Government’s role in adverse events assistance
Authors
Date
1986-07
Type
Discussion Paper
Collections
Fields of Research
Abstract
Despite the many factors that contribute to the annual
variations in agricultural production, climatic fluctuations
explain much of the variability. Although these fluctuations
include flood, snow, hail and wind damages, the
report concentrates on drought. Given that droughts occur
with varying frequency to many parts of the country, the
important question from an efficiency perspective is how to
ameliorate the cost of these droughts. We are not concerned
with measuring the cost of drought by making comparisons
with a perfect world that is the so called nirvana
fallacy. We are concerned with finding a least cost
solution to the whole issue of adverse events.
Historically, one of the justifications for government
involvement has been that adverse events relief is a so called
public good which cannot be accommodated within the
private sector. Externalities are said to exist when costs
of an action are borne by persons other than those able to
be directly affected by the outcome of that action, and it
is considered that an externality exists because people
other than farmers are affected by droughts or floods.
However, recent literature in welfare economics suggests
that the existence of externalities do not necessarily
require government action. Does the private sector offer a
better solution, and, if so, what are the impediments to
transferring the role of adverse events relief to the
private sector?
Government has provided grants and subsidies to
mitigate the effects of both droughts and floods in recent
years. These schemes, as well as other government policies,
are shown to alter the private solution to adverse events.
Farmers alter management strategies if it is considered that
ad hoc drought relief packages will be available from
government. Irrigation is not considered to present an
economically viable option for drought risk management, as
the costs of premiums are too high. The futures market
has little potential for handling climatic risk, as yield
and not price is generally affected by droughts and floods.
The role of insurance schemes is investigated in
detail. Among American, Canadian, Australian and New
Zealand programs for adverse events insurance, the Canadian
forage crop programs, although in the early stage of
development, would appear to have most relevance to New
Zealand. All the schemes reviewed, however, lack financial
viability without government subsidies.
The justification for subsidisation of insurance
schemes is that it allows government to withdraw completely
from providing solutions on an ad hoc basis and the
associated cost involved with these policies. The
responsibility passes from a public to a private solution,
even though some form of subsidisation would be necessary.