Poor corporate governance, undisciplined market and cronyism in the 1997 Asian crisis

Abstract

Corporate governance refers to the rules of the game that enables stakeholders to exercise appropriate oversight of a company to maximize its value and profits. Both financial and corporate governance restructuring is an ongoing reform program in the post Asian crisis-ridden countries. To be fully effective, corporate restructuring must be linked to bank restructuring, which, in turn, must be linked to the settlement of external debt problems to scale down the systemic risks. Fundamental changes within the economy are necessary to create arm’s-length relations between the government, corporations, and banks. Many corporations in the crisisridden countries are over-indebted and frequently are part of conglomerates or monopolies that are controlled by small groups and have nontransparent accounting and close links to government and financial institutions including commercial banks (Iskander, et al., 1999). This paper examines the impact of corporate restructuring and governance in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis in East Asia. There is an immediate clarion need to re-evaluate the issue of the market cultures and corporate governance in East Asia economies. The quality of governance is a key determinant to rehabilitate the financial institutions of crisis-ridden countries. This paper addresses itself towards answering some of the questions that policy-makers themselves must answer as they strive to undertake comprehensive reform to promote better governance so as to reduce excessive risks taking without causing distress in the financial markets minimizing the chances of a second wave of crisis.