Debating Bio(in)security: The containment of genetically modified organisms in New Zealand

Abstract

As a small island nation dependant primarily on agricultural exports and nature tourism for its income, New Zealand biosecurity policy and legislation is predicated on a need to protect its physical borders from incursion by unwanted disease or alien species. There is a sharply defined distinction between “inside” and “outside”, and there is an ever-present effort to control pathways for “escape” or “invasion”. Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) pose one such biosecurity risk, and any research involving GMOs is therefore regulated by biosecurity legislation. Accordingly, risk management strategies are used to control pathways for the escape of genetic material from designated areas for research, known as containment facilities. Although these risk management strategies are often controversial, there is nevertheless some consensus over what constitutes an acceptable venue for research. Field-based research is widely regarded as carrying a high level of risk, whereas research conducted in a laboratory is generally viewed as safe. In this paper we will argue that the contrast between laboratories and fields is not simply due to inherent characteristics of these two places of research. Using the analytical tools of Actor-Network Theory (ANT), we will demonstrate that risk management practices involving actors on both sides of the debate over GMO research are themselves enacting a !106 separation between laboratories and fields. This in turn is serving to shape the direction of GMO research in New Zealand; as yet, however, this research trajectory has not been explicitly recognised or debated. We hope that by initiating this debate we will not only redefine the risks associated with GMO research, but also envision alternative ways of doing GMO research.