

**BUILDING BETTER
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whakamāhorahora

Soft Infrastructure for Hard Times

Collaborative Planning for the (Re)Building of Better
Homes, Towns and Cities

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Building Better Homes, Towns and Cities National Science Challenge

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Abstract

Disaster recovery involves the restoration, repair and rejuvenation of both hard and soft infrastructure. In this report we present observations from seven case studies of collaborative planning from post-earthquake Canterbury, each of which was selected as a means of better understanding 'soft infrastructure for hard times'. Though our investigation is located within a disaster recovery context, we argue that the lessons learned are widely applicable.

Our seven case studies highlighted that the nature of the planning process or journey is as important as the planning objective or destination. A focus on the journey can promote positive outcomes in and of itself through building enduring relationships, fostering diverse leaders, developing new skills and capabilities, and supporting translation and navigation. Collaborative planning depends as much upon emotional intelligence as it does technical competence, and we argue that having a collaborative attitude is more important than following prescriptive collaborative planning formulae. Being present and allowing plenty of time are also key.

Although deliberation is often seen as an improvement on technocratic and expert-dominated decision-making models, we suggest that the focus in the academic literature on communicative rationality and discursive democracy has led us to overlook other more active forms of planning that occur in various sites and settings. Instead, we offer an expanded understanding of what planning is, where it happens and who is involved. We also suggest more attention be given to values, particularly in terms of their role as a compass for navigating the terrain of decision-making in the collaborative planning process. We conclude with a revised model of a (collaborative) decision-making cycle that we suggest may be more appropriate when (re)building better homes, towns and cities.

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Part One: Collaborative Planning - Soft Infrastructure for Hard Times

There is a popular notion that geese in a 'V formation' can fly 70 percent further together than if they fly alone (Figure 1). While ornithologists might debate the details, this idea highlights the advantages that can be gained through working together 'on the fly', as well as pointing to synergies that make a whole greater than the sum of its parts.



Figure 1: Geese in V formation (Photo: Jamie Troughton – Describe Media Services)

In the following pages we present stories about the ways in which communities, local government, NGOs and CBNs (community-based networks) have worked together to accomplish quietly amazing things following the 2010-11 Canterbury earthquakes. The effect of the earthquakes on the region's physical assets are well-documented but it has been much harder to describe and understand the less tangible impacts on relationships, connections and associations. For many Cantabrians, the 'soft infrastructure' of their homes, towns and cities was as badly ripped apart as the pipes, roads and buildings. The repair of a city is as much a social project as it is physical, and successful repair depends upon finding ways for communities and public agencies to 'fly together'.

Although the stories we present are about recovery after the Canterbury earthquakes, the insights within them about working together are more generally applicable. For example, there is a range of environmental 'long emergencies' where tiny incremental changes accumulate to provide ideal conditions for apparently 'sudden shocks' such as algal blooms,

contaminated water supplies or coastal inundation. The results of such long, slow changes are difficult to predict.

Disasters may also be as much fiscal as geophysical in nature: budgets are often tight, and this can lead to cost-cutting for the maintenance of critical infrastructure. This may result in general deterioration or, in some cases, catastrophic failure of essential assets. Privatisation and the out-sourcing of contracts can make good fiscal sense, but it may also complicate service and infrastructure provision, with many previously public sector services and functions now undertaken by the private sector, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), and communities. Consequently, the state must now work with others to provide key services and to address a wide range of social, cultural, environmental and economic challenges.

The broad shift from government to collaborative governance has informed planning practice in a number of ways. The benefits of collaborative modes of working have, as of 2017, been formally recognised in an Amendment to the Resource Management Act that now provides an alternative planning track when preparing a new plan or policy, or when undertaking plan changes and reviews. The intent is to enable communities to participate in planning processes so that a range of values, preferences and perspectives are accommodated, and the plans and policies are less likely to be challenged. This is sometimes described as a movement from ‘decide-consult-defend’ to ‘engage-deliberate-decide’.

However the role of non-governmental actors in this collaborative governance can be problematic because it involves new ways of thinking about adequate resourcing, timeframes, problem-definition, mandate, additional pressures on the third sector, and so on. Thus, whether collaborative planning is for ‘recovery’, ‘revitalisation’ or just business-as-usual, we see value in better understanding the ways in which different actors can work together to (re)build a soft infrastructure able to create better homes, towns and cities.

Part Two: An Overview of the Literature

When we thought about collaborative planning in the context of our field work, what came to mind were the people who participated in our research. Rather than beginning with debates about ‘what collaborative planning is’ (which is the approach many literature reviews adopt) we begin this section with a short discussion about *who* plans collaboratively. Our purpose is simply to highlight that collaboration is a practice, performed by real people in real places. These people have personalities, qualities and a kind of emotional intelligence (Goleman,

2007) that shape the process of collaboration in important ways (see Box 1). These attributes are often overlooked in favour of discussions about how ‘collaboration’ differs from ‘engaging’ or ‘involving’, whether the process is ‘state-led’, or what a ‘stakeholder is’, particularly in the planning literature and among planning practitioners who generally retain the view that ‘people think and act only rationally’ (Baum, 2015, p. 496; though see also Hoch, 2006). Given the disaster recovery context, we became increasingly interested in the ways in which emotional intelligence might shape planning fora, as Erfan (2017, p. 34) argues that these settings provide opportunities for “healing because they offer an indirect but tangible path into collective traumas”.

Box 1: Was it Tom?

In the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquakes, local collections of households (i.e. neighbourhoods) sometimes became ‘communities’ (i.e. residents with a common interest) when their sewerage laterals shattered. The transition from neighbourhood to community was facilitated by having attendees at ‘affected-area meetings’ sit with other people from the same street. Rather than the meeting being dominated by a few loud and angry individuals, the residents from each street were able to ‘have a say’. They got to know each other and develop a shared understanding of where breaks in the laterals were. What is ‘a’ community when geography, interest and infrastructure are thrown into the mix? And who decided to get attendees to sit with others in the same street? Was it Tom?

Though collaboration can take many forms, our research focussed on ‘the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished’ (Emerson et al, 2012, p. 2). That said, we note that much of the literature on collaborative planning still tends to focus on ‘state-led’ processes and programmes. This may be attributed to Ansell and Gash’s (2008, p. 544) oft-quoted definition of collaborative governance as ‘a governing arrangement where one or more *public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders* in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets’ (italics added). Within their deliberately restrictive definition,¹ they

¹ The restrictions were imposed to facilitate comparative analysis and they concede other definitions are possible.

identify public agencies as a category of stakeholders that '*initiate*' the process and '*have a distinctive leadership role*' (p. 544, italics added).

While this definition is helpful, a number of commentators have questioned whether particular elements of it are a necessary condition of collaborative governance and planning. As Emerson et al. (2012) and Birch (2018) have argued, the focus on the initiating and leadership role of state actors may have resulted in a rather impoverished understanding of community-initiated processes. Thus, in the first instance, one of our research questions centred on an exploration of a range of *state- and community-led* initiatives, projects and programmes.

What outcomes can be attributed to the process of planning collaboratively, and what implications does this have for disaster recovery?

Traditionally, collaborative planning has been seen as a formal process undertaken in formal settings where 'all the affected interests jointly engage in face-to-face dialogue, bringing their various perspectives to the table to deliberate on the problems they face together. All participants must also be fully informed and able to express their views and be listened to, whether they are powerful or not' (Innes and Booher, 2010, p.6, see also Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998 and Lane, 2005 for an historical overview). As a result of such deliberations, it is assumed that a consensus-based integration of different perspectives, knowledges, resources and capacities of myriad actors/stakeholders will be achieved (Ansell and Gash, 2008).

Yet, as critics argue (Young, 2001; Hillier, 2003; Mouffe, 2005), neither these deliberations, nor the fora in which they take place, can be cleansed of self-interest or power imbalances. It is thus argued that even the apparently fairest and most inclusive of deliberations has the potential to (re)produce inequality and structurally disempower some participants.

Such inequalities raises important questions about the ways in which collaborative planning process itself – irrespective of the outputs such as plans or infrastructure – may affect participants. The International Spectrum of Participation and 'Arnstein's Ladder' (1969) suggest a typology of collaborative planning in which practices range from the 'tokenistic' to 'empowering'. Even a cursory internet search demonstrates how the IAP2 has been used to emphasise that 'empowered' participation often depends on the nature of the relationships that develop between participants (see Figure 2).

IAP2 SPECTRUM OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION




Figure 2: An example of IAP2 with commentary from BC Healthy Communities

A well-documented literature now highlights the ways in which a ‘good’ planning process can promote social learning, trust, and capability building (see, for example, Friedmann, 1987). In the context of our case studies, it was also important to understand how collaborative processes might contribute to, or detract from, disaster recovery. A growing body of work suggests that participation in both decision-making and implementation in the recovery phase *can* be cathartic (Vallance, 2015; Rumbach et al, 2016; Cretney, 2018) but that all too often it also reproduces the disempowering and traumatic effects of the original disaster. An aim of our research was, therefore, to better understand how post-disaster collaborative planning processes might facilitate recovery.

Who plans, what, when, where, how and why?

In an increasingly diverse society, another debate in planning theory (see Campbell and Fainstein, 2003; Mouffe, 2005; Healey 2010; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Margerum, 2002) centres on whether consensus-based collaboration is possible or even desirable (if it is achieved at the

expense of those with a quieter voice). With this in mind, we sought to identify instances of collaborative planning that might sit between – or seek to accommodate – conflict and consensus. This led us to expand our view of collaborative planning (including both decision-making and implementation) to (i) interrogate the ways it is practised in different settings and (ii) to recognise its composite, iterative and active forms (see also Karaminejad, 2019).

We began to question the traditional ‘rational decision-making cycle (Figure 3) and became increasingly interested in micro-spatial planning processes, actions and programmes, such as those associated with DIY and Tactical Urbanism (Lydon and Garcia, 2015; Wohl, 2017; Iveson, 2013; Vallance et al, 2017).

These provided a different lens that we could use to understand what planning is and who does it, when, where and how? Minimally, DIY and tactical urbanism point to a diverse range of competent community-based

practitioners driving significant urban change. At the same time, their practices raise difficult questions about the mandate needed for more participative (as opposed to

deliberative, representative or direct) forms of democracy (Michels, 2012). The potential benefits of broad participation must also be balanced with the need to avoid ‘collaboration fatigue’.

To summarise, given the increased prevalence and diversity of collaborative planning approaches, this research sought a better understanding of how collaboration has been practised in a disaster recovery context. Specifically, we sought answers to the following three questions:

- Are there general guidelines for ‘good’ collaborative planning that apply to both state- and community-led practice?
- What is the relationship between collaborative planning processes and the outputs and outcomes of these processes?




Figure 3: The traditional rational decision-making cycle

- How might our understanding of collaborative planning – and the development of ‘soft infrastructure’ – be informed by a focus that includes action/implementation (rather than discourse and deliberation) in both formal and informal settings?

Part Three: Methodology

In order to address these questions, we adopted a case study approach. The research team comprised members from both Lincoln and Canterbury Universities and, in our search for ‘exemplars’ of effective collaborative planning processes, we began with a scoping exercise to test both our questions and case study selection with a range of informants already known to us through our various personal networks (see Vallance, 2015). We had connections to staff within, for example, the Regional Council (Environment Canterbury), Christchurch City Council (including those associated with 100 Resilient Cities), the Waimakariri and Selwyn District Councils, and the Canterbury District Health Board. We also had contacts who worked for non-governmental organisations and community groups such as Greening the Rubble, Gap Filler, CanCERN (all Charitable Trusts established post-quake), members of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority Community Forum, Regenerate’s Community and Technical Advisory Committee and a range of other non-quake related initiatives.

We began our research by asking our contacts for their suggestions about exemplars of collaborative planning projects. One of our early advisors suggested an ‘exemplar’ should be a project/plan/programme that made a system change its behaviour. He gave the example of the Life in Vacant Spaces brokerage (<https://lives.org.nz/>) which connects vacant lot/site owners with site users. He saw this process as fundamental to Christchurch’s emerging reputation as a ‘transitional city’ and therefore suggested that Live in Vacant Spaces was a good exemplar of ‘adaptive urbanism’.² Another of our early advisors was the Christchurch City Council’s Sustainability Advisor who saw a number of Charters being developed that were making city-wide systems behave differently. He thought the Food Resilience Network in particular met our criteria.

Another criterion for case study selection was the willingness of potential participants in the initiatives and organisations to be involved. In the post-quake context, we were mindful that some organisations were suffering consultation fatigue and that their staff had demanding workloads already. We did not want this research to become an additional burden.

² See, for example, <http://www.lincoln.ac.nz/Documents/LEaP/adaptive%20urbanism%20report%202014.pdf>

After this 4 month scoping stage, we settled on seven case studies (Figure 4). The cases (described briefly in part four, with more detail in Appendix A) spanned a range of state- and community-led collaborative planning programmes and projects.



Figure 4. Research case studies

In the early stages, core members of the research team³ set off for the field to look, listen and learn about collaborative planning in the post-disaster context. We adopted what might be termed a bricolage approach. As Kincheloe (2005, p. 324) describes it: ‘In its hard labors in the domain of complexity, the bricolage views research methods actively rather than passively, meaning that we actively construct our research methods from the tools at hand rather than passively receiving the “correct,” universally applicable methodologies’. Thus, along with the traditional social research tools of notepaper, cameras and recorders, we took gardening gloves and made time to share kai⁴ and conversation with a wide range of people, to learn details about the size of certain culverts in physical infrastructure projects, the best time to harvest carrots and how geographically isolated communities might be affected by an Alpine Fault rupture.

³ The core research team included Drs Vallance, Edwards and Conradson, permanent staff at Lincoln and Canterbury Universities. Post-graduate students Gareth Birch and Mithran Gopinath undertook dissertations and the supervisors were also active researchers focussing on slightly different, often broader, questions. Karaminejad worked in Aranui and the results included here are based on her fieldwork, undertaken as part of her PhD.

⁴ The Māori word for food.

There were slight variations in the methodologies employed across the cases, but all involved some analysis of secondary data⁵, observations and interviews. At least 3 site-visits⁶ were undertaken for each case study, and 6 and 20 interviews were conducted for each case.

Part Four: The Case Studies

In this section, we give a brief description of the case studies, with more detail provided in Appendix A. As noted earlier, the seven cases range from community-led initiatives, through more hybrid approaches, to state-led examples. Though many of the organisations involved were active before the earthquakes, their activities, purpose or way of operating typically changed considerably as a result of the disaster. The prolonged earthquake sequence both enabled and required a departure from business-as-usual approaches and this involved working differently with others. Thus, in a region dominated by images of physical devastation, the cases all highlight some of the challenges and opportunities associated with the (re)building of soft infrastructure – how people worked together - during those hard times.

One Voice Te Reo Kotahi (OVTRK) was established in 2011 as a non-profit (third) sector ‘voice’ to highlight recovery issues and to facilitate a more cohesive and coordinated sector. OVTRK has a Charter that embraces Te Tiriti, with a kaupapa of ‘enhancing, strengthening and enriching the futures of those who follow’ (<http://onevoicetereokotahi.blogspot.com/>). There are currently 120 TSOs registered as signatories, spanning social, environmental, economic and cultural themes, with interests in mental health, sport, the arts, time-banking, housing and so on. OVTRK curates a range of resources, disseminates information, lobbies public sector bodies, and organises events that seek to the public and third sectors together. Their most recent forum (2019) focussed on *Decision Making for the Wellbeing* budget, with speakers from Statistics New Zealand addressing connections between Statistics NZ, Treasury's Living Standards and the capitals model of stocks and flows, along with the CDHB Wellbeing Index.

The **Food Resilience Network** (FRN) was established in 2013 with the vision of Canterbury becoming ‘a patchwork of food producing initiatives based around local hotspots and linked

⁵ Danielle Barnhill, Mithran Gopinath and Niamh Espiner drafted the case study descriptions based on secondary data sources as part of their Lincoln University ERST 609 Risk and Resilience course work.

⁶ The exception was One Voice Te Reo Kotahi which does not have a ‘site’ as such; however, workshops and committee meetings were observed in addition to undertaking interviews with Charter signatories.

together like a ribbon woven into the fabric of our communities’. Their vision and principles underpin the Edible Canterbury Charter and the Food Resilience Network Action Plan. While the FRN itself has charitable status, Charter signatories represent a diverse mix of private businesses, social enterprises, a number of government organisations, and community groups. Many of these had not worked together before – or may even have been at odds with one another – thus the Charter and the FRN’s ongoing activities seek to ‘cultivate relationships’⁷ in order to build a food resilient community.

Te Whare Roimata (TWR) have had a presence in the Inner City East (ICE)/Linwood area for 30 years. This area has long been home to a diverse community, with key social services located in a small shopping centre that, pre-quake, met many local needs. As a neighbourhood with a significant proportion of low-income households and high levels of social deprivation, ICE faced many challenges⁸ but had a strong history of ‘making the best of it’. TWR has, for many years, provided pre-employment programmes, educational courses, leadership opportunities within Te Whare Roimata, an accessible arts centre, community gardens, and a range of activities designed to provide meaning and purpose for unemployed residents. TWR also support a local café, local post-shop, and an op-shop which are all volunteer-run and focus on providing services and support to the community at low-cost and little profit.

The 2010 and 2011 earthquakes destroyed 300 rented rooms in the ICE area, and 60 percent of the local shops were badly damaged. Many of the boarding houses were demolished, but not rebuilt, and homelessness became an acute problem. As a response to the widespread damage to both commercial and residential space, the CCC devised the Linwood Village Master Plan (2012). After several years, it became apparent that this plan was not achieving the desired results and that a more collaborative approach was needed. TWR ‘chose’ the CCC to partner with them on a community development-based regeneration plan of action for the Inner City East/Linwood neighbourhoods, including Linwood Village.

The Aranui Community Trust (ACTIS). Aranui is a neighbourhood in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch and has one of the highest percentages of state housing in New Zealand. Like Inner City East, this area was also badly affected by the earthquakes with widespread damage to retail premises, homes, community assets and infrastructure. ACTIS played a lead role in

⁷ See Food Resilience Network Action Plan, 20th October 2014, available at <https://ccc.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Environment/Sustainability/FoodResilienceActionPlan2014.pdf>

⁸ According to CCC (2012, p. 16): The ICE has deprivation scores of between eight and ten (where ten is the most deprived) with a high proportion of rented homes, single family and one-person households and a higher proportion of residents on benefits and unemployed than the wider Christchurch population. Approximately a quarter of the population was born overseas. In terms of ethnicity, the community is 70 per cent European, 13 per cent Māori and 11 per cent Asian. Only 30 per cent are owner-residents.

the neighbourhood's recovery. This was possible due to an earlier investment in soft infrastructure; in 2002 Housing New Zealand Corporation (HCNZ) had undertaken a new, community development-based approach to neighbourhood renewal and social housing provision. Early on in this project, HCNZ realised housing was embedded in a broader suite of issues and consequently started working with the Christchurch City Council on a more holistic approach. HCNZ and CCC also looked to partner with 'the' community, but found this difficult given the lack of any local organisation to undertake this role. After a year of engagement involving a mix of small and large trial projects to build trust and capability, ACTIS was formed in 2002. They have a Vision of Aranui as 'a proud community of hope and opportunities where people stand tall' (<https://actis.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/STRATEGIC-PLAN-2016-2021.pdf>). ACTIS then signed a Memorandum of Understanding with HCNZ and CCC detailing how they would work together on community rather than housing renewal. Though this particular project by the three partners ended in 2008, ACTIS and the CCC have continued to work together and ACTIS was able to act as a credible and competent organisation in earthquake response and post-quake recovery.

The **Little River Flood Working Group** (LRFWG) was a hybrid initiative that emerged out of engagement between Environment Canterbury (the Regional Council), the Christchurch City Council, and the local communities of Little River to address flooding in the village. Flooding had been a periodic problem in the village, and ECan had tried twice in the past to establish a dedicated rate to fund work to address the issue, without success. A decade of low rainfall and no flooding meant there was little appetite to pursue a solution. Then, in 2013 and 2014, severe flooding occurred and there were suspicions that it was caused by either the earthquakes affecting ground levels (as they had in other parts of the region) or the mismanagement of lake levels. Amidst general distrust, rumours and repeated flooding, the LRFWG (comprising five community members (including those most and least affected by floods), the elected City Council Community Board member and Chair, senior manager and technical/support staff from ECan, Wairewa rūnanga, Christchurch City Council, and Environment Canterbury Commissioners and elected members) met regularly over 18 months to develop some solutions. The result was a dedicated ratings district that, unlike previous models, required a new way of CCC and ECan working together to calculate the same flat fee for each household (using the CCC's database) rather than a per hectare basis (as ECan's database did). Despite some significant rainfalls, the village has not flooded since the ratings district-funded work started and this has contributed to the viability of other local initiatives.

Box 2: The beginnings of a community-led initiative

Onus on Banks Peninsula residents

Residents on Banks Peninsula have been told they must solve their flooding problems themselves.

The Christchurch City Council held the first of its community meetings in flood-affected areas in Little River on Wednesday night.

Unlike flooding in Christchurch city, the problems in Little River are largely caused by debris blocking waterways and stopping floodwater flowing into nearby Lake Forsyth.

Council representatives told the meeting it is up to individual landowners to clear the debris.

Little River resident Geoff Marks said it's a bureaucratic mess, with many different agencies involved with different bits of land.

<https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/245132/rates-break-for-flood-hit-residents>

Selwyn GetsReady (SGR) is a hybrid council-community programme focused on enabling communities in the Selwyn district to better respond to disasters while also developing good communication between officials and communities, neighbourhoods and households. This initially small-scale, community-led initiative connects households with street and area coordinators in order to better share information and resources. The idea was later adopted by the Selwyn District Council who supported the development of the Selwyn GetsReady (SGR) software. The use of SGR is managed by the Selwyn Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM)/Neighbourhood Support team at the council. This team can view all the information about households, streets and neighbourhoods, and can use the tool to send out alert messages. They oversee and co-ordinate disaster response enabling both the council and community volunteers to collaboratively manage disaster readiness, response and recovery across Selwyn (Figure 5). The council and the public are consequently better informed during disasters, and responses are better suited to communities (creating less opposition to decisions). More generally, people are also better informed about local safety issues and civil defence hazards. The SGR programme has facilitated new relationships between local communities and the Council, and these support the creation of effective local community disaster response plans.

Community Response Model




Figure 5: Selwyn GetsReady's Community Response Model

The Waimakariri District Council (WMK). The 2010 earthquake resulted in extensive damage to Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki in the Waimakariri District. Though a smaller community, in proportional terms Kaiapoi was as badly affected as the city of Christchurch. Over 5000 people lost water and sewerage services. Almost 1200 homes (a third of all housing stock in Kaiapoi) and most homes in Pines Beach and Kairaki were severely damaged. A quarter of Kaiapoi businesses were immediately closed, and there was widespread damage to local infrastructure.

In 2011, almost 90 hectares of land, some of which is immediately adjacent to the town centre, was Red Zoned. The Red Zone Recovery Plan⁹ won the New Zealand Planning Institute's Nancy Northcroft Supreme Award for Best Practice Strategic Planning and Guidance. The Plan was approved in 2016 and outlines proposed land uses and activities for five regeneration areas (Kaiapoi West, Kaiapoi South, Kaiapoi East, The Pines Beach and Kairaki).

⁹ <https://www.redzoneplan.nz/> and https://www.redzoneplan.nz/_data/assets/pdf_file/0017/27062/DPMCWRRZRecoveryPlanWeb_v2pdf.pdf

For both the Red Zone Recovery Plan and the Kaiapoi Town Centre Plan, the Waimakariri District Council has used various participation tools and methods. These include multi-criteria assessment of uses and activities (reviewed by a range of experts), street corner meetings for those affected by decisions, drop-in sessions, and regular meetings with the Regeneration Committee (which includes both Councillors and Community Board members, and is attended by representatives from Ngāi Tūāhuriri and other stakeholders). There were also a number of larger town meetings where the Mayor, Chief Executive, senior managers and technical staff were present to ask and answer questions. For the Kaiapoi Town Centre Plan, three Inquiry by Design (IBD) sessions were undertaken with the business community. These were led by an independent consultant (Boffa Miskell), and were followed by two larger public meetings (one more for commercial interests, to test the findings of the IBDs, and one for the general public). Importantly, these ‘tools’ or ‘methods’ reflected a distinctive logic that, when taken together, enacted a distinctive approach to engagement often referred to as the ‘Waimakariri Way’.

Part Five: Results

Through our case study research, we identified a series of themes about collaborative planning processes in post-disaster contexts. These are detailed in the following sections.

The Journey (of Planning Collaboratively) is as Important as the Destination

Collaborative planning has a purpose – an objective or aim involving a programme of work – that will, ideally, lead to desirable outputs and outcomes. Yet during our fieldwork it became apparent that ‘how we get there’ was often as important as ‘where we’re going’. The very processes of developing the goal(s), implementation and monitoring also had demonstrable impacts and outcomes, irrespective of the goal itself. As one participant in the Waimakariri District noted, ‘I made a submission on the Long Term Plan. I didn’t get what I wanted, but I felt respected and I felt heard’ (WMK).

This kind of experience contrasts with that recounted by Kane and Smith (2013, p. 96, TWR):

We sat in the back [of the Council Long Term Plan submission] sniggering at the prospect of watching sport [at a proposed new stadium in our neighbourhood] from a nearby balcony but feeling some disquiet at the interest this idea stirred and the underpinning discourse that capital generation and betterment were the keys to restoration. Our turn. The Mayor engaged with us for fully 10 seconds before he dropped his eyes to

his cell phone to read his texts and within a minute he and his neighbour were giggling about a shared text or photo. Other councillors were similarly distracted. It was very clear that against the discourse of capital generation, the plight of the marginal has little political pull. Only one Councillor was courteous enough to thank us and ask a question.

Participating in a process described as courteous, civil, respectful or compassionate was important given the trauma associated with the earthquakes. In facilitating a broader sense of recovery, we came to see that the journey was as important as the destination.

A basic respectful attitude and emotional intelligence was evident in the way they participants listened to each other, but also in other ways such as the sharing of food or 'going the extra mile' to provide information on time, in a setting, or in a way that would make sense to others. As we were told:

It's not rocket science. Act like a partner. If you want the community to be a partner, treat them like one. (TWR)

You do what you think will work. You may have to bend the rules and 'go feral'. There's not always a science behind it, you 'just know' what's right. And you go with it. (SGR)

In addition to an indeterminate but powerful sense of recovery, we noted other outputs and outcomes that were attributable to the process rather than the product of collaborative planning. These may be considered 'procedural objectives' to be pursued independently of the plan, pipe or park being considered and they include new relationships, diverse leadership, increased capability and capacity, translation and accessibility as discussed below.

New relationships with others

Adopting a courteous and respectful attitude helped (re)build relationships between disparate and sometimes antagonistic groups. These relationships – sometimes described in the literature in terms of social capital – are the glue of soft infrastructure. The amended IAP2 (Figure 3 above) suggests that more 'empowered' forms of participation actually depend on building and maintaining relationships with others. Thus we came to see the development of new or improved relationships between those who don't know or don't like each other as both an objective in itself and a sign that a collaborative planning process is going well.

The Charter brought together groups that had never before worked together. E.g. Soil & Health and the Horticultural Society had previously

been at odds but came together under the Charter. Similarly, Community and Public Health and the Heritage Fruit Archive didn't know each other before this, but now work together (e.g. by putting heritage trees in schools). (FRN)

I don't necessarily like ECan any more than I did before, but I get on alright with Tim and Lesley and I can understand why ECan is like that a bit more now. (LRFWG).

Building these relationships often takes time, sometimes a very long time:

And we [Te Whare Roimata] have the slow coffee shop and it's been running for 3 years. It's there that we create relationships. We don't do any explicit work on the revitalisation process, it's all just informal. But things come up in conversation. And at the market and at the [volunteer-run] post-office, we make coffee and chat. We have a mobile table to take out and about. And so we're always checking in... 'We heard this, is this right?' And then we put it out there in newsletters and flyers. (TWR)

Importantly, these personal connections paved the way and carried the process through to more formal relationships that were recognised in Memoranda of Understanding, Charters, Terms of Reference, submissions on a formal plan, and other contractual arrangements.

Growing diverse leaders

A perpetual concern of collaborative planning theory is power imbalance between participants. Though other aspects of this are discussed below, here we note that because collaborative planning can take many forms, in different contexts, it is important not to rely on the 'usual suspects' but to develop and see evidence of diverse leadership.

We develop local leadership by finding issues that can be solved locally. If someone comes up with an idea, say 'That's a great idea, you should do it!', then we help them achieve that (SGR).

OVTRK's principles for a good process are that whoever is there has the right to speak, [and] the elderly and kaumatua should be encouraged to speak. We try to create an awareness of ancestors and sacredness of the task. Be honest and transparent. Decisions should strengthen all involved. Leaders should co-construct a way forward. You know when it is working because people are really involved and setting the agenda. (OVTRK)

As we saw with building relationships, this can take some time but may yield dividends over the long term. As we were told 'We look for young rangitahi coming through and assuming greater leadership. They were volunteers, now leading in research, outreach and special events'.

We saw how new leaders had gone on to do other things, taking on new roles. For example, a community member of the Little River Flood Working Group has recently been nominated for the Banks Peninsula Water Zone Committee. Aranui Community Trust (ACTIS) demonstrated strong leadership during the earthquake response phase by securing water, food and shelter and were active in various recovery initiatives as well.

Seeing and supporting the development of new skills, capabilities and understanding

It was often clear that participating in collaborative planning exercises helped those involved develop new skills and capabilities. These might include such things as acting as a Secretary or Chair of Board, negotiation, facilitation, photography, applications for funding, 'knowing the lingo', confidence, presentation skills, first aid, financial literacy, building, gardening, nutrition, abseiling, recycling, using the library and other resources, publishing newsletters, registering for Charitable Trust status, running a business/Trust, understanding business-as-usual planning like Long-Term and District Plans, opening Civil Defence Welfare Centres, learning another language, website maintenance and communications, cultural or financial literacy and so on.

We also saw that state-employees were frequently encouraged to 'learn new things' by their managers, and collaboration and communication were encouraged as a means to enhance institutional capability. In the Waimakariri District, for example, a planner told us that it was important to have a

Good communication team who experiment and who are not afraid to engage. We have a videographer on staff and we use those videos as a tool to engage. We also use Facebook and other social media. We'll try new things. Like with high school students, we used pipe cleaners to design a local park. And we dressed up as Dr Seuss [Figure 6 below] to raise awareness of the Long-Term Plan. The comms team want to help us achieve the results (Planner, WMK).




Figure 6: Waimakariri District Council staff create interest in the Long Term Plan (Source: Facebook)

Translation and Navigation

Participants had to achieve a basic understanding of some quite complex technical information around flooding, liquefaction and other geotechnical issues, sea-level rise and climate change, fire, soil, and economic development. Often, they also had to locate this information within a broader policy and planning framework (such as the Greater Christchurch Urban Development Strategy, Long Term Plans or District Plan Reviews). In this regard, ‘collaborators’ frequently had to become ‘translators and navigators’ in disseminating relevant information to their communities. This was a time-consuming and under-valued task, but a nevertheless absolutely critical role.

I remember after the 2014 flood we had a group at the marae and they go, ‘What does Wairewa actually mean?’ I said, ‘Wairewa means fast rising water.’ It means water that goes up and down very quickly. Rewa means to be uplifted – so water [wai], uplifted.... Where the town is a flood plain - none of our tipuna lived there traditionally”. (Resident and representative of the Te Rūnanga o Wairewa, as reported in Birch, 2018 – Little River Flood Working Group (LRFWG)).

Translation and navigation can also work the other way, in that working collaboratively with others can yield valuable information for planners and officials, as participants demonstrate their understanding of the context. This can be seen in the following accounts:

So we had got to the point where we knew we needed a certain amount of funding to get the [flood mitigation work] done. ECan wanted to charge the rate on a 'per hectare' basis because that's what their software could handle. That meant the large land-owners who lived on the hills and didn't get flooded would pay the most, and the people in the village on small sections whose homes and businesses flooded would pay the least. So we told them "no, we're a community and everyone is affected. We have to have a flat fee, the same across the community, otherwise it won't work [again]". So using the Christchurch City Council's database the [ECan's] rate is calculated on a per household basis. (LRFWG)

Community intelligence and their 'situation reports' [through the SGR programme and Facebook page] are gold.

They help us find solutions that will actually work. (WMK)

Making collaborative planning accessible

It is often asserted that a good collaborative planning process should be 'inclusive'; however unless and until a process directly affects them, many people are unwilling or unable to participate. At that point, the plan is a 'done deal' and 'participation' can often manifest as protest. The reluctance to participate earlier in the planning process might be due to perceived relevance, timing, location, format or a host of other reasons. Hence, we heard a great deal about how collaborative planning can be de-mystified and made more accessible so as to promote inclusion.

'Going where communities are' was an important theme.

The council spends the time engaging well, through drop-ins, one on one, integrated assessments, IBDs [inquiry by design exercises]. All those examples were ones where we could talk to those making the comments. As opposed to reading a submission, you can understand the context (WMK).

During the Aranui community renewal project by HNZA and CCC, the plans would be displayed in the community park every few months and the community was able to oversee the design and implementation and have a role in that (ACTIS).

It is important to note that, often, those from the council who attended community meetings included senior managers and elected members. The Kaiapoi Revitalisation Inquiry by Design sessions were attended by the Mayor and CEO of the Waimakariri District Council (along with a number of other staff), as were the town hall meetings and drop-in sessions for the Red Zone Redevelopment plan. The other case studies also demonstrated a similar commitment from senior staff members to *being present*: The Co-Chair of the LRFWG was also ECan’s Chief Scientist¹⁰ and he was present at most community and LRFWG meetings held in Little River. Elected members and key senior managers are very supportive of, and actively involved in, the SGR programme as well.

This emphasis on physical attendance challenges the contemporary reliance on digital communication strategies. It highlights the value of interpersonal communication, on-site, for collaborative planning initiatives.



Figure 7: Waimakariri District Council’s 3D Planning model in the Kaiapoi library
Source: Waimakariri District Council

Successful collaboration may involve being innovative and working in new sites and settings, such as pavements and parks as well as digital and audio spaces. New tools may also be deployed, including websites, mobile 3-D models (Figure 7) that use chalk, pipecleaners and toothpicks as much as ‘big data’. These settings and tools may help make a process more accessible but, beyond that, there needs to be an understanding that non-state collaborators also face a barrage of deadlines imposed by different organisations and that this may

¹⁰ In 2017, Tim Davie was awarded the inaugural Dr Maggie Lawton Science with Communities Award.

compromise their ability to respond to their community's needs and priorities. A key message, often repeated across all cases and most research participants was, therefore, to *take your time*.

In summarising thus far, we have suggested that a good collaborative planning process is one where the journey is seen as being as important as the destination, because the process itself can promote beneficial outcomes for participants, irrespective of the output. Importantly though, we have to point out that 'the' process may be better seen as an often lengthy, iterative and non-linear series of connected initiatives. As an informant from Te Whare Roimata pointed out:

The measures of success change across the process. In the formative stage (let's call it 'understanding') you want to see a greater number of people engaging. Are people putting their names forward and showing ownership? Then later, people report change and come back with thoughts. These are shared. Then you start drilling down to have a say on 'actions'. It might be a small task like tidying to start with. It's not the most urgent but it is most widespread. Separate people have put that out as a thing so it's not controversial. And it can be a pilot for long term things versus one off things like events. Choose things that also function to bring people together. So tidying can be sorted into short, medium and long term programmes. You know you're successful when people are becoming connected, when different people are showing up and when they're developing their own responses and actions. It's successful when it's enabling and empowering people to make change.

A framework for evaluating a collaborative planning process might therefore be developed around the following questions:

- Are new leaders emerging?
- Are different people being given the opportunity to take responsibility and show ownership?
- Are new skills and capabilities being developed?
- Is there evidence that information is being translated and shared?
- Are new relationships (especially bridging and linking forms of social capital) being built?
- Are a broader range of people (beyond 'the-usual-suspects') turning up with questions and suggestions?

Values as a Compass on the Journey

If a journey/process is genuinely collaborative, the destination/objective will almost certainly have to be negotiated. This can mean participants have to make on the spot decisions about what is the right or best way to proceed. Like emotions, values are often ignored or deliberately stripped from formal planning processes which, instead, elevate rationality as the basis of good decision-making. Values are seen as the business of elected members.

Our fieldwork challenges this basic planning orthodoxy because we saw plenty of evidence that values and principles like whanaungatanga (enabling social interaction and social and cultural wellbeing), kaitiakitanga (enabling stewardship and connecting people to the natural environment and environmental wellbeing), ūkaipōtanga (meeting the needs of diverse peoples for social and cultural wellbeing), manaakitanga (helping people to be healthier and safer for social wellbeing) and whairawa (supporting equitable access to wealth, resources and amenities) helped facilitate or orient collaboration.

Indeed, in the scoping stage of our research, it was suggested we look at the Food Resilience Network as an example of a Charter-based approach precisely *because* it looked like the inverse of orthodox planning by putting values and principles first. The Food Resilience Network has the Edible Canterbury 'Charter' to which signatories subscribe and which guides action. The Charter helps operationalise the:

- WHY? – (the co-created vision, developed together using open strategies)
- WHAT? (what do we need to get results)
- HOW? (actions)
- WHO? (accountability, responsibility)

As a Food Resilience Network Board member explained:

Orthodox planning operates in reverse. Often responsibility is handed to infrastructure people with KPIs, not connected to the why. Strategies are not connected to people or resources and is often out of date before it begins. Charters are more about concepts, principles, direction, relationships, emergence, collaboration, action...

In terms of its 'why', the Food Resilience Network's values and principles are clearly identified as accessibility, mahinga kai, cultural appropriateness, ecological sustainability, social enterprise and local economic development, food education, community empowerment, and collaboration (Figure 8).



We, the signatories to this Charter, believe that all people in the Canterbury region have the right to fresh, nourishing food that is grown and prepared locally in ways that are ecologically sustainable and culturally appropriate.

We support the Food Resilience Network's vision of 'a patchwork of food producing initiatives based around local hotspots and linked together like a ribbon woven into the fabric of our communities'.

As such, we commit to working collaboratively with the other signatories of this Charter to make this vision a reality.

Edible Canterbury Charter

— an initiative of the Food Resilience Network

Values and Principles

Accessibility: access to nutritious food is the right of all people and is a basic determinant of health;

Mahinga kai: food gathering and food growing spaces that reflect the values of local iwi are integral to the vision of a food resilient region;

Cultural appropriateness: food and culture are intimately connected and the many different cultural groups that make up our region's population should all have access to food that is culturally appropriate to them within the limits of our climate;

Ecological sustainability: a resilient food system implies one in which food is grown in ways that regenerate the natural environment (for example using principles of organic agriculture, permaculture, agro-ecology etc);

Social enterprise and local economic development: we endorse the establishment of organisations and businesses that grow, process and distribute food locally, and the development of a diverse local food economy;

Food education: education about nourishing food for all ages and in a variety of learning places is crucial;

Community empowerment: everyone has a role to play in creating a food resilient region and everyone's role is valued;

Collaboration: creating a food resilient region requires partnerships between many agencies and cannot be owned by any single group.

www.edible.org.nz

Figure 8: Values and Principles in the Edible Canterbury Charter

When an initiative or programme clearly understands its 'why' as part of a bigger picture, this can help those involved to manage conflicts that inevitably arise.

Who are stakeholders? They are often single issue representatives who are invited to the table, but that sets you up for conflict. You need people who can think about their concerns in the broader context. They need to represent more than 'their' stake. (LRFWG).

There might be different conflicts at different stages. So the early stages are about experimenting with how to get people interested and see what divisions there are. And that will keep changing. Something might happen to cause a divide. Divisive issues arise when you look at just one part or favour one group, so you need to get people to see the whole picture. So how can you reframe the [controversial issue] into something - like safety - that everyone can work towards. (TWR).

Who can sign the Charter? If we have a vetting process, what is it? We have made signing the Charter a pre-requisite for joining the [network]. By doing this there is a commitment to uphold the principles of the Charter. But the [network] needs to maintain principles of openness and willingness to collaborate – so if Monsanto/McDonalds wants to sign they should be allowed to do so as long as they can point to things they do/changes they've made that are directly in line with the principles of the Charter (FRN).

The Kaiapoi Town Centre plan in the Waimakariri District most closely resembles Ansell and Gash's (2008) definition of state-led, collaborative planning and we surmised this was where would most likely see a clear distinction between the ends (traditionally the role of elected members) and the means (the role of planners). Yet even here, there was clear evidence that values were deliberately cultivated and embedded in the organisation. Cultivating the 'right' attitude has become a key concern of senior management at WMK, facilitated by training for current staff and in the hiring and procurement of new staff. As the CEO noted. "Sometimes people do the wrong thing. I ask myself 'Are they doing the wrong thing for the right reason'?"

The 'right reasons' are articulated in the Waimakariri District Council's Tā Mātou Mauri (Our Values) which are:

- Act with integrity, honesty and trust;
- Work with you and each other;

- Keep you informed;
- Do better every day;
- Take responsibility.

What this looks like in practice is evident in a story from a senior manager describing the Council's early earthquake response (in Vallance, 2014, p. 26):

Traditionally TLAs [territorial local authorities] do not step across the home-owner's boundary and any infrastructure issues between the house and the front boundary is the home-owner's problem. But post-earthquake it would have been impossible to just call a plumber to get the issue fixed. So we [Waimakariri District Council] made a decision fairly early on to liaise with EQC and coordinate repairs across the boundary because there's no point us fixing our side of the sewer and people still not being able to use [the toilet] because the pipe between the house and the boundary is broken.

As we have pointed out above, collaborative planning involves making the process accessible by being present and making decisions with collaborators. Under these circumstances it is not possible to simply follow rules. This was when a compass to navigate and make the 'right' decision became critical. As we were told by an informant from Selwyn GetsReady:

We've had great support from senior management and elected members. And our approach is a bit like the police where you have to empower those frontline staff to make decisions based on what they know at the time and the *right intent*. And you have to be able to adapt on the spot and be flexible. 'Do and adjust'. You can't stand still and flounder. You have to do something. As a cop, you just have to do what you think is best at time. And adjust. It's intuitive. Protect life, get the greatest good. The right thing is usually clear, getting there can be hard. Decision-making in police is delegated to lowest level. You can't always rely on a procedure because if there's no procedure that fits a situation, you've got no clue. So at SGR we adopt a 'Mission Command' style where *we act to fulfil an intent, not to follow rules*. This is hard to convey to Council because they are not used to devolving responsibility. Low levels don't usually make decisions (italics added).

However, it was also pointed out to us that it is not always the case that this support for delegated decision-making is forthcoming. As it was described to us

In some [other] organisations it can be like a witch-hunt. Everything is eggshells. So you're constantly arse-covering rather than getting the job done and checking 3 times that the forms are all ticked so that no-one can blame you. (SGR)

Clear institutional values and support for 'doing the right thing' from senior management and elected members underpins the ability to respond 'appropriately' and in a timely way whilst 'in the field'.

Becoming a Community Before Becoming a Collaborator

Official planners go into collaborative processes with a mandate, experience, institutional support and resources but, often, tight timelines. Communities or assembled 'stakeholders', on the other hand, may be little more than aggregates of (sometimes antagonistic) individuals with none of these advantages and perhaps rather different timeframes. This absence of an obvious partner or clear community voice can make collaborative planning extremely difficult, as illustrated in the following comment:

Initially the community consisted of a lot of individuals ... But they needed to get to a position that they could act together and speak on behalf of the community, so we [HNZC and CCC] wanted to strengthen the community to the extent that they have a voice and they had somebody that represented their voice. That was the concept of what ACTIS [Aranui Community Trust Corporation Society] became and we had to encourage that to happen (see also Karaminejad, 2019).

We heard many accounts of the often lengthy and difficult process of developing a sense of collective efficacy, responsibility and capability.

Keep getting wins on the board and build on your successes. If you just come up with one big project/vision you'll never make any progress. (FRN)

Help locals develop responses to issues concerning the in a way that locals can meet those needs [through] a variety of development projects: Cultural, economic, social ... [including recycling areas, a community garden which helps with pre-employment skills, a gallery, a marae for the spiritual home, a volunteer-run café and post shop, an op shop and developmental education opportunities]....The Tiny Shops [Figure 9] was CCC initiated and we put in our input on what it might look like to work in this

neighbourhood. It's something the CCC understands – business – but we've taken a people-centred approach. (TWR).



Figure 9: Linwood Tiny Village (facilitated by CCC/TWR)

These examples show that where collaboration requires the formation of a new group, a council or government agency may already have staff or networks that have strong relationships with people in a community. These staff (such as Community Development Advisors, Community Board Administration staff and so on) may not be directly involved in the particular project but could help make initial introductions, help navigate the community context or shed light on precedent issues. This background understanding can help speed up, ease and navigate this 'storming and forming' stage of the project. Similarly, pre-established community groups - often seemingly unrelated to the subject matter of a particular collaborative project - can help grease the wheels to bring together members of a community and foster trust and familiarity amongst participants. Most importantly, rather than assembling adversarial stakeholders, it helps to take time to identify people able to represent more than 'their' stake.

Part Six: Conclusions and Implications

Having reported the key findings from the case studies, we now return to our key research questions and respond to each in turn.

1. What is the relationship between collaborative planning processes and the outputs and outcomes of these processes?

Our case studies highlighted various ways in which the process of planning collaboratively could promote positive impacts, independent of the plan's outputs (such as residential re-zoning and houses, a river ratings district) and outcomes (housing affordability, flood mitigation). When the journey is seen as being as important as the destination, methods become secondary to the logic – the why - behind the choice of methods. The focus shifts to building enduring relationships, fostering diverse leaders, developing new skills and capabilities, and translation and navigation. A good collaborative planner – whether statutory or non-state – will be respectful and emotionally intelligent. Inclusion, when evaluated qualitatively, can be facilitated by being present and allowing plenty of time.

Having a collaborative attitude is more important than following prescriptive collaborative planning formulae. As Bishop (2015, p.2) notes in *The Craft of Collaborative Planning*:

In just the same way that one cannot create a successful menu or recipe with a random selection of even the best ingredients, so one cannot deliver a successful collaborative or engagement process just by picking a few clever methods.

2. How might our understanding of collaborative planning – and the development of 'soft infrastructure' - be informed by a focus that includes action/implementation (rather than discourse and deliberation) in both formal and informal settings?

The planning literature often refers to Ansell and Gash's (2008) deliberately restrictive definition of collaborative governance as a formal, deliberative, state-led process. The emphasis on deliberation is often seen as an advance on technocratic, expert-dominated, decision-making, characteristic of modern rational planning. We have seen however, that the focus on discourse and deliberation limits the attention given to other more active forms of planning that occur in various sites and settings. Indeed, we could make a case that planning without sufficient attention to implementation, by whom, where and when is, at best, fanciful and, at worst, dangerously misleading. In expanding our notion of what planning is, where it

happens and who does it, we suggest more attention be given to values, particularly in their role as a compass for navigating the new terrain of decision-making.

3. Are there general guidelines for good collaborative planning that apply to both state- and community-led practice?

Our conclusions to the first two questions had led us to a revision of the rational decision-making cycle that we think is more appropriate for collaborative planning processes. This revision involves the inclusion of six elements:

1. Exploring the Issues and Options: Those who define ‘the’ problem also shape the possible solutions. It may be that there are a series of problems but also a range of other issues and opportunities.

The first new business (in Linwood Village) post-quake was a bottle store. For those who can’t afford to go to the pub, they need a place to drink safely. Why make it so easy to get alcohol then punish those who drink? So we have to reframe the conversation as not about ‘alcohol’ but ‘safety for everyone’. This leads to different kinds of solutions. If it’s about alcohol, the solution is an alcohol ban. If it’s about safety for everyone, it might lead to Māori Wardens (TWR).

Exploring the problem involves developing an understanding of *why* we should work together, as well as:

- Building relationships with those involved.
- Discussing what kind of outcomes you may want to see coming from the process itself (this helps to build a sense of ‘why’ should we collaborate).
- Exploring foundations (values and principles) for cooperation and collaboration
- Building and bringing together communities, finding stakeholders who represent more than ‘their’ interest.
- Making the process accessible.
- Finding and enabling potential leaders, navigators and translators.
- Growing capability and capacity.

2. Co-develop a range of ideas and solutions: Try to include state- and community-led actors and agencies in the co-development process, both small and large.

‘Start with ideas and a range of potential actions. Some long term and large like housing renewal and others small like moving a park bench (ACTIS).

3. Monitor the process: When monitoring the process (rather than the results of outputs including the plan or programme), we suggest a number of criteria for success. If framed as questions, these are:

- Are new leaders emerging?
- Are different people taking responsibility and showing ownership?
- Are new skills and capabilities being developed?
- Is there evidence that information is being translated and shared?
- Are new relationships (especially bridging and linking capitals) being built?
- Are a broader range of people (not just 'the-usual-suspects') turning up with questions and suggestions?

4. Co-select a composite range of state- and community-led solutions that can be implemented over different timeframes: Select a mix of options, some of which 'function to bring people together' (TWR) and that 'can be enacted by people locally' (SGR). Set aside some contingent funding to help pave the way for implementation (LRFWG) but also mediation, conflict resolution and community advisors (TWR). Allow collaborators to participate in decision-making and implementation. For example, after the floods the SDC provided the toilets, but told the Community Response Teams 'You decide where they should go'. Some 'solutions' might be a pilot test.

5. Partial and Iterative Implementation: Get some easy wins, pilot test, refine as per tactical urbanism and other micro-spatial approaches.

6. Monitor (again) the process and the planning outputs/outcomes:

- Monitor the results and outcomes of the plan (e.g. anticipated number of houses/housing affordability, retail outlets/revitalisation, reduction in traffic accidents/walkability)
- Monitor the outcomes of the process: How will this process inform and shape future engagement?

Our analysis has suggested that the traditional decision-making cycle be revised to incorporate these elements (Figure 10, below). In comparison to traditional approaches, we suggest that the collaborative decision-making cycle is more attentive to context, has an eye on future relationships and can be used to weave soft-infrastructure into the (re)building of better homes, towns and cities.




Figure 10: A composite and iterative collaborative decision-making cycle

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Appendix A: Detailed Description of the Case Studies

One Voice Te Reo Kotahi

One Voice Te Reo Kotahi (OVTRK) was established in 2011 as a non-profit (third sector) 'voice' to highlight recovery issues but also to facilitate a more cohesive and coordinated sector through a Charter that articulates the OVTRK kaupapa.

The two drivers behind the formation of OVTRK were earthquake recovery and the need for more cohesive ways of working within the local voluntary sector. Third sector organisations (TSOs) that subscribe to the OVTRK kaupapa – which is to enhance, strengthen and enrich the futures of those who follow - may register and there are currently 120 TSOs registered. These organisations span a diverse range of interests across social, environmental, economic and cultural themes, with a focus on issues such as mental health, sport, the arts, time-banking and housing.

OVTRK curate a range of resources and disseminate research and opportunities relevant to the sector through meetings, blogspots and podcasts. Some examples of this work include the publication of free training for staff in TSOs, providing new location details for certain social services, reporting staffing changes at prominent TSOs, and advertising conferences and reports such as the State of Volunteering.

OVTRK lobby various public sector bodies to highlight the vital role the third sector plays in post-disaster recovery, and they have organised various fora and events to bring the public and third sector together. Their most recent forum (2019) focussed on Decision Making for the Wellbeing budget, with speakers from Statistics New Zealand addressing connections between Statistics NZ, Treasury's Living Standards and the capitals model of stocks and flows, along with the CDHB Wellbeing Index.

OVTRK highlight issues relevant for the third sector arising from the activities, policies and programmes of local government (CCC, ECan) and local government organisations such as Regenerate Christchurch, the Greater Christchurch Partnership, Healthy Christchurch and the Mayoral Forum. OVTRK have made submissions on plans and they also interpret and question central government policy and actions such as the Wellbeing Budget, the establishment of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, the work of Statistics New Zealand, the Local Government Amendment Bill, and so on.

The Food Resilience Network

The FRN was established in 2013 with the vision of Canterbury becoming “a patchwork of food producing initiatives based around local hotspots and linked together like a ribbon woven into the fabric of our communities”. Their vision and principles underpin the Edible Canterbury Charter and Food Resilience Network Action Plan.

The Food Resilience Network (FRN) was established in 2013 following a hui held at the University of Canterbury to discuss the growing of fruit and nut trees in public spaces. The wide variety of people and organisations who attended this hui shared a general concern about the availability of locally grown food in Canterbury, and decided to work together to improve the food resilience of the region. They were united by a common vision for the future of food in Canterbury that had been guiding them individually for some time, but found strength in the diverse linkages and support that a broader network could provide.

Following the establishment of the network, the group decided to encapsulate its shared vision in a set of principles. These principles became the Edible Canterbury Charter which, alongside the FRN Action Plan and Christchurch City Council Food Resilience Policy, were formally adopted by the Christchurch City Council in late 2014.

The Edible Canterbury Charter is a set of core principles that guide the activity of FRN members as opposed to rules that must be followed or outcomes that should be achieved. Signatories of the Charter agree to follow these principles but are not penalised for shortfalls, the network having decided to celebrate successes instead. These successes are included in the FRN’s annual reporting framework, which communicates numerical indicators of progress (such as the number of volunteers, funding received, and Facebook likes), and also provides a range of case study narratives on various network activities, relating these directly to Charter principles.

While the FRN itself has charitable status, Charter signatories represent a diverse mixture of organisational models. This includes private businesses, social enterprises, government organisations, and community groups. Each of these organisations links to a variety of others, including local food producers, primary schools, and mental health services. This diversity of membership brings together groups and individuals who have never worked together before – or even been at odds with one another – thereby creating space for novel food resilience practices.

The public profile of the FRN has been raised through the initiation of its flagship project, Ōtākaro Orchard, on the banks of the Avon river in the Christchurch CBD. It combines a food forest, vegetable gardens, café, community gathering space, and education centre. For some

network members, the recent focus on the orchard has diverted time and resources away from other activities that are equally necessary to achieve the overall vision of the Charter, and this has led to some discord in the network. A return to key principles embodied in the Charter, and a focus on communication and relationship building across the network, is now seen as key to overcoming these challenges.

Although a community-driven initiative, larger institutions have had an important role in the formation and activity of the FRN. Soil & Health Canterbury provided the organisational support needed to get the FRN up and running, and the Christchurch City Council and Canterbury District Health Board have been key partners since its inception. Nevertheless, it is arguably individuals in these (and other) institutions that have been crucial to the development of the network, and this highlights a recurring theme in the FRN's ongoing activities: to 'cultivate relationships'¹¹ between people in order to build a food resilient community.

Who was involved?

The FRN steering committee, FRN staff (2 co-ordinators and 1 secretary), Charter signatories (organisations/businesses/social enterprises that support the Charter principles), Volunteers (on gardening projects such as Ōtākaro Orchard, Roimata Food Commons, school gardens part of the Orchards in Schools/Edible Gardens projects, community gardens across Christchurch), Supporting organisations, links to other groups across the country (see https://www.ttophs.govt.nz/food_security_national).

How are they involved?

The FRN steering committee provides overall governance of network (maintain vision, decide on strategic priorities). FRN staff – apply for funding; planning/logistics for key projects (e.g. arranging a planting day); communication across network members. One staff member is specifically focused on implementing the Ōtākaro Orchard project.

Charter signatories – operate according to their own specific purpose, but do so in line with Charter principles. Volunteers – contribute to individual projects (as measured in Annual reports: number of volunteers engaged/conversion of help received to dollar value). Supporting organisations provide advice (such as Ākina foundation) and resources (such as funding from Christchurch City Council, and also individual donors).

¹¹ See Food Resilience Network Action Plan, 20th October 2014, available at <https://ccc.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Environment/Sustainability/FoodResilienceActionPlan2014.pdf>

Key messages

- The success of achieving the vision rests on productive and enduring partnerships with others.
- Where relevant, these partnerships also enable mentoring and sharing of expertise.
- Strong partnerships are often built and maintained through personal relationships.
- Compatibility between partners is key, however, and it isn't necessarily useful to involve as many people or organisations as possible just to "look good" on paper.
- Partners still maintain their individuality. Communication between partners is also important, but this requires a strategy that includes the diversity of members without unintentionally excluding some of them.

Te Whare Roimata/CCC Inner City East Revitalisation

The community-initiated Inner City East Revitalisation project, led by Te Whare Roimata with support from Christchurch City Council, uses a 'community development' approach to earthquake recovery.

Inner City East (ICE)/Linwood has long been home to a diverse community, with key social services located in a small shopping centre that, pre-quake, met many locals' needs. As a neighbourhood of low-cost housing, ICE faced many challenges but had a strong history of 'making the best of it'. Research conducted by the CCC (2012) found residents had enjoyed the 'village vibe', the small shopping centre that met many day-to-day needs, the sense of community, supported by long-term shop keepers and long-term residents, the activity in and around both the shopping centre and the Linwood Community Arts Centre (CCC, 2012). In an area with a high number of people living alone, the broader community was an important source of support.

The 2010 and 2011 earthquakes destroyed 300 rented rooms and 60 percent of the local shops were badly damaged. Many of the boarding houses were demolished, but not rebuilt, and homelessness had become an acute problem. The shopping centre was mostly demolished, leaving gaps in both the built environment and the retail landscape, as well as reducing local opportunities for social interaction. Residents we spoke to believed crime, homelessness, poverty, unemployment and substance abuse had worsened since the earthquakes.

In 2012, the City Council released the Linwood Village Suburban Master Plan (Figure 12) for the ICE shopping centre¹². Though the Masterplan sought to integrate retail, housing, community facilities and open space, recovery in ICE was described as ‘patchy’ despite being considered ‘ripe for redevelopment’. Furthermore, there were concerns that the kind of development being proposed did not meet the needs of existing residents. As an example, new housing (that has to meet current building code regulations) was more expensive and suited to families, whereas many existing residents were on benefits and lived alone. This accentuated the ‘poverty of the single’ who incur all the costs of running a household, alone.



Figure 12: The Linwood Village Master Plan (2012, p. 11)

Te Whare Roimata (TWR) is a community development organisation that has had an active presence in the Linwood community for 30 years. TWR enables and supports grass-roots neighbourhood responses to local issues. TWR emerged from the nearby City Mission, which also has a strong emergency response and charity approach, but focusses on encouraging community development and building resilience at all times. This is achieved through, for example, pre-employment programmes, educational courses, leadership opportunities within Te Whare Roimata, an accessible arts centre, community gardens, and a range of activities designed to provide meaning and purpose for unemployed residents. Te Whare Roimata also owns a local café (Kua Hua Ake Te Ao Café), the local post-shop, and an op-shop which are all volunteer-run and focus on providing services and support to the community at low-cost and little profit. Securing funding for these projects is an on-going challenge, made more difficult by TWR’s commitment to serving the diverse community’s needs. The area is home to a high

¹² <https://www.ccc.govt.nz/the-council/plans-strategies-policies-and-bylaws/plans/suburban-centres-master-plans/linwood-village-master-plan>

number of maata waka or urban Māori and this can be problematic when funding is often directed to Iwi. Maata waka with no tribal affiliation can fall through the gap.

In 2017, TWR made a submission to the CCC during the Long Term Plan process (chaired by Mayor Lianne Dalziel) soliciting support for this developmental approach to complement the suburban Masterplan. Though funds were not awarded from the LTP budget, TWR received \$160,000 for a 2 year programme.

Given the context, a first step was to develop a grounded and holistic sense of the issues. Rather than survey residents (many of whom had no fixed abode or who struggled to read and write, TWR used 'slow' engagement at Te Ao (coffee shop), at the local market and by being present anywhere in ICE. These deformed settings enabled more honest and comfortable conversations, and reached different, and perhaps otherwise unheard, voices and opinions on local issues. In an area characterised by a lack of residents' association, business associations, or local agencies and organisations, this process also helped identify potential leaders who were able to think about the community's interests and who would later form a new steering group for the revitalisation programme.

Key Messages

- Be compassionate.
- Move at the community's pace. Particularly after a disaster, it may take significant amounts of time and networking to re-build a community that is then able to become engaged in the process. Give plenty of notice if there are deadlines.
- Community membership was diverse but all had interests in achieving an outcome that would benefit everyone.
- Be focussed but flexible.
- Mixing elected members, senior managers and diverse representatives of the community (including those most likely to object) legitimises the process but can make it difficult when this brings deadlines.
- Go where the community is.
- Acknowledge that a key resource is credibility. This can take time to build and is easily lost.
- If you want the community to be a partner, treat them like one. Keep communities informed of decisions that affect them.

The Aranui Community Trust

The Aranui Community Trust (ACTIS) was founded in 2002 as part of a community development-based approach to neighbourhood renewal and social housing provision.

Aranui, a community in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch, has one of the highest percentages of state housing in New Zealand. From the 1960s to early 2000s, housing stock in the area deteriorated and Aranui became regarded by many as the poorest and the most deprived suburb of Christchurch, with the highest rate of crime.

In 2000, the newly elected Labour government officially piloted a comprehensive and collaborative neighbourhood renewal project for Aranui. There was a strong emphasis on community engagement from the lead renewal partners, Housing New Zealand Corporation (HNZC) and the Christchurch City Council (CCC). Their first step was to develop better relationships with 'the Aranui community'. Consequently, HNZC and CCC established a local office in Aranui in order to help and build relationships with the community and work towards the renewal. The neighbourhood lacked empowered local representatives usually active in 'a

community', so HNZN and CCC encouraged residents to develop a community organisation. As a result, Aranui community formed the Aranui Community Trust Incorporated Society (ACTIS) that could represent the community in the renewal process. ACTIS also signed the MoU and the three partners officially collaborated for 8 years on the community renewal project.

The outputs of this renewal were some detached, single story New Zealand houses, a new park with new facilities and new roads. The outcomes of the process were, first, a stronger sense of community with a community-based organisation able to represent local interests in the renewal. The process also led to improved neighborhood safety, pride and sense of ownership, social learning particularly around how to collaborate with public and non-public organisations.

Who was involved? HNZN (Housing New Zealand project manager and two tenancy managers), CCC (the council project manager, the council community development advisor, the council park and waterway manager), ACTIS board and staff, New Zealand Ministry of Education (head of Adult Educator Center East Christchurch), New Zealand Ministry of Internal Affairs, private developers (Wilson and Hill construction) and other community members.

How were they involved? HNZN and CCC allocated some people to work in Aranui full-time, so they had direct, face-to-face, daily communication with locals and ACTIS members. ACTIS, HNZN and CCC had regular meetings every other week in the local office. HNZN and CCC funded a door-to-door survey and involved each and every household in Aranui as part of a Needs Analysis that also identified locals' ideas for solutions to local problems. The main problem (housing) was addressed but, importantly, so too were many of the smaller problems that the community had mentioned. Significant funding was spent on housing but small budgets were directed towards community-led projects like cleaning the streets and backyards in Aranui.

For the larger projects like rebuilding houses and upgrading the park, other than ACTIS, the broader local community was involved in the design and implementation stages. A series of events and meetings were held to inform the design stage. These were held in Wainoni park (Figures 13 and 14) and the Community Center rather than the civic offices, and 3D maps were provided along with painting facilities and screen projectors to show the designs.



Figure 13: Events and meetings attended by Aranui community members

For the implementation/building stage, some unemployed local people were employed as builders, but children also had a visible presence in upgrading the park and planting the plants. Throughout the process local people were updated through monthly newsletters that ACTIS started publishing (and is still publishing as of 2018). At the time, ACTIS, HNZA and CCC also initiated a festival called Affirm to get the community feedback on the project. This festival is still running 17 years later, under ACTIS leadership.

ACTIS' capabilities and capacities have grown over time and they are now able to work with other agencies such as Ministry of Education and Ministry of Internal affairs. They also undertake numerous projects and programmes on their own such as community education and community empowerment classes. This experience formed a foundation for their post-quake recovery work.

Key messages

- Developing 'community' capability (skills plus the ability to see beyond individual 'stakeholder' interests) takes time.
- Be where the community is. This enables agencies to a) be proactive and preventative rather than reactionary and b) better able to contextualise community needs and aspirations.
- Have direct and face-to-face communications with the communities.
- Define a community: every neighborhood comprises multiple households and individuals and collaboration with each and every one is impossible. Considerable thought has to go into building a 'collective' that can show *community leadership* or be a *community representative*.
- Support the communities to develop leadership and capability for themselves and to be able to work together (by contributing funds or other resources). This is cost-effective in the long-term as communities are enabled to find their own solutions for their problems.
- Involve the community from the 'very beginning' of a project and keep them involved to the 'end' of it. At a foundational level, this is about asking questions and listening to the responses. Collaborative processes have histories and futures.
- Don't focus solely on the biggest problem but look for ways to address smaller issues as well.
- Make sure that there are at least some small projects that the local people define, plan, lead and implement. This can give those involved a real sense of efficacy and also a commitment to working together.
- Try to let the communities be involved in actual doing and implementation of the designed plans because it provides a sense of ownership and may promote an ongoing attitude of care.

The Little River Flood Working Group

The Little River Flood Working Group was a community-led initiative, supported by ECan and the CCC to mitigate flood risk in the village.

Following severe flooding in 2014 in Little River (a township on the Banks Peninsula, Canterbury, New Zealand), the Little River Flood Working Group (LRFWG) was established. This Group was initiated by the local Community Board representative who eventually brought together residents and government agencies to work collaboratively to mitigate flood hazard.

Research into possible causes of flooding was commissioned by Environment Canterbury (ECan) (Blakely, 2015). The 'result (or 'output' of the process) was a community proposal to introduce a targeted 7 year River Ratings District, administered by Environment Canterbury, with funds used to undertake river clearance and maintenance. The 'outcomes' included reduced flooding, an improved understanding of flood management in the catchment, on-going relationships between CCC, ECan and community members, and further community-led initiatives to both improve drainage and align drainage infrastructure with broader village plans (see Little River, Big Ideas).



Figure 14: Flooding in Little River (Photo courtesy Neil Brown)

Who was involved?

Five community members including those most and least affected by floods, the elected City Council Community Board member and Chair, senior manager and technical/support staff from ECan, Wairewa rūnanga, Christchurch City Council, and Environment Canterbury

Commissioners and elected members. This working group ascribed to Terms of Reference and was co-chaired by a community and ECan staff member.

How were they involved? ECan commissioners approved the community’s proposal for a River Ratings District as part of their long-term plan process, but community members had input along the way. These community members undertook a survey of fellow residents to assess support/opposition to the proposal (with responses returned to ECan), kept locals involved via newsletters and advertisements in the Akaroa Mail, and fielded locals’ questions about the ratings district.

Significantly, ECan originally calculated the rates according to their usual approach which was based on acreage owned. This would mean that large land-owners whose land rarely flooded bore the highest rate burden. Furthermore, community members of the LRFWG argued that ‘community’ assets were at stake, hence the fee should be calculated on a flat fee per household basis. This meant ECan had to use the City Council’s database. ECan also made clear some boundaries with regard to what could feasibly be considered by the working group, and what was out of scope (no river re-alignment, no secondary flow paths, no raising of the Kinloch Bridge). However, it was agreed that these ideas could be reassessed if the proposed river maintenance works were unsuccessful. The WG met when necessary over the 18 month process. A timeline was dictated by the LTP process but 18 months allowed those involved to ‘move at the right speed’.

<p>Key Messages</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Community appetite for a solution to flooding was high. Strike while the iron’s hot but move at the community’s pace.• Give plenty of notice if there are deadlines.• It can take time to agree on the nature of the problem and this stage of the process should not be rushed.• Be receptive to the community’s ideas. If an idea has to be deferred, try to include a timeline (for gathering information, securing resources, prioritising) so that deferring discussion doesn’t sound like a ‘fobbing off’.• Be focussed (on the objective) but flexible (on how to get there).• Mixing elected members, technical staff, senior managers and diverse representatives of the community (including those most likely to object) can help legitimise the process and facilitate solutions that will be broadly acceptable.• Go where the community is.
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- The co-funding of a scoping report (by the Wairewa Community Trust and CCC) highlighted flooding as a priority and located the issue in the broader context of community aspirations and concerns.
- Be prepared to provide sufficient technical advice, delivered in a user-friendly way, in a place where people can ask questions. If you don't know the answer, try to indicate when you will have an answer.

Selwyn GetsReady

Selwyn Gets Ready¹³ is a way of connecting households, communities, council and civil defence so as to better manage disasters before, during and after they occur.

This initially small-scale, community-led initiative connects households with street and area coordinators in order to better share information and resources. The idea was later adopted by the Selwyn District Council who supported the development of software. The outcome is enabling the council and community volunteers to collaboratively manage disaster readiness, response and recovery across the district.

Selwyn Gets Ready (SGR) focuses on enabling communities to manage disasters using information submitted by the community members regarding local skills, resources and needs. This information is visible to local Community Response Team members, who are police checked and have some training.

Who is involved? Selwyn District Council – champions at senior management level, the emergency management team, civil defence volunteers/community response team members, community members who sign up to SGR, WebMad software developers.

How are they involved? This was a community-led initiative so it is very much based on a model that enables a grass-roots approach to a disaster management and facilitates a response that best suits the community (See Figure 16 below). Households, streets and neighbourhoods can all be involved and contribute to SGR and the council actively supports this. Households identify their various needs (e.g. diabetic, disabled, lives alone), skills (first aid trained, electrician, vet) and resources (4WD, generator, water tank). “Street Contacts” help create neighbourhood support groups. Community Response team members are the “Area Contacts” and they coordinate the local response. They have access to all the local

¹³ <https://selwyn.getsready.net/>

information so can solve local problems using local skills and resources. They can open an emergency centre to support evacuated local people and they can liaise directly with nominated council staff. These frontline staff roles are hybrids of Civil Defence Emergency Management, Neighbourhood Support and council. Communication can flow between those who have joined SGR (which is free for communities) and CDEM council staff via SGR.

Communications can be issued to, and received from, selected households, streets, neighbourhoods or areas. Community Response Teams also have a closed face book group where they post updates and photos during an event thereby creating and sharing situational awareness with the EOC and each other.

Civil Defence Volunteers first created the GetsReady software tool and model that has since been adopted by the Selwyn District Council. The tool was first trialled by the Darfield community and proved successful – community members were willing to sign up and share information on their needs, skills or resources. Following its success, the idea was brought to the Selwyn District Council who realized the importance of this tool and provided funding for it to be developed and rolled out throughout the entire district. The software was built by and is now managed by an independent software company (WebMad). The use of SGR is managed by the Selwyn Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) team at the council who can view all the information about households and can use the tool to send out alert messages. They oversee any disaster response. Volunteers, known as community response team members, work with the Selwyn CDEM team to provide information about their areas to the Emergency Operations Centre during a disaster, as well as inform their communities about the disaster. They are empowered and supported by the Selwyn CDEM team to coordinate a disaster response in their own communities using information about the skills and resources the community has, and to meet the needs of people. Community members at the grassroots level can sign up to Selwyn Gets Ready and provide information about their household, and can receive emergency alert messages.

Selwyn Gets Ready is focused on enabling communities to coordinate their own response to a disaster using information submitted by the community members to Selwyn Gets Ready regarding the skills, resources and needs of the community. Using a bottom-up approach to a disaster response ensures the response is what best suits the community.

Selwyn Gets Ready allows for collaboration between the Selwyn CDEM team and the community response team members. While the Selwyn CDEM team oversee the disaster response and create the rules that the community response teams must follow when

coordinating a response, they still create an open relationship with the volunteers – they allow the volunteers to give ideas and suggest where Selwyn Gets Ready could be improved. This therefore helps to achieve the top-down requirements of a council, while meeting the bottom-up requirements of a community.

There is two-way communication between the Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) and the communities through the community response teams. This increases the situational awareness of the EOC to allow for better understanding of what is happening in the communities in the district during the event, and allows for the communities to be more informed and get the specific help they require.

Selwyn Gets Ready has been a success as community members are willing to sign up to the database or as a volunteer which allows for people to be more informed during disasters so they can improve their preparedness. Disaster responses have been more informed and the responses have been better suited for the communities. There is less pressure on the EOC during a response and more accurate situational awareness.

The council and the public are more informed during disasters, responses are better suited to communities creating less opposition to decisions and people are more informed about safety issues and Civil Defence hazards. It has created a relationship between the communities and the council that can be used to create local community disaster response plans. Other councils have adopted the Gets Ready database as a means to communicate with their communities. These include North Canterbury, Christchurch city, Ashburton and South Canterbury. Selwyn Gets Ready has led to other projects relevant to disaster responses.

SGR has enabled local community response plans to be written between remote and vulnerable communities and the council. (Arthurs Pass, Castle Hill, Lake Coleridge and Springfield)

Key Messages

- There is two-way communication between the council and communities. This increases the situational awareness of the Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) to allow for better understanding of what is happening in the communities and in the district during a disaster. It allows communities to be more informed and get the specific help they require. It also allows the EOC to make better decisions about priorities and where to deploy resources.
- Devoting sufficient resources - such as information, time, funding and staff - to making and maintaining connections. This happens through constant face-to-

face networking, and going where communities are, as well through news releases and other media.

- Mixing elected members, technical staff, senior managers and diverse but credible and well-known representatives of the community both legitimised the process and facilitated the outcomes.
- Staff also need to be focussed but 'willing to think outside of the norm'.
- Open, honest, two-way communication
- Positive relationships between the council and the community in which both are happy to work together.
- Timing is important - The support of council staff and the community towards a tool such as Selwyn Gets Ready may only be possible if there has recently been a disaster and interest is high.
- Pre-established community connections with the council (such as people on a community board or volunteers whom are known to the council) may make it easier to find volunteers to be on the community response teams and train to coordinate responses. However these may not always be the best people as they can be over-committed already.
- The community needs to be interested in learning about disasters as this helps to generate interest in signing up at a household level or at a community response team level.
- When using the tool to send out alert messages, it will only be taken seriously by the community if it is not overused or misused to send irrelevant messages to the community. Selwyn CDEM staff have a high threshold for what messages will and won't be sent to maintain this credibility.

The Waimakariri District Council.

The 2010 earthquake resulted in extensive damage to Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki in the Waimakariri District. Though affecting a smaller area, in proportional terms Kaiapoi was as badly affected as the city of Christchurch. Over 5000 people lost water and sewer services. Almost 1200 homes (a third of all housing stock in Kaiapoi) and most homes in Pines Beach and Kairaki were severely damaged. A quarter of Kaiapoi businesses were immediately closed, and there was widespread damage to local infrastructure.



Figure 15: Red Zoned areas of Kaiapoi, with KTC area within white outline and MUBA's shaded red (Source: Waimakariri District Council's KTC Draft Plan (2018)).

In 2011, almost 90 hectares of land, some of which is immediately adjacent to the town centre, was Red Zoned. The Red Zone Recovery Plan¹⁴ won the New Zealand Planning Institute's Nancy Northcroft Supreme Award for Best Practice Strategic Planning and Guidance. The Plan was approved in 2016 and outlines proposed land uses and activities for the five regeneration areas of Kaiapoi West, Kaiapoi South, Kaiapoi East, The Pines Beach and Kairaki.

Given the context, the plan initially focussed on non-built and non-residential options such as new parks and reserves, walking and cycling links, a BMX track, a dog park, mahinga kai

¹⁴ <https://www.redzoneplan.nz/> and https://www.redzoneplan.nz/_data/assets/pdf_file/0017/27062/DPMCWRRZRecoveryPlanWeb_v2pdf.pdf

activities, rural applications, roads and infrastructure sites, as well as some ‘mixed use business areas’ (MUBAs) for those parts of the Red Zone immediately adjacent to the town centre. These MUBAs comprise the areas that are now the focus of the Kaiapoi Town Centre Plan.

Who was involved in the KTC? The Council used various tools and methods of engagement to inform both the Red Zone Recovery Plan and the KTC, including multi-criteria assessment of uses and activities reviewed by a range of experts, street corner meetings for those affected by decisions, drop-in sessions, regular meetings with the Regeneration Committee that included representation from both Councillors and Community Board members and is attended by representatives from Ngāi Tūāhuriri, ENC, WBNC and other stakeholders. There were also a number of larger town meetings where the Mayor, CE, senior managers and technical staff were present to ask and answer questions. For the KTC specifically, three Inquiry by Design (IBD) sessions were undertaken with the business community by an independent consultant (Boffa Miskell), along with two larger public meetings (one more for commercial interests to test the findings of the IBDs, and one for the general public).

Importantly, these ‘tools’ or ‘methods’ reflected a distinctive logic that, when taken together, enacted a distinctive approach to engagement often referred to as the ‘Waimakariri Way’. For the Council, this approach is articulated in Tā Mātou Mauri (Our Values):

- Act with integrity, honesty and trust;
- Work with you and each other;
- Keep you informed;
- Do better every day;
- Take responsibility.

Key messages:

- Regeneration projects are more likely to be successful if the community buy in to the process and the intended outcomes.
- Be present: whether the ‘engagement budget is large or small, be out there. Don’t hide, be a face.
- Engagement is not ‘a thing’, it’s not an add- on. Everyone is an engagement officer, all the time. In order to get engagement done properly, it has to be a line item in your budget.

- Empower communities and elected members with good advice. Allow, enable and ask technical staff to go out into the community with you.
- If relationships are positive, disagreements can be respectful.
- Good communication and experimentation. Communications teams must not be afraid to engage in different ways.
- Spend time engaging well, through drop-ins, one on one, integrated assessments, IBDs. Use these on-site, one-to-one opportunities to engage with those making the comments and where you can understand the context.
- Those writing the plan should front up and go out with the coms team to hear what the community thinks.
- Triangulating formal and informal data sources can be helpful.
- It can be difficult to balance decision-making at the right level with the economies of scale larger councils enjoy.