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dc.contributor.authorWright, Julian K. D.
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-19T22:54:46Z
dc.date.available2009-02-19T22:54:46Z
dc.date.issued1991-05
dc.identifier.issn0113-4507
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10182/850
dc.description.abstractThe simple Nash demand game is analysed in an evolutionary context. The evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) are characterised in the cases where players have symmetric and asymmetric roles. Introducing stochastic effects we show conditions under which the set of Nash equilibria converges to the Nash bargaining solution as the noise becomes negligible. Two evolutionary models are given for which these conditions are satisfied. In each case above the simulated limit outcome of the replicator selection dynamics is given for a range of parameter values. Both approaches give evolutionary support for the Nash bargaining solution.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherLincoln University. Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit.en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper (Lincoln University (Canterbury, N.Z.). Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit) ; no. 130en
dc.subjectNash bargaining gameen
dc.subjectbargaining processen
dc.subjectgame theoryen
dc.subjecteconometric modelen
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen
dc.subjectstochastic demanden
dc.subjectEvolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS)en
dc.titleEvolutionary bargaining gamesen
dc.typeDiscussion Paperen
dc.subject.marsdenFields of Research::340000 Economics::340400 Econometrics::340402 Econometric and statistical methodsen
dc.subject.marsdenFields of Research::340000 Economics::340100 Economic Theory::340103 Mathematical economicsen
dc.subject.marsdenFields of Research::340000 Economics::340400 Econometrics::340401 Economic models and forecastingen
lu.contributor.unitDepartment of Accounting, Economics and Financeen
lu.contributor.unitAgribusiness and Economics Research Uniten


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