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dc.contributor.authorLi, Zhaohua
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-22T02:09:17Z
dc.date.available2019-02-11en
dc.date.issued2019-02-11
dc.date.submitted2018-12-19en
dc.identifier.issn1035-6908en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10182/10557
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines who receives government subsidies when a firm faces delisting risk and how subsidies affect such a firm's performance in China. It focuses on the accounting-based delisting rule issued in 1998 that relies heavily on the profitability of firms. Using the probit model, this study finds that subsidies are less likely to be granted to a firm that has a higher risk of being delisted than a healthy firm, but are more likely to be granted to such a firm if it is state-owned. It is also found that having a political connection increases a firm's chance of receiving subsidies, but such an effect disappears when a firm faces a delisting risk. In assessing the impact of a subsidy on firm performance, this study shows that a subsidy increases a firm's valuation and profitability for firms at delisting risk.en
dc.format.extent18en
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWiley on behalf of CPA Australia
dc.relationThe original publication is available from - Wiley on behalf of CPA Australia - https://doi.org/10.1111/auar.12283en
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1111/auar.12283en
dc.rights© 2019 CPA Australia
dc.subjectgovernment subsidiesen
dc.subjectdelistingen
dc.subjectChinaen
dc.subjectstock exchangeen
dc.titleEarnings-based delisting regulations and government subsidiesen
dc.typeJournal Article
lu.contributor.unitLincoln University
lu.contributor.unitFaculty of Agribusiness and Commerce
lu.contributor.unitDepartment of Financial and Business Systems
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/auar.12283en
dc.relation.isPartOfAustralian Accounting Reviewen
pubs.notesEarly View recorden
pubs.organisational-group/LU
pubs.organisational-group/LU/Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce
pubs.organisational-group/LU/Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce/FABS
pubs.organisational-group/LU/Research Management Office
pubs.organisational-group/LU/Research Management Office/PE20
pubs.organisational-group/LU/Research Management Office/QE18
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden
dc.identifier.eissn1835-2561en
lu.identifier.orcid0000-0002-4732-7997


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