

# Sustainability needs good economics

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## Economics

With few exceptions ... its practitioners are little known to non-economists, and frequently mocked. Who can forget what Lyndon Johnson once said to John Kenneth Galbraith?

*"Did it ever occur to you, Ken, that making a speech on economics is a lot like pissin' down your leg. It seems hot to you, but it never does to anyone else."*

Kevin R. Kosar , 2007.

## Key economics ideas

- Economics - how we make *choices* over scarce items
- People respond to *incentives* in making choices
- *Scarce items* have alternative uses
- If we choose one use of a resource we forgo the benefit from other uses of the resource.
- Benefit foregone = *Opportunity Cost*


## Water in New Zealand

- Large amounts of water but not always in the right place at the right time in the right amount
- 1410 m<sup>3</sup>/capita abstracted, 2<sup>nd</sup> highest in OECD
  - irrigation 77%, public supply 16%, industry, 7%
- Water quality is degraded in many urban waterways, lowland rivers and streams, lakes.
- Public concern about water availability and quality
- New policies and tools needed.

## State of New Zealand environment, Hughey et al. 2006

- 2000 adults also asked to rate quality of 11 aspects of NZ environment (rivers and lakes, groundwater, air, soils...)
- And ...”how does NZ natural environment compare to other developed countries”
- Respondents state:
  - NZ rivers and lakes, and groundwater are in ‘good’ or ‘very good’ state,
  - But are lowest, and fourth lowest, rated respectively of 11 aspects of NZ environment
  - NZ environment is in better condition than is environment in other developed countries.

# Perceived state of NZ environment Hughey et al., 2006




## International rating of water availability and quality

- Esty et al., 2005 provide a rating of 146 countries national environmental stewardship.
- Water quality is measured by 4 variables,
  - DO, EC, Phosphorous concentration, suspended solids
- Water quantity
  - freshwater and groundwater per capita
- Overall NZ ranked 14<sup>th</sup> of 146 countries.
- Water quantity is NZ best score.
- Water quality is NZ 3rd best score

# New Zealand

ESI:	61.0
Ranking:	14
GDP/Capita:	\$18,416
Peer group ESI:	55.4
Variable coverage:	70
Missing variables imputed:	2



Air Quality	0.65	0.43
Biodiversity	-1.99	-0.23
Land	-0.68	0.61
Water Quality	1.31	0.57
Water Quantity	1.71	-0.14
Reducing Air Pollution	-0.61	-1.08
Reducing Ecosystem Stress	0.44	-0.20
Reducing Population Stress	0.60	0.76
Reducing Waste & Consumption Pressures	-0.35	-0.25
Reducing Water Stress	-0.38	-0.71
Natural Resource Management	-0.26	-0.55
Environmental Health	0.88	0.83
Basic Human Sustenance	0.90	0.93
Reducing Env.-Related Natural Disaster Vulnerability	0.31	0.19
Environmental Governance	1.15	0.99
Eco-Efficiency	0.40	-0.13
Private Sector Responsiveness	0.41	0.92
Science and Technology	1.33	1.28
International Collaborative Efforts	0.34	0.62
Greenhouse Gas Emissions	-0.15	-0.15
Reducing Transboundary Environmental Pressures	-1.39	-0.36

- Indicator value  
 - Reference (average value for peer group)


## Urban Water and Wastewater Services

- Large, costly network services
  - Capital invested big part of TLA assets
  - Annual costs big part of some TLA budgets
  - Water ~ 6.1% CCC of annual expenditure
  - Wastewater ~ 9.3% CCC of annual expenditure
- Diverse pricing systems used, but metering and volumetric charging is rare
  - Dunedin users: \$320/household for water
  - Twizel, \$109 + \$45/ property for water
  - Hurunui all water users: Charge per m<sup>3</sup>
  - Kaikoura motels, wastewater charge – number of toilets
- Choice of pricing system matters


## Seasonal demand

- Seasonal water and wastewater demand, driven by tourism in many smaller centres
- Can have major environmental effects
- Peak demand has high % of discretionary use
- Peak pricing could reduce water demand, and better reflect fiscal and environmental costs

# Akaroa Tourism, Water Seasonality



# Marginal Social Benefits from water



## Funding Water & Wastewater Services


Rates set prices for water and wastewater services

If price/litre = 0, likely that usage  $\uparrow$  until MB = 0, and  $\uparrow$  demand for capacity,  $\uparrow$  operating costs,  $\uparrow$  environmental impacts.

**Do rating systems for water and wastewater services contribute to sustainability goals?**

Could they be improved?

# Marginal Social Benefits from water



## Do prices reduce water use?

- Price elasticity =  $\frac{\% \Delta \text{ quantity}}{\% \Delta \text{ price}}$
- Price elasticity of demand for water is  $< 1.0$
- Water usage falls by 15+% with water charges/m<sup>3</sup>
- Price elasticity is greatest during peak use periods, as more water use is discretionary
- Water meters & charges assist identification of leakages
- Water meters installed in Akaroa, December 2002
  - Water use over summer peak period 40% less than in 2001/02

## Christchurch water and sewerage rates, 2007-08

	Water	Sewerage
Residential (connected)	0.042195c/\$CV	0.067728c/\$CV
Non-Residential (connected)	0.042195c/\$CV Excess water 45c/m <sup>3</sup>	0.067728c/\$CV

# Hanemann (1998) Evaluation Criteria

## Revenue generation

- Sufficient
- Stable over time
- Complexity and administrative costs

## Cost allocation

- Non-arbitrary
- No cross subsidisation
- Include all private and social costs

## Provision of incentives

- Statically efficient water use
- Dynamically efficient water use
- Encourage water conservation
- Transparent water charges

# Christchurch water charges evaluated

	Compliance	Justification
<b>Sufficient</b>	<b>Yes</b>	The rates collected cover all costs.
<b>Stable over time</b>	<b>Yes</b>	Predictable and no significant changes with water use.
Administration costs & complexity	Costs only	Flat rate and little differentiation between users.
Non-arbitrary	No	MC = 0 for residents, 45c/m <sup>3</sup> for business after reach allowance
<b>No cross subsidisation</b>	<b>No</b>	High water users are subsidised.
Static efficiency	No	Big first block of water, no seasonal peak charges.
Dynamic efficiency	No	High water allowance sets no incentives to change long-run behaviour.
<b>Encourage conservation</b>	<b>No</b>	Zero marginal water charge - residents no incentives to engage in water conservation
Correct interpretation	Partially	Transparent system, but no recognition of right incentives.

## Christchurch pricing, comment...

- Meters read once per two years residential, once per year non residential.
- No incentive for residential users to reduce water use until reach  $1\text{m}^3$  per day, non residential until reach  $3\text{m}^3$  per day.
- No recognition of seasonal variation in scarcity.
- No price incentive to reduce volumetric use of wastewater system.

# Marginal Cost or Average Cost pricing?

- AC easy to calculate, but could we do better?
- $MC = \frac{\Delta \text{ Total costs}}{\Delta \text{ quantity of water}}$
- MC pricing desirable for efficiency but...
  - Difficult to calculate
  - Revenue can be unstable
  - Complicated for customers to understand
- Use combination of tools to get close to Marginal Cost pricing

## Sustainability and three goals of rating systems

- TLA are concerned about revenue stability
  - Two part pricing to ensure that revenue does not fluctuate unacceptably with changes in water usage
- Fixed charge plus volumetric charges a solution
  - Sufficient revenue is collected
  - Costs are more accurately allocated
  - Incentives are provided to conserve water and reduce use of wastewater system

# Fixed and volumetric charges

- Accounting for fixed and variable costs
- Block increases in price per cubic metre
  - E.g.: \$1.80/m<sup>3</sup> for first 200m<sup>3</sup>, \$2/m<sup>3</sup> for next 500m<sup>3</sup>, \$3/m<sup>3</sup> for all subsequent m<sup>3</sup>
- High first fixed charge and lower but increasing subsequent fixed charges
  - E.g.: \$110 for first 200m<sup>3</sup>, +\$40 for next 500m<sup>3</sup>, +\$65 for all subsequent m<sup>3</sup>
- **Wastewater usage** can be charged by a **proxy** - m<sup>3</sup> of water used.
- Use **seasonal prices** to conserve water in summer.


## Rating systems and Sustainability

- Reduced water use means
  - less demand for infrastructure
  - lower operating costs
  - less pressure on the water sources
- Achievements are useful contributions towards
  - economic,
  - social and
  - environmental sustainability objectives.

## MSB and water allocation

- If we have fixed quantity of water to allocate between uses, economic efficiency is achieved if we allocate water so that  $MSB_d = MSB_h$  for any  $d$  and  $h$
- Allocate  $0-Q_1$  water to dairy,  $Q_2 - Q_1$  to horticulture
- Opportunity cost of using water for horticulture is the foregone MSB of less water for dairy
- If current allocation is at  $Q_2$ ,  $MSB_d > MSB_h$  and we could increase social welfare by reallocating  $Q_2 - Q_1$  water
- ABC - the gain in social benefit from water reallocation

# MSB and water allocation



## Water allocation in New Zealand

- Water permits allocated on first come first served basis
- Unlikely to result in water going to its highest valued uses if there are competing uses
- Permits for up to 35 years, non transferable, hence water unlikely to move to highest valued uses
- RMA allows water to be allocated at zero price
  - ⇒ no return to 'owners'
  - ⇒ economic rents to permit holders leads to land price ↑
- Zero price likely to result in inefficient use of water
- Allocation process can involve 'assessment of environmental effects'
- 'Economic effects' are considered, but flawed if they do not include an opportunity cost for water

## Rural water allocation

Allocation process could aim for several objectives

- Allocation of water to its highest valued uses (economic, social, environmental, cultural)
- Efficient use of water
- Fair return to ‘resource owners or managers’
- Ability for water to be reallocated to highest valued uses as they become known
- Investor certainty


## Rural water allocation

- Water allocations at zero price for up to 35 years, little transferability, only meets investor certainty objective.
- Some water uses are public goods, e.g. instream use, and government decision required on its MSB and how much to retain for that purpose.
- Water for private use - pursue the 5 objectives by:
  - Competitive bids for water
  - Royalties for use of water
  - Allow transfer of water rights
  - Well defined property rights for water

# Water allocation and water quality

- If one water use has external effects on third parties (e.g. lowers stream quality) we need to subtract the marginal external costs from MSB for that use.
- Measurement of marginal external costs requires careful research, or use of value transfer methods to help identify the efficient allocation.
- <http://ecovalue.uvm.edu/newzealand/>
- If MSB - MEC used to determine allocation of water, → reduced allocation to the use with external effects.
- Reduced allocation to that use → less external effect.

# MSB and water allocation



# External costs of Canterbury dairy farming

Tait and Cullen 2006.

<b>Canterbury Dairy Economic Surplus (\$1780/ha)</b>		<b>\$260,000,000</b>
<b>Damage estimates</b>		<b>\$</b>
Water	Surface water	115,000
	Groundwater	40,000
	Angler values	9,000 - 16,000
Air	CO <sub>2</sub> equivalent	24,269,000 - 40,449,000
Biodiversity	Shelterbelts	2,947,000
	Sediment	18,000
Human Health	Pathogen related illness	39,000 - 152,000
	Bovine TB	1,265,000
<b>Total</b>		<b>\$28,702,000 - \$45,002,000</b>
	<b>External costs/</b>	<b>~ \$200/ha/year</b>

## Recognise water scarcity, reduce use, increase efficiency of use

- Water is scarce, and we need to recognise scarcity.
- We can increase social benefits, reduce demand for water and infrastructure by use of variable charges for urban water and wastewater services
- Allocation of rights to use water could be modeled on methods to allocate rights to minerals, oil and gas
- AFO, Competitive bids, royalties will ensure a fair return to owners/managers of water
- Allowing transfer of water rights will ensure it has scarcity value and use gravitates towards highest valued uses.
- Economic research needed to value marginal external costs to impact water allocation decisions

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