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    Evolutionary bargaining games

    Wright Julian, KD
    Abstract
    The simple Nash demand game is analysed in an evolutionary context. The evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) are characterised in the cases where players have symmetric and asymmetric roles. Introducing stochastic effects we show conditions under which the set of Nash equilibria converges to the Nash bargaining solution as the noise becomes negligible. Two evolutionary models are given for which these conditions are satisfied. In each case above the simulated limit outcome of the replicator selection dynamics is given for a range of parameter values. Both approaches give evolutionary support for the Nash bargaining solution.... [Show full abstract]
    Keywords
    Nash bargaining game; bargaining process; game theory; econometric model; Nash equilibrium; stochastic demand; Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS)
    Fields of Research
    140201 Agricultural Economics
    Date
    1991-05
    Type
    Discussion Paper
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    • AERU Discussion Paper series [158]
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