on not only had overall participation decreased, but the very concept of nation-state-based democracy appeared to be a dying ideal. I illustrate how and why this is so with examples from New Zealand. This is not only because I have access to the most up-to-the-minute information from New Zealand. More significantly, New Zealand’s long tradition of Green politics, and its peculiar recent history of voluntary and radical adoption of globalist economic and social reforms, means that New Zealand acts a bell wether in the global economy and polity.

**External challenges**

With regard to the external circumstances most likely to impact on Green politics in the future, then, the most important factor that will shape politics in the early twenty-first century will continue to be the expansion of the global economy. This will be
both a result of and facilitated by the further development of the ‘informational’
mode of production. Manuel Castells summarises how it will happen thus:
‘The global economy will expand in the twenty-first century, using substantial
increases in the power of telecommunications and information processing. It will
penetrate all countries, all territories, all cultures, and all financial networks,
relentlessly scanning the planet for new opportunities for profit-making. But it will
do so selectively, linking valuable segments and discarding used-up, or irrelevant,
locales and people. The territorial unevenness of production will result in an
extraordinary geography of differential value-making that will sharply contrast
countries, regions and metropolitan areas. Valuable locales and people will be found
everywhere, even in sub-Saharan Africa...But switched off territories and people will
also be found everywhere, albeit in different proportions. The planet is being
segmented into clearly distinct spaces, defined by different time regimes.’ (Castells,

What (further) impacts will this uneven expansion of the global economy have on
politics at the nation-state level? The most significant one appears to be on the re-
definition of the traditional security role of the nation-state. Take a country in which
almost all of the economic enterprises (such as external transport, internal and
external communications, power generation, forests), which were once considered to
be strategic assets – and hence better off in public ownership – have been privatised
and are largely foreign-owned. This is the case for New Zealand. In such a country
the original point of military forces (to defend the country from a foreign take-over)
seems largely redundant, and the emphasis shifts to suppressing anti-globalists
within the nation-state, and either ignoring or rationalising away the dangers posed by the rogue globalists without.

Another significant aspect of the acceleration of globalisation, both then and in the future, is the role of the global media, and the impact they have on how politics is conducted locally, nationally and globally. I therefore look at what is happening in this area, and particularly at attempts to use the interactive sphere of cyberspace as an alternative to traditional political arenas.

The third and vital external circumstance affecting the development of Green politics is the collapse of democratic participation at nation-state level, which has reached crisis proportions, and is a major circumstance limiting the growth of Green parties and politics.

*Insecure security?*

In the ‘excluded’ zones, which now form a ‘Fourth World’ of material and informational poverty, with associated ill-health, illiteracy, crime and violence (Castells, 1998, 70-161), the political response to exclusion is seldom pretty. From the hatred towards women enacted physically by the Taliban militiamen in Afghanistan through to the verbal hatred expressed towards Aborigines and non-white immigrants by Pauline Hanson’s followers in Australia, we can find example after example of a retreat into fundamentalist, simplistic and violent ‘solutions’ to the problems and stresses imposed by globalisation. The ancient
human characteristic of projecting fear and anger on to an easily distinguished out­
group, and rallying to defend one's own group, which was doubtless functional in
the days of Viking and Tartar raids, is tragically inappropriate in a world of abstract
networks of power. Neither Hutu nor Tutsi as ethnic groups were responsible for the
beggaring of Rwanda through structural adjustment – the international financial
institution technocrats and ideologues who were remain safely and comfortably
behind their computer screens half a world away (Chossudovsky, 1998, 111-120).

In the twenty-first century security for most of the world's population will depend
not on strong national armies and/or armouries, but on gaining some control over the
policies and practices of the international financial institutions, transnational
companies and their nation-state based functionaries. This is vital so that social
welfare and amenity are not reduced to the point where 'molecular' or full scale civil
war breaks out, and citizens live in constant fear of crime and terrorism.

Global geopolitics will continue to be multilateralist, with regional security and
economic blocs (e.g. NATO/the EU, ASEAN/APEC) playing an increasing role in
shaping political geography. Such blocs will determine who is 'friend' or 'enemy',
and will offer the chief means of preventing or ameliorating civil and border
conflicts.¹ An increasing role for non-state providers of security is also already
apparent and likely to increase.²

Multi and transnational economic institutions, linked into global networks which are
c centred on the 'Paris and London clubs' (the G-7 nations) will continue to set the
ground rules and enforce the 'iron laws' of global capitalism. They will link formally through world and regional summits of various kinds. At such summits non-governmental organisations (NGOs) may be permitted to hold parallel conferences so long as there is no geographical overlap and minimal personnel interchange (as per the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 1992). (Although it is possible that the 'battle of Seattle' in December 1999 may have marked the beginning of the end for NGO passivity with respect to global trade negotiations.) However the NGOs will find it extremely difficult to even find out about, let alone influence, the informal global linkages taking place at exclusive gatherings from which the national and global publics are totally excluded. Such gatherings are both a product of globalisation, and a producer of it. The 1989 Mont Pelerin Society conference has already been discussed (Chapter Two). In 1999 New Zealand hosted another major globalist gathering, the 'World Economic Leaders Summit' of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (APEC). Around $50 million of public money was budgeted for this summit, most of it for the heaviest 'security' provisions New Zealand has ever seen. The summit budget did not include the costs, both financial and social, of amending the New Zealand Arms Act to allow the bodyguards of foreign leaders to bring their own weapons into New Zealand, a country where the police force has never been routinely armed (McKinnon, 1998a). Nor did it include the expense of the security dummy run, 'Lawman '98', where the New Zealand military, police and Security Intelligence Service co-operated in the largest counter-terrorist exercise ever held in New Zealand (Horton, 1998, 4).

Foreign Minister Don McKinnon's official October 1998 announcement of APEC coming to New Zealand (McKinnon, 1998b) provides such a good example of
globalisation in action at nation-state level that it is reproduced in full as Appendix G. Among the salient points to note is the use of the term 'economy' to replace the terms nation, state, or country. Even where these 'economies' appear to have nation-state names. For example, 'From November the existing eighteen member economies will be joined by three new members – Russia, Vietnam and Peru. Other economies are queuing up.' Also noteworthy is McKinnon's promotion of APEC as a trade event of considerable significance to New Zealand in and of itself. He states that the estimated $65 million that the 4000+ delegates and 2500 global media representatives will spend in New Zealand, plus the incalculable 'value of the international exposure' of New Zealand, constitutes a pretty good rate of return on an investment [of public money] of $44 million. McKinnon's comments on ABAC (the APEC Business Advisory group) are also informative. ABAC has three top business representatives from each member 'economy', meets at the same time as APEC, reports directly to the 'economic' leaders, and 'has assumed an important monitoring role within APEC.' To complete the confusion about where the economy ends and the state starts, which appears to be rampant in the New Zealand government, the chair of ABAC for 1999 is a former New Zealand Minister of Trade (who is also a millionaire businessman). The other two New Zealand representatives are Douglas Myers, another millionaire with transnational business interests (plus a stalwart of the Business Roundtable and attendee at the Mont Pelerin Society conference), and Fran Wilde, a former Labour MP, a former Mayor of Wellington, and now a business consultant. Somewhat disingenuously, in light of the roll call of movers and shakers he has just given us, McKinnon then pads his press release with the statement 'Globalisation is largely driven by technological change.'
Numerous other examples from New Zealand alone, let alone world-wide, can be given to show how the concepts of ‘freedom’ and security’ have been deformed by the globalists. This poses a challenge to Greens and others seeking to even enter the global debate on trade liberalisation, economic reform, and related matters. Not all countries will have bothered to amend their security legislation to legally permit their security intelligence agency to direct its attention to ‘subversion’ of the country’s ‘economic wellbeing’, as New Zealand did in 1996 (with the support of both the National and Labour parties), let alone followed through by issuing non-specific, unlimited warrants covering the breaking and entering of the homes of ‘economic subversives’. Of course this will seem very tame – even enviable – to Third World fair trade activists, who have to endure far worse than law-bending and petty harassment. But First and Third World activists would concur that what we see here is the paradoxical extension of the power and force available to the nation-state being exercised to further undermine the actual sovereignty of the state, and place it in the role of handmaiden to globalist interests.

Which brings us to the key ‘external’ challenge facing Greens and other anti-globalist political actors – the transformation of the nation-state from the defender of the public good of its citizens to the denier and betrayer of it. As Susan Strange expresses it, given that in the past two decades we have seen an increase in government interference in the lives of ordinary citizens, how is it possible to proclaim a retreat by government, a decline of the authority of the state within its territorial frontiers? The answer, Strange says ‘...relates not to the quantity of authority exercised by the governments of most territorial states, but to the quality of that authority. It rests on the failure of most governments to discharge those very
basic functions for which the state as an institution was created – the maintenance of civil law and order, the defence of the territory...the guarantee of sound money to the economy, and the assurance of clear, judicially interpreted rules regarding the basic exchanges of property...’ (Strange, 1996, xii).

Strange reiterates the views already canvassed (in Chapter Two) regarding the co-constitutive nature of the nation, the state and ‘their’ currency, expressing it as ‘The necessity of the state as a public good, in short, arose with the emergence of a developed market economy. Modern nationalism – as often imagined as real – was in large part the creation of modern capitalism. The market economy could not function properly without the political framework provided by the state. National sentiments of identity and loyalty provided the glue that gave social cohesion to the political framework. Where territorial states had existed before the birth of a capitalist economy, they had done so not so much as a public good but as a private perquisite of the powerful. The very idea of a social contract could not have been conceived without the economic necessity of civic co-operation between state and society.’ (Strange, 1996, xii).6

Today we live in a world where most states are not prepared to defend their once constitutive currency, let alone sustainable livelihoods for their citizens. Hence the very real possibility that unscrupulous foreign exchange (forex) traders could collapse a small national economy as easily as one took down Britain’s oldest bank (Fay, 1996; Gapper and Denton, 1996; Rawnsley, 1995). This almost happened to New Zealand in 1987 when a proprietary trader for Bankers Trust in New York began speculating on the New Zealand dollar (the kiwi) just after the Wall Street
crash. He extended his position in borrowed kiwi so far that when asked by a colleague 'How big is your short position in kiwi?' he deflected the question by answering 'How large is the money supply of New Zealand?' (Jesson, 1996). Eventually the 'over-valued' kiwi started to fall and the trader began selling his borrowed dollars, making a profit of over $50 million. Meanwhile New Zealanders remained oblivious to the fact that a foreign individual was gambling with the money needed to finance the New Zealand economy and hence their jobs, their pay packets, their schools, their hospitals, and so on. What was New Zealand's response to this situation? There was no official or public response – it is rumoured that the Reserve Bank wrote a stiff letter to Bankers Trust. (More information about the excessive influence of the finance sector on New Zealand politics, and New Zealand’s economic vulnerability, can be found in Jesson, 1999.)

The Asian financial crisis of 1998 was a product of this sort of speculative short-selling behaviour (Chossudovsky, 1999), and illustrates just how vulnerable the world's money supply is. Such engineered crises of course affect the only sources of 'security' most people know, (ownership and/or use of a piece of land or paid employment), as crashing firms sack employees and banks call in loans to farmers. Society is thus further destabilised, and more vulnerable to internal violence – and to challenges to the globalist definition of 'security'. But how can the challengers seeking non-violent solutions, such as Green parties, propagate their alternative opinions and build a social consensus around them?
Managing the media?

Despite the plethora of local and global mass media, it was nine years before the 'news' of the 1987 attack on New Zealand's currency became public in New Zealand, and then it came via a small, left-wing publication. This is just one minor example of the fact that the severing of the connection between economy, nation and state has been both facilitated and compounded by the rise of privatised mass media. While it is not immediately obvious why or how the de-regulation of the media market, and the increasing freedom of print media and broadcasters from government control or interference (Castells, 1996, 340-342; 1997, 254-257) should further exacerbate the split between nation and state, in practice this is what does occur. For of course the large and potentially lucrative national broadcasting networks are sold to transnational corporates. While there has been a countervailing growth of local and specialised media as a result of de-regulation, none of these are mass media. Also very few of them are public media in the sense that the state-owned broadcasters were, in that they were/are financed largely with public money, collected via licence fees and taxes, rather than by advertisements placed by large companies.

While TV audiences may not be as 'dumb' or manipulated by the increasingly inane and lowest common denominator programming which results when shows must avoid offending the advertisers' potential markets, as some commentators think they are, the idiocy of the content of the majority of broadcasts is not the real problem. The problem — for the health of democracy — is twofold. Manuel Castells focuses primarily on the fact that in the Information Age the media have become
'the privileged space of politics', thus without a presence in the media '...there is no chance of winning or exercising power' (Castells, 1997, 311; emphasis added). 'Outside the media sphere there is only political marginality', says Castells. He further argues that '...this framing of politics by their capture in the space of the media (a trend characteristic of the Information Age) impacts not only elections, but political organisation, decision-making, and governance, ultimately modifying the nature of the relationship between state and society.' (Castells, 1997, 312). The end result of this is a shift from party-based representative democracy to mediacracy (Castells. 1997, 317).

Media usurpation of the traditional spaces of politics may not be an unmitigated bad thing. Castells for one doesn’t think so, since the old-style parties weren’t that inclusive or representative and have become less so. (Although that could well be in part a result of media usurpation.) But there is still the problem that in the profit-driven, globally-owned media the amount of time and space allocated to factual coverage and informed debate of the governance and government of the nation-state shrinks dramatically, and is replaced by a rapidly-paced 'game show' approach to coverage. Less attention is paid to what politicians and other political actors have to say, and they have to say it faster than ever before. As just one example of this, the average sound-bite length shrank from 42 seconds in 1968 to less than 10 seconds in 1992. Further, in-depth interviews with political actors have been largely replaced by 'pundit shows' that showcase garrulous, rude commentators who reinforce the perception that politics is a zero-sum game (Castells, 1997, 321-22). Under media lights, the definition of what is 'political' news also becomes increasingly soft and amorphous by picking up on the 'personality' approach adopted by the media to
other public figures deemed worthy of coverage. Hence the extensive coverage of politicians altering their ‘image’. This phenomenon has reached new lows in New Zealand, where the two largest parties are both led by women. Hence when one of them changes her style of spectacles or the other gets her hair cut differently this can be ‘political’ news for a week.

A politics based on media ‘personalities’ and gamesmanship is also a politics peculiarly liable and able to become a politics based on scandal (Castells, 1997, 337). Hence the ‘exposé saga’ approach to political reporting, which has become a dominant style since Watergate, which in itself has given a new coinage to the English language (the latest being the Clinton/Lewinsky affair, a.k.a. Zippergate). This approach to politics brings it in line with the fictional soap operas that are a television staple. The focus on petty personal details effectively obscures the very real underlying issues of power, control and participation which political scandals generally raise.8 Further, the media scandal approach to politics shades very easily into the media dirty tricks approach, in which the ultimate score is to successfully smear the opposition one day before the election, i.e. in time for the smear to be widely disseminated by the media, but without leaving time for the opposition to do ‘damage control’. Anti-Green political forces in Australia have a very strong grasp of this tactic. This started as early as 1972 with the (publicly-funded) advertisement placed in the Tasmanian papers by the Hydro-Electric Commission on the eve of the 1972 snap election, which claimed that voting for the United Tasmania Group would lead to a rise in consumer power prices. Some years later there was another attempt to throw an election via a story that came out two days before polling day claiming that ‘greenies’ were endangering lives by putting a bomb on a logging railway line
These smears, of course, need not be true—so long as they are "good copy" they will run, and do their dirty work. Global public relations firms now include specialists in political spin doctoring (Beder, 1997) and have even developed ongoing ways to discredit green politics through the media, including the creation of fake environmental groups, such as Mothers Opposed to Pollution, which was financed by cardboard drink carton manufacturers to oppose the use of plastic beverage containers on "environmental grounds" (Burton, 1995a; Megalli and Friedman, 1991).

New Zealand provides a good example of the way the media transforms politics even as it provides a new space for it. The country now has four free-to-air nation-wide television networks (for a population of only 3.6 million), instead of the one state-owned and controlled national channel it had in 1972 when the Values Party launched itself via a current affairs show (see Chapter Five). Yet not one of those four channels runs a regular dedicated current affairs programme which conducts extended, in-depth interviews with politicians, would-be politicians, or other significant political actors. (In 1972 the one state-owned channel ran two such programmes weekly.) Only the state-funded, non-commercial AM radio network, the aptly named National Radio, still provides this form of public service. One of the TV channels does provide a "live" political pundit show, named after the "personality" who hosts it. At the time of writing this show was being promoted with the claim "Cause when it's live, the truth is written all over their faces." ("Ralston Live", New Zealand Listener, 1999), which is of dubious veracity, but certainly underscores the point of the power of real-time, visual media.
The impact on political coverage and debate due to privatisation and foreign ownership of the broadcasting media seems to be particularly marked (although most viewers have more complaints about the steady and inordinate increase in advertising rather than the decrease in the quantity and quality of political journalism) (Rosenberg, 1996). However it is also occurring in the print media. Over 90% of the metropolitan daily newspapers in New Zealand are owned by foreign media transnationals (Hope, 1993), and the attention they pay to national politics has also decreased. The Press, the Murdoch group-owned daily newspaper in Christchurch, seldom features national level political news stories on its front page any more. It has also largely replaced political and social opinion pieces written by informed local people (which it used to run four to five times a week) with syndicated columns written by out-of-town professional commentators.

On television and in the newspapers this leads to a state of affairs that may be more accurately described as ‘dumbing’, rather than ‘dumbing down’. On matters of national political importance the mass media are literally silent. Hence Bill Rosenberg (1996) argues that the commercialisation of the media has contributed far more effectively to the stifling of democratic debate in New Zealand than occasional government bans on the publication of ‘sensitive’ information ever did in the past. He considers that the only way to start reviving democracy is to revive genuinely public media – media which are owned by the public, operated for the public good, and reach a majority of the public.

The most important medium for this purpose is the one that is the most pervasive and the most seductive – television. As Castells expresses it ‘The social impact of
television works in the binary mode: to be or not to be.' (Castells, 1996, 336).

Television is the premier medium of 'real virtuality'; in the Information Age – it is the ultimate arbiter of whether something 'has happened' or not. Virtual seeing is real believing. As I discuss further on in this chapter, this poses particular problems for Green parties, which are a creation of the television era (see Chapters Four and Five), and have a symbiotic relationship with the media. The problems are both practical (how to get on to major networks in prime time as 'real' news on a regular basis) and theoretical. Does participating in 'politics as spectacle' further debase the currency of discursive democracy and make it less rather than more likely that the Green ideal of active citizen participation in political decision-making will be achieved?

Any exacerbation of the air of real virtuality that surrounds politics in the late twentieth century, feeding the perception that politics is something that one watches a global elite do on television rather than something that one does locally with one’s fellow citizens, might only serve to deepen the current crisis of democracy. Nor, as I will argue below, is one of the twenty-first century attempts to address the problem – the bypassing of mass mediated politics via involvement in the seemingly more egalitarian and participatory zone of cyberspace – as unproblematic and liberatory as it may first appear.
The redefinition of democracy

If the constitutive and constitutional relationship between state and nation, the economic and social contract, no longer prevails, what hope is there for parties and other political actors trying to conduct democratic, progressive politics under the ‘old rules’ of national sovereignty? This is really the biggest challenge facing Greens and other pro-democracy forces today. For the fact of the matter is that the citizens of the First World democracies have been ‘voting with their feet’ for the past two decades, by simply withdrawing from involvement in electoral politics at nation-state level. Voter turnouts and party memberships have declined dramatically. The phenomenon has been most marked in countries that were formerly leaders in extending democracy, and have latterly been leaders in promoting and practising globalist politics. These include the USA and New Zealand. There can be no question that the formal democratic process within First World nation-states is in crisis, a crisis of legitimacy that is both a cause and a result of a crisis in participation.

Do the citizens who are ‘dropping out’ in their millions first go through a process of reaching a considered conclusion about where the real power over decisions that directly affect their daily lives has gone? When they think about it, do they conclude that decision-making power over important issues - such as the quality and price of the food they eat, the safety of their streets, the employment options open to them, their educational opportunities, the range and cost of health care, and the transport available to them - no longer resides with the national government? That the government has been deliberately devolved to ‘market mechanisms’, international financial institutions, transnational corporations and other faceless, non-democratic,
non-accountable globalist constructs? Or do they simply respond in a less calculated way to the \textit{Zeitgeist}? Whichever route they take, the net effect appears to be the same – an increase in cynicism and apathy about the possibilities of democratic politics, and a consequent decline in involvement in real time and space politics.

\textit{Cyber-pollies?}

Has there been a corresponding shift to conducting politics in virtual time and space, which can make up for the reality deficit? I have already given an example of a successful anti-globalist campaign conducted via the Internet (Chapter Two). Castells (1997, 129) gives other examples of successful Net use by global environmental activists, while Appendix H provides an example of a 1998 New Zealand Greens initiative to provide rapid virtual support (mainly via fax) for the campaign against the Jabiluka uranium mine in northern Australia.

The first Greens were both the creation and the co-creators of the Information Age, and then and now tend to be enthusiastic about technologies which allow for networking. New Zealand Greens take this passion to the point of designating their provincial representatives on the party’s national executive ‘Executive Networkers’, and the entire executive is linked by an e-mailing list on which it conducts its business between ‘meeting’ on monthly conference calls. The party also operates two national e-lists for members, GreenNews and GreenViews, for posting information and conducting debate, and these lists in their turn spin off to city-based Green e-lists, and to other addresses and sites of party and non-party green interest.
and action. The Green Party website receives a lot of hits from overseas. In 1998 it even received two requests from the USA via the site for membership papers, which puzzled the membership secretary as neither inquirer appeared to be a New Zealand citizen or resident and therefore entitled to vote in New Zealand. (Collins, pers comm, 3.8.98) Was this a positive statement (a sort of 'citizens without frontiers' initiative), or merely indicative of the low level of American knowledge about world geography and politics?

Quirky aberrations like this aside, the possibilities for politics in cyberspace seem exciting. Is this where politics will happen in the twenty-first century? Yes and no. The downside of all this cyber-participation is that it both reflects, and further exacerbates, the divide between the information and technology rich and the information and technology poor (which these days are increasingly one and the same thing). This in turn has important implications for democracy. Even within the comparatively well-off New Zealand Greens, only 10-20% of the membership is currently able (or in some cases willing) to devote the material and time resources required for cyber-democracy. By the mid-1990s the Internet was estimated to have 25 million users world-wide, and the capacity to double in a year (Castells, 1996, 345). But even if by the twenty-first century the projections for increase come true, and hundreds of millions become connected, with a world population of six billion and rising this means that 80-90% will still be out of the loop. Many countries (especially those in sub-Saharan Africa) do not even have the necessary physical infrastructure for Net connection, such as a reliable source of electric power plus telephone line. If they do have access to a line they are largely dependent for connection on charitable organisations in the North, such as GreenNet, which is the
largest Internet Service Provider for Africa (Aurigi and Graham, 1998, 62; Castells, 1998, 92-93; Haywood, 1998, 24-26; Holderness, 1998, 43-47). It is hard to impossible to enter the Information Age without the legacy of the industrial era. Since the ‘...switched-off territories and peoples will be found everywhere, albeit in different proportions.’ (Castells, 1998, 354), attempting to use the Net as a sort of town meeting place for the purposes of doing politics on a global scale merely displaces existing social and economic inequities into cyberspace\textsuperscript{10}, and does nothing to address the crisis of democracy at the nation-state (or global) level. The Net has been and will be an important tool for global political campaigning (as we have already seen with the MAI example given in Chapter Two), but this must not be confused with democratic participation in the true sense of the term.

Finally, it would-be somewhat naïve of Greens to think that they have got the political jump on the corporates via any superior ability to use cyber means of politicking. Already there is evidence that both corporates and government agencies make regular visits to campaign websites to check out and presumably try and anticipate the opposition. Chris Wheeler, (1999, 10), gives examples of Monsanto visiting a site devoted to exposing the toxicity of the artificial sweetener aspartame – which it markets as Nutrasweet – sixty-eight times in one week, while in another week the Federal Drug Administration visited the site one hundred and twenty nine times. Cyber-politics certainly has an agreeable air of freedom about it, but does this compensate for what it lacks in equality?
**Doing democracy differently**

The political effects of economic and technological globalisation make clear the extent to which the standard definition of 'democracy' is based upon representation and negotiation at nation-state level. At the end of the twentieth century it seems that the struggle for the right of every adult citizen to participate in national level decision-making, which dominated the politics of the excluded for most of the nineteenth century, and was only won after great sacrifices, has been rendered null and void as the powerhouse of capital shifts from the national to the global level. If that is so, is there any point in trying to invent or re-invent a democratic politics based on the nation-state?

As Greens generally do much better in elections to the sub-national and supranational levels than to the national level, it is tempting to reply that they have their answer there. But that would be to ignore the fact that the nation-state will still play a role, even if no longer a sovereign role, in determining political outcomes, including outcomes at the sub and supranational levels. As Hirst and Thompson express it (quoted in Castells, 1997, 304)

> "The emerging forms of governance of international markets and other economic processes involve the major national governments but in a new role: states come to function less as "sovereign" entities and more as components of an international "polity". The central functions of the nation-state will become those of providing legitimacy for and ensuring the accountability of supra-national and sub-national governance mechanisms."

(Emphasis added.)
It is certainly easy to find examples of the nation-state being important in determining outcomes at both sub and supranational levels – and also examples of those levels increasingly engaging in direct contact that bypasses the state.11 The issue of climate change is a good one for illustrating the linkage of the three levels. Action at the sub-national (local government and business) level is essential if national carbon emission reduction targets (reluctantly agreed to in supranational forums) are to be met, yet thus far in New Zealand national-level government has hindered rather than supported the sub-national level. For example, it was only through the initiative of Green MP Jeanette Fitzsimons, who in 1998 persuaded the Transport and Energy Select Committee to commission a researched report on the energy and emissions implications of the government’s proposed roading ‘reforms’ (read: privatisation of roading), that the environmental impacts of handing the construction of roads to transnational contractors and their nominal ownership to local government were able to be considered.

This is just one of many instances where Greens can and have played a useful role at nation-state level. The Australian Green senators holding out for better Native Title legislation would be another one. But such examples do not of course ‘prove’ that this is where Greens should focus their political energies. What the analysis of what is happening to the nation-state as a result of globalisation does suggest is that Greens would be wise to assess the costs and benefits of participating at each level, and to set effort and expenditure priorities accordingly. They also need to look at how they participate, and whether and how their ideal of participatory democracy is achievable, and I look at these issues in the next section of the chapter, below.
Internal difficulties

When Green parties first began forming the nation-state still felt like a relatively secure and self-evident level of political activity. Even though the global changes which were going to destabilise the state were already starting to happen, and may well have helped tilt the new politics towards its emphasis on having a global perspective but acting locally, the national parliament seemed a sensible place to target. The Greens and the Labour Party in New Zealand could agree on an anti-nuclear form of nationalism in the early 1970s, such as sending a frigate to the Moruroa test zone. In the mid-1970s (unlike the late 1990s) the Labour Party was opposed to extending the powers of the Security Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Security Bureau to spy on New Zealand citizens. So while the electoral system was not as favourably inclined towards forming a successful new political party as it was by the time proportional representation was introduced in 1996, there was no question that the policies of the new Green party would be regarded as a threat to the state. (This is what we must now assume that they are, as opposition to APEC is currently construed as a potentially 'subversive' activity that warrants breaking and entering by the Security Intelligence Service.) (See Note 5.)

The media/political party relationship was also comfortably nation-state based in the 1970s, and as we have seen, this facilitated the growth of the Values Party. Now that the media are globally owned, opportunities for expressing alternative views have
WE HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH
THE PAPA HOSTING A STAR TREK® EXHIBITION...
WHAT COULD POSSIBLY BE MORE KIWI THAN SHELLING
OUT ASTROBUCKS FOR A HUGE PROMOTIONAL
EXTRAVAGANZA PUBLICISING A CANADIAN-OWNED
TV CHANNEL'S PARTICIPATION IN A HIGHLY
SUCCESSFUL, IF CULTURALLY VOID, U.S.
SCI-FI FRANCHISE??!

ANYWAY, PSS OFF! THIS IS
OUR PLACE & WE'VE GOT
THE REMOTE!!
become further constrained – occasioning cynical and sarcastic comment from local artists (see Figure 3).

Lastly, but most perhaps importantly of all, the Greens brought their own participatory, consensus-oriented style to doing democracy. Is it capable of transforming politics at any level, let alone the global one? Is it possible to realise it in an era in which representative democracy is under attack? Does it need re-thinking in the light of the increasing gravity of the environmental and social problems wrought by globalisation?

In taking the following very brief and largely suggestive look at the internal difficulties faced by Green parties, I reprise the themes which were foundational to the politics, and ask whether they are adequate to deal with today’s problems.

New Leftism—a juvenile disorder?

Just what have the Greens inherited from their own past which can help or hinder them achieve their goals. As we saw in Chapter Four, even in its heyday the New Left was censured by those who were supportive of most of its goals but critical of some of its means. Reflecting on the New Left’s successes and failures thirty years later American philosopher Richard Rorty praised the New Left thus – ‘Had it not been for the zany protestors of the anti-war movement the US might have become ‘a garrison state’. The student radicals ‘saved us from losing our moral identity’,
Rorty says, and they also cheered the Left up – 'reminding us that Dewey's image of American democracy as an orderly town meeting had its counterpart in Whitman's dream of the United States as 'the greatest poem', a country in which politics would have less to do with calculation and machinery than with beauty, self-creation and rapturous love.' (Ree, 1998, 8).

But he also criticised the New Left for continually regressing into '...an unforgiving moral fundamentalism: into the kind of preachy fixation on sinfulness that Whitman and Dewey had laboured to remove from the American soul...They thought theologically rather than politically, preferring purity of heart to effectiveness of action...They preferred to let democracy drift to the right while they got high on contempt, priggishness and political voyeurism.' (Ree, 1998, 8).

Both the strengths and weaknesses identified by Rorty are present today in Green parties – and sometimes the line between whether a typical characteristic is a strength or whether it is a weakness can be whisker thin. For example, a 'moral' or 'ethical' or 'values' approach to politics is typically Green, and Rorty obviously considers that a certain degree of it ('moral identity') is good, but that too much of it ('moral fundamentalism') is bad. But who decides which is which, and how much is too much?

When it comes to Green practices, it is also hard to make a judgement call on how far Greens should go. The elements of spontaneity, fun and creativity which Rorty identifies in the New Left – the 'street theatre' approach to politics – are still more likely to be found in the Greens than in other political parties. But is this approach
inherent in Green philosophy? Or is it a result of the psychological makeup of Greens? Or is it principally an artefact of the desperate need (then and now) of a minority political tendency to attract the attention of the media machine in order to propagate its ideas? And at what point does ‘fun’ degenerate into ‘silliness’?12

Both moralism and spontaneism can handicap a politics which has as both a major principle and a major goal the extension and strengthening of democracy. By examining the Green party approach to mediated politics, moralist politics and democratic politics I endeavour to tease out the contradictions and flaws in Green practice to date, and show where more work needs to be done before Green politics can successfully meet the challenges of the globalist twenty-first century. For in the final analysis, a politics that does not know itself for what it is will be unable to re-create itself to meet new challenges.

Mediated politics

Both party and non-party greens (e.g. Greenpeace) have been media-oriented from the beginning. In fact, Green politics and the global electronic media are contemporaneous in world historical terms, and feed on each other. We have already seen (Chapter Five) how superior media savvy enabled the Values Party to definitively establish itself ahead of other minority parties in New Zealand (including small socialist parties with a similar message). But conducting politics through the media requires enormous effort, and may carry other costs as well.
Firstly, there is the cost of having to continually up the ante to gain media attention. Michelle Gabriel (1995, 4) has documented the greater efforts that non-party ‘environmental challengers’ in Tasmania now have to go to get media coverage, compared to the relatively easy access enjoyed by elected Green representatives, who can operate within established frameworks of parliamentary media coverage. The fact that elected representatives find it easier to get coverage (and on a wider range of issues) than environmental groups is not merely an artefact of the institutionalisation of political media. It also reflects the perception that elected representatives have a *democratic mandate* to speak for political causes and the public good, which non-elected activists lack.

The Fourth Estate still feels some obligation to follow parliamentary-based politics, whereas it feels free to pick and choose among non-governmental organisations, and may do so on ‘non-news’ criteria, such as the desire not to offend lucrative advertisers. Informal political actors are generally more vulnerable than formal actors to media close-out. Hence while their non-partisan approach can be a plus when it comes to mobilising a political consensus around an issue, I am not as sanguine as Castells (1997, 352-3) that the issue-based approach holds as much potential for progressive politics generally as he believes. Nor is it necessarily a positive re-framing of what constitutes ‘democracy’. Indeed, as we saw in Chapters Five and Six, Green party activists were heavily involved in leading and supporting all the key ‘green issue’ campaigns of the 1970s in Australasia. Yet the successes of some of those campaigns (a forest saved here, a nuclear free zone there) have been largely hollow. For they have thus far failed to produce (or secure) a large enough constituency of people prepared to *work and vote* for a politics which is committed
to addressing the causes and not just the symptoms of contemporary environmental and social decay. They still represent a procession of ambulances and emergency medics at the foot of the cliff, rather than a sturdy fence and sustainably employed people at the top.

The tension between focussing on success in the realm of real virtuality, and succeeding in practising as well as preaching real democracy, is a very real one, and is further explored under ‘Democratic Politics’, below. But there are still further the costs of doing politics to be counted. The most frequent difficulty encountered is that it is the media, not the Greens, which decides what will be broadcast or printed, and how it will be editorialised. Thus even a spectacle carefully constructed to convey a pro-Green message may be twisted to convey the opposite. Todd Gitlin discusses the framing devices used by the media that may prevent accurate, unbiased coverage of leftist politics, and shows how photographs of a large anti-war demonstration were selected by the New York Times to minimise the size of the crowd, maximise the size of the opposition, and disguise the mixed-race nature of the demonstration. (Gitlin, 1980, 27-28. 50-51). He goes on to look at the ways in which the sudden hike in media coverage of the SDS in 1965 led to the recruitment of members and elites via the media. This proved to have a distorting and destructive effect upon the internal workings of the organisation (Gitlin, 1980, 130-178). This is a salutary caveat to Greens and others trying to do antisystemic politics through the media.

Despite the costs, though, Greens will no more be able to give up their foundational relationship with the media than any other twenty-first century political tendency. but more reflection on how and why Green politics is a peculiarly ‘mediated’ politics
But more reflection in understanding how such a politics might become more
democratic, rather than reserved for an elite who know how to play the media game.

*Moralist politics*

That the first Australian Green manifesto was entitled ‘The New Ethic’, and the first
New Zealand Green party was called the *Values* Party, speaks volumes about the
philosophical foundations of Green politics.¹⁴ As we saw (in Chapter Six) the
majority of Greens in Australasia have no affiliations with organised religion. Yet
they do have a strong sense of what constitutes ‘goodness’ or ‘the good life’, of what
is ‘valuable’. This is expressed in many of the policies of Green parties.¹⁵

Green ethics, furthermore, are not confined to intra-human behaviour, but extend to
interactions with other species, and with non-living components of ecosystems.
Nor is Green morality restricted to talking the talk. In practice Greens place a high
value on consistency between means and ends, so that people in party spokesperson
roles are expected to practise what they preach, for example farming or gardening
organically themselves now if that is what they advocate for others in the future.

Saying that Green politics has an ethical base, and that that ethical base extends
further in theory or practice than previous and/or competing political tendencies¹⁶
may seem like a plus for the Greens. Especially if one agrees with the policies
derived from Green ethics – once one can determine what they are. (See Tenbensel
1994 and 1995 for a discussion of the wide range of positions adopted by Greens on
what exactly the ‘core’ Green values are.) However, as Rorty suggests, depending on
how it is practised, a politics based on 'fundamental' ethics may become a political minus. There is a constant tension between 'purity of heart' and 'effectiveness of action'. The more prescient founders of the New Left were well aware of this tension (see Dick Flack's characterisation of it given in Chapter Four), and the need to keep it constantly in view. Within Die Grünen and other European Green parties the split between 'realos' and 'fundis' (see Brian Doherty, 1992, for a useful discussion of this split), which in most cases has ended with the 'fundis' leaving party politics, is more about tactics than goals, means than ends. Green parties are probably the only parties operating in the world today that have members (and ex-members) able to define electoral success as political defeat.

The reluctance of Greens to take party politics 'seriously', with all the compromises and trade-offs that it entails, is on the one hand a reassuring reminder that the dreams of the New Left for a politics of egalitarian self-management and discursive democracy are not dead. Yet seen from the urgent perspective of making vital changes in critically adverse global circumstances it can seem more like a diversion and an indulgence. A byway that will condemn the Greens and their ideas to perpetual minority status and political irrelevancy. A sort of 'Greens fiddle while rain forests burn' scenario; or as a frustrated peace activist once expressed it to me, reversing Emma Goldman's famous aphorism, 'I don't want to dance with you guys if you don't have a revolution.'

These difficulties around conducting politics 'ethically' point to the conclusion that probably the greatest lacuna in Green theory and practice today is how to achieve Green goals within the context of the changes which globalisation has wrought on
the nation-states and their citizens. These changes have radically altered the
perception and practice of democracy. Which brings us back to 'the crisis before the
crisis' which confronts the Greens, namely the crisis of democracy.

Democratic Politics

Thus far most of the thinking on Greens and democracy has been conducted within
rather narrow parameters. The emphasis has been either on the contradictions within
Green political philosophy itself (see, for example, Carter, 1993; Doherty, 1996;
Hayward, 1995; Saward, 1993), or on the problematic differences between Green
philosophy and other political philosophies which hinder the achievement of Green
political goals (Eckersley, 1996). While this work has an important place in the
maturation of the Green tradition, none of it is located within the realities of the
global political economy within which Greens must operate politically, struggling for
sustainability, equity and democracy simultaneously. As should be clear by now,
I believe that the political impacts of economic globalism on the nation-state
constitute a major (if not the major) constraint on the development and extension of
democracy at the present time. Therefore I conclude this chapter with some
examples of just how far globalism is compromising Green democratic aspirations,
and suggest that the problem needs further attention.

The sorry state of democracy in the nation-state of New Zealand has already been
touched on in this chapter. Following on the marked decline of citizen participation
in electoral politics, the 'expatriation' of control over the economy, and the extension
of the powers of the Security Intelligence Service to intensify surveillance of New
Zealand citizens, there came a further attack on representative democracy in the form of a successful Citizens Initiated Referendum petition. (So here’s to you Mrs Robertson, *Political Review*, 1999, 9). Heavily sponsored by the ACT party, and also promoted by one of New Zealand’s foreign-owned tabloid newspapers, the petition calls for a cut in the number of members of parliament, from 120 to 99. The proposal was endorsed by a large majority when the referendum was held at the end of 1999. While it still has to be considered and voted upon by parliament before it becomes law, it represents a major resiling from the result of the 1993 referendum on proportional representation. This was the referendum that led to New Zealand extending representative democracy by changing from a simple majority, constituency-based electoral system to the MMP (mixed-member proportional) system used in Germany. This system ensures party proportionality through a mix of constituency and list positions. The effect of cutting the number of MPs would be not only to reduce citizen access to an elected representative, but also to destroy the gains in female and minority group representation which were achieved with the first MMP election in 1996. It would also reduce the likelihood of Green representation – as we have seen (in Chapter Three) the representation of Tasmanian Greens in their parliament has been cut simply by cutting the number of members.

While proportional representation is well accepted in north-western Europe (with the exception of the United Kingdom), and has enabled Greens to participate in most parliaments and hence some governments there, the struggle for better forms of representative democracy is a big issue for Greens elsewhere. But as the sovereignty of the state dwindles, this task becomes both harder, and less potentially rewarding. It is also a far cry from the original Green goal of ‘grass roots’ democracy – a radical
democratisation not just of the national assembly but also of workplaces, cities, neighbourhoods and institutions. But then we are also a long way from the explosive energy of the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, with their large numbers of young people bent on participating themselves, and encouraging others to do so. Three decades later Greens are faced with a very different situation, and may end up in the invidious position of being the strongest defenders of a 'representative' democracy at nation-state level, which now lacks legitimacy among the public. Certainly New Zealand Green MP Rod Donald, who was firstly a community activist and then a leader of the successful campaign for MMP, is currently reduced to making the unpopular case for more rather than fewer parliamentarians. This is definitely not the 'Green' extension of democracy he had hoped to facilitate by becoming a Green politician.

The dilemma facing Greens is then to what extent, and how, they should defend and try to reconstitute democracy at the nation-state level. Under conditions of globalisation this begs further questions about whether this is possible without regaining control of the national economy. Further, how this might be done? Having ruled out violent means, Greens and other pro-democracy forces are restricted to democratic means – which are precisely what are being eroded at nation-state level by the forces and agents of globalisation. Catch 22.

It is therefore tempting to Greens to leave this issue in the too-hard basket. Perhaps it is possible to trust to positive democratic initiatives at sub and supranational levels, where Greens find it easier to gain traction (and also, at the sub-national level, to practice participatory democracy) to make up the national level deficit. But while the
national level still retains the power (and literally the forces) to determine what is possible at the other levels, this ‘alternative’ may be severely limited. For the moment, no easy (or even possible) solutions suggest themselves. Perhaps all that is to be gained from an analysis of the extent of the problem is the capacity to proceed in a more informed and aware manner in seeking solutions. Politics in the twenty-first century promises to be pretty much as Walter Benjamin characterised it in the mid-twentieth century – like playing chess on a three-dimensional board with pieces whose values are constantly changing.

Working at the beginning of a story...

The founding German Green Petra Kelly entitled her first collection of Green speeches and essays (Kelly, 1984) *Fighting for Hope*. On the door of her office in the *Bundestag* she had a picture of an inspirational fellow revolutionary who preceded her in that place – Rosa Luxemburg.

Luxemburg and Kelly were both murdered – just two among the hundreds of thousands (perhaps millions) of not-so-well-known people world-wide in the past century who have had the will and the ability to actively participate in antisystemic politics, and have met their deaths through it. What price hope in a world of daily extinctions and obliterations, practised and mediated globally, a world of globally compounding emiserations and degradations of societies and environments?
The socialist and social democratic movements and parties that surged at the end of the nineteenth century and gained strength in the early part of the twentieth century, in response to the internationalisation of capital, have no late twentieth century mass counterparts which are opposing the globalisation of capital. Some of the reasons why this is so have been canvassed in this and other chapters. Without a sense of mass involvement (even if it is more apparent than real), it is hard to have a corresponding sense of 'making history', let alone the (misplaced but encouraging) confidence in the historical inevitability of socialism which characterised those earlier movements and parties. What we have instead, at the turn of the twentieth century, is a plethora of small, independent initiatives, including Green parties, linked nationally and globally via the Net. Perhaps this is what is required; perhaps it is better suited to the political realities of today than a mass movement based on only one socio-economic dimension (class), with delusions of historical grandeur?

Perhaps even, as Michel Foucault expressed it:

'A progressive politics is a politics which recognises the historical and specified conditions of a practice, whereas other politics recognise only ideal necessities, univocal determinations and the free interplay of individual initiatives. A progressive politics is a politics which defines, within a practice, possibilities for transformation and the play of dependencies within those transformations, whereas other politics rely on the uniform abstraction of change or the thaumaturgic presence of genius.'

(Foucault in Macey, 1993, 195).
And perhaps Green politics is such a politics, and will succeed – or fail – accordingly. Undoubtedly, we live in a time of stunningly rapid change, and where it is going, who can say? By the end of the twenty-first century, to take just the politics of food as an example, will the extremes of obesity and anorexia in the First World and starvation and gluttony in the Third World have been replaced by the enjoyment of an adequate and healthy diet by everyone? Or will satiation and deprivation have polarised even further? For those of us who do get enough to eat, will we all be consuming genetically engineered food produced in factory conditions, or will Green campaigns for organic, humane, 'natural', sustainable food production have succeeded? Will even more of us be cooking and storing our food in machines running on electricity generated by nuclear, coal and oil powered stations, and transporting it across our countries and the world in oil-powered machines? Will the resultant greenhouse gas-induced climate change be wreaking havoc on countries where women still walk for miles to find fuel for their cooking fires, and transport everything they eat on their backs?

One can generate examples like this for every sphere of life, where environmental diversity and sustainability and social justice and development will either converge – or diverge. From my traverse of the first years of Green politics as a world historical phenomenon I am not able to say whether a ‘Green’ convergence will happen, but I have been able to suggest how it will happen, if it does happen. Beginning at the beginning, one sees how change occurs, and in itself changes.

Meanwhile, most of those who began the Green direction of change are still alive, and many of them are still working at their 'new' politics. What does that feel like?
Are they, too, fighting for hope? A few months before he was brutally murdered by the forces of the junta that overthrew the democratically elected government of Chile in 1973, the singer/songwriter Victor Jara wrote a love song to his life’s partner in the work for social and political change. The refrain encapsulates the hopes, fears and uncertainties of working at a politics that opposes the system of greed and power. The system that stripped Chile of its democratic government then and is plundering its natural and social resources now. The system that is replicating itself on a global scale. The system that is being opposed on a global scale.

The song goes like this...

'...pienso en ti...

compañera de mis días

y del porvenir,

de las horas amargas y la dicha,

de poder vivir,

laborando el comienzo de una historia,

sin saber, el fin.'

'...I think of you...

compañera of my life

and of the future,

of the bitter hours and the happiness

of being able to live

working at the beginning of a story

without knowing the end.'
Cuando voy al trabajo/On my way to work

(Jara, 1976, 87-89)

Notes

1. We have seen such multilateralist attempts at keeping the peace work very well on a small scale. For example, New Zealand provided the peace talks venue, the mediators and the unarmed peacekeeping force to break the deadlock between Australia, Papua New Guinea and the various factions on Bougainville, thus bringing an end to years of conflict there. They can also fail dismally on a large scale (e.g. in former Yugoslavia). A big part of the problem rests with the roles played by the one remaining super-power, the USA, and the former super-power (now reduced to Russia) in multilateralist initiatives. The US is able to make a nominally ‘multilateral’ action by itself (as in its 1998 attack on Iraq), or break it (as in its failure to commit resources to keeping the peace in Somalia).

2. Some of these non-state ‘security’ activities have been and will be very nasty. They include a return to domination, oppression – and protection – by old-style warlords, of the type we have seen in Somalia in the 1990s. Others will be non-violent and constructive, but still problematic. An excellent example of this is the recent case of fish poaching in Antarctic waters. In February 1999 the New Zealand government sent its brand new $600 million frigate, Te Kaha, to patrol New Zealand’s ‘area of interest’ in the southern ocean and prevent illegal fishing of the Patagonian toothfish. Despite surveillance flights of the area as well as sailing around it, no poachers were detected. The Greenpeace boat Arctic Sunrise, however, also on poacher patrol in the southern ocean, managed to find a ‘pirate’ ship and scare it off fishing (‘Greenpeace hunts down toothfish pirates’, Press, 4.3.99; Greenpeace alerts French to fishing pirates, Press, 9.3.99). Greenpeace, of course, has neither the legal authority nor the physical capacity to arrest and detain poachers, and its entire fleet could probably be bought for the price of one new frigate, yet it appears to be able to provide a level of international fisheries protection which is beyond nation-states. In a further ironic twist, Greenpeace found the pirate ship in the French exclusive economic zone. This meant that it ended up asking the nation-state that had conducted a terrorist act against Greenpeace (France), on the territory of another nation-state (New Zealand), to send a frigate of its own to deal with the pirate.

3. As it happens, there has never been a terrorist attack on a foreign leader visiting New Zealand (nor on any New Zealand political leaders). The only proven political terrorism ever to occur in New Zealand was the bombing of the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbour, which killed one Portuguese photographer who was working for Greenpeace at the time. The terrorists in this case were working for and paid by a nation-state, France (Szabo, 1991).

4. Rod Donald, Green MP, tells me that when he queried this use of the word ‘economy’ he was told that it was intended to cater to the sensitivities of Beijing and Taipei. It gets around the ‘problem’ of which is the ‘real’ state of China, and entitled to join APEC as such. If this is indeed the case, it merely reinforces the point that ‘nation-statehood’ is increasingly irrelevant to participation in geopolitics.
5. The 'subversive' known to be targeted in this instance is Aziz Choudry, a worker for New Zealand’s oldest aid organisation, Corso, and the organiser of a conference critical of APEC and GATT, which was being held at the time of the break-in to his home. Purely by chance two S.I.S. agents were surprised on the property by a friend of Choudry’s, and the ensuing court cases found that it was indeed the S.I.S. doing the breaking and entering, and that they had a non-specific warrant to do so. It also found that their activity was illegal under the terms of the S.I.S. Act, which did not allow for breaking and entering. The government then promptly introduced a bill to legalise breaking and entering by security service agents. Commenting on this move, Choudry emphasised its implications for democracy, saying ‘I think basically what the government has done is declare war on lawful dissenters. I think it’s sending a really strong message to people to shut up, don’t make a noise, don’t disagree and don’t talk. This issue goes to the heart of the sort of society we want and the kind of debate we want in the future.’ (Henzell and Bell, 1998).

6. More on the historical construction of the nation/state/economy edifice (and its current deconstruction) can be found in Castells (1997, 242-273). For another perspective, which characteristically focuses on the power dimension in the development of the nation-state, see Michel Foucault’s account of the creation of the first nation-state (England). This proceeded via the realignment of the binary political discourse of the Middle Ages (rich/poor; oppressors/oppressed) with certain ‘facts of nationality’, such as language, country of origin, ancestral customs, common history, ancient rights and laws, etc., so as to reconstitute the state on the basis of the ‘rights’ of the nation (Foucault, 1977).

7. See Castells (1996, 330-335) for comment on the irony of intellectual history that it is ‘...precisely those thinkers who advocate social change who often view people as passive recipients of ideological manipulation...’, and also for references to the studies which show how viewers make meaning of what they see.

8. In the second week of February 1999 a major national-level political news story broke. It was announced that the world-wide chief executive of Saatchi and Saatchi, the world’s largest transnational advertising agency, (British-born and New York-domiciled New Zealand citizen Kevin Roberts) would be giving a motivational pep talk to the National Party caucus. This was a favour to his close personal friend, Prime Minister Jenny Shipley. The Labour and Alliance parties then speculated that Roberts’ friendship with Shipley, and close association with the National Party, had given Saatchis an improper advantage when it came to securing a $30 million dollar contract with the New Zealand Tourism Board to promote New Zealand. On the day this development in the story broke it was put on page 8 of The Press. The only political story on the front page was another instalment in the Clinton impeachment saga. That had to compete for attention with a lead story on DNA matching of local rapists, and a second ‘major’ story on the fate of a child cancer sufferer whose parents chose ‘alternative’ treatment. Also with a quarter page photo of some stars of the British soap opera Coronation Street on the Tranz-Alpine Express train, and another photo of two radio presenters promoting a St Valentine’s Day dance.

The story was consistently fitted into the ‘scandal/saga’ framework of contemporary political reportage (complete with its own ‘Gate’ nickname – Jennygate), with lots of attention paid to who had dinner with whom and when and what they said. On the day Parliament resumed sitting for 1999 (February 16), the Prime Minister gave an explanation to the House of her dinner with Roberts, which denied all the accusations that she was improperly discussing a Saatchi and Saatchi contract with the Tourism Board. Instead she said that she was dining with Mr Roberts because ‘...he was keen to work with me to see that the Labour-Alliance bloc never got into government again.’ That neither the Prime Minister, nor the political pundits, see anything at all ‘improper’ in the head of a transnational corporation (which has an annual global turnover of $US7 billion – Robert’s annual salary alone is $2 million), conspiring to turn New Zealand into what would effectively be a one-party state, is as good an indication as any of how capitalist globalism is a now a greater threat to representative democracy on a world scale than communism ever was. (‘PM says links with agency not improper’, Press, 12.2.99; ‘PM attacks Labour “lies”’, Press, 13.2.99).
9. For details on the crisis of legitimacy of the federal government of America see Castells (1997, 287-297). Especially telling are the figures for the 1996 presidential election – only 49% of eligible voters bothered to vote, and only 49% of that 49% voted for Bill Clinton. Hence the president of the world’s most powerful ‘democracy’ was actively chosen by less than one quarter of the population.

In New Zealand there have traditionally been high voter turnouts at triennial general elections. New Zealand was after all the first nation-state to extend the suffrage to women, in 1893, and exclusively Maori constituency seats, to ensure Maori representation in parliament, were established as early as 1867 and still exist. However, turnouts have been declining, dropping by about 15% in the last forty years, from an average of almost 90% pre World War Two to 77% in the mid 1990s. This means that whereas New Zealand once ranked highly among democratic nations, it is now at about the average (Vowles et al, 1993, 139). Party membership in New Zealand was also high when the country was a prosperous nation-state, reaching a peak of just over 22% of the voting age population in the late 1950s. By the mid-1990s, however, it had shrunk to just below 6% (Vowles, 1999, Table 4). Bronwyn Hayward (1997) gives further information on the decline in public participation in New Zealand, and increased cynicism about politicians, and documents how restructuring has directly reduced representative participation e.g. the restructuring of the health service replaced democratically elected female representatives with government-appointed male managers.

10. Analysis and criticism of doing politics in cyberspace is of course very new. Early critiques came from feminists looking at the gender politics dimension of being wired (Adam and Green, 1998; Cherney and Weise, 1996; Spender, 1995). This work shows that the political economy of access to and use of the Net is as skewed for women as access to and use of other new technologies. Men dominate the discourse in virtual discussion groups just as readily as they do in real ones, and overt and covert sexual violence is as prevalent and frightening to women in cyberspace as it is in real space, and reduces their freedom to participate. This has led to the creation of virtual ‘women-only’ spaces on the Net, so women can be positive actors with and not mere victims of the technology – but this can hardly be considered to be an advance in democracy. Other recent analysis has criticised computer communication as ‘...the enemy of truly collective reason and debate...’ and hence a danger to democratic freedoms (Haywood, 1998, 27). There has also been an investigation of the attempts to create ‘cyber-cities’, such as the Amsterdam-based DDS. It was noted that 85% of the cyber ‘residents’ of DDS were male, almost 75% had higher education and 58% were under thirty, so these innovations are not yet advancing, (and may never advance) a more engaged and representative form of democracy (Aurigi and Graham, 1998). It has even been argued that the ruling class has now gone virtual, and that the so-called ‘information superhighway’ is an artefact of bourgeois possessive individualism put to the service of commercial imperatives (Kroker and Weinstein, 1994).

11. In New Zealand there was strong opposition to the MAI from the sub-national level, as local governments realised that they could be legally locked into contracts with transnationals and prevented from providing work to local firms and citizens. The city of Christchurch is also engaged in making pro-active ‘global/local’ connections that bypass the nation-state. These include linking with other cities using transnational companies as the medium. For example Christchurch was a joint winner, with Phoenix, Arizona, of the 1993 Carl Bertelsmann Foundation prize for innovative local government, and with eight other ‘top’ cities is now part of a global ‘Cities of Tomorrow’ forum, exchanging ideas and practices. This has attracted the interest of the accountancy transnational KPMG, which in February 1999 sent a German ‘specialist public sector advisor’ to Christchurch to look at what was happening (Bruce, 1999a, 2). Christchurch has also invited a promoter of the ‘city-state’ concept to the city recently, and is working on developing a GPI (Genuine Progress Indicator) for the city, along the lines of the one developed in Phoenix. The GPI aims to measure what citizens themselves define as quality of life, and hence capture concepts like ‘safety’, ‘aesthetic amenity’, ‘environmental quality’, etc., which can’t be measured in dollar terms. (The Green Party has been advocating that such indicators be adopted at national level for some time.) When Phoenix did this exercise the top indicator for the city turned out to be education. If a similar result were found in Christchurch this would pose an interesting political challenge in a country in which educational institutions have always been nationally funded ands controlled (Bruce, 1999b, 7). Not everyone is happy
with Christchurch’s moves towards city-statehood, and refusal to run the city economy in neo-liberal style. The nationally influential New Right lobby group, the Business Round Table, has been reduced to expressing its displeasure by dubbing the city ‘The People’s Republic of Christchurch’ – which amused the city so much that it promptly had T-shirts made emblazoned with the city logo and ‘The People’s Republic of Christchurch’.

12. Many examples of Green fun and creativity feeding on and off media seriousness and lack of originality could be adduced. One of the most memorable (and amusing) for me is from 1991, when Mike Smith and I presented the New Zealand Green Party’s first economic directions statement at a press conference, and declined to play the ‘freak show’ game. Mike disappointed the media by being clean-shaven, suited and well-shod, while my longish hair was well clipped back, my plain beige blouse had a white lace collar and ‘pearl’ buttons, and my face was lightly made up. Neither of us arrived on a bicycle, nor was anyone smoking dope. The media actually complained about being cheated of their expected quota of beards, sandals, tie-dyed muslin and other ‘freak’ material.

13. A good case study of what corporate/global media can do to make or break political organisations is the first friendly and supportive, and then hostile and destructive, relationship between the Whitlam-led Labor Party and the Australian global media conglomerates headed by Rupert Murdoch and Kerry Packer. This produced one of the best politics/media jokes of all time, in which Whitlam is reluctantly persuaded by his aides to show what he is made of and to rally support for Labor by walking across Lake Burley Griffin, the lake in front of Parliament House in Canberra. He is duly rowed to the centre of the lake, steps out and walks across to the other side. The next morning The Australian carries the banner headline ‘Whitlam fails to swim lake’!

I saw the same phenomenon genuinely in action in January 1999, at the New Zealand Greens conference that was held at a summer camp. Greens Co-Leader Jeanette Fitzsimons allowed herself to be persuaded by a Sunday newspaper into being photographed whizzing across a lake on a flying fox. She was told that this was ‘less boring’ than a head and shoulders shot, and that it was a choice between this photo or no photo at all. But the photograph when published was then used as ‘evidence’ that The Greens were ‘desperate to get attention’.

Knowing that this is what they are up against, the New Zealand Greens conduct media training sessions in which activists are instructed in how to maximise the message the party wants to get across, and minimise distractions or misrepresentations – particularly when dealing with visual media.

14. In this section I deal only with the ‘moral’ or ‘ethical’ side of Green politics. There is of course a considerable literature on its ‘spiritual’ side, and some would say they are related, and should not be considered in isolation. However, I believe that they can legitimately be considered separately, since as we saw in Chapter Six the spiritual or religious affiliations and inclinations of Greens are diverse. Yet atheists, agnostics, Christians, pagans, Jews, Buddhists and others seem to be able to endorse documents like ‘The New Ethic’ without outraging their spiritual or religious sensibilities or non-sensibilities. Whether or how they link them to their religious or spiritual beliefs and practices (as a good many of them do) is not as important as the fact that they find a common ground around these key principles.


16. The only real competition Greens have for the moral high ground position comes from the fundamentalist religious parties, but they are a somewhat different case than the Greens since they can claim both divine revelation and ancient scripture as the source of their morality, whereas the largely irreligious Greens must rely principally on discursive reason to reach their
ethical positions, (see Singer, 1993, as a good example of this approach), even where some of them hold their 'Green' views as a result of spiritual beliefs and experiences.

17. A good example of this tension in action could be found in the New Zealand Greens between May and December 1998. This was the time it took the party to earnestly discuss and agree on a position regarding whether it would or would not go into a coalition with Labour after the next election. For a party that was polling less than 1% at the time, and was also behind in candidate selection and other key electoral functions, this was either an indication of how seriously Greens take internal and external democracy - or of how an overly-principled commitment to democratic process severely handicaps Green electoral viability. Or both.

18. Michel Chossudovsky gives examples of globalist take-overs of vulnerable nation-states at the most fundamental level. For example the Dayton Accord of November 1995, which aimed to settle the conflict in former Yugoslavia, included a new constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina written by the powers responsible for installing the new administration. Article VII of that constitution states that the first governor of the Central Bank for Bosnia-Herzegovina will be appointed by the IMF, and "shall not be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina or a neighbouring state". Nor is the bank permitted to function as a genuine, sovereign central bank, i.e. enabled to issue the currency of the new nation-state. (Chossudovsky, 1998, 256). Chossudovsky found a similar usurpation of national sovereignty by globalist bankers when he talked to Citibank officials in Brazil in 1998, at the time of that state's currency crisis. The bankers were not discussing debt rescheduling and other financial matters - rather, they were focussing on constitutional reform (which in the Brazilian context could well mean the derogation of the land rights of indigenous peoples), and other social issues (Chossudovsky, 1999).
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Green Charter

The Greens/Green Party of Aotearoa-New Zealand

1. Ecological Wisdom

The basis of ecological wisdom is that human beings are part of the natural world. This world is finite, therefore unlimited material growth is impossible. Ecological sustainability is paramount.

2. Social Responsibility

Unlimited material growth is impossible. Therefore the key to social responsibility is the just distribution of social and natural resources, both locally and globally.

3. Appropriate Decision Making

For the implementation of the principles of ecological wisdom and social responsibility, decisions will be made directly at the appropriate level by those affected.

4. Non-Violence

Non-violent conflict resolution is the process by which ecological wisdom, social responsibility and appropriate decision-making will be implemented. This principle applies at all levels.
THE NEW ETHIC
United Tasmania Group

We, citizens of Tasmania and members of the United Tasmania Group,
United in a global movement for survival;
Concerned for the dignity of man and the value of his cultural heritage while rejecting any view of man which gives him the right to exploit all of nature;
Moved by the need for a new ethic which unites man with nature to prevent the collapse of the life support systems of the earth;
Rejecting all exclusive ideological and pragmatic views of society as partial and divisive;
Condemning the misuse of power for individual or group prominence based on aggression against man or nature;
Shunning the acquisition and display of individual wealth as an expression of greed for status or power;
While acknowledging that Tasmania is uniquely favoured with natural resources, climate, form, and beauty;
Undertake to live our private and communal lives in such a way that we maintain Tasmania's form and beauty for our own enjoyment and for the enjoyment of our children through unlimited future generations;
Undertake to create aesthetic harmony between our human structures and the natural landscape where our individual and communal needs demand modification to the natural environment;
Undertake to regulate our individual and communal needs for resources, both living and non-living, while preventing the wholesale extraction of our non-replenishable resources for the satisfaction of the desire for profit;
Undertake to husband and cherish Tasmania's living resources so that we do minimum damage to the web of life of which we are part while preventing the extinction or serious depletion of any form of life by our individual, group, or communal actions;
And we shall
Create new institutions so that all who wish may participate in making laws and decisions at all levels concerning the social, cultural, political, and economic life of the community;
Provide institutions for the peaceful and unimpeded evolution of the community and for the maintenance of justice and equal opportunity for all people;
Change our society and our culture to prevent a tyranny of rationality, at the expense of values, by which we may lose the unique adaptability of our species for meeting cultural and environmental change;
Prevent alienation of people in their social and work roles and functions while making scientific, technical, and vocational knowledge and practice free and open to all;
Create a new community in which men and women shall be valued for their personal skills, for the material and non-material worth of these skills to groups and the whole community, for their service to the community, and for their non-competitive achievement in all aspects of life;
Live as equal members of our society to maintain a community governed by rational, non-sectional law;
Preserve specific areas of private and group life where private thought, speech, and action is of individual or group importance and does not interfere unreasonably with others;
Introduction

New Zealand is in the grip of a new depression.

It is a depression which arises not from a lack of affluence but almost from too much of it.

It is a depression in human values, a downturn not in the national economy but in the national spirit.

It is the inevitable culmination of 20 years of uninspired leadership by a Government whose goals have been almost entirely materialistic.

It is not attributable to affluence itself, but to affluence without direction, to an emphasis on economic security as an end in itself rather than as a means to an end.

It is the outcome of an obsession with the growth of the economy rather than with the growth of the human mind and the non-economic capacities of the population.

And it is spawning a disillusionment with our society and political system that is driving our youth to protest in the streets and filling the sensitive among their elders with a peculiar despair.

It is a despair which comes usually with physical poverty. But New Zealand's peculiar malady is not physical poverty; it is spiritual poverty.

For a generation New Zealand has been governed not in the light of discerned goals or morally based convictions in which a more perfect society and a more perfect world were the ultimate ends, but in a hand-to-mouth fashion in which the perpetuation of political power seemed to be all that mattered.

The depressing expediency of the Government was met not with the offering of a relevant and uplifting alternative by its opponents but with an outmoded definition of social problems, a narrow vision of political solutions, and an opportunism which, like that of its adversaries, placed the winning of the next election ahead of moral considerations and consistency.

While our citizens cry out for Government action to make their cities and lives livable, for an imaginative assault on the new social ills that are eroding the quality of their lives, the national leadership continues to overemphasise economic growth at the expense of both the environment and a more natural pace of life, increasing productivity at the expense of job satisfaction, technology at the expense of the human spirit, bureaucracy at the expense of more imagination and more public participation in Government, and individualism at the expense of a sense of community.

The real tragedy of New Zealand life is not that the Government is ignoring the country's problems; it is perpetuating them.

It is the unquestioning servant of an economy which must expand at an alarming rate, inventing ever more dubious goods, in order to maintain full employment.

It sees the main problem of our times as an increase in the pace of inflation and ignores the increase in the pace of life; it frets over the decline in the value of the dollar and is heedless of the decline in the value of human friendship.

It spoon feeds its citizens with affluence in order to keep them quiet instead of reshaping society and industry to meet their deeper, non-material needs as well.
It proceeds on its unenlightened path, however, at an ever increasing risk to itself. For there is a new set of values emerging in society which will either transform it or destroy it.

It is a set of values which shows in the movements to free members of our society from positions subtly fabricated by others and forced upon them. It shows in the movements to reject the de-personalising effects of our bureaucracy and technology.

It wants to improve morals—the morals of a Government which gives tacit support to a country which institutionalises racial inferiority; the morals of a nation which initiates a men-for-meat deal in which it fights in a pointless war to foster its trading links with an ally.

The new consciousness shows most simply of all in the movement by young people to establish a warmer and more meaningful relationship with each other, with society, with nature, and with the land.

There is a new current flowing in the country. The Values Party is just one product of this current. It seeks to give political expression to the new values.

It says that for too long this country has been allowed to wallow and drift.

It points to a better society, one in which men will recover their ability to gain happiness from relationships with other men and with nature, from creativity and service rather than consumption and competition. It firmly believes that the people of New Zealand are perceptive enough to see this society and reach out for it.

The people of New Zealand are once again restless and when that happens the world should sit up and watch. For great change seems to come in this country in 40-year cycles.

It was 40 years after New Zealand began developing in earnest that we had the great industrial reforms of the 1890s. New Zealand was the first country to give women the vote. Forty years after that we had the great social reforms of the first Labour Government.

The pattern seems to be that we go forward and then we consolidate. And when we go forward we lead the world.

The third 40 years is almost up.
NTRODUCTION

Tasmania is in a crisis due to gross over-emphasis on hydro-economics. Population has declined and Tasmania share of the workforce has not increased. Employment opportunities for the State's youth are not improving. UTG declares that this grim position is accelerating towards a needless social disaster. UTG urges you not to be lulled into a sense of false security threatening your human dignity, freedom, and standard of living. It is imperative that the State embarks on a new-life economy. UTG offers the following points for your consideration:

The United Tasmania Group
Economic Program

Please note that this program is only a portion of the total UTG political policy.

1. Exposure of the Present Economic State

UTG will move to bring before the public the true state of the economy. The object will be to disclose the gravity of the present dangerous instability, and the steps that must be taken to restore confidence in political administration.

2. Industrial Development & Employment

UTG is sharply aware that employment will continue to decline unless existing industry is supported and balanced by smaller diversified industries which can be developed from the environment. UTG believes that the scope in the latter aspect is neglected and will explore and develop valid possibilities. UTG will also institute a permanent travel-research program to increase trade in Western and Asian markets.

3. Tourist Industry

The Tourist Industry is acutely handicapped by lack of loan funds, and by too limited promotion. Tourism is an investment of importance. It is now identified with knowledge-seeking as well as with traditional pleasures. The world wants to know who we are, what we are doing, and where we are going. UTG will see that such questions are answered, and initiate practical steps to revitalise this industry.
Forestry Industry & Enterprises

Forests are not just wood. They are the guardians of the fertility of our earth. With proper protection, harvesting and regeneration they are the most valuable of our land assets. UTG recognizes that a scientifically conducted wood-chip industry, provided with development capital, need not be a threat to the environment. However, there is concern at the rate in which forests are being destroyed on private land.

It advocates the use of sound entry principles on private land to prevent the ills that arise from insufficient knowledge or methods of control.

Forest Conservation is an Insurance Against Want

UTG declares that natural and cultivated forests under systematic control are an insurance against want. They provide for a large scale of employment and are labour intensive. UTG认为 in the following objectives:

- A percentage of loan funds should be used to sponsor co-operatives.

Similarly such aid should be given in the replanting of harvested forests.

Similarly such aid should be given to rehabilitate un-economic farms as a form of rural reconstruction.

Exemption of probate duties duties to private owners selling forests to the wood-chip industry who reforest their land.

Increased research and extension facilities for the Forestry Commission.

6. Marine Fisheries Industries

State marine fisheries are seriously compromised by foreign competition amounting to a monopoly of a multi-million dollar enterprise. UTG is firmly opposed to the inertia and unresponsive attitudes which have permitted this sweeping take-over. UTG is determined to seek a reasonable share of marine fisheries and will do everything possible to encourage development and restore investment confidence in such fisheries. The possibility of building suitable competitive fishing vessels in this State will be thoroughly investigated. The Commonwealth Government will be requested to increase its marine research program in Tasmanian waters.

7. Agricultural Industries

UTG recognizes that many aspects of the rural economy are seriously neglected and affected by lack of developmental funds, and by insecurity of marketing and freighting factors. UTG will initiate a research program into alternatives for failing industries, and intensive efforts to secure freight justice for all industries.

8. Public Works

UTG recognizes the importance of Public Works in maintaining employment, and its essential role in the building of public structures and access ways throughout the Island. UTG believes that Public Works have been unduly restricted by hydro-economics, and that a much higher proportion of funds should be devoted to State works in order to bring Tasmania into parity with mainland States. The UTG believes that under the present system of hydro-economics that there is a duplication of services which should be carried by the Department of Public Works.

Vote UTG

A.U.S. MELBOURNE

Authorised by Chris Harwood, 70 Princes St., Sandy Bay, Tasmania
ECOLOMICS
AN ECONOMIC BASE FOR THE VALUES SOCIETY AND PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE.
This presentation is based on the goals and objectives initially spelt out in the 1972 'Blueprint' and further developed redefined and reconfirmed at the 1974 Conference in Palmerston North.
The presentation is not only a review of existing Values economic policies, it also outlines the cohesiveness of Values economics and its importance for New Zealand's future.
The following is an outline of Values economic principles.
1. The introduction of a stable-state world economy is necessary to the survival and well-being of humanity.
2. The establishment and maintenance of a stable state economy is dependant upon an equitable distribution of wealth both between nations and within nations.
3. The Values Party's economic policies are based upon long term proposals to secure this type of stable state economy. In pursuing our long term aims our intermediate policies must of necessity be concerned with equitable distribution of the products of our economy and the preservation of its basic resources.
4. We hold that there is a minimum level of income below which, as of right, no-one should fall. (This minimum would replace the necessity for social security benefits and superannuation.) We further believe that excessively high incomes are a travesty of human justice and therefore oppose the tradition of inherited wealth and support a steeply progressive tax scheme.
5. The Values Party economic goals will lead towards community control and management of production, finance and distribution. Initial steps will be based on the concept of Co-operative Enterprise which provides for equal control of an enterprise by its workers, its consumers, the suppliers of its finance and its local community.
6. An important aspect of New Zealand's future is its role as a major supplier of agricultural products and expertise in a hungry world. Values policies would support the farming community in the fullest possible agricultural production compatible with sound environmental principles and the food needs of the world.
7. The Values Party sees a major role of the government in economic matters as one of promoting and maintaining regional balance. Planning and co-ordination will also seek to ensure that economic enterprises serve social purposes compatible with the values of the community. Government will be guided in this by the ongoing public forum on the one hand and on the other by social, environmental and technological research units, independent of the government.
8. The Values Party seeks to promote decentralisation of political and economic activities with delegation of administrative decisions to the lowest possible level of operation.
VALUES AND SOCIALISM

Acknowledging What Is Radical In Socialism

1. The issues of ownership and management —
   who controls? for what purposes? who contributes?
   for what return? who profits? by how much?

2. The issues of social justice and equal opportunity —
   do we accelerate, freeze, or break down inequalities?
   justice v. freedom; community v. individual.

3. The issues of analysis and policy —
   what makes New Zealand society tick? how do we
   find out? is our policy consistent? is it utopian
   (unworkable)?

4. The issues of class interest —
   what does class mean in New Zealand? is there class
   conflict? what attitude do we take to 'saboteurs'?

5. The extent of economic determinism —
   to what degree does conditioning determine interest
   and motivation? to what extent are 'vested interests'
   self or sectional interests?

6. The need for revolution —
   structural as well as attitudinal change; community
   activism; the transition stage and continuing revolution.

7. Developing an organisation —
   discipline and commitment? accountability, to whom?
   broadening the social base of support.

Defining What Isn't Radical In Socialism

1. The poverty of scientific materialism —
   cultural and spiritual aspects of humanity — art and
   ethics; values as a procedure of analysis.

2. The limits of determinism —
   the existence of mind and will, the central issue of
   alienation (political and social as well as economic)
   — not confined to one class.

3. The follies of (bureaucratic) centralism —
   The issues of scale, accountability, community develop­
   ment and participation.

4. The limits to growth —
   evaluating growth; depletion of resources; growth as
   accelerator not corrector of inequalities; need for
   changes in economic style as well as structure (agricul­
   ture and services as against industry and goods).

5. The issues of civil rights —
   tolerance of alternatives; scope for individual free­
   doms (which don't include the freedom to sabotage
   the community); scope for initiative; where private
   enterprise can begin and end.

6. The need for a New Zealand analysis —
   the primacy of land and farmers, the centrality of
   Maori traditions to the New Zealand revolution, the
   lack of a revolutionary proletariat, decentralisation.
"APEC 1998 - Scene Setter For NZ's Year In The Chair"

By Rt Hon Don McKinnon, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade

In just eleven months, NZ is to host a meeting that will thrust us into the world spotlight as never before. We have never had a better opportunity to showcase our country to the world.

The APEC 1999 Economic Leaders Meeting, will bring to Auckland the leaders of 20 major economies from the Pacific Rim, including the US, Japan, Russia and China. More than 4000 international delegates will visit New Zealand. APEC will attract around 2500 of the worlds media, generating international exposure and publicity we could never afford to buy.

Initial estimates indicate that APEC will attract more than $65 million into the local economy. Add to this the value of the international exposure, and its a pretty good return for an investment of $44 million. And these are just the short-term gains.

Long-term gains amount to expanding trade opportunities and a stronger economy. This means more jobs and more money to spend on social goals such as health and education. APEC is important for all of us.

NZ effectively takes the Chair of the APEC process for the 1998 -1999 year, following next month's APEC Leaders meeting in Malaysia. Here APEC's work programme for 1999 will be determined and our role more clearly defined.

Naturally, the Kuala Lumpur meeting will be dominated by the Asian economic crisis.

It is heartening to note that despite the pressures the crisis has put on the region, all APEC members have maintained their commitment to APEC's open market goals. These are to achieve free and open trade and investment in the region by 2010 for developed economies and 2020 for developing ones.

In fact, those economies hit hardest by the crisis - such as Korea and Thailand - are those most committed. They see the APEC agenda as part of the solution to the structural problems of their economies - many of the same structural problems that New Zealand has painfully worked through over the past 15 years.

The commitment to APEC's policy agenda is vital as we seek to reinvigorate growth and investment in the region. If we've learned one thing from history, it's that economic isolationism doesn't work.

Last year, in Vancouver, Canada, 15 economic sectors were identified as candidates for liberalisation even earlier than the 2010/2020 goal. This initiative, called Early Voluntary Sector Liberalisation, includes two important sectors in our economy - fisheries and forestry. Much of our total trade in these products is within the APEC region, and some regional economies have very high tariff barriers on them.

It has been estimated that removal of tariffs in these two sectors could save our exporters $130
million a year. This doesn't include the value of any additional exports that free market access would give our exporters.

APEC also does much practical work in the area of trade facilitation - that is, making it easier for traders to get access to international markets by tackling the maze of red tape that slows up business transactions. It is estimated that around 7-10% of total world trade is tied up in unnecessary duplication and bureaucracy. APEC estimates that full implementation of its trade facilitation programmes would save an incredible US$46 billion a year for the region.

The APEC process has long recognised the value of including private sector input. The APEC Business Advisory Group (ABAC) reports directly to leaders, and has assumed an important monitoring role within APEC.

Each member economy has three representatives in ABAC. New Zealand's representatives in 1998 are Hon Philip Burdon, Kerry McDonald and Rosanne Meo. Next year, Hon Philip Burdon takes the Chair ABAC. Our other representatives will be Douglas Myers and Hon Fran Wilde.

Another group of New Zealand business people, including some involved in the growing area of Maori enterprises, will also be travelling to Kuala Lumpur to attend a Business Summit meeting.

Globalisation is largely driven by technological change. Much of APEC's work is devoted to helping member economies deal with the challenges. The value of APEC's work is shown by the commitment of members, and the desire of other economies to join.

From November, the existing 18 member economies will be joined by three new members - Russia, Vietnam and Peru. Other economies are queuing up.

Following Kuala Lumpur, the Prime Minister will be setting out further details of how New Zealand intends to approach its year as Chair of APEC. We will be working hard to ensure that progress in Kuala Lumpur provides a solid foundation for New Zealand's APEC year.
The Stop the Jabiluka Mine Campaign needs your help URGENTLY. The two year fight by the Mirrar people and the Australian green movement against the construction of Australia's fourth uranium mine (the second in World Heritage Site Kakadu National Park) has reached crisis point.

Despite the fact that the World Heritage Committee of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature is about to make a special inspection tour of Kakadu and consider declaring it a World Heritage Site In Danger; despite the fact that there are two cases against the mine pending before the Australian courts; and despite the fact that the usual Environmental Impact Assessment procedures have not been properly followed or completed, construction workers moved on to the proposed mine site in late June.

A camp and blockade of peaceful protestors has been set up. In the first week of July there were hundreds of arrests, and also police harassment and violence against the protestors. It is important that international public opinion is now brought to bear on the Australian authorities to stop these gross abuses.

Aboriginal anti-mine activist Christine Christopherson fishing in the Jabiluka billabong, Kakadu National Park. The health, safety and traditional livelihood of the local people are threatened by uranium mining.
WHAT CAN YOU DO TO HELP?

Please send a fax to any or all of the following people:

Jabiru Police Station............................................................. 61 8 8979 2216
Police Commissioner of the Northern Territory ....................... 61 8 8922 3316
Chief Minister of the Northern Territory .................................. 61 8 8981 1621
Prime Minister John Howard .............................................. 61 2 6273 4100
Senator Robert Hill, Minister of Environment, Sport and Territories ...... 61 2 6273 6101
Senator Warwick Parer, Minister of Resources and Energy ........... 61 2 6273 4134

In your message, say any or all of the following things:

♦ stop police harassment of peaceful protestors
♦ respect due legal process
♦ follow the environmental impact assessment procedures properly
♦ respect the wishes of the Mirrar people
♦ don’t endanger the traditional owners and their culture
♦ don’t endanger the unique flora and fauna
♦ don’t destroy a World Heritage Site
♦ Australia/the world does not need another uranium mine
♦ we are cancelling our Australian holiday and/or will not be spending any money on Australian products if you continue to mistreat your people and environment in this way

For background information on the Jabiluka Campaign and the Mirrar Gundjehmi people and their land, visit the website at http://www.green.net.au/gundjehmi.

For regular updates on the campaign and the situation at the blockade e-mail nonukes@foesyd.org.au and ask to go on the Jabiluka list; for how you can be part of the action from New Zealand check the Green Party web page http://www.greens.org.nz

For copies of campaign information and/or hire of the Jabiluka video send $5 for information and $10 for video hire to The Greens, Box 46, Diamond Harbour, Christchurch 8030. (Make cheques out to ‘Canterbury Greens’)

New Zealand contact, Jabiluka International: Christine Dann, Box 46, Diamond Harbour
Phone and fax: (03) 329 4067; e-mail: christine.dann@clear.net.nz
Appendix I

Interviews

Persons interviewed on Green and environmental politics in Australia and New Zealand:

Ralph Allen, Geoff Bertram, Molly Colbert, Alan Cumming, Mike Donoghue, Rod Donald, Jim Falk, Jeanette Fitzsimons, Kevin Hackwell, Chris Harries, Denis Hocking, Drew Hutton, Tim Jones, Keith Johnston, Sue Maturin, Molly Melhuish, Les Molloy, Craig Potton, Stephen Rainbow, Guy Salmon, Trish Sarr, Derek Shaw, Norman Smith, John Stewart, Denys Trussell, Richard Thompson, Warren Thomson, Cath Wallace.