Is there an Indigenous response to financial crises?: The evolution of Māori Cultural Political Economies

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Abstract: If economic strategies are framed by culturally-bound collectives that draw on particular ideas, values and beliefs, then Cultural Political Economy (CPE) offers a useful standpoint for understanding human responses to crises, including the current financial crisis. To better understand the methodological standpoint and possibilities of such an approach, this paper investigates the linkages between the philosophies and practices that originate with Indigenous peoples, and the distinct cultural logics that inform their past, present and future responses to crises. What successive ‘new economies’ have had in common for Indigenous peoples is 1) the dominance to change the type of crisis Indigenous communities are vulnerable to, and 2) both the power and inclination to exclude Indigenous thought and practice from building resilience and appropriate response mechanisms to these crises.

Māori - the Indigenous people of New Zealand - have endured various crises since the first sustained ‘contact’ with Europeans in C18th, including the often brutal effects of colonisation in the C19th and the affects of ‘true’ financial recessions in the C20th. Now re-emerging as a burgeoning ‘sector’ embedded in a wider NZ economy, Māori economic concepts and practices will potentially have major affects in the C21st and beyond. In their endurance over this time, Māori have drawn upon social memory, cultural traditions (including resistance and collaboration), concepts of socio-ecological resilience, and the need to secure the intergenerational transfer of assets, practices evident over the millennium of Māori settlement. But Indigenous CPEs are not static; indeed increasing the resilience of Māori communities can only be achieved by the timely adoption of relevant innovations in a manner that sees ‘sustainability’ comprehensively diffused across Māori land and through Māori society. Reassuringly, the politics of identity have enabled the politics of redistribution.

Keywords: Cultural Political Economy, Māori, Indigenous development, socio-ecological resilience, cultural resilience, innovation diffusion.

Introduction

[People] are constantly moving from a past that no longer exists into a future that has yet to happen. [They] are obliged to see themselves in term of memory and anticipation.

Leszek Kolakowski1

While cultural political economy (CPE) literature presents various overviews and histories of alternative economies2, little attention has been given to those CPEs that originate and, I will

argue, continue within Indigenous societies. This terra nullius is despite Indigenous CPEs being the pre-existing economic order over which extensive colonial and modernisation models were laid, affecting huge territories and their numerous and diverse communities. A simplistic meta-narrative would have these communities cursed by their contact with the aggressively expanding industrial empires of Europe, America and Japan, a benighted collection of peoples, hidebound, passive laggards whose ways were dying out through Darwinian attrition. However, the sheer tenacity of Indigenous cultures points to alternative economic spaces in which these cultures are somehow maintained. This resilience is despite massive change to Indigenous societies, notably the linking of Indigenous land, resources, and labour to hegemonic metropole economies.

The history of colonisation frames how Indigenous peoples can respond to contemporary crises but does not necessarily consign Indigenous communities to ongoing marginalisation. There is increasing urgency to learn from the past and present strategies of adaptation, not least to help understand the limitations of the various agents of change, notably government, markets, and civil society. Examining the ideas, beliefs, and values of Indigenous peoples and the distinct cultural logics that underpin their economic activity informs our understanding of crises and how better to respond.

While territorial loss may be peaking for many (but not all) Indigenous ‘contact’ scenarios, some commentators point to an insidious creep of hegemonic practices, the neocolonisation of Indigenous cultures via neoliberalism. But this neoliberal ‘way of life’, with its attendant ideas, values and beliefs, is neither preordained, ‘natural’ nor can it bestow universal, equitable, development. In addition, against almost all theorising about the resilience of neoliberalism, neoliberal economies have proved rather resilient according to their own definitions of success and failure. But to paraphrase a recent political mantra, it was always the cultural political economy. If Homo economicus was the standard bearer of imperial rule, the highly codified template of ideas, beliefs and values ensnared as neoliberalism became the de facto modus operandi for any serious nation-state, including those with significant tranches of Indigenous peoples such as New Zealand.

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5 Japan’s role as a colonising nation limits the usefulness of the term ‘Western’ that is usually applied to this phenomenon.


In this paper I examine the responses of Māori, the Indigenous people of New Zealand, to successive crises. The neoliberal restructuring of the 1990s that dramatically altered the broader NZ and global economy has merely framed the latest incarnation of crisis to test the Māori CPE. Beginning with the first ‘Contact’ experiences with an expansionary Europe, Māori engaged with various assimilation and modernisation strategies, constantly reforming and reworking their responses to the crises that prompted or resulted from such strategies. Throughout this history, the ‘politics of recognition’ can be observed bringing about unique ‘politics of redistribution’.11

**Cultural Political Economy Overview**

CPE has emerged over the past decade from an increasing prominence accorded to the processes and practices of meaning in understanding economic activities.12 In methodological terms, this shift is from a focus on the technical rules of modern systems to the ‘lifeworld’ where individuals and groups gather, interpret, muse and variously communicate their experiences. Whereas the imposition of a purposive-rationality through technical rules is fundamental to the hegemonic threat of systems, the symbolic interactions of the lifeworld are instead experienced through institutions where ‘reciprocal expectations’ between participants are governed by ‘consensual norms’.13 Life is undoubtedly (qualitatively) greater than the sum of its (quantitative) parts.

But are issues of fundamental importance being ignored through this ‘cultural turn’? Several commentators have warned that the growing literature on embeddedness and social networks may signal the politics of recognition risks overshooting the politics of redistribution, diluting what is rigorous from an older political economics first promulgated by theorists and activists fully aware of the hegemonic tendencies of capitalism.14 System and lifeworld do not correspond respectively to economy and culture: we need to accept the possibility of oppressive practices being located in our lifeworlds, just as freedom and self-fulfilment can be achieved through contractual employment. The debate has yet to identify what aspects of the ‘cultural turn’ are most insightful and which parts of the old political economics should be salvaged, although we should be hopeful the current financial crisis might clarify the options.

For Indigenous peoples, ‘old school’ political economy concerns - labour organisation, the production and distribution of goods and services, consumption — remain vividly experienced. Painfully aware of the extraction of value from their lands and bodies through the surreal ascription of exchange value to pieces of their world, Indigenous people had to fight to survive. They did not always succeed. Cynically we might say, from an Indigenous perspective, that semiotics within CPE discourse merely expands the ability of Indigenous peoples to discuss their lives within an academic context, although the importance of this should not be underestimated.15 Perhaps researchers could be forgiven for being enticed

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into the politics of identity; it is, in the parlance of the day, sexy. Of course, crises encourage semiotic as well as strategic innovation, and so more charitably we can recognise that what Indigenous peoples offer is greater diversity in the available imaginaries, discourses and practices that constitute economics.

The endurance of what is referred to (colloquially and academically) as ‘tradition’ is commonly presented as a matrix of geohistorically valid insurance policies, residual response mechanisms against the loss and fear that past crises have wrung. Other examples of what have been termed ‘gift’ or ‘moral’ economies build on our understanding of variation in cultural logics and their application in economics. This ‘stitching together’ of collectives is not just a phenomenon of isolated Indigenous communities. Close-knit social interactions have been observed on the brutal trading floor of the Chicago Board of Trade, an environment for managing financial risk that nevertheless is infused with all the quirkiness and fallibility of human beings. The Chinese custom of ‘guanxi’, the hierarchical exchange of information and capital between individuals and groups within a context of mutual obligations, has been observed within the real estate market of Vancouver as Hong Kong Chinese migrants sought security after the 1989 handover of Hong Kong to China. While similar exchanges within Western commerce are interpreted as verging on or actually breaching corruption laws, when global capital ‘locks up’, literally and metaphorically, we should not be shocked to find the absence of trust a sufficient causal factor. Indeed, such is the continued relevance of so-called ‘alternative’ economies, we might be more challenged in finding where mutual obligations and trust are absent.

For Indigenous researchers, the dyad of system (glossed as colonial intrusion) and lifeworld (reduced to ‘traditional’ and/or ‘cultural’ values) remains a fundamental theoretical viewpoint from which the collective experiences of Indigenous peoples can be described. Understanding economic processes such as commodification, industrialisation and development requires the employment of cultural terms, such as ‘symbol, imaginary, and rationality’. Integral to this debate is the interpretation of ‘place-bound experiences’, a phenomenon that underpins Indigenous cultures. Considerable disciplinary flux is evident in the wider academic literature. Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore have challenged the ‘varieties of capitalism’ school and its comparisons between coordinated market economies (notably Germany, Japan, Sweden, Austria, Norway) and liberal market economies (the US, UK, and NZ). Peck, Theodore and others promote an approach evolving out of economic geography with its multiscalar perspectives, ‘permissiveness’ as to the causes and effects of spatial

differentiation, and the problematisation of the ontological status of any ‘national’ economy.\textsuperscript{23}

The current financial crisis requires us to reintegrate macro-economic processes into our often localised studies and accept that the spaces, places, scales and flows of value are not pregiven. Māori have drawn on their historical experiences through traditional institutions to frame contemporary strategies in economic theory and practice. Despite many well-meaning scholarly treatments\textsuperscript{24}, I argue that it is the insertion of Indigenous voices and praxis that opens up the possibility of understanding economic logic in all its diversity, thus contributing to a true(r) sustainability which integrates cultural resilience for, among others, Indigenous minorities. CPE is thus an approach by which Indigenous responses to change in general and crises in particular can be understood, although I do not argue this approach is to be interpreted as the methodological answer to our many problems in discussing economics. Like nature, our CPEs abhor a vacuum! Assumptions that what replaces any defunct economic model will be more humane than what is supposedly passing have been wrong before; improvement will only happen if suitable templates exist, are acknowledged, and are engaged.

\textbf{An overview of New Zealand’s economic history}

Before commencing my primary exercise, namely the description of Māori CPE history, it is perhaps necessary to give an overview of the CPE ‘partner’ with which Māori now operate and have done for over a century. New Zealand itself is a remarkable CPE. With scarcely 6 generations of European occupation it has transitioned through a harsh frontier economy, attained status as one of the richest countries in the early to mid C20\textsuperscript{th}, and for much of that century consistently articulated liberal social, environmental, and global values. NZ was the first state to give women the vote, established a social welfare egalitarian society with world class education and health systems, and a majority of its population generally enjoys a good standard of living and an excellent quality of life, despite being perhaps the most isolated developed country in the world.\textsuperscript{25}

Yet NZ exhibits interesting contradictions. Several periods or events have challenged assumptions New Zealanders hold about themselves and their society. The 1951 ‘watersiders’ strike saw the institution of state violence and oppression; NZ involvement in the Vietnam War (from 1964 to 72) provoked widespread alarm and protest, as did the 1981 rugby tour by the national team of apartheid South Africa.\textsuperscript{26} Despite its history of wealth, NZ now has a large income gaps between rich and poor, high rates of imprisonment (with Māori disproportionately overrepresented), and poor statistics for child poverty (ditto). The media presents ongoing debates about relative international standing(s) and domestic indicators with increasing angst. New Zealanders are well aware of their relative decline in wealth, being very mobile global citizens; as many as one in five ‘Kiwis’ live offshore.

\textsuperscript{23} Gibson-Graham, J. K. 2008. Diverse economies: performative practices for ‘other worlds’. \textit{Progress in Human Geography} 32(5): 613-632,
\textsuperscript{25} Belich, King
\textsuperscript{26} ibid.
Many commentators link these negative indicators to the neoliberal reforms implemented by successive governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s, perhaps the most radical neoliberal restructuring programmes attempted anywhere.27 Yet in the words of the OECD:

The mystery is why a country that seems close to best practice in most of the policies that are regarded as the key drivers of growth is nevertheless just an average performer.28

The neoliberal reforms have perhaps done most to demarcate a line between the ‘traditional’ egalitarian welfare society that NZers would’ve claimed for their CPE, and a new global context where seemingly omniscient market forces toss the NZ economy to and fro. The ripples from these reforms continue to affect policy discussions, with some commentators maintaining they have not gone far enough and the economy requires further deregulation.29 Others argue that New Zealand is perhaps as efficient as a small, isolated economy can be through a peculiar mix of history and geography. In an insightful critique of the ‘Kiwi’ CPE orthodoxy of the past two decades, Philip McCann argues NZ is not locked into a ‘productivity paradox’ as the OECD assumes but is experiencing more of a ‘conundrum’, a ‘particular riddle’ that has resulted from ‘external, enormous and fundamental changes in the global marketplace’.30

While the NZ CPE is interesting in its own right, and its interactions in the world fundamental in many respects to this paper, I shall focus on a curious parallel CPE that originated prior to this Kiwi CPE. The Māori CPE supported the Kiwi CPE in its infancy; collaborated with, fought against, and fought for it in the two World Wars; and all the while faced oppression, marginalisation, and in perhaps the ultimate insult, was simply ignored for many decades. To paraphrase Paul McHugh, the Māori CPE is highly historicised, Anglo-settler one ‘calculatedly dehistoricised’.31 The functioning of this Māori ‘cultural political economy’ is certainly a significant factor in the resilience of Māori society. Senior Māori academic Mason Durie uses the term ‘endurance’ which he describes as being founded on time and resilience. The temporal dimension “…lends a sense of durability to endurance and confers perspective on these seemingly important – but transient – events that so often dominate the business of a single day”.32 The concepts that comprise the cultural

32 Durie’s use of the term ‘resilience’ echoes that of Adger, Berkes, Holling and others, reflecting “…both a capacity for adaptation and a propensity for turning adversity into accomplishment” (2005: 1). Durie goes on to say “Evolutionists might call it adaptation to the environment or survival of the fittest; patriots might see it simply as the fulfillment of destiny”. See also Irwin, R., and J. Ruru 2002. Mangatu. In Whenua: Managing our resources, edited by M. Kawharu, 48-61. Auckland: Reed.
logics of a Māori CPE are regularly attested by Māori. Several of the most commonly cited concepts are:

kaitiakitanga – responsibility for the environment.
kotahitanga - respect for the individual in combination with consensus.
manaakitanga – the obligations of hospitality.
taonga tuku iho – esteem for tangible and intangible assets passed down.
whanaungatanga – acknowledgment of the bonds of kinship.

Endurance is, of course, common to global humanity but aspects specific to Māori can be identified and understood as Māori culture. ‘Traditions’, including contemporary constructions of what it means to be ‘indigenous’, what it means to be ‘Māori’, draw attention to change: the adoption of new technologies, alternative policies, and institutional evolution. The ‘Māori economy’ is now seen as at least part of the answer to the productivity and economic growth issues of the NZ. The cultural distinctions operating within this political-economic sphere, that is the CPE, are such that a major component of the NZ economy is made opaque and even unintelligible, presenting a serious challenge to our understanding of the NZ economy. While we know Māori have survived ‘external, enormous and fundamental’ changes, what exactly is this history from a cultural political economic perspective?

1. Pre-Contact

The briefness of this section is not a reflection of the irrelevance of Māori ‘pre-history’, the bulk of which, after all, has occurred prior to any contact with Europe or Europeans. Māori are members of a Polynesian diaspora that originated as a distinct group of Austronesian-speakers who migrated eastwards from islands of Southeast Asia between 4-6,000 years before the present. Although precise dates are beyond current methods, Māori have occupied the south-western extremity of the ‘Polynesian triangle’, bounded by Rapanui/Easter Island to the east and Hawai’i to the north, for at least 800 years and possibly as long as 1,200. Hunting, gathering, fishing and gardening were all aspects of Polynesian culture, adapted to each locality, that were important components of economic activity as broadly conceived, stemming from the accumulated experiences of indigenous peoples and their continuous use of territorial resources.

Archaeological evidence and Māori oral history point to the seasonality of Māori subsistence which by the time of contact was an intimate and highly adapted eco-cultural resilience that had evolved from the island-dwelling geohistory of East Polynesia. An example is the hard-

won success of introducing the tropical *kumara* or sweet potato that required a two-fold adaptation: the first was to Aotearoa/New Zealand’s temperate climes; the second was a series of innovations in storage and protection of plants and tubers from extremes of temperature and post-harvest degradation. Key myths, traditions and ongoing practices serve to illustrate the importance of conserving resources for following seasons and future generations. It has been repeatedly described as an intensely holistic worldview in which Māori were materially, emotionally and spiritually entwined with their environment.

But this holistic myths and conservation ethos was hard won. Athol Anderson, a Māori archaeologist, has posited two phases for the Polynesian settlement of New Zealand. The first saw a focus upon the megafauna, represented by several species of Moa that were more abundant in the relatively dry southeast. With the extinction of these species, subsistence switched to fishing, fern-root collection, and agriculture, especially in the more humid northwest. Māori engaged in the ‘sustained predation’ and ‘cultural levels of burning [forest]’ that resulted in half the endemic bird species becoming extinct. Anderson notes this history is ‘characteristic’ of the settlement of people into a previously uninhabited and ‘fragile’ environment. Yet despite this geohistory, neither Māori nor their land and resources were so isolated, so sacrosanct, as to be immune from threatening crises which were to come, as with so many other Indigenous peoples, in the form of European explorers.

2. **Fleeting Contact: 1642 – 1800s**

On the 17th of December, 1642, the Dutchman Abel Janszoon Tasman recorded the appearance of “a large high elevated land” which he named Neew Zealend. Two days later, when attempting to land a small boat upon these new shores, a canoe of Māori (most probably members of a tribe called Ngāti Tumatekohi) rammed the vessel and four sailors were clurbed to death. It is often ignored, or perhaps not recognised, but the first material exchange between Māori and Europeans took place a little after this moment, when a small metal projectile was fired by a Dutch crew member tasked with keeping Māori at a safe distance, and was mortally received by a single Māori man. Tasman aborted any further attempts to land and Neew Zealend was no more than an outline on European maps, an alluring if forbidding destination.

In 1769, Englishman James Cook actually landed, at a place now called Gisborne on the East Coast of the North Island. While Cook and his officer companions explored the foreshore, four adolescents, including coxswain Samuel Evans, ventured some distance from the officers. Evans was standing watch when four Māori men approached. He fired two shots over their heads, to little affect. With the Māori showing no visible intent to leave, Evans levelled a musket at the man he perceived to be their leader. Thus 127 years after the first exchange, another small metal projectile was sent by another European until it too was stopped by a Māori torso, and yet again with fatal results.

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38 Leach, H. 1984. *1,000 years of gardening in New Zealand.* Wellington: Reed.

39 Anderson, op. cit.

One might think, given such disastrous first meetings, that European ideas, objects and activities would be disdained by Māori, and *vice versa*. But despite this second tragic meeting between Europeans and Māori, the very next day saw a barely contained rush by Māori for the tools of these vastly outnumbered but powerful strangers. Several individual Māori risked their lives to take a sword. Shots were again fired, felling one Māori, another leapt forward in an attempt to take the weapon, more shots were fired. This incident serves to illustrate the passionate desire Māori held for the tools, and yes the baubles, of European culture. As with their Dutch and Ngāti Tumatakokiri predecessors, the English and East Coast Māori occupied different worlds. Māori as a people were collectively strong enough to contain any threat, actual or perceived, from these newcomers and those that followed in small numbers. In fact, ‘Pākeha’ (the name soon applied to these newcomers) were often sought out to facilitate the diffusion of their radically new technologies. These two worlds were soon to come into regular, intense, and ultimately permanent contact.

3. ‘Musket Wars’ to ‘Land Wars’: Māori CPE from 1814 to 1872

Despite the violent, confused contact between Māori and Europeans, relations flourished as explorers, followed by sealers and whalers and then traders and missionaries, sought to variously profit from this new land and new people. The second period I examine is bookended by two significant, if often localised, periods of warfare, both of which I posit as proxies for ‘recession’. The first was fought among Māori according to very traditional beliefs and practices, sparked by the arrival of a radical technology – the flintlock musket. The second came about through the assertion of a radical by British settlers and involved these settlers and their military overseers fighting against and alongside Māori tribes for the rights to land. Both conflicts serve to outline the basic logics of the Māori and Colonial CPEs - one indigenous with its soon-to-be-threatened traditions, the other foreign with its hegemonic ‘deliverance’ of modernity. This binary in many ways continue to frame the contemporary situation in New Zealand.

Contact between exploring Europeans and supposedly island-bound Indigenous societies serves to highlight the ‘classic’ diffusion study of radically new European technologies to isolated stone-age societies, to the detriment of that society’s ‘traditions’. For Māori the epitome of this disruption was the large-scale introduction of firearm technology circa 1810. Dorothy Urlich described the trade in muskets from the explicit perspective of adoption and diffusion, integrating the temporal and spatial features of the diffusion of a radically new technology through Māori society in the map reproduced in Figure 1.

What is not immediately apparent is the determination of tribal agency and Māori cultural logics (principally the concept of *utu*, avenging past wrongs) that underpins the map. Internal contests led to intra-iwi fighting until tribal stability reformed and enabled more distant disputes to be settled, this time with an ever-increasing firepower. Extensive diffusion of muskets led to a series of campaigns waged between Māori, ostensibly in retribution for past grievances, and notable for their unprecedented scale and extensive demographic changes. While undoubtedly fitting the criteria of crisis for those afflicted, as

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it involved the loss of people, land, resources, and *mana* or authority, this was far from ‘financial’ as capital of this nature was yet to be widely known, let alone woven into the resilience of Māori communities. However, many if not most Māori endured, continuing a history of resilience during the post-Contact era.

Figure 1: Diffusion of Muskets, 1820-1835

The immediate aftermath of contact did not change the substance of the Māori CPE. The traditional economy (kin-centric, hunter/gatherer, horticultural) was augmented by new crops as some Māori joined an expanding market economy. This was led and controlled by chiefs whose strengthening positions were owed to their ability to supply European
settlements in Auckland and even Sydney. \(^{44}\) Hori Haupapa argued for his *iwi* or tribe to “...strive to possess some portion of [the Europeans’] wealth, and acquire mills, and ploughs, that we may be able to procure better food for our families than we lived upon in our youth”. \(^{45}\) But most initial exchange between Māori and Europeans was limited to certain locations, usually coastal settlements and often widely separated geographically. Māori knowledge bases remained strong, ownership and acquisition of property was, in the words of Firth ‘practically unaffected’. \(^{46}\) It is clear that the foundational years of a post-contact society saw Māori reforming their CPE by actively engaging with a radically new (British colonial) CPE.

Māori ventures in this period operated within the still distinct Māori context, contributing to the resilience of families and tribes but also adding to the *mana* or authority of those individuals who led successful innovation. \(^{47}\) But an understanding of the market was clearly shown when wheat prices crashed 50% in the 1855/56 season, and *rūnanga* in Tūranga and Tauranga sought to fix prices. \(^{48}\) European commentators noted the rapid depression of prices as contacts and experience widened and Māori rapidly came to understand the ‘complexities’ of a market economy while remaining broadly supported by the customary practices of long-established, well-attuned, ideas, objects and activities. Māori engaged in a quite rational experimentation with the market economy while retaining the traditional economy for any failure in the new economy, participating in a global economy, albeit attenuated through the ‘tyranny of distance’. \(^{49}\)

But the autonomy of the Māori CPE did not last. The zeal of the missionaries was matched by the passion of the entrepreneurs – Māori and non-Māori – who established extensive trading networks, buttressed by exogenous ‘revolutions’ in industry, science and agriculture. Perhaps the most fundamental and radical revolution was the growing role of market relations. The kindling of latent commercial instincts thought to reside in all civilized peoples had been an explicit motivation of European post-contact strategies. \(^{50}\) Given the domineering CPE of an immensely powerful (if waning) British empire, the identification of Māori ‘communistic’ habits led to concerted efforts by colonial officials, empowered by spectacular achievements of capitalism, to break this Indigenous paradigm. \(^{51}\) Despite a


\(^{47}\) This has been examined in diffusion discourse through the role of opinion leaders. See e.g., Rogers, E. 2005. *Diffusion of Innovations*. New York: Free Press.


\(^{50}\) Māori were not thought to occupy the lowest rung of the evolutionary ladder and thus possessed considerable potential for development and civilisation. Māori could be ‘redeemed’ allowed that their exposure to innovation might not be wasted. This was the position of the Church Missionary Society which put prospective missionaries through two years training if destined for New Zealand, as against three for India Belich, J. 1996. *Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders: from Polynesian Settlement to the end of the Nineteenth Century*. Auckland: Penguin Press., p. 135.

Treaty being signed in 1840\textsuperscript{52}, limited military conflict occurred throughout the 1840s and ongoing tension between the rapidly growing settler population and their demands for land, and increasingly recalcitrant Māori lead to open warfare in the 1860s. Māori, who had worked through whānau (family), hapū (subtribe) and occasionally iwi (tribal) contexts, now experimented with pan-iwi alliances to counter the threat of rapidly increasing and militaristic European settler forces.\textsuperscript{53}

This period saw the military defeat of Māori and their subsequent loss of control of much of what comprised their historical economies. At the end of hostilities, disease, punitive confiscation of land (which included the land of those who fought \textit{with} the government) and an almost overwhelming dislocation from their lands and resources and thus much of the ability to express and from their culture. From this time on, a variant of British CPE was firmly entrenched and the Māori CPE was further marginalised through oppressive legislation.\textsuperscript{54} Māori were quickly romanticised by their European conquerors, admired for their military bearing, their preserved tattooed heads in demand from museums around the world, their artworks and treasures exchanged as a part of an international network of imperial victors. Neither their culture nor their peoples were expected to survive as anything other than anthropological curios.

4. Smothered by the Colonial Pillow: 1878 – 1910s

The short discussion that follows does not reflect the historical evidence or importance of this period to understanding either a Māori CPE or a British/colonial CPE. Indeed the period is perhaps remarkable for the achievements of both, survival for Māori and growth for Pākehā. Essentially, Māori came to experience the same detrimental effects as other Indigenous peoples: marginalisation in their own lands; decimation through disease and military conflict; ongoing appropriation of land; fragmentation of remaining land; desecration of resources; repressive legislation and a myriad oppressive ways perpetrated by a racist majority settler population.\textsuperscript{55} More liberal observers sought to alleviate the worst of the suffering Māori were experiencing, a duty to ‘smooth the pillow of a dying race’, without believing their demise could be prevented.\textsuperscript{56}

But is it possible to eradicate all of a culture’s expression? Wherever collective remnants of a people remain, do they not also carry with them a portmanteau of CPE practices?

Assumptions on the ‘passivity’ of natives in the face of overwhelming exogenous innovations were locked to the power of the metropolitan ‘core’ and its seemingly indestructible ability to invent what was needed to maintain its own resilience and continue the extraction of wealth from the periphery. Yet while this extraction is asymmetric and inequitable, it still involves an exchange, however lop-sided, and necessarily involves the presence and agency

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} The Treaty of Waitangi, signed between representatives of the Crown and several hundred Māori chiefs, has been extensively examined and critiqued. See, e.g., Orange, C. 1987. \textit{The Treaty of Waitangi}. Wellington: Bridget Williams Books.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Ballara, A. 1998. \textit{iwi: The dynamics of Māori tribal organisation from c. 1769 to c. 1945}. Wellington: Victoria University Press.
\end{itemize}
of two distinct communities. The journals and correspondence of explorers, settlers, soldiers and sailors, the oral and recorded histories of Indigenous and colonial societies, museums, artworks and businesses are replete with the buying and selling of things, a market in which Māori were enthusiastic participants when and where they could. Their ability to do so was severely, shamefully, constrained.

Through legislation, successive NZ governments alienated Māori from their land. Perverting Māori practices of succession led to the number of owners proliferating through inheritance to a degree of fragmentation that rendered much land uneconomic. Inheritance in one case from 1876 were as little as 0.4 of a 52nd of an estate. But Māori leaders continued to explicitly integrate European concepts into their economic strategies. For example, In 1878, Wi Pere persuaded many East Coast Māori to formalise control of some of their lands to a trust. This land could then be sold or leased, and the profits used for developing other Māori land. Although the scheme ultimately failed through political opposition and the effects of economic depression (and was bailed out by the government in 1902), it marked the first time Māori land had been managed on behalf of its owners. This approach was to resurface as a significant strategy in the next period.

5. Assimilation and the Price of Citizenship: 1914 – 1945

This period forced on Māori a painful awareness of global events: over 2,200 Māori served in World War One, and about 8,500 were killed by the Spanish Flu pandemic (from a population low of 42,000 in 1896 and just 57,000 in 1921). Western ‘scientific planning’ emerged from the mobilisation of Western national production during World War One, the extensive efforts of Soviet planners in the 1920s and 30s, US scientific management, and Keynesian economic policy. To this list can be added programmes for Māori land-based industries. Two overlapping models for Māori development were promoted. The first was a continuation of assimilation policies, a default position throughout the colonial world, whereby native populations would become ‘modern’ and benefit from all that Western civilisation has to offer by adopting the ways of Pākeha.

The second mode of Māori development was selectively to adopt new ideas, objects and activities, and selectively retain Māori cultural practices considered useful or valued. This self-determination model can be identified in the actions and philosophies of several prophet movements of the 1800s and early 1900s. Across Māori society, an incredible number of new institutions were established: local marae committees and tribal rūnanga councils, as well as the (still contentious) Māori seats by which Māori were guaranteed admittedly limited parliamentary representation. Āpirana Ngata, an immensely influential leader of the Ngāti Porou tribe, began to espouse the ‘judicious’ adoption of Western

58 Pere worked with W.L. Rees, a lawyer for the Repudiation movement that sought to overturn fraudulent land deals.
59 336 Māori were killed and 734 wounded Ministry for Culture and Heritage 2009. Māori and the First World War. Ministry for Culture and Heritage.
innovations and their synthesis with aspects of Māori culture. At the start of the 20th Century, Māori on the East Coast of New Zealand formed the Union of Ngāti Porou Farmers and held meetings to promote the productive utilisation of their land. Elders were encouraged to raise money to send their sons to agricultural colleges in New Zealand and Australia. Bush was cleared from extensive areas of Māori land, then introduced grass species sown and the land stocked. Much of this work was done by communal effort, as before, and such finance as was needed came from the limited savings of the tribal members and charity from leading Europeans.

As farms became profitable, owners used their money and credit to develop further land, eventually leading to the establishment of the Waiapu Farmers’ Cooperation to provide better financial organisation. The idea of incorporating Māori land originated in the need for establishing a form of security that would be recognised by banks and commercial houses. Incorporations were made legal bodies by parliament in the 1909 Māori Land Act. This opened up the question of the land titles which could be either individualized or reduced to some form that enabled owners to offer their land as security for mortgages. These ventures remained the family affairs in the manner of the traditional land ownership and use; the owners would meet as they were accustomed, make decisions and do the work themselves. Māori began to enthusiastically take on the new ways of Pākeha.

The 1920 Native Trustee Act saw Māori receiving finance to develop their lands for agriculture. Initially implemented in Ngata’s tribal area, the practice diffused ‘outwards’, first to neighbouring Tūhoe in the Urewera in 1922. An initial venture involved sheep farming but later extended into dairying which then required engagement with “the organisation and scientific conduct of a butter-factory”. In just its second year the venture had 76 suppliers providing 300,000 lbs of butter that fetched £19,60. A limited number of Māori communities had begun participating in modern economic networks with overt commercial aims to be achieved through self-determined strategies and tactics.

Despite strong criticism of his land development initiatives, Ngata continued to advocate for both an increasing individualisation of Māori agriculture and a strengthening of ‘tribal relations’. But the strongly institutionalised traditional exchange practices were maintained, despite continued European opposition. In an extensive study of the Māori community of Ahipara, Northland, by Joan Metge and published as A New Māori Migration: Rural and Urban relations in Northern New Zealand (1964), refuted claims that Māori farm output was negatively affected by kinship obligations:

...contribution to hui, both labour and goods, were a loss or drain on the farmers’ resources only on a short-term view. He was recompensed, not for each specific gift but in a general way, when a

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66 Ibid.
69 In comparison to Ngata’s schemes in which Māori social capital and coordination were assumed to be cost-less inputs, European settlers received considerable funds to develop land, as much as £13,000 per settler in 1907. Macrae, J. T. 1975. A Study in the Application of Economic Analysis to Social Issues: The Māori and the New Zealand Economy. London: University of London.
wedding or a death occurred in his own immediate family, for then he received from kinsfolk (not necessarily those to whom he had given or in the same measure) contributions which in the aggregate covered all or a greater part of the expenses of staging of necessary hui. The [Ahipara] farmers also gave frequent gifts of meat, milk, fruit, and vegetables to kinsmen who lacked them, but these were usually returned indirectly, in the form of labour or gifts of goods not produced on the farm, such as seafoods.\(^{70}\)

In the 1930s, a new generation of Māori appeared with greater experience and confidence in managing land and possessing the fierce desire to direct their own development. Responding to this generation, Parliament set up ‘block committees’ in 1935 to assist and advise the East Coast Commissioner. These committees met regularly and discussed the problems of their respective blocks but they had no power of decision which resided solely in the government appointed commissioner.

By August 1931, there were 41 land incorporation schemes amounting to almost 240,000 hectares.\(^{71}\) By the 1950s there were 180 in the East Coast/Tairāwhiti district. Other districts also adopted this approach in utilising their land and resources. Efforts to promote and celebrate Māori farming were manifested in the competition for the Ahuwhenua Trophy to be awarded to the Māori-Farmer-of-the-Year. Instigated by Āpirana Ngata with the support of the Governor-General, Lord Bledisloe, in 1932, the contest saw farming technologies and practices promoted among an ever wider number of Māori communities.\(^{72}\) This period emphasises the entwinement of the Māori CPE with non-Māori as more innovations were either forced upon or voluntarily adopted by Māori.

The 1930s were, of course, the time of the Great Depression. Known as Te Pāheketanga Ohaoha, 75% of all Māori men were unemployed by 1933.\(^{73}\) In a further blow, the land development initiatives of Ngata were ultimately futile in the face of continued ‘land grabs’ and ongoing exclusion from broader political and structural support.\(^{74}\) A period that began with self-conscious Māori efforts to protect, assert, and enhance their approach to economics ended with another global war in which Māori played a somewhat greater role through the establishment of the 28\(^{th}\) (Māori) battalion through the efforts of the indefatigable Ngata. Ngata saw Māori participation in combat as the ‘price of citizenship; it was to be a high price, particularly for his own iwi of Ngāti Porou.\(^{75}\) Māori casualties decimated the cream of Māori leadership, and on their return, survivors found that land issues had not been resolved and the marginalisation of Māori continued.

\(^{70}\) Metge, pp. 33-34. In the book, Ahipara is named Kotare.
\(^{72}\) In 1954 the competition was split into two sections: Sheep and Cattle, and Dairy, acknowledging the impossibilities of comparing such different farming systems.
However, despite the vulnerability of Māori, examples of new Māori strategies and tactics are apparent in this period. Māori leaders brought their bicultural skills to bear upon whatever options presented themselves in the betterment of their people, often along iwi lines but also in other representations. Through parliamentary machinations, sectoral opportunities, migration, even global geopolitics, Māori were at least proving adept at enduring by winning some (admittedly limited) concessions and expanding into whatever economic opportunities arose.


In the late 1940s, a boom in wool improved performance of the weaker Māori land blocks and the great majority of Māori incorporations were resilient. However the co-operative spirit evident in their establishment began to decline. Three causes of this change can be identified. First, owners were now rarely living together as community; Māori drifted to urban areas, and not just to local urban centres but all over the country. The number of Māori farmers showed a slow decline (from 9,773 in 1951, 9,676 in 1956, to 9,141 in 1961\(^76\)) while employment opportunities were increasingly opening in manufacturing and tertiary sectors in the main metropolitan areas, as shown in Table 1.\(^77\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% change in Māori pop.</th>
<th>% tot. labour in manufacturing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Auckland</td>
<td>+3.8</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington-Hutt</td>
<td>+1.4</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Island</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotorua-Tauranga</td>
<td>+0.3</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkes Bay-Wairoa</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manawatū-Wairarapa</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whanganui-Taranaki</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton-Paeroa-Taumarunui</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Coast</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northland</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Butterworth (1967), Table 15, p.41.

The second cause of change was the growing complexity of these incorporations that were now investing large sums of money. The reliance on a communal work ethic had been replaced by paid labour, as were the vital tasks of management and administration. Thirdly, owners had become ‘legal-minded’ and advice was regularly sought as incorporations came to resemble private companies. In other cases, incorporations failed through poor accounting and administration, with struggles for power among conflicting factions and

\(^76\) Department of Industries and Commerce. 1967. *The Māori in the New Zealand Economic*, p. 34.

\(^77\) Primarily in Auckland but also pulp paper and other industries in the Bay of Plenty/Volcanic Plateau regions (Dept. Industries and Commerce, 1967, op. cit.).
assumption of power by dominant personalities, features hardly unique to Māori of course. Others suffered equally banal negative conditions, such as declining soil fertility. But the overall trend was for non-Māori, non-traditional practices to become more and more prevalent in managing Māori land, resources and employment.

The broader New Zealand economy was to face an enforced isolation when Britain, the ‘Mother Country’ and primary recipient of NZ commodity exports, joined the European Economic Community. However, for Māori, the 1975 establishment of a tribunal to address Māori grievances over breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi marked a significant change in prospects. Despite this major legislative change, the manifestation of modernisation was primarily focused on ‘European’ society and its concerns. While the cultural logics that gird production, exchange and the attribution of value according to Māori - their CPE as I have framed it - continued to operate, this was still in a colonial shadow and therefore at a much reduced scale and impact. This was to change dramatically in the next period I examine.


The 1970s were a period when Māori voices became more noticed as a younger generation took on the task of reasserting Māori culture. Later tagged a Māori ‘Renaissance’, it inspired revitalisation of the language, arts and crafts, and certain practises or customs, some of which were soon evident on the political stage as new Māori leaders agitated for change. This period highlights a fundamental concept underpinning this paper, namely the endurance of Māori culture through what equates to the politics of recognition. It is emphasised in the words and works of individuals and collectives who demonstrably or privately behaved in accordance with the historically continuous and still distinct consensual norms and obligations of Māori lifeworlds.

A fundamental focus for protests and subsequent government legislation was the land Māori had lost through questionable deals, confiscation and outright theft. Through addressing Māori claims to their historical land and resources, the Waitangi Tribunal and NZ judiciary implemented efforts to redress past injustices. When the Tribunal remit was extended to all historical claims in 1985 (i.e., including grievances dating back to 1840), tribes began to receive considerable (if partial) compensation. Although the first major tribal claims were not settled until the mid 1990s (Tainui, 1995, $170m; Ngāi Tahu, 1998, also $170m), the negotiations were initiated in the 1980s, although for Māori this was a continuation of over a century dialogue.

A wider array of responses is evident, with Māori emigrating for employment opportunities, particularly to Australia, as the NZ economy fluctuated. Māori language was revitalised through the kōhanga reo or ‘language nest’ concept and provocative, even threatening, protests brought the concerns of Māori into the wider cultural political economy of Pākeha. The closing point I have chosen for this period is perhaps the single most notable event for Māori art and culture. An exhibition of ancient carvings, collectively known as Te Māori, toured several American museums to much acclaim. Opening at the Metropolitan Museum, New York, in September 1984, Māori were on a world stage and amazingly comfortable with...

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79 Cant
in role! It marked the continuing existence of Māori culture and the worth of its historical achievements. Resonating back to NZ in an increased awareness of ‘things Māori’, it serves as a somewhat ironic demarcation point, given the radical modernism that was to follow.

8. Neoliberalism: mid-1980s on...

I closed the previous period with the opening of Te Māori in New York, a celebration of Māori artistic achievement. I open this period with a major meeting of Māori leadership, the Hui Taumata, that took place in October the same year.\(^80\) As mentioned in the introduction, the neoliberal restructuring of NZ society and economy profoundly changed and challenged the country. This hui set the stage for Māori engagement with the philosophy and practice of neoliberalism although in many respects the attempt was as naïve as efforts by ‘mainstream’ NZ to understand and respond to neoliberalism.

Chosen as an historical marker for their impact on the wider NZ economy, the structural changes saw spikes in unemployment, particularly in those sectors where Māori were disproportionately overrepresented, and a decline in living standards for poorer NZers, again with Māori overrepresented. In 1991/92 recession in NZ saw the overall unemployment rate rose from 7.2% to 11.2%, for Māori, the rate rose from 18.4% to 26.2%. In similar fashion, during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 saw unemployment for Māori increase from 15.3% to 18.7% while the overall rate only increased from 6.2% to 7.9%.\(^81\) Other data are presented below in Table 2. The sense and actuality of crisis for Māori had not abated over the entire century.

The ‘settlements’ process mentioned in the previous section was to have initiated ‘full and final’ resolution of Māori grievances. However, as Maria Bargh has argued, the settlement process itself is infused with neoliberal theory through the ‘commodification of the Māori claims and rights, and the corporatisation of the structure of the tribe’.\(^82\) Just as aspects of Anglo-settler political-economics explicitly and implicitly ‘rubbed off’ onto the dynamic Māori economic world of the C19th, Māori ventures now express various attributes of ‘corporate culture’. The elevation of ‘corporate warriors’ has seen neoliberal discourse taken to the heart of Māori debates by Māori themselves. But concerns over the operation of tribal businesses are frequently expressed by tribal members and others, and often excruciatingly played out in the NZ media to the extent that Māori often ruefully mock their own ‘politics’.\(^83\)

The pressures upon NZ’s economy have emphasised the need for a competitive national innovation system, maximising all possible contributions including those of the historically dismissed Māori who have since reclaimed ever wider space within their own country.\(^84\) This can be just a temporary demarcation of Māori space by the physical and vocal presence of Māori, including the enactment of certain selected rituals and practices. Instances of this practice occur regularly when Māori collectives meet in non-Māori institutional venues, opening meetings and closing meetings with traditional rituals. A second form of

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\(^{80}\) See www.huitaumata.māorionz/


reclamation of Māori space is over the extended canvas of policy, sociotechnologies, and institutional innovation. Both reclaims are a result of intergenerational protest and activism on the part of Māori (and their not-inconsiderable Pākehā supporters).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 15-24</th>
<th>Year 25-44</th>
<th>Year 45-64</th>
<th>Year Tot. 15+</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009            (Sept)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009            (Dec)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Labour (2009)

This centring of debate and protest action on historical territories echoes the argument of Arturo Escobar and others for the reassertion of ‘place’ in the globalisation discourse. Escobar considers “The marginalisation of place in European social theory of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been particularly deleterious to those social formations for which place-based modes of consciousness and practices have continued to be important”. Here we might see the politics of recognition – ‘I am Māori’ - largely won, with what it means to be Māori the primary challenge. But within the ‘space of place’, codified in successive New Zealand legislative and policy attempts to ‘develop’ the natives, Māori clearly continue what the influential Ngata referred to as the ‘old time paths’. These paths are identifiable as traversing alternative economic space, being predicated on Māori cultural logics that guided development strategies. These logics are expressed through the institutional means by which Māori seek to develop their land and resources, combining small-scale geohistorical knowledge bases with externally sourced innovations.

9. **Diversification: Māori CPE to the 22nd Century**

And so we come to the current period, marked as it is by significant and continuing financial crises around the world. As noted in the previous section, contemporary Māori development

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occurs in a context of fluid knowledge, moving through extensive networks of potential and actual global reach in which participants continually re-imagine their personal and collective involvement, the utilisation (or not) of natural resources, and the intergenerational transfer of assets and liabilities. Negotiated settlements between successive New Zealand governments and Māori iwi or tribes that began to be implemented in the 1990s have seen significant transfer of land, assets and cash to Māori. While I do not wish to gloss over Māori concerns and opposition to this process and its outcomes, the table below gives the structural bones of what is arguably a ‘Māori economy’. While definitions are reformed and approaches refined, it is commonly agreed that this economy – estimated at over $NZ16 billion - continues to expand. Māori farmers own over $100m worth of shares in the dairy company Fonterra making them among its largest shareholders; they also contribute over 15% of New Zealand’s sheep and beef exports. Māori also control 40% of the seafood sector (often in joint ventures with Asian companies), are set to take 20% of the new aquaculture sector, and have large and increasing forestry assets.

Ongoing ‘Treaty settlements’ will see continued the return of traditional lands and significant (if partial) financial compensation to mandated tribal authorities, contributing to a still-growing Māori asset base. While more complex indicators than simple economic ones are needed to measure any development, coarse data are informative. As Table 3 shows, Māori commercial ventures lie predominantly in the primary production sector, much of which is committed to the export sector, further exposing Māori development to an economic vulnerability arising from a lack of sufficient resilience in the face of global economic forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Māori Assets and Capital Investments 2005/06</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary ($m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori collectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total NZ %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Te Puni Kōkiri (2008a), Table 3, p. 32.

A number of constraints have been identified in the development of this Māori asset base. Māori ventures experience difficulties in raising capital, due to restrictions on Māori land as collateral, and a lack of the appropriate governance structures and management skills. Successful development of primary industries is increasingly dependent on advanced

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technology and marketing, that is networks from which Indigenous peoples were historically excluded. Examples of the new vigour and challenges in the Māori CPE abound. The Federation of Māori Authorities (FOMA), a collective of over 150 Māori trusts and incorporations collectively managing 800,000 hectares of land for over 100,000 shareholders. 95 Established in 1987, FOMA hosts an annual conference showcasing the achievements of their members as well as presenting and discussing relevant research aimed of improving their performance. Several Māori incorporations were represented that are valued at hundreds of millions of dollars, media companies including internet broadcasting, and others representing Māori ventures in construction, health, and education. 98

These contemporary Māori ventures sit within a confident Māori-centric socio-political context. These ventures involve advanced digital technologies, some will seek advanced biotechnologies, including genetic engineering, and they increasingly engage international partners, all as a matter of course. A Māori political party (called the Māori Party) is currently in a government coalition with the centre-right National Party and the hard-right Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT) Party. A Māori television station has been operating since 2004; there has been a proliferation of both fiction and non-fiction publications which present Māori to the rest of New Zealand society, to Māori themselves, and to the world. Māori themes have been evident in several acclaimed movies notably Once were Warriors and Whalerider), and Māori imagery continues to be popular, although often for purposes beyond the control or approval of many Māori.

Yet strong divisions are now evident. Māori political representation crosses all political parties. A class system, perhaps nascent in recent treatments, is perhaps well entrenched. The transfer of assets and financial compensation implements significant change for Māori and Pakeha, not least in the reassertion of iwi and hapu authority at the expense of a pan-Māori societal identification. The growing wealth of the incorporations and trusts hints that iwi authority may also wane, at least in some instances. Having presented what I hope is a cogent argument for the interpretation of Māori development as an example of the evolution of a cultural political economy, I concede it may already be dated, and that we must speak of the plurality of Māori CPEs, divided along iwi, hapu, and even whānau lines as incorporations and whānau trusts demarcate their assets and strategic development on legal and cultural grounds.

Discussion

Modernisation sought to eradicate traditions as being not just inconducive but utterly antithetical to universal development. While resistance has been expressed by large-scale social movements, it has also arisen from localised responses where collective embeddedness in territorial occupation not only provided a source of fundamental knowledge, but unique and often vibrant ways of being that I have interpreted as cultural

political economies. Through the post-contact history of Māori we can observe the politics of redistribution merging with the politics of recognition. Māori now assert aspects of their culture – through CPE praxis – in their increasing interactions with a CPE that was previously impervious to the ideological contagion inherent within this Indigenous ‘tradition’. 99

Māori have endured the ‘transient’ events that ‘so often dominate the business of a single day’. They are also now required to endure increasingly significant financial crises that originate beyond the influence of a traditionally hegemonic ‘partner’ CPE. In the history of this endurance can be observed the ‘strategies of the powerless’ and the ‘tools of the oppressor’. 100 The brief overview I have presented views post-contact Māori economic development as a synthesis between, on the one hand, geographically-fixed physical capital (primarily ‘traditional’ lands and associated resources as seen with Māori) and the ideas, beliefs and values of ancestral owners, and on the other hand the economic forces and all the chaotic fluidity of ICT-mediated knowledge and (often speculative) capital that extends globally.

Yet in the last phases of interaction can be discerned remarkably similar responses to crises, especially as these crises take the format of financial crises. Māori agribusinesses engage in debates concerning strategies on management, accounting, rates, investing and so on; lately these debates have included responses to national and international climate change policies. Politically, the Māori Party – a member of a right-wing coalition – instigated a Ministerial review of the recession and its effects on Māori, particularly Māori unemployment, a classic ‘modern’ response of the type once mocked by Māori. Table 4 outlines the various crises that Māori society has experienced since contact with non-Māori, the responses of both Māori and the mainstream NZ; other CPEs involved are listed (albeit at the relatively coarse scale of the nation-state). Each phase of adaptation has, over time, drawn responses less dissimilar from the historically hegemonic ‘colonial’ CPE. While Māori constantly express the desire to preserve and develop their cultural capital, this is now juxtaposed within a global exchange of historically personal and localised narratives, images and performances. Since the mid-1980s, Māori have had to frame their development strategies within a challenging neoliberal context and this has naturally – and I use the term deliberately – led to a syncretism between two previously violently opposed CPEs.


Table 4: Summary of evolution of post-contact Māori CPEs and their responses to crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crises</td>
<td>radical technologies</td>
<td>invasion, disease, loss of land and resources, dislocation.</td>
<td>marginalisation</td>
<td>industrial war, poverty</td>
<td>widening gaps</td>
<td>unemployment, substandard education, working conditions</td>
<td>real estate bubble, debt-fuelled consumption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori responses</td>
<td>rapid adoption, barter</td>
<td>militariation, collaboration, pan-iwi alliances, religious movements</td>
<td>incorporation, land trusts, urban migration</td>
<td>protest, art &amp; literature, international migration&lt;sup&gt;101&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Treaty settlements, eclectic social policy initiatives, Māori Party</td>
<td>Ministerial taskforce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>exploration, scientific description</td>
<td>anthropological curiosity, romanticism</td>
<td>Eurocentricism</td>
<td>paternal legislation, collaboration</td>
<td>neoliberalism</td>
<td>Global citizenship</td>
<td>Public spending cuts</td>
<td>Tax reform?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream actions</td>
<td>exploration, scientific description</td>
<td>anthropological curiosity, romanticism</td>
<td>Eurocentricism</td>
<td>paternal legislation, collaboration</td>
<td>neoliberalism</td>
<td>Global citizenship</td>
<td>Public spending cuts</td>
<td>Tax reform?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core CPEs</td>
<td>Holland, England, France</td>
<td>Britain, Australia, USA</td>
<td>Britain, Australia</td>
<td>Britain, US,</td>
<td>EU, US, Australia</td>
<td>EU, US, Middle-East, Japan, Australia</td>
<td>EU, Nth America, Middle-East, SE Asia, Sth America, Australia, China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>101</sup> Principally Australia.
Any remaining conceptual walls of a utopian Indigenous enclave are torn down by the escalation of problems faced by these modern Māori ventures. Those in the primary sector are now confronted with the ecological constraints predicted, ironically, by the Indigenous discourses noted previously and the failure to provide employment to their own youth. Interaction between Māori CPEs and other economies continues with increasing speed and scale. Valuable insight into such interactions can be gained through the observation and analysis of the trade and transfer of innovations, i.e., the diffusion processes between ‘cores’ and Indigenous ‘peripheries’. For Māori, these processes are affected by policies and approaches (of both Māori and non-Māori), the characteristics of the innovations (such as the culturally perceived peculiarities of biological innovations), and the establishment, evolution and always-possible demise of institutions that attempt to innovation.

The Māori history of resistance nests within a cultural identity that has produced an ‘imaginary’ of economic activities that builds on traditions of guardianship of ecosystems and descendents through the adoption of the ideas, objects and activities from a succession of CPEs that have arrived on their borders. Bugs in the code have been apparent from the inception of capitalism. For reasons ranging from the perpetuation of social injustice to the dangerous degradation of ecological systems, the programme keeps on crashing and various socio-ecological systems are clearly under serious threat. But just as ‘mainstream’ societies accept significant change will be related to economy, so too do Indigenous communities with the proviso that their distinct cultural logics concerning, among other things, how individuals and collectives exercise choice in their economic activities.

Let me reiterate that Indigenous peoples are not averse to change but rather express an obvious desire to retain the autonomy of their lifeworlds. If modernity is a rupture with tradition, and a demarcation point between (supposedly) sustainable societies of the past and the (evidently unsustainable) contemporary societies, Indigenous peoples attempt to bridge this division by continuing with selected expressions of their cultures, not least attempts at commercial exploitation of their lands with an articulated history of ecological guardianship of the holistically-interpreted biosphere. What Māori collectives are asserting in their development strategies is the expansion of their cultural political economy into the highly dynamic spaces of whatever ‘new economy’ should arise from the ashes of the previous contender. Allocating the benefits of this Māori economy will become increasingly difficult as partner CPEs, particularly the ‘Kiwi’ CPE, face ongoing pressures to successfully perform with financial capital. Admonitions by those concerned at a softening of investigation due to the a relaxing of attempts to redistribute the benefits of economic activities, of whatever form or nature, must be wonderfully isolated from the lifeworlds of Indigenous peoples.

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