

The well-evolved life: Well-being, evolution and personhood: An annotated bibliography



Kevin Moore
Lyn Minchington

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Introduction

Advances in most areas of specialization within the broad discipline of psychology occur incrementally – sometimes in larger increments, sometimes in smaller increments. One often-noted disadvantage of such specialized research progress is that connections between different areas can be overlooked or neglected.

Three areas within psychology that have been making rapid theoretical and empirical progress over the past few decades have been: (i) understandings of well-being; (ii) evolutionary and related biological approaches to human psychology; and, (iii) theories of the development of personhood (or the ‘self’).

There is reason to believe that these areas have strong conceptual inter-relationships. In psychology, work on well-being is usually cast at the individual level (e.g., through the notion of ‘subjective well-being’ (SWB) - Diener & Lucas, 1999). That casting implicates the indexing of well-being to a person or ‘self’ as subject or agent of well-being.

Similarly, the evolutionary distinctiveness of many human psychological traits connects to the sociality of the species and, in particular, to how that sociality has influenced the evolution of personal consciousness and social individuation. Work on the evolution of emotions such as envy (Hill and Buss, 2006), jealousy (Buss et al. 1992) and shame (Glibert, 2003), for example, has highlighted the social and moral networks within which persons are located, perceived and held accountable as individual persons.

Finally, analyses of well-being frequently make reference to some notion of human nature, most obviously in eudaimonic approaches that emphasise ‘nature fulfillment’ as central to the experience of well-being (e.g., see Haybron, 2008). While there is general acknowledgment that evolutionary processes are not specifically targeted at maximizing individual well-being, it is also true that there is enough congruence between evolutionary selective processes and the evolved physical and psychological ‘design’ of humans to suggest considerable overlap between adaptive function and organismic and psychological well-being. Simply, we tend to feel better at various levels when we operate in a manner suited to our evolved physical and psychological architecture.

Given significant advances in all three of these areas it therefore makes sense to draw together threads from each in order to take stock of what is known about the convergence and interdependence of these streams of research activity.

In practical terms, there has been considerable public interest in well-being research to the extent of increasing consideration of ways in which policy settings might incorporate human well-being (e.g., as policy goals and as measures of policy success). Grounding such policy and practice in relation to well-being within broader understandings of evolutionary influences and social and developmental processes involved in the generation of persons seems timely.

Such grounding should also provide more fundamental understandings of well-being that indicate how different policy areas (e.g., social development, education, the economy, health, environmental management, etc.) potentially interact, reinforce, moderate or combine to produce well-being outcomes at the population level.

The aim of this annotated bibliography is to provide a ‘first cut’ at characterising this multiple interface. It cannot hope to be comprehensive and apologies are made in advance to any authors of work that might be omitted from this collection.

In particular, the bibliography, with a few exceptions, is restricted to journal articles accessed via the targeted databases. The omission of many books and book chapters is a definite limitation of the bibliography. The assumption, however, was that most books in the area are based upon published articles. Also, in most cases, book or book chapter authors are themselves article authors. Should someone wish to pursue the work of particular authors featured in this bibliography they will be able to locate books, book chapters and other omitted reference material by those authors. The aim of this bibliography is to assist with rather than substitute for comprehensive literature searches.

Many bibliographies are designed to provide useful source material for particular areas of research specialization or the development of particular theoretical frameworks (e.g., see Axelrod and D'Ambrosio's (1994) "[Annotated Bibliography on the Evolution of Cooperation](#)" for an example of the latter). This bibliography differs from many others in that, as just noted, it seeks to target a set of *interfaces* between three distinct bodies of literature:

- Human well-being;
- Evolutionary (and related biological) perspectives on human behaviour;
- Personhood (including the 'self').

Each of these bodies of literature is extensive in its own right. Importantly, this bibliography does not aim to include all the literature in each area. Instead, its focus is on the overlap between these areas.

As will be explained in the 'Methods' section, this has involved a necessarily subjective, but principled, process of selection of those published works (captured in the search process) that provide clear insight into the connections between two or more of these areas of research.

Within those bounds, the selection process has been deliberately 'permissive'. While major, well-cited works are included so too are some quite focused and specific studies. The selection criterion in this respect is a work's 'fit' with the purpose of the bibliography, rather than its renown.

Methods

The initial stage of the project involved extensive database searches on the overlap between the areas of evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being. In order to achieve the objectives of the study, the following databases were chosen as being appropriate to locate articles linking the three subject areas:

Web of Science; Science Direct; Proquest-Social Science; Google Scholar; General One File; Web of Knowledge.

In addition, the *Evolution and Human Behavior* journal website and General LIU Library searches were performed.

Words were identified that would target the connections between evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being. On that basis, literature searches were undertaken using combinations of the following keywords:

evolutionary psychology; evolution*; behavio* ecology; personhood; self; selfhood; social construct*; well-being; human; happiness; flourish*; neurodevelopment; play.

As the search progressed, keywords were added if they were being used in a way related to the focus of this study, or to follow themes that seemed to be particularly relevant and fruitful. For example, the keyword 'play' was added to follow a developmental theme that emphasised development of cognitive and social skills necessary for personhood and, potentially, well-being. Children have always engaged in play, play has evolved with the developing person, and play leads to well-being, joy and happiness.

Citations were selected primarily from reviewing the abstracts, and the relevant citations were saved in an Endnote file (Version X4), with the PDF's attached (if they were available to download). Extra citations were located and added from appropriate references cited in the located articles, and also by searching for key authors identified (e.g., Martin, J., for articles relating to selfhood/personhood; Grinde, B., for articles relating to evolutionary well-being; and, Pellegrini, A., for articles relating to play).

In the development of any bibliography there is a process of selection and filtering. As well as the limitations inherent in the databases searched and in the choice of keywords and combinations of keywords to search, there is also a necessarily subjective process of making judgments about relevance to the objective of the bibliography. Relevance was judged either on the basis of explicit mention of two or more of the areas of interest (i.e., well-being, evolutionary psychology or personhood) or, when only one them was focused on, when the focus on one area of interest was detailed and/or provided a model or distinctive theoretical framework.

The second stage of the project was a process of confirmation of citations and a final check for relevance and completeness. From this final set of entries, an annotated bibliography on the connections between evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being was produced and is reported here.

The completed bibliography contains a total of 347 annotated references, presented in APA 6th style. All cited references are listed in alphabetical order by surname of the first author and have been numbered consecutively. This numbering has been used in the production of two indexes: One based on the various overlaps between three subject areas; one based on authors.

The original abstracts have been included, either in full or abbreviated where they were extremely long. Most citations also include brief notes about the article that position it in relation to the three subject areas. If no abstract was available for the journal articles, brief notes have been included.

References

Buss, D. M.; Larsen, R.J.; Westen, D. & Semmelroth, J. (1992). Sex differences in jealousy: Evolution, physiology, and psychology. *Psychological Science*, 3, 251-255.

Diener, E. & Lucas, R. (1999). Personality and subjective well-being. In D Kahneman, E. Diener, & N. Schwartz (Eds.), *Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology*. New York: Sage.

Gilbert, P. (2003). Evolution, social roles, and the differences in shame and guilt. *Social Research*, 70(4), 1205-1230.

Haybron, D. (2008). Philosophy and the science of subjective well-being. In M. Eid, & R.J. Larsen (Eds.), *The science of subjective well-being*. (pp. 17-43). New York: The Guilford Press.

Hill, S.E. & Buss, D.M. (2006). Envy and positional bias in the evolutionary psychology of management. *Managerial and Decision Economics*, 27, 131-143.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Adams, G. R. & Marshall, S. (1996). A developmental social psychology of identity: Understanding the person-in-context. *Journal of Adolescence*, 19(5), 429-442. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014019719690041X>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jado.1996.0041>

Abstract: This essay focuses on the socialization of identity formation. It provides a theory about the developmental social psychology of identity. A set of propositions are derived from the authors' reading, research, cultural observations and clinical experience regarding adolescent identity formation. The essay covers the socialization process, nature of the self, processes of growth and development, person-in-context, and a statement on the linkage between macro- and micro-environmental influences on identity. The theoretical propositions are offered for their potential heuristic utility in the study of identity formation during adolescence and young adulthood.

Notes: Relates to the development of personhood/selfhood through the process and socialisation and has implications for the study of well-being.

2. Adams, K. B.; Leibbrandt, S. & Moon, H. (2011). A critical review of the literature on social and leisure activity and well-being in later life. *Ageing & Society*, 31(04), 683-712. doi:10.1017/S0144686X10001091

Abstract: An engaged lifestyle is seen as an important component of successful ageing. Many older adults with high participation in social and leisure activities report positive well-being, a fact that fuelled the original activity theory and that continues to influence researchers, theorists and practitioners. This study's purpose is to review the conceptualisation and measurement of activity among older adults and the associations reported in the gerontological literature between specific dimensions of activity and well-being. We searched published studies that focused on social and leisure activity and well-being, and found 42 studies in 44 articles published between 1995 and 2009. They reported from one to 13 activity domains, the majority reporting two or three, such as informal, formal and solitary, or productive versus leisure. Domains associated with subjective well-being, health or survival included social, leisure, productive, physical, intellectual, service and solitary activities. Informal social activity has accumulated the most evidence of an influence on well-being. Individual descriptors such as gender or physical functioning sometimes moderate these associations, while contextual variables such as choice, meaning or perceived quality play intervening roles. Differences in definitions and measurement make it difficult to draw inferences about this body of evidence on the associations between activity and well-being. Activity theory serves as shorthand for these associations, but gerontology must better integrate developmental and psychological constructs into a refined, comprehensive activity theory.

Notes: A comprehensive review of recent studies from a number of countries and cultures on the activity theory of ageing. The findings report that higher levels of participation in

social and leisure activities leads to higher levels of well-being in older adults. An interesting contribution to the study of well-being and personhood, particularly relevant because of the growing increases in numbers of elderly people.

3. Adams, M. (2003). The reflexive self and culture: A critique. *British Journal of Sociology*, 54(2), 221-238. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000183578200004. doi:10.1080/0007131032000080212

Abstract: This article attempts to engage with a tendency in the theorization of social change and self-identity evident in the work of a number of contemporary social theorists, to place an extended process of reflexivity at the heart of modern identity. As symptomatic of 'neo-modern' accounts of selfhood, critical readings of Giddens, Beck, Castells and some aspects of social theory more generally, and their account of modern reflexivity's relationship to culture, are assessed. In light of these criticisms, ways in which culture might still play an important part in the shaping of identity are considered. The relationship between language, culture and reflexivity, drawing from philosophy, sociology and G. H. Mead's own brand of social psychology, are all utilized in establishing a critique of the role Giddens and others designate for culture in the constitution of the contemporary self. By potentially repositioning self-identity in its connection to culture, the overall bearing of reflexivity upon the processes of self-identity is thus questioned. It is argued that a culturally-situated, yet fluid and multifarious account of self-identity is a necessary analytical and normative alternative.

Notes: A critique of the development of identity through reflexive processes of modernity, especially as featured in the work of Anthony Giddens. Relates to personhood.

4. Ahuvia, A. C. (2002). Individualism/collectivism and cultures of happiness: A theoretical conjecture on the relationship between consumption, culture and subjective well-being at the national level. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 3(1), 23-36. doi:10.1023/a:1015682121103

Abstract: This theory paper seeks to explain an empirical puzzle presented by past research on the relationship between consumption and subjective well-being (SWB). Research has shown that people in rich countries are, on average, significantly higher in SWB than people in poor countries, which is consistent with a strong link between one's overall level of consumption and one's SWB. However, when individuals within the same country are compared, income has little relationship to SWB above the level at which basic needs can be met, suggesting that higher levels of consumption may not be linked to higher levels of SWB. This link between consumption and SWB when nations are compared to each other, but not when individuals within a given nation are compared to each other, presents a puzzle. As a solution, I propose that economic development leads to higher levels of national average SWB not by increasing consumption (again, with the caveat that this statement excludes situations where basic needs are not being met), but by creating more individualistic cultures which encourage their members to pursue personal happiness over honor and meeting social obligations. Whether or not this is seen as a socially positive development depends in a circular fashion on the cultural values of the person making the judgement.

Notes: The author argues that people who put more emphasis on 'intrinsic' goals such as personal growth or having rich social relationships, have higher levels of subjective well-being than those who place more emphasis on 'extrinsic' goals such as acquiring wealth or social recognition. The type of motivation is the key, as intrinsic motivations come from within, and one *wants* to do something, whereas extrinsic motivations are based on what one *ought* to do. Therefore to have high subjective well-being goals must be intrinsically motivated. An interesting perspective on individualistic/collectivist cultures, showing that collectivist cultures are not necessarily the happiest, nor are individualistic cultures primarily motivated by consumption. Relates to both personhood (via individualistic or collectivistic influences) and well-being.

5. Ahuvia, A. C. (2005). Beyond the extended self: Loved objects and consumers' identity narratives. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 32(1), 171-184. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/429607>. doi:10.1086/429607

Abstract: This article investigates the possessions and activities that consumers love and their role in the construction of a coherent identity narrative. In the face of social forces pushing toward identity fragmentation, interviews reveal three different strategies, labeled "demarcating," "compromising," and "synthesizing" solutions, for creating a coherent self-narrative. Findings are compared to Belk's "Possessions and the Extended Self." Most claims from Belk are supported, but the notion of a core versus extended self is critiqued as a potentially confusing metaphor. The roles of loved objects and activities in structuring social relationships and in consumer well-being are also explored.

Notes: Explores the notion of a 'self' being extended into the objects and artefacts a person possesses. Relates to selfhood/ personhood and well-being.

6. Alexander, G. M. (2003). An evolutionary perspective of sex-typed toy preferences: Pink, blue, and the brain. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, 32(1), 7-14. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A%3A1021833110722>. doi:10.1023/a:1021833110722

Abstract: Large sex differences in children's toy preferences are attributed to gender group identification and social learning. The proposal outlined in this paper is that contemporary conceptual categories of "masculine" or "feminine" toys are also influenced by evolved perceptual categories of male-preferred and female-preferred objects. Research on children exposed prenatally to atypical levels of androgens and research on typically developing infants suggest sex-dimorphic preferences exist for object features, such as movement or color/form. The evolution and neurobiology of mammalian visual processing—and recent findings on sex-dimorphic toy preferences in nonhuman primates—suggest further that an innate bias for processing object movement or color/form may contribute to behaviors with differential adaptive significance for males and females. In this way, preferences for objects such as toys may indicate a biological preparedness for a "masculine" or "feminine" gender role—one that develops more fully as early perceptual preferences are coupled with object experiences imposed by contemporary gender socialization.

Notes: An analysis of the links between evolutionary theory and toy preferences as a function of gender that seeks to bridge the interface between evolved biological preferences and gender socialisation processes. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

7. Alexander, R. D. (1990). Epigenetic rules and Darwinian algorithms: The adaptive study of learning and development. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 11(4–5), 241-303. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/016230959090012U>. doi:10.1016/0162-3095(90)90012-u

Abbreviated **Abstract:** Recent efforts toward a Darwinian psychology of human behavior will profit from taking account of prior investigations of proximate phenomena and adaptive mechanisms conducted within the science of biology, and from realizing that adaptive significance and underlying mechanisms must be investigated in concert. Contrary to some recent arguments, evidence of adaptive design is usually manifested initially and most prominently in the behavior (or other "ultimate" phenotypic expressions) of organisms, human or nonhuman, rather than in underlying psychological, physiological, or developmental mechanisms, which are often obscure, and in any case, as adaptive mechanisms, must be investigated secondarily. The reason is that selection acts most directly on behavior, and on its underlying mechanisms only as they influence the behavior. This is as true for learned and cultural behaviors as for any others. Adaptive significance of behavior, and evidence of its underlying design, is thus examined only by studying the behavior itself, its complexity, the situations in which it is expressed, and its effects in different situations. It is argued that the principal environment of natural selection leading to the modern human psyche was social, and that on this account the environment of human behavior has not changed as much since the Pleistocene as is often assumed.

Notes: An early account of the relationship between evolutionary processes, human sociality and the human mind. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

8. Allott, R. (1992). Evolutionary aspects of love and empathy. *Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems*, 15(4), 353-370. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1992KW12600002. doi:10.1016/1061-7361(92)90023-7

Abstract: Love has always been a central preoccupation in individual human lives, but there has been little consideration of it by psychologists or other scientists and little attempt to explain it as an evolutionary phenomenon. There are various possible behavioral precursors of love: animal "love," empathy, group feeling, sexuality, and the mother/infant bond. The principal candidates are sexuality and the mother/infant bond. Sexuality has been favored as an origin by a few writers, but has characteristics which distinguish it sharply from love. However, neither does the mother/infant bond alone fully account for human love. Love evolved as the outcome of interaction between the genetic basis for mother/infant attachment and other capabilities of evolving humans manifested in and made possible by the increase in human brain-size: enlarged cognitive capacity, improved communication, and the evolution of language. The capacity of language led to the emergence of the conscious self, and with this the capability to recognize and empathize with the selfhood of others. The

deepening of the mother/infant attachment into love plays, and still plays, an essential role in the transmission of culture from one generation to the next, and in making possible the cohesion of the human group. This account fits well with recent research into the process and significance of the mother/infant relation.

Notes: Provides an account of how empathic abilities could have evolved in humans, given the social context of other selves and the presence of deep and prolonged mother-infant interaction. Relates to self/personhood and evolution.

9. Anderson, K. G. ; Kaplan, H. , Lam, D. & Lancaster, J. (1999). Paternal care by genetic fathers and stepfathers II: Reports by Xhosa high school students. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 20(6), 433-451. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513899000227>. doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(99)00022-7

Abstract: In this article we present a biosocial model of human male parental care that allows relationship (mating) effort to influence male parental allocations. The model recognizes four classes of relationships between men and the children they parent: genetic offspring of current mates (combined relationship and parental effort), genetic offspring of previous mates (parental effort solely), step offspring of current mates (relationship effort solely), and stepchildren of previous mates (essentially no expected investment). We test the model using data on parental investment collected from 340 Xhosa high school students in Cape Town, South Africa. Six measures of paternal investment are examined: the amount of money men spent on students for school, clothing, and miscellaneous expenditures, respectively, and how often men spent time with children, helped them with their homework, or spoke English with them. The tests provide support for the roles of both parental and relationship effort in influencing parental care: men invest significantly more in their genetic offspring and in the children of their current mates. We also examine several proximate influences on parental care, specifically the age and sex of the child, and the percentage of the child's life the father figure coresided with him or her.

Notes: The authors argue that individuals may select mates partly on the basis of their predicted ability or willingness to provide parental care. Parental care can improve the quality and or duration of the relationship. Introduces the term 'relationship effort' which covers economic and reciprocity issues as well as solely reproductive considerations. Connects evolutionary theories of male parental investment with support for the development of children (persons). Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

10. Anderson, M. L. (2003). Embodied cognition: A field guide. *Artificial Intelligence*, 149(1), 91-130. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0004370203000547>. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702\(03\)00054-7](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702(03)00054-7)

Abstract: The nature of cognition is being re-considered. Instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols, the new approach foregrounds the fact that cognition is, rather, a situated activity, and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore be considered first and foremost as acting beings. The essay reviews recent work in Embodied Cognition,

provides a concise guide to its principles, attitudes and goals, and identifies the physical grounding project as its central research focus.

Notes: An important overview of the field of embodied cognition, its philosophical bases, evolutionary emphasis and connections to socially situated cognition. Relates to evolutionary psychology and the cognitive nature of selves as embodied beings. It also touches on socially-situated approaches to cognition.

11. Anderson, W. T. (2003). Augmentation, symbiosis, transcendence: Technology and the future(s) of human identity. *Futures*, 35(5), 535-546. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328702000976>. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0016-3287\(02\)00097-6](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0016-3287(02)00097-6)

Abstract: Accelerating and converging technological changes in several fields are now challenging fundamental assumptions about human nature in general and, more specifically, ideas about the sense of personal identity. Major themes in the emerging dialogue concerning this subject are: augmentation (creating abilities not biologically inherent in the phenotype), symbiosis (interaction between two organisms or between people and intelligent machines), and transcendence (going beyond present identity boundaries to become parts of a larger entity). These themes are now being explored by various futurists and also by science-fiction writers who create imaginative scenarios of far distant futures in which human identity may change in spectacular ways. Such explorations offer not only useful visions of possible futures, but important insights into the past and present nature of human evolution.

Notes: A speculative investigation of how personal identity may be affected in the future by technological innovations that augment, connect and transcend current and past ways of constructing personhood. Relates to personhood.

12. Andrews, P. W. (2002). The influence of postreliance detection on the deceptive efficacy of dishonest signals of intent: Understanding facial clues to deceit as the outcome of signaling tradeoffs. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 23(2), 103-121. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513801000848>. doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(01)00084-8

Abstract: Evolutionary communication theory posits that signalers and receivers are in a coevolutionary arms race. Receivers attempt to predict the behavior of signalers, and signalers attempt to manipulate the behavior of receivers (often through the use of dishonest signals of intent). This has led to the perception that deceitful signalers prefer perfectly deceptive signals. However, it is often easy for receivers to determine that a signal of intent was dishonest after relying on it to their detriment. Even the best deceivers may then acquire a reputation for being dishonest. For instance, in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD)-like social situations, predictable defectors make better social partners than unpredictable defectors. When opportunities to engage in social interaction depend on one's reputation for predictability, those who are better at concealing their defecting intentions may suffer

the most from the reputations they acquire. Deceivers then face a tradeoff between the short-term benefits of successful deception and the long-term costs to their reputations. A mathematical model is developed and it is shown that the tradeoff often favors signalers who produce imperfectly deceptive signals over perfectly honest or perfectly deceptive ones. Implications for understanding human facial expressions and sociopathy are drawn.

Notes: An interesting account that highlights the trade-off between short-term pay-offs that arise from deception/dishonesty in a social setting versus longer-term damage to one's reputation. This is a central issue for the moral accounting of persons in social settings as it involves managing obligations to others while maintaining the interests of the individual person in the local moral order. Relates to evolutionary psychology and social selves/personhood.

13. Babchuk, W. A. ; Hames, R. B. & Thompson, R. A. (1985). Sex differences in the recognition of infant facial expressions of emotion: The primary caretaker hypothesis. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 6(2), 89-101. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309585900020>. doi:10.1016/0162-3095(85)90002-0

Abstract: Although much research has been devoted to studying sex differences in functioning (e.g., Maccoby and Jacklin 1974), most efforts have been directed toward documenting or elucidating the proximate causes of sex differences. Few attempts have been made, however, to explain the ultimate causes of these differences or the selective pressures that have led to the development of psychological differences between males and females [for exceptions see Symons (1979) and Daly and Wilson (1983)]. Toward this end of blending psychology with evolutionary theory we develop what we call the "primary caretaker hypothesis," which predicts that the sex that through evolutionary time has dominated infant caretaking will differentially exhibit skills that are important in caretaking (e.g., the ability to rapidly recognize infant emotional expressions). Evidence is advanced to show that females dominate childcare in nonhuman primates and humans and that a high level of care of infants is crucial, given universally high infant mortality rates throughout our evolutionary history and the number of potential hazards impairing infant development. The prompt and accurate recognition of infant emotional cues—especially in the face—is an important component of caretaking practices, and thus selective pressures should result in greater proficiency in this ability in the sex that caretakes most. An experimental procedure is described where informants were tested in their speed and accuracy of identifying infant facial expressions of emotion. A statistical analysis of the results revealed that females were significantly more accurate and rapid than males in their discrimination of facial expressions and that previous experience in childcare had no effect on this sex difference. Follow-up research concerning the "primary caretaker hypothesis" is proposed.

Notes: An early work that links evolutionary theory on parental investment (caretaking) with emotional responsiveness and recognition of facial emotional expressions. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for child development and social-emotional capacities/personhood.

14. Barbour, I. G. (1999). Neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and human nature: Theological and philosophical reflections. *Zygon*, 34(3), 361-398. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000082173800002. doi:10.1111/0591-2385.00222

Abstract: I develop a multilevel, holistic view of persons, emphasizing embodiment, emotions, consciousness, and the social self. In successive sections I draw from six sources: 1. Theology. The biblical understanding of the unitary, embodied, social self gave way in classical Christianity to a body-soul dualism, but it has been recovered by many recent theologians. 2. Neuroscience. Research has shown the localization of mental functions in regions of the brain, the interaction of cognition and emotion, and the importance of social interaction in evolutionary history and child development. 3. Artificial intelligence. Some forms of robotics use embodied systems that learn by interacting with their environment, but the possibilities for emotion, socialization, and consciousness in robots remain problematic. 4. Relations between levels. Concepts that can help us relate studies of neurons and persons include the hierarchy of levels, the communication of information, the behavior of dynamic systems, and epistemological and ontological emergence. 5. Philosophy of mind. Two-aspect theories of the mind-brain relation offer an alternative between the extremes of eliminative materialism and the thesis that consciousness is irreducible. 6. Process philosophy. I suggest that process thought provides a coherent philosophical framework in which these themes can be brought together. It combines dipolar monism with organizational pluralism, and it emphasizes embodiment, emotions, a hierarchy of levels, and the social character of selfhood.

Notes: A philosophical and theoretical inquiry into selfhood that draws upon a range of empirical and theoretical developments, including evolutionary theory and child development. Relates to evolution, development and social interaction/personhood.

15. Barker, D. J. P. (2004). The developmental origins of well-being. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B.* , 359 1359–1366.

Abstract: Low birthweight is now known to be associated with increased rates of coronary heart disease and the related disorders, stroke, hypertension and adult-onset diabetes. These associations have been extensively replicated in studies in different countries and are not the result of confounding variables. They extend across the normal range of birthweight and depend on lower birthweights in relation to the duration of gestation rather than the effects of premature birth. The associations are thought to be consequences of developmental plasticity, the phenomenon by which one genotype can give rise to a range of different physiological or morphological states in response to different environmental conditions during development. Recent observations have shown that impaired growth in infancy and rapid childhood weight gain exacerbate the effects of impaired prenatal growth. A new vision of optimal early human development is emerging, which takes account of health and well-being throughout life.

Notes: Relates to well-being through a developmental analysis of prenatal growth and its long-term effects on well-being throughout life.

16. Barnett, S. A. (1983). Humanity and natural selection. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 4(1), 35-51. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309583900079>. doi:10.1016/0162-3095(83)90007-9

Abstract: In some modern biological images of the human species human action is reduced to a consequence of natural selection, that is, to a tendency to maximize fitness. The precise nature and scope of the theory of natural selection are, however, undecided; yet in evolutionary interpretations of human society neodarwinism is often treated as a dogma, and natural selection sometimes becomes a transcendental force. There are instances of changes in gene frequencies, in human as well as other populations, that conform with neodarwinian ("socio-biological") presumptions; but it is not known to what extent the evolution of the human (or other) species has been due to such changes. There is still less ground for explaining the diversity of human societies in this way. The image-makers also make illegitimate use of the comparative method: familiar features of human conduct, such as favoring kin and reciprocation, are used in accounts of animal behavior, and are then rediscovered among human beings; during this two-way transfer, the meanings of words are changed; altruism, egoism, and deceit lose their moral content, and the complex human idea of kin is reduced to a measure of genetical similarity. The intention of neodarwinists is to reveal a human nature determined by evolutionary processes, but one of the most important distinctive features of our species is the plasticity of our behavior, attitudes, and intentions. Moreover, if neodarwinian premises are accepted, to speak of intention is misleading, and there are no independent criteria by which neodarwinian (or any other) arguments may be judged: all one does is regulated by the need to maximise one's inclusive fitness. Hence much writing in this field wavers between an uncompromising reduction of human action to considerations of population genetics, on the one hand, and a recognition that there are other kinds of authentic knowledge about human beings, on the other. Among the latter is historical knowledge. The neodarwinian images of humanity emphasize human depravity. In their misanthropy they reflect the outlook of conservative pessimists who have influenced European thought for two and a half millennia, and whose views imply that most attempts to improve the human condition are against nature and so must fail. An alternative, which corresponds to the facts of everyday life and of history, is that human beings are capable of rejecting what is conventionally held to be inevitable, and of determining their destiny by conscious, deliberate action.

Notes: An early argument that 'neodarwinist' views of human nature undervalue persons' abilities to determine their actions through conscious and deliberate means. An early discussion that highlights the tension between common views of personhood and evolutionary explanations. Relates evolutionary psychology to personhood.

17. Barresi, J. (1999). On becoming a person. *Philosophical Psychology*, 12(1), 79-98. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/217709618?accountid=27890>

Abstract: How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are (1) persons are constructed out of natural

but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through the process of evolution; (3) persons develop ontogenetically; (4) persons are created through the unifying activity of self-narrative; (5) persons are constituted through socio-historical and cultural processes; and (6) the concept of person is a normative ideal. I suggest that it is important to consider all of these projects and related criteria in order to appreciate fully how an entity becomes a human person.

Notes: A comprehensive account of personhood that incorporates evolutionary, developmental and social contexts. A major theoretical framework for understanding personhood. Relates evolutionary psychology to personhood.

18. Barresi, J. (2012). On seeing our selves and others as persons. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 30(1), 120-130.

Abstract: Human beings may be the only organisms capable of thinking of self and other in equivalent ways – as selves and persons. Most organisms think about their own activities differently than they do the activities of others. A few large-brained organisms like chimps and dolphins sometimes think of the activities of self and other in the same way. But, only humans think quite generally in this manner. In this paper I give a description of our commonsense notions of self and person, and a scientific framework in which it can be fit. I then provide a phylo- and onto-genetic account of these concepts. Finally, I argue that the theory of reciprocal altruism provides the best account of why the notions of self and person evolved to have the form and function they do with respect to human social life and moral capacities.

Notes: An important discussion on evolution and personhood.

19. Barresi, J. & Juckes, T. J. (1997). Personology and the narrative interpretation of lives. *Journal of Personality*, 65(3), 693-719. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/235956131?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Personology is the science of persons. In this article we show that the concept of person presupposes the continuity of experience and that the storylike structure of lives makes narrative the most promising methodology. Researchers use first-person narratives as source material and third-person narratives in describing and interpreting lives because the temporal nature of experience makes it difficult for human beings not to attribute order, direction, and purpose to experience. It is because lives are structured through experience in a storylike manner that their study takes the narrative form. Psychologists' attempts to understand the person are traced from James and Freud, through Murray and Erikson, to Tompkins, McAdams, and Hermans and Kempen. We outline each psychologist's concept of person and show how their case studies illustrate their use of narrative methodology.

Notes: An important narrative-based theoretical account of selves and their production. Relates to personhood.

20. Bartlett, R. & O'Connor, D. (2007). From personhood to citizenship: Broadening the lens for dementia practice and research. *Journal of Aging Studies, 21*(2), 107-118.

Abstract: Personhood has provided a lens for conceptualising dementia practice and research for over ten years. It has afforded the rationale and language for improving care and for raising consciousness about the status of people with dementia, as people, intrinsically worthy of respect. However, because personhood is essentially an apolitical concept concerned with psychosocial issues it may be too limiting. Citizenship provides another possible lens. Citizenship is used in cognate disciplines to promote the status of discriminated groups of people still further, to that of a person with power entitled to the same from life as everyone else. However, as citizenship tends to assume the self-cognizance to exercise rights and responsibilities, it may not be as appropriate for people with severe dementia. Both concepts are problematic then, taking too narrow a view of the human experience. For this field to develop over the next ten years it clearly needs a wider lens that is both inclusive of personhood and citizenship, but which also recognizes the complexities of human experience. This article reviews the relevance of personhood and citizenship for dementia practice and research, and argues for a broader lens that incorporates citizenship and sociological ideas about agency and structure.

Notes: The field of dementia practice and research is constantly evolving and changing, demographically, linguistically, and as knowledge of effective treatments increase. This article reviews both the contribution and limitations of the lens of personhood in dementia research, and reviews conceptualizations of citizenship in relation to people with dementia. The author argues for a broader lens in dementia practice and research, which incorporates citizenship, personhood, but also includes sociological ideas about agency and structure. It raises questions about the social and political aspects of our accounts of persons. An important contribution which connects personhood and well-being in the context of the field of dementia.

21. Baumeister, R. F. (2011). Self and identity: a brief overview of what they are, what they do, and how they work. In D. Braaten (Ed.), *Perspectives on the self: Conversations on identity and consciousness* (Vol. 1234, pp. 48-55). Oxford: Blackwell Science Publ. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000299291600006. doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06224.x

Abstract: The human self exists at the interface between the animal body and the social system. Solitary beings would hardly need or have selves, but social and cultural systems define identities, and the human animal acquires selfhood in order to function in these systems. Self begins with the physical body, with acting and choosing as a unity, and as a point of reference distinct from others, and it acquires meaningful content by participating in the social system. The self is not contained in the brain, but rather the human brain learns to operate a self.

Notes: A significant contribution that analyses the relationship between biological embodiment and the social world and the way that relationship gives rise to selves and selfhood. Relates to personhood and evolutionary/biological accounts of humans.

22. Baumeister, R. F. (2011). The unity of self at the interface of the animal body and the cultural system. *Psychological Studies*, 56(1), 5-11. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12646-011-0062-5>. doi:10.1007/s12646-011-0062-5

Abstract: The self is defined by unity, which must be constructed from multiple inner processes and representations. The unity is more a requirement of social life than of brain activities. The self exists at the interface between the physical body and the social system, which for humans includes culture. The three main aspects of the self are a network of information (sometimes called the self-concept), an interpersonal being (e.g., member of a group or relationship), and executive function (e.g., making decisions). For each of these, multiple inner processes and representations must be integrated to produce the unity of self. Conscious processing plays a key role in this integrative process, because it is a vital means by which different areas of brain and mind exchange information.

Notes: Highlights the accomplishment of a unitary self via integration of multiple inner processes. Links to Rom Harré's (1983) account of persons in *Personal being*. Relates to personhood.

23. Beahrs, J. O. (1994). Dissociative identity disorder: adaptive deception of self and others. *The Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law*, 22(2), 223-237. Review. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://MEDLINE:7949411

Abstract: Dissociative identity disorder (multiple personality) is increasingly diagnosed, often follows childhood trauma, and is characterized by rigidification of phenomena that resemble hypnosis. To interpret dissociated aspects of selfhood as autonomous entities is a useful heuristic; but when taken too literally, it leads to three kinds of anomaly: (1) legal: dissociators remain culpable for misdeeds carried out beyond apparent awareness or control; (2) clinical: legitimization sometimes leads not to relief, but to escalating cycles of regressive dependency; and (3) scientific: the form of dissociated entities varies with how they are defined, in ways that are intrinsically motivated and clinically manipulable. These anomalies yield to an evolutionary perspective that views dissociative identity disorder as an evolved strategy of adaptive deception of self and others; e.g., a beaten subordinate avoids further retribution by "pleading illness." Such a deceit best avoids detection when fully experienced; through its intensity and persistence, it becomes real at a new level. One's basic competencies remain intact, however, and are the source of the anomalies described. They can be clinically accessed and empowered, providing the key to therapeutic change when dissociative processes are problematic. Overall, despite clear impairment in subjective awareness and volition, dissociative-disordered individuals are best held fully accountable for the consequences of their actions.

Notes: An evolutionary account of the adaptive nature of dissociative disorders. Has implications for personhood and its evolutionary adaptiveness. Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology.

24. Becker, G. S. (2007). Habits, peers, and happiness: An evolutionary perspective. *The American Economic Review*, 97(2), 487-491. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/872522450?accountid=27890>

No abstract.

Notes: The authors argue that "the principal motivating factor in our lives is the pursuit of happiness ... throughout, we presume that maximizing happiness is the fundamental goal of the individual when making decisions. In fact, we believe that happiness evolved precisely as a decisionmaking device. In this sense, we consider that maximizing happiness is closely linked, if not identical, to maximizing utility in the standard economic way ... our goal has been to show that, when attempting to understand the determinants of happiness, both evolutionary thinking and empirical work can benefit from each other." Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

25. Bekoff, M. (2002). Empathy: common sense, science sense, wolves, and well-being. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 25(1), 26-+. Editorial Material. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000183685900008

Abstract: Empathy is likely more widely distributed among animals than many researchers realize or perhaps are willing to admit. Studies of social carnivores, other group-living animals, and communication via different modalities will help us learn more about the evolutionary roots and behavioral, sensory, and cognitive underpinnings of empathy, including what it means to have a sense of self. There are also important implications for debates about animal well-being.

Notes: Focuses on the role of empathy in social behaviour and the formation of a self. Adopts an evolutionary perspective. Relates to evolutionary psychology, selfhood/personhood and well-being.

26. Bekoff, M. (2003). Consciousness and self in animals: Some reflections. *Zygon*, 38(2), 229-245. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000183139300003. doi:10.1111/1467-9744.00497

Abstract: In this essay I argue that many nonhuman animal beings are conscious and have some sense of self. Rather than ask whether they are conscious, I adopt an evolutionary perspective and ask why consciousness and a sense of self evolved-what are they good for? Comparative studies of animal cognition, ethological investigations that explore what it is like to be a certain animal, are useful for answering this question. Charles Darwin argued that the differences in cognitive abilities and emotions among animals are differences in degree rather than differences in kind, and his view cautions against the unyielding claim that humans, and perhaps other great apes and cetaceans, are the only species in which a sense of self-awareness has evolved. I conclude that there are degrees of consciousness and self among animals and that it is likely that no animal has the same highly developed sense of self as that displayed by most humans. Many animals have a sense of "body-ness or "mine-ness". but not a sense of "I-ness." Darwin's ideas about evolutionary continuity, together with empirical data ("science sense") and common-sense, will help us learn more

about consciousness and self in animals. Answers to challenging questions about animal self-awareness have wide-ranging significance, because they are often used as the litmus determining and defending the sorts of treatments to which animals can be morally subjected.

Notes: A conceptual, evolutionary account of various forms of self throughout the animal kingdom. Relates to evolutionary psychology and selfhood/personhood.

27. Benedikter, R. ; Giordano, J. & Fitzgerald, K. (2010). The future of the self-image of the human being in the age of transhumanism, neurotechnology and global transition. *Futures*, 42(10), 1102-1109. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328710001801>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2010.08.010>

Abstract: In the present moment of cultural and political transition, one question seems to become the center of most other societal and civilizational questions: will the basic self-perception of the human being change under the influence of the new “neurotechnologies” and its accompanying ideologies like “Human enhancement” and “Transhumanism”? And if yes, how? Applied consciousness research is currently one-sidedly understood as brain research, and it is carried out mainly by the Natural Sciences under the influence of the “Economic–Technological Complex” and its relatively narrow interests. With its paradigmatic materialism determining the cultural spread of its temporary findings, it is already modifying our imaginary about what a human being is, what its rational self-determination can be, and how a “good society” can work. What is at stake with the change related to the findings of the new “consciousness technologies” is not only the principal socio-philosophical status of the human “self” or “I”, but also the related concepts of humanism, open societies, individualism and rationality. Thus, the new neurotechnologies and their “neurophilosophies” are currently in the process of profoundly influencing the very basics of our cultural self-understanding, grown over centuries. This article discusses some of the implications of this development within the greater picture of the current “global mindset change”.

Notes: Cautions about the possible future effects of technological and neurological/neurophilosophical accounts of the ‘self’ on our understanding of human selves. Relates to personhood and biological accounts of humans.

28. Bering, J. M. (2006). The folk psychology of souls. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 29(05), 453-462. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X06009101>. doi:[doi:10.1017/S0140525X06009101](http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X06009101)

Abstract: The present article examines how people's belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is grounded in the tenets of Darwinian natural selection. Many of the predominant questions of existential psychology strike at the heart of cognitive science. They involve: causal attribution (why is mortal

behavior represented as being causally related to one's afterlife? how are dead agents envisaged as communicating messages to the living?), moral judgment (why are certain social behaviors, i.e., transgressions, believed to have ultimate repercussions after death or to reap the punishment of disgruntled ancestors?), theory of mind (how can we know what it is "like" to be dead? what social-cognitive strategies do people use to reason about the minds of the dead?), concept acquisition (how does a common-sense dualism interact with a formalized socio-religious indoctrination in childhood? how are supernatural properties of the dead conceptualized by young minds?), and teleological reasoning (why do people so often see their lives as being designed for a purpose that must be accomplished before they perish? how do various life events affect people's interpretation of this purpose?), among others. The central thesis of the present article is that an organized cognitive "system" dedicated to forming illusory representations of (1) psychological immortality, (2) the intelligent design of the self, and (3) the symbolic meaning of natural events evolved in response to the unique selective pressures of the human social environment.

Notes: Analyses the emergence of notions of the 'soul' and 'self' in an evolutionary context. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

29. Bickhard, M. H. (2012). A process ontology for persons and their development. *New Ideas in Psychology, 30*(1), 107-119.

Abstract: Persons are socio-cultural emergents—emerging progressively in the bio-psychological development of the individual. Persons are special kinds of agents, crucially characterized by their abilities to participate in the constitution of emergent social ontologies. I will present a model of these special bio-cultural relationships, and argue that modeling these relationships requires revisions in conceptions about the ontology of social realities, the relationships between agency and cognition, and naturalism and normativity.

Notes: "Persons are often considered to be autonomous psychological individuals who happen to function within social settings, and at other times as having a thorough social ontology, being constituted as some sort of intersection of socio-cultural processes and meanings". "A major focus of this paper is to provide a process ontology for persons that can make sense of these two fundamental characteristics of persons as inherent aspects of a unified underlying ontology". The author does this by outlining "a model of the developmental ontology of social persons that provides an integration of both aspects". Relates to the development of personhood.

30. Bird, R. B. ; Scelza, B. ; Bird, D. W. & Smith, E. A. (2012). The hierarchy of virtue: mutualism, altruism and signaling in Martu women's cooperative hunting. *Evolution and Human Behavior, 33*(1), 64-78.

Retrieved from

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S109051381100050X>.
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.05.007

Abstract: Cooperative hunting is often assumed to be mutualistic, maintained through returns to scale, where, by working together, foragers can gain higher per capita return rates or harvest sizes than they can by hunting alone. We test this hypothesis among Martu hunters and find that cooperation only provides increased returns to poorer hunters while

disadvantaging better hunters. Even so, better hunters still cooperate as frequently as poorer hunters. We ask whether better hunters are advantaged in secondary sharing distributions or whether they bias their partner choice to kin or household members. We find that better hunters are not more likely to pair up with kin and they do not gain consumption benefits from acquiring more. They share a greater proportion of their harvest than poorer hunters: no matter how much one produces — better hunter, worse hunter, cooperator, solitary hunter — all eat the same amount in the end. Such a result suggests the hypothesis that cooperation might be a costly signal of commitment to the public interest on the part of better hunters, which generates trust among camp members and facilitates strong social networks, particularly among women, who cooperate more than men. While some foragers may benefit through cooperation from returns to scale or risk reduction, others may benefit more through signaling commitment and generating trust.

Notes: In this article, the authors ask whether or not returns to scale structure the benefits of cooperative hunting among Martu, Aboriginal foragers of the Western Desert in Australia. Results show that cooperative hunting among Martu does not predictably increase per capita foraging returns for any hunting or collecting activity, however other more intrinsic benefits such as social capital, good feelings such as being part of a family and nurturing are evident. Martu women "benefit more from maintaining closeness (spatial and social) to female kin, and better hunters reap more of the benefits from cooperative caretaking by virtue of the cohesive social networks they create around them"(Scelza, 2009; Scelza & Bliege Bird, 2008; in Bird et.al. 2012). Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being

31. Bjorklund, D. F. & Smith, P. K. (2003). Evolutionary developmental psychology: Introduction to the special issue. *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, 85(3), 195-198. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022096503000742>. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0965\(03\)00074-2](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0965(03)00074-2)

No abstract.

Notes: Introduction to special issue. Relates to evolutionary psychology and development of personhood.

32. Blanke, O. & Metzinger, T. (2009). Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 13(1), 7-13. Review. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000262898500002. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003

Abstract: We highlight the latest research on body perception and self-consciousness, but argue that despite these achievements, central aspects have remained unexplored, namely, global aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Researchers investigated central representations of body parts and actions involving these, but neglected the global and unitary character of self-consciousness, the 'I' of experience and behaviour. We ask, what are the minimally sufficient conditions for the appearance of a phenomenal self, that is, the fundamental conscious experience of being someone? What are necessary conditions for self-consciousness in any type of system? We offer conceptual clarifications, discuss recent empirical evidence from neurology and cognitive science and argue that these findings offer

a new entry point for the systematic study of global and more fundamental aspects of self-consciousness.

Notes: An investigation of the phenomenal self of experience. Relates to personhood.

33. Bock, J. (2004). Introduction: New evolutionary perspectives on play. *Human Nature*, 15(1), 1-3. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-004-1000-1>. doi:10.1007/s12110-004-1000-1

No abstract.

Notes: Introduction to special issue. Relates to personhood and well-being.

34. Bock, J. , & Johnson, S. E. (2004). Subsistence ecology and play among the Okavango Delta peoples of Botswana. *Human Nature*, 15(1), 63-81. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-004-1004-x>. doi:10.1007/s12110-004-1004-x

Abstract: Children's play is widely believed by educators and social scientists to have a training function that contributes to psychosocial development as well as the acquisition of skills related to adult competency in task performance. In this paper we examine these assumptions from the perspective of life-history theory using behavioral observation and household economic data collected among children in a community in the Okavango Delta of Botswana where people engage in mixed subsistence regimes of dry farming, foraging, and herding. We hypothesize that if play contributes to adult competency then time allocation to play will decrease as children approach adult levels of competence. This hypothesis generates the following predictions: (1) time allocated to play activities that develop specific productive skills should decline in relation to the proportion of adult competency achieved; (2) children will spend more time in forms of play that are related to skill development in tasks specific to the subsistence ecology in which that child participates or expects to participate; and (3) children will spend more time in forms of play that are related to skill development in tasks clearly related to the gender-specific productive role in the subsistence ecology in which that child participates or expects to participate. We contrast these expectations with the alternative hypothesis that if play is not preparatory for adult competence then time allocated to each play activity should diminish at the same rate. This latter hypothesis generates the following two predictions: (1) time allocation to play should be unaffected by subsistence regime and (2) patterns of time allocation to play should track patterns of growth and energy balance.

Results from multiple regression analysis support earlier research in this community showing that trade-offs between immediate productivity and future returns were a primary determinant of children's activity patterns. Children whose labor was in greater demand spent significantly less time playing. In addition, controlling for age and gender, children spent significantly more time in play activities related to tasks specific to their household subsistence economy. These results are consistent with the assertion that play is an important factor in the development of adult competency and highlight the important

contributions of an evolutionary ecological perspective in understanding children's developmental trajectories.

Notes: An interesting analysis of the role of play in the production of appropriately skilled adults for the form of subsistence prevalent in a community. Relates to personhood development.

35. Bonanno, G. A. (2004). Loss, trauma, and human resilience - have we underestimated the human capacity to thrive after extremely aversive events? *American Psychologist*, 59(1), 20-28. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000188285300003. doi:10.1037/0003-066x.59.1.20

Abstract: Many people are exposed to loss or potentially traumatic events at some point in their lives, and yet they continue to have positive emotional experiences and show only minor and transient disruptions in their ability to function. Unfortunately, because much of psychology's knowledge about how adults cope with loss or trauma has come from individuals who sought treatment or exhibited great distress, loss and trauma theorists have often viewed this type of resilience as either rare or pathological. The author challenges these assumptions by reviewing evidence that resilience represents: a distinct trajectory from the process of recovery, that resilience in the face of loss or potential trauma is more common than is often believed, and that there are multiple and sometimes unexpected pathways to resilience.

Notes: The author concludes that to be fully able to understand dysfunction requires a deeper understanding of health and resilience. There are many questions to be investigated about the various ways that people adapt and sometimes flourish in the face of debilitating events, with a crucial issue pertaining to the "commonalities and differences in resilient functioning across the life span". Within this context, it relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and personhood.

36. Bonnett, M. (2009). Education and selfhood: A phenomenological investigation. *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 43(3), 357-370. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000269086900004

Abstract: Although effectively the idea of selfhood receives scant attention in much current educational policy, it is an idea that is central to understanding education in the Western tradition. This paper evaluates the implications of a growing movement in educational philosophy and theory to see the self as relational to the extent that it possesses little or no internally maintained steady identity and is constantly reconstituted by external agencies in a variety of ways. A well-worked-through view that draws on the work of Hannah Arendt and Emmanuel Levinas amongst others and that is taken to be representative of this wider movement is examined. It is argued that while important issues concerning the relationship between education and individual subjectivities are raised in ways that invite productive discussion, ultimately the decentred and de-nucleated conception of the self to which its argument leads is both phenomenologically untenable and educationally stultifying.

Notes: A conceptual critique of the notion of a 'decentred and de-nucleated' self, in the context of educational settings. Relates to personhood.

37. Bortolotti, L. & Harris, J. (2005). Stem cell research, personhood and sentience. *Reproductive Biomedicine Online*, 10, 68-75. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000227647700017

Abstract: In this paper the permissibility of stem cell research on early human embryos is defended. It is argued that, in order to have moral status, an individual must have an interest in its own well-being. Sentience is a prerequisite for having an interest in avoiding pain, and personhood is a prerequisite for having an interest in the continuation of one's own existence. Early human embryos are not sentient and therefore they are not recipients of direct moral consideration. Early human embryos do not satisfy the requirements for personhood, but there are arguments to the effect that they should be treated as persons nonetheless. These are the arguments from potentiality, symbolic value and the principle of human dignity. These arguments are challenged in this paper and it is claimed that they offer us no good reason to believe that early human embryos should be treated as persons.

Notes: Links sentience, personhood and concerns over one's own well-being in an attempt to understand the moral status of human embryos. Relates to personhood and well-being.

38. Boyden, S. & Millar, S. (1978). Human ecology and the quality of life. *Urban Ecology*, 3(3), 263-287. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0304400978900177>. doi:10.1016/0304-4009(78)90017-7

Abbreviated Abstract. "In all human situations there is a constant interplay between variables of different kinds — physical, chemical, biotic, social, cultural and economic. We refer to the study of patterns of interaction between these different components of human situations as 'human ecology'. It is suggested that human ecology, as so defined, can contribute significantly to the understanding of problems relating to the quality of life. It can do this by drawing attention to the full spectrum of aspects of experience that directly relate to the quality of life, and by improving understanding of the interrelationship between these experiential factors on the one hand, and economic, technical, environmental and societal conditions on the other ...

The conceptual approach must be one that assures that, whichever aspects of human ecosystems are under consideration, full consideration is given to their implications for the actual life experience of people. This paper includes a summary of some of the concepts on which our own approach to the ecological study of human settlements and the quality of life of their inhabitants is based. We suggest, for example, that knowledge of the evolutionary history of mankind is relevant to our interest in the effects of environmental influences on human health and well-being. It is emphasized that there is no relationship in human affairs between quantifiability and importance, and consequently any conceptual approach to the study of human ecosystems and of human well-being must be such that full attention is paid to both tangible and intangible aspects of situations and of human experience. An essential aspect of the conceptual approach summarized in the paper is that it recognizes two orientations or dimensions in the study of human ecosystems. The first orientation is referred to as 'the total environment'. The study of the total environment is fundamentally similar to system ecology in biological science, and involves consideration of the components of the 'system as a whole' and their dynamic interrelationships. It differs from biological

system ecology in that the systems under investigation contain, in addition to inorganic and biotic components and processes, the components and processes of human culture. The second orientation is referred to as 'human experience'. It is based on recognition of the fact that each individual human being experiences his own personal life conditions, which are influenced by the properties of the total environment, and which, in turn, are the main determinants of his level of health and well-being. Ultimately it must be the people who make up society who decide what is, and what is not, important to them in the quality of life."

Notes: An ambitious early account of the relationships between evolutionary perspectives on persons and their reliance on the broader ecosystems in which they operate. Relevant to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well being

39. Bracanovic, T . (2007). Utilitarian impartiality and contemporary Darwinism. *Filozofia*, 62(1), 14-25. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000243983100002

Abstract: One important component of utilitarian ethical framework is a specific version of the principle of impartiality. The principle claims that one should bring about the greatest possible overall utility or happiness and that our moral and morally relevant actions ought to result from objective and neutral deliberations, with all our personal interests, likes and dislikes left out. Drawing on relevant insights from sociobiology and evolutionary psychology this paper seeks to show that utilitarian principle of impartiality is seriously endangered by two interconnected Darwinian facts: (1) the fact that human biologically shaped psychology and motivation mechanisms do not fit well with the principle requiring the indiscriminate promotion of general happiness, and (2) the fact that human beings are individuals with naturally evolved personal desires, projects and ideals, and not merely spare parts of some general utilitarian clockwork of happiness.

Notes: A critique of utilitarian understandings of well-being based upon evolutionary considerations. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

40. Brandtstädter, J. & Greve, W. (1994). The aging self: Stabilizing and protective processes. *Developmental Review*, 14(1), 52-80. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0273229784710033>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/drev.1994.1003>

Abstract: The transition from middle to later adulthood involves a multitude of changes and losses on physical, psychological, and social levels that impose considerable strain on the individual's construction of self and personal continuity. Widespread assumptions which relate psychological aging to reduced well-being, loss of control, and problems of self-esteem, however, have received astonishingly little empirical support. Recent evidence rather gives testimony to a considerable resourcefulness and adaptive flexibility of the aging self. The present article attempts to lend further substance to this emerging picture of psychological aging. It is argued that preservation and stabilization of a positive view of self and personal development in later life basically involve three functionally interdependent processes: (a) instrumental and compensatory activities that aim at preventing or alleviating

losses in domains which are relevant to self-esteem and identity; (b) accommodative changes and readjustments of personal goals and aspirations, which dampen or neutralize negative self-evaluations; (c) immunizing mechanisms, which mitigate the impact of self-discrepant evidence.

Notes: Analyses the process of maintenance of self-esteem and general well-being through the aging process. Relates to personhood and well-being.

41. Brigg, M. (2009). The developer's self: a non-deterministic Foucauldian frame. *Third World Quarterly*, 30(8), 1411-1426. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000274296900002. doi:10.1080/01436590903279208

Abstract: Recent development studies literature has begun to consider the developer's self. This welcome enlargement of the field deserves to be deepened and extended by moving beyond opposition to post-development critics, and by articulating an explicit theoretical frame for examining developers' selves. By exploring Foucault's suggestion that modern approaches to knowledge and selfhood may be entwined through developmentalism, this paper proposes a flexible and non-deterministic cultural-historical framework for considering developers' selves. Foucault's analyses of relations of power and subjectivity provide strategies for examining developers' selves, but this does not suggest that such selves can be read off the proposed framework. Examining developers' selves is necessarily a reflective ethical task, and one which requires engaging the external relations that constitute the self. Foucault provides valuable resources for this task, but there is also a need to extend upon and complement a Foucauldian approach. Pursuing our new-found interest in developers' selves by working through and beyond Foucault promises to open new professional futures and possibilities for development practice.

Notes: Explores a Foucauldian approach to reflexively understanding developers' (in developmental studies) selves. Interesting in that it leverages Foucault's view that selfhood is understood through a developmentalist lens. Relates to personhood.

42. Bukobza, G. (2007). The epistemological basis of selfhood. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 25(1), 37-65. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X06000675>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2006.11.001>

Abstract: Multiple definitions and conceptualizations of selfhood have appeared in psychological literature over the years. A fundamental debate that had risen as a result is whether the self is made of universal properties that transcend local factors or whether it is a construction particular to specific conditions of history, culture and individuality. This article begins with a review of different ways by which the self has been understood and construed; it then proceeds to suggest an epistemological framework that generates four distinct types of selves: monolithic–monoformal, relativistic–relational, dialectical–deconstructive, and integral–inclusive. It is claimed that these basic structures consist of much of the cross-cultural and intra-cultural variation in the construction of selfhood.

Notes: An attempt to distinguish the ways in which selves have been theorised in psychology. Relates to selfhood/personhood.

43. Burwood, S. (2009). Are we our brains? *Philosophical Investigations*, 32(2), 113-133. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000263705200002. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9205.2008.01366.x

Abstract: My aim in this paper is to destabilise the brain-is-self thesis, something that is now regarded in some quarters as philosophical commonsense. My contention is that it is the epithelial body that enters into the formation of our sense of self and that largely bears the burden of personal identity as well as playing the key role in grounding our psychological ascriptions. Lacking any sensorimotor or social presence of its own, the brain by itself cannot "underlie" selfhood, but only as part of the whole living human being. If the minded individual is embodied, this must mean more than being embrained.

Notes: A conceptual critique of the idea that selves are brains. Instead, a more thorough embodiment is argued as necessary for selfhood. Relates to selfhood/personhood and its biological foundations.

44. Buss, D.M. (2000). The evolution of happiness. *American Psychologist*, 55, 15-23.

Abstract: An evolutionary perspective offers novel insights into some major obstacles to achieving happiness. Impediments include large discrepancies between modern and ancestral environments, the existence of evolved mechanisms "designed" to produce subjective distress, and the fact that evolution by selection has produced competitive mechanisms that function to benefit one person at the expense of others. On the positive side, people also possess evolved mechanisms that produce deep sources of happiness: those for mating bonds, deep friendship, close kinship, and cooperative coalitions. Understanding these psychological mechanisms--the selective processes that designed them, their evolved functions, and the contexts governing their activation--offers the best hope for holding some evolved mechanisms in check and selectively activating others to produce an overall increment in human happiness.

Notes: A major statement about the relationships between happiness, its pursuit and an evolutionary understanding of the emotion. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

45. Byers, J. A. (1998). The biology of human play. *Child Development*, 69(3), 599-600. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1998.tb06227.x>. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.1998.tb06227.x

Abstract: Pellegrini and Smith call for the biological study of human physical activity play. Such study will reveal, among other things, whether physical activity play represents an example of performance-dependent development during a sensitive period.

Notes: Comment on the biological role of play in physical activity. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being, via the adaptive function of play.

46. Carlisle, S. & Hanlon, P. (2007). The complex territory of well-being: contestable evidence, contentious theories and speculative conclusions. *Journal of Public Mental Health*, 6(2), 8-13. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/212415288?accountid=27890>

Abstract: This paper brings together evidence and theories from a number of disciplines and thinkers that highlight multiple, sometimes incommensurable understandings about well-being. We identify three broad strands or themes within the literature(s) that frame both the nature of the problem and its potential solutions in different ways. The first strand can be categorised as the 'hard' science of well-being and its stagnation or decline in modern western society. In a second strand, social and political theory suggests that conceptualisations of well-being are shaped by aspects of western culture, often in line with the demands of a capitalist economic system. A third theme pursues the critique of consumer culture's influence on well-being but in the context of broader human problems. This approach draws on ecology, ethics, philosophy and much else to suggest that we urgently need to reconsider what it means to be human, if we are to survive and thrive. Although no uncontroversial solutions are found within any of these themes, all play a necessary part in contributing to knowledge of this complex territory where assumptions about the nature of the human condition come into question.

Notes: Acknowledges the multiple forms of knowledge and understanding around well-being, its complexity involving multiple disciplines and varieties of thinkers. The intention of the authors is to "synthesise some complex evidence, contentious theories and speculative conclusions" and they acknowledge that much is simplified in their deliberate framing of the debates into three themes- 'hard' science, cultural and social constructionism, and alternative views of the human condition as seen through spirituality, ecology, ethics, philosophy and other diverse fields. A common question between all three themes is the nature of what it means to be human. A general article, relating to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being.

47. Carlisle, S. ; Henderson, G. & Hanlon, P. W. (2009). 'Well-being': A collateral casualty of modernity? *Social Science & Medicine*, 69(10), 1556-1560. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027795360900567X>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.08.029>

Abstract: In the now vast empirical and theoretical literature on well-being knowledge of the subject is provided mainly by psychology and economics, where understandings of the concept are framed in very different ways. We briefly rehearse these, before turning to some important critical points which can be made about this burgeoning research industry, including the tight connections between the meanings of the concept with the moral value systems of particular 'modern' societies. We then argue that both the 'science' of well-being and its critique are, despite their diversity, re-connected by and subsumed within the emerging environmental critique of modern consumer society. This places concerns for individual and social well-being within the broader context of global human problems and planetary well-being. A growing number of thinkers now suggest that Western society and culture are dominated by materialistic and individualistic values, made manifest at the political and social levels through the unending pursuit of economic growth, and at the individual level by the seemingly endless quest for consumer goods, regardless of global

implications such as broader environmental harms. The escalating growth of such values is associated with a growing sense of individual alienation, social fragmentation and civic disengagement and with the decline of more spiritual, moral and ethical aspects of life. Taken together, these multiple discourses suggest that well-being can be understood as a collateral casualty of the economic, social and cultural changes associated with late modernity. However, increasing concerns for the environment have the potential to counter some of these trends, and in so doing could also contribute to our well-being as individuals and as social beings in a finite world.

Notes: Provides an environmental context for the consideration of human well-being, arguing for well-being to be seen as a consequence or 'casualty' of broader political, economic and environmental changes and trends. Relates to well-being.

48. Carroll, J. (1999). The deep structure of literary representations. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 20(3), 159-173. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513899000045>. doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(99)00004-5

Abstract: The author argues that cognitive rhetoricians have introduced the idea of cognitive domains into literary theory, but they have not yet developed a model for a comprehensive, species-typical structure of human motives. Evolutionary psychology can provide this model. Elemental human motives and basic emotions provide the deep structure of literary representations, and this deep structure serves to organize the particularities of circumstance and individual identity. Personal power and reproductive success are governing purposes in life and in literary representations. The concept of individual identity is necessary to literary representation, and a theory of literature based in evolutionary psychology has to incorporate models of personality. Literature and its oral antecedents organize experience in personally meaningful ways. They provide models of behavior and help regulate the complex cognitive machinery through which humans negotiate their social and cultural environments.

Notes: An interesting analysis of how literature can be understood from an evolutionary perspective as representative of species-typical motives in forming individual identities. Argues that evolutionary psychology can provide a model that cognitive rhetoricians can use for "comprehensive, species-typical structure of human motives." Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

49. Carver, C. S. ; Scheier, M.F. & Kumari Weintraub, J. (1989). Assessing coping strategies: A theoretically based approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 56(2), 267-283.

Abstract: We developed a multidimensional coping inventory to assess the different ways in which people respond to stress. Five scales (of four items each) measure conceptually distinct aspects of problemfocused coping (active coping, planning, suppression of competing activities, restraint coping, seeking of instrumental social support); five scales measure aspects of what might be viewed as emotionfocused coping (seeking of emotional social support, positive reinterpretation, acceptance, denial, turning to religion); and three scales measure coping responses that arguably are less useful (focus on and venting of

emotions, behavioral disengagement, mental disengagement). Study 1 reports the development of scale items. Study 2 reports correlations between the various coping scales and several theoretically relevant personality measures in an effort to provide preliminary information about the inventory's convergent and discriminant validity, Study 3 uses the inventory to assess coping responses among a group of undergraduates who were attempting to cope with a specific stressful episode. This study also allowed an initial examination of associations between dispositional and situational coping tendencies.

Notes: Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being

50. Cervone, D. (2005). Personality architecture: Within-person structures and processes. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 56, 423-452. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/205849658?accountid=27890>

Abstract: This chapter reviews theory and research on intraindividual personality structures and processes. Principles for modeling the architecture of personality, that is, the overall design and operating characteristics of intraindividual personality systems, are addressed. Research demonstrates that a focus on within-person structures and processes advances the understanding of two aspects of personality coherence: the functional relations among distinct elements of personality, and cross-situational coherence in personality functioning that results from interactions among enduring knowledge structures and dynamic appraisal processes. Also reviewed are recent conceptual and empirical advances, which demonstrate that the interindividual personality variables that summarize variability in the population are wholly insufficient for modeling intraindividual personality architecture.

Notes: Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood

51. Chang, Y. P. ; Lin, Y. C. & Chen, L. H. (2012). Pay it forward: Gratitude in social networks. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 13(5), 761-781. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000308963700001. doi:10.1007/s10902-011-9289-z

Abstract: Based on the framework of the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson in *Philos Trans R Soc B Biol Sci* 359(1449):1367, 2004a, b), we proposed that the emotion of gratitude generates upstream reciprocity (UR, which is helping an unrelated third party after being helped) by broadening the beneficiary's perspective toward others and thus making the beneficiary represent the benefactor and newly encountered strangers in the same social category. Furthermore, by inducing one UR after another, gratitude may lead to a chain/network of UR and strengthen the structure of organization. We named the effect the integration function of gratitude and demonstrated it by applying the social network analysis technique to eighteen small groups. Implications of the integration function are discussed in terms of self-identity, social exchange theory, and quality of life.

Notes: A network analysis of the dynamics of 'upstream' (future) reciprocity to unrelated parties. An interesting piece of empirical work into the social processes of cooperative behaviour. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

52. Charlesworth, W. R. & La Freniere, P. (1983). Dominance, friendship, and resource utilization in preschool children's groups. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 4(3), 175-186. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309583900286>. doi:10.1016/0162-3095(83)90028-6

Abstract: Field and a laboratory experiments were carried out with 58 preschool children in order to analyze their behavior when faced with a limited resource (a movie viewer which required help to operate it) and to relate variations in resource utilization to measures of dominance and friendship obtained earlier by observation in the pre-school setting and by sociometric measures. The field experiment elicited a mixture of physically assertive/agonistic behaviors, commands, appeals to personal needs or rules, and cooperative behavior—all related to viewing the movie. Dominance rank was significantly and positively related to resource utilization (viewing the movie). In the laboratory experiment, the children varied greatly in resource utilization and cooperative behavior as a function of their dominance status—dominant children having much more access to the resource than their lower-ranked classmates. Group performance also varied greatly and appeared to be significantly influenced by dominance and friendship. The optimal combination for producing high utilization appeared to be a group of high-ranking friends. Equitability and effectiveness of utilization were also affected by dominance and friendship as well as by physically assertive/agonistic and cooperative behaviors during the episode. In both experiments, boys used the resource significantly more than girls. The findings are discussed briefly in terms of sociobiological notions of cooperation, competition, and resource utilization.

Notes: A sociobiologically interpreted experiment on resource utilisation by children. The study reports the effects of different levels of dominance and friendship/cooperation on resource utilisation. An early study of social behaviour analysed from a sociobiological perspective. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for personhood and well-being.

53. Chaudhary, N. (2003). Speaking the self into becoming? *Culture & Psychology*, 9(4), 471-486. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000189244000008. doi:10.1177/1354067x0394009

Abstract: The self is an alluring topic for debate, and Boesch's (2003) article creates ample space for playing with ideas and positions on personhood. I have chosen specific portions of the article to lead towards discussions of self and 'I', the notion of an inner self, multiplicity of the self, and the cultural configuration and language of selfhood. This commentary has been sprinkled with examples of self-related experiences from Indian communities in order to demonstrate the important ways in which cultures can diverge in the organization of activity around being a person. Hopefully, these examples will help to distract readers from aspects of their own cultural and personal lives while entering into different perspectives on sociality and individual existence. I end by questioning whether, despite its attractions, the self has become somewhat overexposed to academic attention in the recent past.

Notes: Useful for its cautionary approach to 'over-focusing' on the notion of the self. Remarks on various examples of how cultures differentially organise the processes of being a person. Relates to personhood.

54. Cheng, J. T. ; Tracy, J. L. & Henrich, J. . (2010). Pride, personality, and the evolutionary foundations of human social status. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 31(5), 334-347. Retrieved from <http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1090513810000267?showall=true>

Abstract: Based on evolutionary logic, Henrich and Gil-White [Evolution and Human Behavior, 22(3), 165–196] distinguished between two routes to attaining social status in human societies: dominance, based on intimidation, and prestige, based on the possession of skills or expertise. Independently, emotion researchers Tracy and Robins [Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(3), 506–525] demonstrated two distinct forms of pride: hubristic and authentic. Bridging these two lines of research, this paper examines whether hubristic and authentic pride, respectively, may be part of the affective-motivational suite of psychological adaptations underpinning the status-obtaining strategies of dominance and prestige. Support for this hypothesis emerged from two studies employing self-reports (Study 1), and self-and peer-reports of group members on collegiate athletic teams (Study 2). Results from both studies showed that hubristic pride is associated with dominance, whereas authentic pride is associated with prestige. Moreover, the two facets of pride are part of a larger suite of distinctive psychological traits uniquely associated with dominance or prestige. Specifically, dominance is positively associated with traits such as narcissism, aggression, and disagreeableness, whereas prestige is positively associated with traits such as genuine self-esteem, agreeableness, conscientiousness, achievement, advice-giving, and prosociality. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for our understanding of the evolutionary origins of pride and social status, and the interrelations among emotion, personality, and status attainment.

Notes: Aspects of pride are studied in relation to two strategies for gaining status: Dominance and prestige. An interesting link between the emotional experience of an important aspect of well-being (other regard) and evolutionary strategies to gain status. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

55. Choi, B. & Han, G. (2009). Psychology of selfhood in China: Where is the collective? *Culture & Psychology*, 15(1), 73-82. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000263912600003. doi:10.1177/1354067x08099616

Abstract: The analysis of Chinese maxims shows strong Confucian norms of filial piety operating in the family (Wang & Dai, 2009). Admitting that the norm is also strong in Korea, we explore the difference in selfhood between Korea and China. Taking a sociolinguistic approach, we characterize Chinese collectivism as relational collectivism and pose the question of how the collective works in Chinese selfhood. For comparative purposes, we describe the working of the collective in Korean selfhood and invite efforts to examine linguistic practice.

Notes: A rare comparison of how selfhood is understood in two collectivist cultures. Relates to personhood.

56. Christiansen, M. H. & Chater, N. (2008). Language as shaped by the brain. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 31(05), 489-509. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X08004998>.
doi:doi:10.1017/S0140525X08004998

Abstract: It is widely assumed that human learning and the structure of human languages are intimately related. This relationship is frequently suggested to derive from a language-specific biological endowment, which encodes universal, but communicatively arbitrary, principles of language structure (a Universal Grammar or UG). How might such a UG have evolved? We argue that UG could not have arisen either by biological adaptation or non-adaptationist genetic processes, resulting in a logical problem of language evolution. Specifically, as the processes of language change are much more rapid than processes of genetic change, language constitutes a “moving target” both over time and across different human populations, and, hence, cannot provide a stable environment to which language genes could have adapted. We conclude that a biologically determined UG is not evolutionarily viable. Instead, the original motivation for UG – the mesh between learners and languages – arises because language has been shaped to fit the human brain, rather than vice versa. Following Darwin, we view language itself as a complex and interdependent “organism,” which evolves under selectional pressures from human learning and processing mechanisms. That is, languages themselves are shaped by severe selectional pressure from each generation of language users and learners. This suggests that apparently arbitrary aspects of linguistic structure may result from general learning and processing biases deriving from the structure of thought processes, perceptuo-motor factors, cognitive limitations, and pragmatics.

Notes: An intriguing account of the evolution of language that argues that language evolved in order to ‘fit’ the brain and, hence, a universal grammar, is a product of that fitting rather than of the complex variety of functional tasks to which it could be said to ‘fit’. An interesting biological and evolutionary account of the reasons for the structure of language. Especially interesting given the centrality of language and language use to personhood. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

57. Christopher, J. C. & Hickinbottom, S. (2008). Positive psychology, ethnocentrism, and the disguised ideology of individualism. *Theory & Psychology*, 18(5), 563-589. Retrieved from <http://tap.sagepub.com/content/18/5/563.abstract>.
doi:10.1177/0959354308093396

Abstract: This article aims to examine critically the attempts by positive psychologists to develop a science of happiness and positive human functioning that transcends temporal and cultural boundaries. Current efforts in positive psychology are deconstructed to reveal an adherence to the dominant Western conception of self and its accompanying vision of the good life as personal fulfillment. It is argued that in failing to recognize the tacit cultural and moral assumptions underlying their investigations, positive psychologists not only distort the outlooks of cultures that do not subscribe to an individualistic framework, they also insulate themselves from reflecting critically on their work. Alternative forms of inquiry are offered to assist positive psychology in overcoming these limitations.

Notes: A critical account of the assumptions underpinning positive psychology and the culturally influenced view of well-being it promotes. Relates to well-being and personhood.

58. Chrysanthou, M. (2002). Transparency and selfhood: Utopia and the informed body. *Social Science & Medicine*, 54(3), 469-479. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000173266800014. doi:10.1016/s0277-9536(01)00033-8

Abstract: One aspect of the development of a health-orientated consumer culture is the growth of self-screening and self-diagnosis among the lay public-e.g. over-the-counter diagnostic tests, Computerized health assessments, DIY genetic tests. This trend is interpreted as the expression of a distinctively postmodern 'utopian' impulse. Postmodernity's inwardly directed gaze has replaced the communitarian vision of modernity. In the absence of overarching visions, the postmodern utopian telos becomes the attainment of a perfect, imperishable body. Somatopia is the collective expression of these privatized and personalized body projects. The accomplishment and authentication of these body projects necessitates the creation of a 'transparent body'. This 'transparent body' is enabled and constructed by developments in information and medical technologies. The political and health implications of the transparent, 'informed' body are explored.

Notes: An analysis of the importance of the 'utopian' body in postmodernity. Selfhood is said to be increasingly sought and validated by body improvement processes as individuals focus on their 'utopian' goal. Relates to personhood and well-being.

59. Coall, D. A. & Hertwig, R. (2010). Grandparental investment: Past, present, and future. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 33(1), 1-+. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000276976600001. doi:10.1017/s0140525x09991105

Abstract: What motivates grandparents to their altruism? We review answers from evolutionary theory, sociology, and economics. Sometimes in direct conflict with each other, these accounts of grandparental investment exist side-by-side, with little or no theoretical integration. They all account for some of the data, and none account for all of it. We call for a more comprehensive theoretical framework of grandparental investment that addresses its proximate and ultimate causes, and its variability due to lineage, values, norms, institutions (e.g., inheritance laws), and social welfare regimes. This framework needs to take into account that the demographic shift to low fecundity and mortality in economically developed countries has profoundly altered basic parameters of grandparental investment. We then turn to the possible impact of grandparental acts of altruism, and examine whether benefits of grandparental care in industrialized societies may manifest in terms of less tangible dimensions, such as the grandchildren's cognitive and verbal ability, mental health, and well-being. Although grandparents in industrialized societies continue to invest substantial amounts of time and money in their grandchildren, we find a paucity of studies investigating the influence that this investment has on grandchildren in low-risk family contexts. Under circumstances of duress for example, teenage pregnancy or maternal depression there is converging evidence that grandparents can provide support that helps to safeguard their children and grandchildren against adverse risks. We conclude by discussing

the role that grandparents could play in what has been referred to as Europe's demographic suicide.

Notes: Important discussion of the literature on grandparenting that argues for the integration of explanations from evolutionary, social and economic accounts of grandparenting. The authors also encourage research into the effects of grandparenting on outcomes for grandchildren, including on their overall well-being. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being and has implications for personhood development.

60. Coall, D. A. & Hertwig, R. (2011). Grandparental investment: A relic of the past or a resource for the future? *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 20(2), 93-98. Retrieved from <http://cdp.sagepub.com/content/20/2/93.abstract>. doi:10.1177/0963721411403269

Abstract: From changing diapers and minding the kids when school is out to providing support when they set fire to the carpet, grandparents can be invaluable to have around. What motivates grandparents to lend a hand? Several disciplines have offered answers. The most important accounts come from life-history theory and evolutionary psychology, sociology, and economics. These accounts exist side-by-side, but there is little theoretical integration among them. But regardless of whether grandparental investment is traced back to ancestral selection pressure or attributed to an individual grandparent's values or norms, one important question is, what impact does it have in industrialized, low-fertility, low-mortality societies? We briefly review the initial evidence concerning the impact of grandparental investment in industrialized societies and conclude that in difficult circumstances, grandparents can provide the support that safeguards their grandchildren's development. Additional cross-disciplinary research to examine the effects of intergenerational transfers in our evolutionarily unique environment of grandparenthood is needed.

Notes: A review of evidence for the efficacy of grandparenting support in grandchildren's development. Concludes that, especially in difficult circumstances, such support can buffer adverse effects. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being and has implications for personhood.

61. Coall, D. A. ; Meier, M. ; Hertwig, R. ; Wänke, M. & Höpflinger, F. (2009). Grandparental investment: The influence of reproductive timing and family size. *American Journal of Human Biology*, 21(4), 455-463. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ajhb.20894>. doi:10.1002/ajhb.20894

Abstract: The influence that grandparents have on the life history traits of their descendants has been studied extensively. However, no attention has been paid to the potential influence a grandparent's own reproductive history has on the investment they make in their grandchildren. We use data from 658 Swiss grandchildren and 591 of their grandparents to investigate whether grandparents' reproductive scheduling and family size influence the amount of investment grandparents make in a focal grandchild (shared contacts, occasions to meet, activities, discussions, interests, and important roles the grandparent plays).

Grandparents who were younger when they had their first child had more children and grandchildren; this relationship strengthened after controlling for grandparental age, sex, lineage, and education (all $P < 0.001$). Generally, having more children or grandchildren was associated with reduced levels of grandparental investment. After adjustment for a wide range of factors known to influence investment, having more children or grandchildren and having a first child or grandchild at a younger age were associated with reduced investment in 14 of 24 analyses (all $P < 0.09$). The association between reproductive scheduling and investment was partially mediated by the grandparent's family size. Interestingly, these relationships were only present in data reported from the grandchild's point of view, not the grandparent's. This analysis provides preliminary evidence that grandparents' reproductive strategies have consequences for the amount of investment they make in their grandchildren. These results are examined in terms of the trade-offs between current and future reproduction and offspring quality and quantity.

Notes: A significant empirical study measuring the relationship between grandparent reproductive strategies (e.g., having children early and having many children) and grandparental investment in grandchildren. Evolutionary psychological predictions were supported. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for well-being.

62. Colarelli, S. M. & Dettmann, J. R. (2003). Intuitive evolutionary perspectives in marketing practices¹. *Psychology & Marketing*, 20(9), 837-865. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/227715071?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Firms spend considerable sums of money on marketing, and they continue to do so because marketing works. However, marketing can only work if marketers have a reasonably accurate view of human nature. It is argued that many consumer products and advertisements reflect an accurate view of human nature, a view that is compatible with the tenets of evolutionary psychology. Implicit theories of human nature that are out of synch with reality sell few products. An overview of an evolutionary perspective on marketing is provided here, and connections between marketing practices and evolved adaptations, including kin selection, prestige seeking, preferences for salt, sweets, and fat, and savanna-like landscapes are examined. Adaptations that differ by sex and how they are mirrored in marketing are also examined. Finally, some marketing practices that reflect evolutionary principles of variation are discussed.

Notes: An application of principles from evolutionary psychology to successful marketing practice. It is particularly relevant given discussions in the well-being literature that concern the effect of modern media and commercial environments on well-being. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for well-being.

63. Conradson, D. (2005). Landscape, care and the relational self: Therapeutic encounters in rural England. *Health & Place, 11*(4), 337-348. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1353829205000146>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthplace.2005.02.004>

Abstract: Over the last decade a number of studies have employed notions of therapeutic landscape to describe the ways in which places become implicated in processes of healing or health enhancement. While this work has usefully highlighted the environmental, social and symbolic dimensions of such places, relatively less consideration has been given to the relational dynamics through which these therapeutic effects emerge. In this paper I seek to address this absence through engagement with two related bodies of work: ecological formulations of place and relational notions of selfhood. These ideas are explored with reference to the experiences of guests at a respite care centre in Dorset, a predominantly rural county in southern England. Alongside its residential services, this centre places a strong emphasis on facilitating guests' engagement with the wider natural environment in which it is set. A number of general analytical and methodological points are developed with regard to future therapeutic landscape research.

Notes:

An interesting analysis of the links between therapeutic landscapes and ecological and relational notions of selfhood. Relates to personhood and well-being.

64. Cordes, C. ; Richerson, P. J. ; McElreath, R. & Strimling, P. (2008). A naturalistic approach to the theory of the firm: The role of cooperation and cultural evolution. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68*(1), 125-139. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268108000784>. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.03.008

Abstract: One reason why firms exist, this paper argues, is because they are suitable organizations within which cooperative production systems based on human social predispositions can evolve. In addition, we show how an entrepreneur, given these predispositions, can shape human behavior within a firm. To illustrate these processes, we will present a model that depicts how the biased transmission of cultural contents via social learning processes within the firm influence employees' behavior and the performance of the firm. These biases can be traced back to evolved social predispositions. Humans lived in tribal scale social systems based on significant amounts of intra- and even intergroup cooperation for tens if not a few hundred thousand years before the first complex societies arose. Firms rest upon the social psychology originally evolved for tribal life. We also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence on the performance and size of different kinds of organizations. Modern organizations have functions rather different from ancient tribes, leading to friction between our social predispositions and organization goals. Firms that manage to reduce this friction will tend to function better.

Notes: An interesting application of evolutionary psychology to the operation and success of firms. Suggests that there is a potential conflict between cooperative predispositions that

have evolved and the organisational settings in modern firms. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for well-being

65. Cornejo, C. (2012). Contrasting Vygotsky's and Bakhtin's approaches to consciousness. *Culture & Psychology, 18*(1), 109-120. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000301887200008.
doi:10.1177/1354067x11427470

Abstract: Matusov (2011) sustains that Vygotsky and Bakhtin represent irreconcilable theoretical approaches. In his view, Vygotsky's model is monologic and universalist, while Bakhtin's is dialogic and pluralist. Although the two authors differ importantly, one cannot speak of irreconcilability for two main reasons. First, Vygotsky's approach is much more multifaceted and even contradictory than usually thought. In fact, his concept of sense echoes the Romanticist claim that experience exceeds the limits of language. Second, a dialogical conception of mind is not outside the reach of Hegelian tradition, which, in Matusov interpretation, is where Vygotsky's approach comes from. I emphasize that Bakhtin's unit of analysis is the voice-a concept more sociologic than psychological. "Voice" is insensitive to selfhood and should not be taken as synonymous of "person." Notwithstanding, Vygotsky and Bakhtin share beliefs with respect to the social constitution of the mind that allow including them in the same research program.

Notes: A discussion of the compatibility of Vygotskian and Bhaktinian notions of the 'self'. Relates to personhood.

66. Cosentino, E. (2011). Self in time and language. *Consciousness and Cognition, 20*(3), 777-783. Retrieved from
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810010002655>.
doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.12.006>

Abstract: Time has been considered a crucial factor in distinguishing between two levels of self-awareness: the "core," or "minimal self," and the "extended," or "narrative self." Herein, I focus on this last concept of the self and, in particular, on the relationship between the narrative self and language. In opposition to the claim that the narrative self is a linguistic construction, my idea is that it is created by the functioning of mental time travel, that is, the faculty of human beings to project themselves mentally backwards in time to relive, or forward to anticipate, events. Moreover, I propose that narrative language itself should be considered a product of a core brain network that includes mechanisms, such as mental time travel, mindreading, and visuo-spatial systems.

Notes: A cognitive interpretation of the narrative sense of self as involving mental 'time travel', both backwards and forwards. The model is mapped onto brain networks. Relates to personhood.

67. Cox, L. M. & Lyddon, W. J. (1997). Constructivist conceptions of self: A discussion of emerging identity constructs. *Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 10*(3), 201-219. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1997XF76200001. doi:10.1080/10720539708404623

Abstract: A significant feature of the postmodern turn in the sociobehavioral sciences focuses on the way self or identity is understood. In particular, postmodern scholars have challenged modernist notions of an essentialized self and have paved the way for the emergence of various constructivist conceptions of selfhood. In this article different constructivist theories of self are reviewed and discussed in relation to the current postmodern zeitgeist-self as (a) self-theory, (b) evolving process, (c) transcendent, (d) narrative, and (e) social/economic/political/construction. Critical points of convergence and divergence among these theories are discussed.

Notes: An overview of different strands within a social constructivist approach to selfhood. Useful as a means of categorising the theories promoted under this general approach. Relates to selfhood/ personhood.

68. Cramer, P. . & Tracy, A. (2005). The pathway from child personality to adult adjustment: The road is not straight. *Journal of Research in Personality, 39*(3), 369-394. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S009265660400073X>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2004.07.003>

Abstract: In a prospective longitudinal study of 62 individuals from the Berkeley Guidance Study of the Institute of Human Development, we examined the pathway from early childhood personality to early adult adjustment and maladjustment. The results from a path analysis indicated that shifts in personality from childhood to adulthood, influenced by the use of defense mechanisms, was the strongest predictor of adult adjustment. Developmental shifts in Outgoingness, influenced by the use of the defense of projection, predicted better psychological health, less depression, but more anxiety. Shifts in Self-confidence, influenced by the use of the defense of identification, predicted better psychological health, less depression, and less anxiety. A theoretical explanation of these relations is provided.

Notes: An important longitudinal study that tracked the influence of childhood personality factors on early adult adjustment. Relates to personhood and well-being.

69. Crocker, J. (2011). Presidential address: Self-image and compassionate goals and construction of the social self: implications for social and personality psychology. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15*(4), 394-407. doi:10.1177/1088868311418746

Abstract: Interpersonal dynamics of self-esteem are explored. The author proposes that the desire to be seen as having positive qualities and avoid being seen as having dreaded qualities paradoxically leads to lowered self-esteem and lowered regard from others through its adverse effects on interpersonal relationships. The author also argues that the human

capacity to transcend concerns with the images others hold of oneself, through caring about the well-being of other people, paradoxically leads to higher self-esteem and regard from others through its salutary effects on relationships. Data from two recent studies demonstrate these paradoxical effects and prompt questions about the nature of persons and situations, research methods, and the union between personality and social psychology. Accordingly, the author reflects more broadly on how people create their social situations, which in turn create the self, and what that means about the methods scholars use to understand social behavior.

Notes: An interesting suggestion about the relationships between self-driven attempts to be regarded well by others and actual regard. Paradoxically, attempts to enhance other regard can work against self-esteem and other regard. This happens primarily through the effect of such attempts on the interactions that comprise interpersonal relationships. Relates to personhood and well being.

70. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1992). Imagining the self: An evolutionary excursion. *Poetics*, 21(3), 153-167. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0304422X9290002K>. doi:10.1016/0304-422x(92)90002-k

Abstract: Organisms increase adaptive efficiency - and reduce entropy - by extracting information from the environment. In addition to relying on direct sensory information, humans have developed the ability to form images based on sensory input, thereby extending their capacity to model external conditions. A further advance is reached when images become detached from their sources in direct experience, and are created and manipulated internally in the mind - at which point we enter the realm of imagination. Imagination expands the open systemic dimension of the organism enormously, by allowing the mind to operate on data that need not be materially available. The 'evolutionary explosion' of the Upper Paleolithic seems to have been a high point in the transfer of information, mediated by visual images, that provided the basis for the development of writing and other forms of extra-somatic memory. One of the most important and interesting classes of data represents images of human beings and their inner states. Hunters, warriors, priests, rulers and saints have been depicted or described in song and verse as models for humanity to fear or to aspire to. The idealized portraits of women and children have served to instill meekness and obedience. The present study will focus on images of the optimally functioning human organism as represented in various media and in different cultures. This image seems to describe a negentropic state of involvement, control of mental and physical states, yet unselfconscious participation in systems of greater complexity. The evolutionary implications of this image will be explored.

Notes: A major theoretical exploration of the relationships between self, evolution and well-being/optimal functioning mediated through imagination. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and personhood.

71. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2001). Expressive forms and the evolution of consciousness. In J. S. Editors-in-Chief: Neil & B. B. Paul (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (pp. 5180-5186). Oxford: Pergamon. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0080430767040705>. doi:10.1016/b0-08-043076-7/04070-5

Abstract: Expressive forms are seen from an evolutionary perspective as attempts on the part of individuals possessed of self-reflective consciousness to discover and to express their images of self. The main focus is on how symbolic forms ranging from household objects, clothing, dance and music to ritual performances serve to reify both individuation on the one hand, and social integration on the other. The adaptive significance of expression is explored.

Notes: Personal expressiveness is understood from an evolutionary perspective and in relation to images of the self. Relates to evolutionary psychology and selfhood/ personhood.

72. Cummins, R. A. ; Eckersley, R. ; Opallant, J. ; Van Vugt, J. & Misajon, R. (2003). Developing a national index of subjective well-being: The Australian Unity Well-being Index. *Social Indicators Research*, 64 (2 (Nov)), 159-190.

Abstract: The Australian Unity Well-being Index has been designed as a new barometer of Australians' satisfaction with their lives, and life in Australia. It is based on, and develops, the theoretical model of subjective well-being homeostasis. The Index comprises two sub-scales of Personal and National Well-being. Data were collected through a nationally representative sample of 2,000 people in April/May 2001. Factor analysis confirmed the integrity of the two sub-scales and, confirming empirical expectation, the average level of life satisfaction was 75.5 percent of the scale maximum score. Group comparisons revealed that all age groups maintained their Personal Indexscore within the normal range. In addition, people in country areas were more satisfied with their personal lives than city-dwellers, but less satisfied about the national situation, and people who had recently experienced a strong positive event evidenced a rise in well-being, whereas those who had experienced a strong negative event evidenced well-being in the low-normal range. It is argued that these data generally support homeostatic theory. However, an unusual result was that females were more satisfied with their own lives than males. A tentative argument is advanced that this may represent a constitutional difference. It is concluded that the Australian Unity Well-being Index has potential as a valid, reliable and sensitive instrument to monitor national well-being.

Notes: A significant attempt to create a comprehensive measure of Australians' well-being. Relates to well-being.

73. Cummins, R. A. ; Lau, A. A. L. D. ; Mellor, D. & Stokes, M. A. (2009). Encouraging governments to enhance the happiness of their nation: Step 1: Understand subjective well-being. *Social Indicators Research* 91, 23-36.

Abstract: This article considers the issue of facilitating policies that enhance population happiness. An impediment to such action is the failure of most policy makers to understand that subjective well-being can be measured and understood within the framework of science. Additionally, they fail to realize that enhancing the subjective well-being of populations enhances not only the functioning of individuals but that of the population as a whole. A framework for understanding calls on the Theory of Subjective Well-being Homeostasis and data from the Australian Unity Well-being Index. This Index has been used to monitor the subjective well-being of the Australian population over the 6-year period 2001–2006. The article begins by a description of the subjective well-being construct and the theory that it is homeostatically managed. The operation of homeostasis makes very determined predictions as to the kinds of relationships that should be found in association with various environmental challenges and resources. These predictions will be examined in the light of the data from our surveys and the benefits of population happiness will be discussed. Finally, consideration will be given as to and how such understanding may be conveyed to politicians, in order to assist the development of policies aimed at enhancing the level of happiness in society.

Notes: An argument for the use of the Australian Unity Well-Being Index and its underlying homeostatic theory of well-being to assist in policy making concerning well-being. Relates to well-being.

74. Cunha, C. & Goncalves, M. M. (2009). Accessing the experience of a dialogical self: Some needs and concerns. *Culture & Psychology*, 15(1), 120-133. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000263912600006. doi:10.1177/1354067x08099618

Abstract: This commentary focuses on Konig's (2009) work as an opportunity to elaborate on selfhood as a dynamic and dialogical phenomenon. We depart from Bakhtinian dialogism and dialogical self theory to focus on the dynamics of selfhood processes and draw a more explicit theoretical link between the dialogical self and phenomenological experience. The interconnected dimensions of discontinuity and continuity in a multiple, multipositioned self are also elaborated. We defend that the construction of similitude in the self is permitted by self-regulation and self-organization processes that create recurring patterns in a moving self. Finally, the role that the introduction of difference and alterity can play in the promotion of change and development is also discussed.

Notes: A dialogical framework for understanding the self in its phenomenological dimensions. Relates to personhood.

75. D'Acci, L. (2011). Measuring well-being and progress. *Social Indicators Research*, 104(1), 47-65. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000294541900004. doi:10.1007/s11205-010-9717-1

Abstract: Well-being is becoming a concept which is more and more involved in any world development consideration. A large amount of work is being carried out to study measurements of well-being, including a more holistic vision on the development and welfare of a country. This paper proposes an idea of well-being and progress being in equilibrium with each other. This is distant from the two extreme positions: poor but happy, and rich then happy; too romantic the first, and reductive the second. After a short explanation on the meaning of Objective and Subjective well-being, we show some interesting relations between economic and social variables, and we propose a new index to measure the well-being and progress of the countries: the Well-being & Progress Index (WPI). It includes several aspects of well-being and progress, like human rights, economic well-being, equality, education, research, quality of urban environment, ecological behaviours, subjective well-being, longevity, and violent crime. The most frequently used indexes usually only focus on some aspects, like ecology, or economy, or policy, or education, or happiness, and so forth. On the contrary, this new WPI index allows a global and well-balanced vision, thanks to the large range of indicators used, and how representative they are.

Notes: Discusses measures of well-being at the national level and argues that both objective and subjective aspects of well-being can be combined in the 'Well-being and Progress Index' (WPI). The aim of the paper is to integrate notions of well-being and understandings of progress into a comprehensive index that has subjective well-being as only one amongst many indicators. Relates to well-being.

76. Davidson, R. J. (2004). Well-being and affective style: neural substrates and biobehavioural correlates. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B. Biological Sciences.*, 359 (1449 (September 29)), 1395–1411

Abstract: One of the most salient features of emotion is the pronounced variability among individuals in their reactions to emotional incentives and in their dispositional mood. Collectively, these individual differences have been described as affective style. Recent research has begun to dissect the constituents of affective style. The search for these components is guided by the neural systems that instantiate emotion and emotion regulation. In this article, this body of research and theory is applied specifically to positive affect and well-being. The central substrates and peripheral biological correlates of well-being are described. A resilient affective style is associated with high levels of left prefrontal activation, effective modulation of activation in the amygdala and fast recovery in response to negative and stressful events. In peripheral biology, these central patterns are associated with lower levels of basal cortisol and with higher levels of antibody titres to influenza vaccine. The article concludes with a consideration of whether these patterns of central and peripheral biology can be modified by training and shifted toward a more salubrious direction.

Notes: A significant and detailed overview of the neurology and biobehavioural correlates of affective well-being. Relates to evolutionary/ biological psychology and well-being.

77. de Catanzaro, D. (1991). Evolutionary limits to self-preservation. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 12(1), 13-28. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/016230959190010N>. doi:10.1016/0162-3095(91)90010-n

Abstract: A simple mathematical formula can be derived, on the basis of inclusive fitness theory and notions of reproductive value, to represent the residual capacity of an individual to influence his inclusive fitness. This formula involves the individual's remaining reproductive potential in his expected natural lifetime, plus the summated impacts of his continued existence on the remaining reproductive potentials of each of his kin, each weighted by the coefficient of relationship. In theory, this quantity should predict the extent to which self-preservation is optimally expressed in that individual. For asocial species, the value will vary from zero up to the maximal reproductive value observable, and the logic of the Medawar-Williams theory of senescence should apply directly. However, for highly social species like our own, it can be demonstrated that negative values can also obtain, given the conjunction of low residual reproductive potential and burdensomeness toward kin. Much empirical evidence suggests that outright self-destructiveness is often found in circumstances of such conjunction.

Notes: A formal analysis of the conditions required in a social species for individuals to have a negative residual inclusive fitness, hence leading to the possibility of self-destruction. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being.

78. de la Sablonniere, R. ; Auger, E. ; Sadykova, N. & Taylor, D. M. (2010). When the "We" impacts how "I" feel about myself: Effect of temporal collective relative deprivation on personal well-being in the context of dramatic social change in Kyrgyzstan. *European Psychologist*, 15(4), 271-282. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000285378800004. doi:10.1027/1016-9040/a000062

Abstract: Dramatic social change leads to profound societal transformations in many countries around the world. The two recent revolutions in March 2005 and April 2010, and the ethnic conflict in June 2010 in Kyrgyzstan are vivid examples. The present research aims to understand people's reactions to dramatic social change in terms of personal well-being. To further understand how people react psychologically to dramatic social change, the theoretical framework of our research is based on a dominant theory in social psychology: Collective relative deprivation theory. In the past, researchers have argued that collective relative deprivation is logically associated with collective outcomes, and thus is not likely to impact personal well-being (e. g., Walker & Mann, 1987). Others, however, have argued that feelings of collective relative deprivation do impact personal well-being (e. g., Zagefka & Brown, 2005). We postulate that these inconsistent results arise because past research has failed to consider multiple points of comparison over time to assess collective relative deprivation. Specifically, we theorize that multiple points of collective relative deprivation need to be taken into account, and in so doing, collective relative deprivation will, indeed, be related to personal well-being. We also explore the entire trajectory of collective relative deprivation (which represents how an individual perceives the evolution of his/her group's history across time) to predict personal well-being. In the present study, we tested these

theoretical propositions in the context of dramatic social change in Kyrgyzstan. Regressions, group-based trajectory modeling, and MANOVA confirm our hypotheses.

Notes: Seeks to understand the relationships between personal well-being and collective social changes. Relates to well-being and personhood (especially its links to collective identity).

79. Deci, E. L. & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. *Psychological Inquiry*, 11(4), 227-268. Review. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000166046400001. doi:10.1207/s15327965pli1104_01

Abstract: Self-determination theory (SDT) maintains that an understanding of human motivation requires a consideration of innate psychological needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness. We discuss the SDT concept of needs as it relates to previous need theories, emphasizing that needs specify the necessary conditions for psychological growth, integrity and well-being. This concept of needs leads to the hypotheses that different regulatory processes underlying goal pursuits are differentially associated that effective functioning and well-being and also that different goal contents have different relations to the quality of behavior and mental health, specifically because different regulatory processes and different goal contents are associated with differing degrees of need satisfaction. Social contexts and individual differences that support satisfaction of the basic needs facilitate natural growth processes including intrinsically motivated behavior and integration of extrinsic motivations, whereas those that forestall autonomy, competence, or relatedness are associated with poorer motivation, performance, and well-being. We also discuss the relation of the psychological needs to cultural values, evolutionary processes, and other contemporary motivation theories.

Notes: A broad-ranging discussion of the relationships between levels of needs and their satisfaction and the consequences for well-being and performance. The development of autonomy, competence and relatedness are highlighted as positive indicators of well-being and performance. Evolutionary perspectives are included in discussion. Relates to well-being, personhood development and evolutionary psychology.

80. Deci, E. L. & Ryan, R. M. (2008). Hedonia, eudaimonia, and well-being: An introduction. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 9(1), 1-11. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/215879966?accountid=27890>
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&rft_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Aabiglobal&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Journal+of+Happiness+Studies&rft.atitle=Hedonia%2C+eudaimonia%2C+and+well-being%3A+an+introduction&rft.au=Deci%2C+Edward+L%3BRyan%2C+Richard+M&rft.aulast=Deci&rft.aufirst=Edward&rft.date=2008-01-01&rft.volume=9&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=1&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.title=Journal+of+Happiness+Studies&rft.issn=13894978

Abstract: Research on well-being can be thought of as falling into two traditions. In one--the hedonistic tradition--the focus is on happiness, generally defined as the presence of positive affect and the absence of negative affect. In the other--the eudaimonic tradition--the focus is on living life in a full and deeply satisfying way. Recognizing that much recent research on well-being has been more closely aligned with the hedonistic tradition, this special issue presents discussions and research reviews from the eudaimonic tradition, making clear how the concept of eudaimonia adds an important perspective to our understanding of well-being.

Notes: Introduces the focus on eudaimonic approaches to well-being. Relates to well-being.

81. Demsetz, H. (1996). Rationality, evolution, and acquisitiveness. *Economic Inquiry*, 34(3), 484-495. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/200844922?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Alchian's (1950) article Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory is discussed, and the notion that it is easy to eliminate rationality from economic behavior by appealing to evolution as a substitute is argued against. Rationality is discussed and a specific meaning for this term that distinguishes it from the axioms of choice found in economic theory is developed. This definition is used and rationality is linked to a behavioral propensity almost unique to the human species - acquisitiveness. It is concluded from this linkage that acquisitiveness can speed up the evolution of intelligence.

Notes: An exploration of the links between human rationality and evolutionary theory through a focus on acquisitiveness. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

82. Deneulin, S. & McGregor, J. A. (2010). The capability approach and the politics of a social conception of well-being. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 13(4), 501-519. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000284377800005. doi:10.1177/1368431010382762

Abstract: The capability approach constitutes a significant contribution to social theory but its potential is diminished by its insufficient treatment of the social construction of meaning. Social meanings enable people to make value judgements about what they will do and be, and also to evaluate how satisfied they are about what they are able to achieve. From this viewpoint, a person's state of well-being must be understood as being socially and psychologically co-constituted in specific social and cultural contexts. In this light, the telos of 'living well' which is at the heart of Sen's version of the capability approach is inadequate and must be modified to a telos of 'living well together' which includes consideration of the social structures and institutions which enable people to pursue individual freedoms in relation to others. The policy significance of the capability approach can be further strengthened by paying greater consideration to the political economy of policy decision-making processes and the ways in which conflicts and distributions of power are institutionalized.

Notes: Argues for the dependence of 'living well' on human sociality and the consequent social construction of meanings for people. Relates to personhood and well-being.

83. Derksen, M. (2007). Cultivating human nature. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 25(3), 189-206.

Abstract: Evolutionary psychology claims to offer a unified perspective on human nature and culture, which can serve to further the integration of psychology and the social sciences. I describe four approaches to evolutionary psychology, and note increasing attention to the agency of the individual in constructing the biological and cultural environment. These approaches, however, share a problematic conception of culture as information. I explore the possibility of using Latour's concept of mediation to analyse the relation between human nature and culture without restricting the latter to information, and collect a number of recent studies and essays that illustrate the way individuals mediate nature and culture.

Notes: A critique of evolutionary approaches to psychology that relegate cultural processes to information received by the individual. Attempts to argue against the increasing focus on the role of the individual in constructing social and biological environments. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

84. Deshmukh, V. D. (2008). The multistream self: Biophysical, mental, social, and existential. *The Scientific World Journal*, 8, 331-341. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000254985000034. doi:10.1100/tsw.2008.19

Abstract: Self is difficult to define because of its multiple, constitutive streams of functional existence. A more comprehensive and expanded definition of self is proposed. The standard bio-psycho-social model of psyche is expanded to biophysical-mental-social and existential self. The total human experience is better understood and explained by adding the

existential component. Existential refers to lived human experience, which is firmly rooted in reality. Existential living is the capacity to live fully in the present, and respond freely and flexibly to new experience without fear. Four common fears of isolation, insecurity, insignificance, and death can be overcome by developing a lifestyle of whole-hearted engagement in the present reality, creative problem solving, self-actualization, and altruism. Such integrative living creates a sense of presence with self-awareness, understanding, and existential well-being. Well-being is defined as a life of happiness, contentment, low distress, and good health with positive outlook. Self is a complex, integrative process of living organisms. It organizes, coordinates, and integrates energy-information within and around itself, spontaneously, unconsciously, and consciously. Self-process is understood in terms of synergetics, coordination dynamics, and energy-information-directed self-organization. It is dynamic, composite, ever renewing, and enduring. It can be convergent or divergent, and can function as the source or target of its own behavior-mentation. The experience of self is continuously generated by spontaneous activation of neural networks in the cerebral neocortex by the brainstem-diencephalic arousal system. The multiple constitutive behavioral-mental streams develop concurrently into a unique experience of self, specific for a person at his/her developmental stage. The chronological neuro-behavioral-mental development of self is described in detail from embryonic stage to old age. Self can be behaviorally-mentally oriented and realized in three complimentary modes of being: egocentric, allocentric, and ecosystemic or existential. The existential mode is both immanent and transcendent, and can be self-actualized, resulting in a healthy, creative, conflict-free, and meaningful life.

Notes: A wide-ranging analysis of the self, particularly in its 'existential' dimension. Relates to selfhood/ personhood.

85. Dezechache, G. & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2012). Sharing the joke: The size of natural laughter groups. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 33(6), 775-779. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513812000682>. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2012.07.002

Abstract: Recent studies suggest that laughter plays an important role in social bonding. Human communities are much larger than those of other primates and hence require more time to be devoted to social maintenance activities. Yet, there is an upper limit on the amount of time that can be dedicated to social demands, and, in nonhuman primates, this sets an upper limit on social group size. It has been suggested that laughter provides the additional bonding capacity in humans by allowing an increase in the size of the "grooming group." In this study of freely forming laughter groups, we show that laughter allows a threefold increase in the number of bonds that can be "groomed" at the same time. This would enable a very significant increase in the size of community that could be bonded.

Notes: Explores the role of humour in permitting increases in the size of socially-bonded groups. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

86. Dickens, P. (2001). Linking the social and natural sciences: Is capital modifying human biology in its own image? *Sociology*, 35(1), 93-110. Retrieved from <http://soc.sagepub.com/content/35/1/93.abstract>. doi:10.1177/0038038501035001007

Abstract: Social science has long fought shy of the natural sciences. Meanwhile, concerns with the environment, health and the new genetics are creating a need for systematic links to be made between these disciplines. This paper suggests a new way in which social theory can be linked to biology. Recent developments in biology point to the importance of considering organisms in relation to their environment. And work in epidemiology stresses the links between the infant-development, health in later life and the well-being of future generations. Complex combinations of genetically-determined predispositions and capitalist social relations are responsible for important features of contemporary social stratification and well-being. The paper is informed by critical realist epistemology and Marx's theory of the subsumption. Such a fusion leads to a key assertion. Capital tends to modify the powers of human biology in its own image.

Notes: An argument for viewing economic and social conditions in capitalism as structuring of evolved human biology to fit itself. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and personhood.

87. Dickins, T. E. (2005). Can there ever be a non-specific adaptation? A response to Simon J. Hampton. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 35(3), 329-340. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.2005.00275.x>. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.2005.00275.x

No abstract.

Notes: Article Introduction: Hampton (2004) has recently discussed the application of evolutionary theory to the behavioural sciences. In his paper he argues that social situations are so unpredictable that the optimal evolutionary response is to select for a social-cognition adaptation, or social intelligence, which he refers to as an adaptation for nothing in particular. This paper will begin with an outline of Hampton's arguments in which he details the problem of unpredictability. It will then go on to describe Hampton's proposed solution and finally present some criticisms of his solution that are firmly embedded within contemporary evolutionary theory.

Notes: An argument in response to the claim that social intelligence, per se, would have been selected for in human evolutionary history. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

88. Diener, E. ; Napa-Scollon, C. ; Oishi, S. ; Dzokoto, V. . & Suh, E. (2000). Positivity and the construction of life satisfaction judgments: Global happiness is not the sum of its parts. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 1(2), 159-176. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A%3A1010031813405>. doi:10.1023/a:1010031813405

Abstract: The present study investigated how reports of satisfaction with specific versus global domains can be used to assess a disposition towards positivity in subjective well-being reports. College students from 41 societies (N = 7167) completed measures of life satisfaction and ratings of global and specific aspects of their lives. For example, participants rated satisfaction with their education (global) and satisfaction with their professors, textbooks, and lectures (specific). It was hypothesized that global measures would more strongly reflect individual differences in dispositional positivity, that is, a propensity to evaluate aspects of life in general as good. At both the individual and national levels, positivity predicted life satisfaction beyond objective measures. Also, positivity was associated with norms about ideal life satisfaction such that countries and individuals who highly valued positive emotions were more likely to display positivity. The difference between more global versus more concrete measures of satisfaction can be used as an indirect and subtle measure of positivity.

Notes: A useful empirical study that dissects the relationships between different 'levels' of satisfaction and does so in a way that identifies general tendencies towards positivity. Relates to well-being.

89. Diener, E. ; Ng, W. ; Harter, J. & Arora, R. (2010). Wealth and happiness across the world: Material prosperity predicts life evaluation, whereas psychosocial prosperity predicts positive feeling. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 99(1), 52-61.

Abstract: The Gallup World Poll, the first representative sample of planet Earth, was used to explore the reasons why happiness is associated with higher income, including the meeting of basic needs, fulfillment of psychological needs, increasing satisfaction with one's standard of living, and public goods. Across the globe, the association of log income with subjective well-being was linear but convex with raw income, indicating the declining marginal effects of income on subjective well-being. Income was a moderately strong predictor of life evaluation but a much weaker predictor of positive and negative feelings. Possessing luxury conveniences and satisfaction with standard of living were also strong predictors of life evaluation. Although the meeting of basic and psychological needs mediated the effects of income on life evaluation to some degree, the strongest mediation was provided by standard of living and ownership of conveniences. In contrast, feelings were most associated with the fulfillment of psychological needs: learning, autonomy, using one's skills, respect, and the ability to count on others in an emergency. Thus, two separate types of prosperity-economic and social psychological-best predict different types of well-being.

Notes: Provides extensive evidence of the differential relationships between life satisfaction, quality of social relationships, wealth and positive affect. A major study of global subjective well-being (SWB). Relates to well-being.

90. Diener, E. & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Beyond money: Toward an economy of well-being. *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, 5(1), 1-31. Retrieved from <http://psi.sagepub.com/content/5/1/1.abstract>. doi:10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00501001.x

Abbreviated Abstract: Policy decisions at the organizational, corporate, and governmental levels should be more heavily influenced by issues related to well-being—people's evaluations and feelings about their lives. Domestic policy currently focuses heavily on economic outcomes, although economic indicators omit, and even mislead about, much of what society values. We show that economic indicators have many shortcomings, and that measures of well-being point to important conclusions that are not apparent from economic indicators alone. For example, although economic output has risen steeply over the past decades, there has been no rise in life satisfaction during this period, and there has been a substantial increase in depression and distrust. We argue that economic indicators were extremely important in the early stages of economic development, when the fulfillment of basic needs was the main issue. As societies grow wealthy, however, differences in well-being are less frequently due to income, and are more frequently due to factors such as social relationships and enjoyment at work. Important noneconomic predictors of the average levels of well-being of societies include social capital, democratic governance, and human rights. In the workplace, noneconomic factors influence work satisfaction and profitability. It is therefore important that organizations, as well as nations, monitor the well-being of workers, and take steps to improve it ... Desirable outcomes, even economic ones, are often caused by well-being rather than the other way around Periodic, systematic assessment of well-being will offer policymakers a much stronger set of findings to use in making policy decisions.

Notes: A discussion of the broad influences on well-being at the social and economic levels leading to the conclusion that policy needs to take account of the wide-ranging influences on human well-being. Relates to well-being.

91. Dolan, P. ; Hallsworth, M. ; Halpern, D. ; King, D. ; Metcalfe, R. & Vlaev, I. (2012). Influencing behaviour: The mindspace way. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 33(1), 264-277. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487011001668>. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.10.009

Abstract: The ability to influence behaviour is central to many of the key policy challenges in areas such as health, finance and climate change. The usual route to behaviour change in economics and psychology has been to attempt to 'change minds' by influencing the way people think through information and incentives. There is, however, increasing evidence to suggest that 'changing contexts' by influencing the environments within which people act (in largely automatic ways) can have important effects on behaviour. We present a mnemonic, MINDSPACE, which gathers up the nine most robust effects that influence our behaviour in mostly automatic (rather than deliberate) ways. This framework is being used by policymakers as an accessible summary of the academic literature. To motivate further research and academic scrutiny, we provide some evidence of the effects in action and highlight some of the significant gaps in our knowledge.

Notes: A review of the various ways in which personal behaviour is influenced, beneath conscious awareness, by characteristics of the context or setting. Relates to personhood – especially the degree of agency often considered to be involved.

92. Dombek, M. T. (1991). The contexts of caring: conscience and consciousness. *NLN publications*, (15-2401), 19-36. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://MEDLINE:2057336

Abstract: In this paper, I have maintained a distinction between person and self in order to describe and analyze contexts of caring in nursing encounters. As the nursed person's perspectives are examined in light of the nurse's capacity to engage his or her own experience, four contextual categories emerge: comprehension, consideration, concern, and communion. Such concepts can help us describe and analyze many situations in clinical nursing and in nursing education. The following paragraphs describe several of the possibilities for future research. It is important to study in which contexts in nursing personhood and selfhood are enhanced and when they are diminished. Diminishment of personhood leads to depersonalization which describes a condition of loss of agency and helplessness in a world where others are in control. This can happen to the nursed person and to the nursing person. When nurses are placed in contexts where they experience lack of agency and authority in their practice settings (even when they attempt to engage others with concern and compassion), they can start to feel and become depersonalized. Diminishment of self leads to dehumanization, which describes a loss of contact with one's own experience. Rules and relationships are oppressive or inflexible and the participants experience meaninglessness. For example, how long can nurses be in daily situations of administering painful procedures to patients without experiencing dehumanization? The same question can be asked of nurses at all levels in hierarchies, and in all relationships, for example, nursing instructors with students, nurse administrators with staff nurses, faculty in academic institutions, and staff nurses with each other. Depersonalization and dehumanization eventually lead to one another. Another significant question to explore could be this: In which of the four contexts defined above does the nurse experience most satisfaction, most dissatisfaction, and the condition we call burnout? We live in a world, a society, and a profession where depersonalization and dehumanization are the plight of many. How can personhood and selfhood be enhanced or even restored in our hospitals, clinics, classrooms, and academic institutions? I propose that investigations of the contexts of caring can help us explore, discover, describe, and analyze these questions.

Notes: A conceptual account of the relationship between considerations of personhood and selfhood and their consequences for depersonalisation and dehumanisation in a nursing context. Relates to selfhood/ personhood and well-being.

93. Dressler, W. W. (2006). Commentary: Taking culture seriously in health research. *International Journal of Epidemiology*, 35(2), 258-259. Retrieved from <http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/35/2/258.short>. doi:10.1093/ije/dyi236

No abstract.

Notes: Commentary on Eckersley's article 'Is modern Western Culture a health hazard?'
Relates to well-being.

94. Drigotas, S. M. (2002). The Michelangelo phenomenon and personal well-being. *Journal of Personality*, 70(1), 59-77. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000173590800004. doi:10.1111/1467-6494.00178

Abstract: Previous research has demonstrated that when a close romantic partner views you and behaves toward you in a manner that is congruent with your ideal self, you experience movement toward your ideal self (termed the "Michelangelo phenomenon"; Drigotas, Rusbult, Wieselquist, & Whitton, 1999). The present research represents an attempt to demonstrate the phenomenon's link to personal well-being. Results of a cross-sectional study of individuals in dating relationships, with a 2-month follow-up assessing breakup, replicated previous findings regarding relationship well-being and revealed strong links between the model and personal well-being, even when accounting for level of relationship satisfaction. Such results provide further evidence for the social construction of the self and personal well-being.

Notes: An empirical investigation of the dependence of personal well-being upon close, romantic relationships in which people are viewed by their partner in a way congruent with their ideal self. Relates to personhood and well-being.

95. Ebstein, R. P. .; Israel, S. ; Chew, S. H. ; Zhong, S. & Knafo, A. (2010). Genetics of human social behavior. *Neuron*, 65(6), 831-844. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0896627310001376>. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.02.020

Abstract: Human beings are an incredibly social species and along with eusocial insects engage in the largest cooperative living groups in the planet's history. Twin and family studies suggest that uniquely human characteristics such as empathy, altruism, sense of equity, love, trust, music, economic behavior, and even politics are partially hardwired. The leap from twin studies to identifying specific genes engaging the social brain has occurred in the past decade, aided by deep insights accumulated about social behavior in lower mammals. Remarkably, genes such as the arginine vasopressin receptor and the oxytocin receptor contribute to social behavior in a broad range of species from voles to man. Other polymorphic genes constituting the "usual suspects"—i.e., those encoding for dopamine reward pathways, serotonergic emotional regulation, or sex hormones—further enable elaborate social behaviors.

Notes: An overview of work on the evolved and genetic bases of human social and cooperative behaviours and emotions. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and personhood.

96. Eckersley, R. (2000). The state and fate of nations: Implications of subjective measures of personal and social quality of life. *Social Indicators Research*, 52(1), 3-27. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A%3A1007071621613>. doi:10.1023/a:1007071621613

Abstract: The equation of 'more' with 'better' – of standard of living with quality of life – is at the heart of a growing international debate about indicators of progress. At one level, the debate is about the adequacy of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) as the dominant indicator of national performance. However, the debate also reaches far beyond this question to challenge conventional thinking about progress. Quality of life includes both objective and subjective elements, so indicators of progress should include measures of how people feel about their lives. Drawing mainly on Australian data – but also on US and international studies – this analysis examines and differentiates between subjective measures of personal and social quality of life, and discusses their use in evaluating whether life is getting better – or worse.

Notes: Discusses the relationship between subjective and objective measures of well-being, arguing for the inclusion of subjective measures at the national level. Relates to well-being.

97. Eckersley, R. (2006). Is modern Western culture a health hazard? *International Journal of Epidemiology*, 35(2), 252-258. Retrieved from <http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/35/2/252.short>. doi:10.1093/ije/dyi235

No abstract.

Notes: 3 Key messages from end of article:

"Cultural factors such as materialism and individualism are underestimated determinants of population health and well-being in Western societies.

Evidence links cultural factors, via psychosocial pathways, to psychological well-being, and well-being, through behavioural and physiological pathways, to physical health.

An important and growing cost of our modern way of life is 'cultural fraud': the promotion of images and ideals of 'the good life' that serve the economy but do not meet psychological needs or reflect social realities."

A general discussion of how well-being is influenced by cultural messages via social interactions. Relates to well-being.

98. Eckersley, R. (2009). Population measures of subjective well-being: How useful are they? *Social Indicators Research*, 94(1), 1-12. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/197628151?accountid=27890>

Abstract: This article focuses on the contributions and, importantly, the limitations of subjective well-being (happiness/satisfaction) measures as indicators of broad population

well-being and societal functioning. The popular practice of comparing happiness among countries gives a skewed view of how well their people are faring. Charting trends over time in happiness and mental health gives contradictory pictures of population well-being; even the responses to different questions within the same survey can yield very different findings. Asking people about their own lives and about social conditions produces contrasting results. These issues challenge the orthodox model of human development, which places Western liberal democracies at its leading edge. According to an alternative, psychosocial-dynamics, model, some, at least, may be societies in decline. Reconciling these views is no simple matter.

Notes: A critical commentary on how best to measure well-being given the uncertain relationship between personal and social aspects of well-being. Relates to well-being.

99. Ellis, B. J. & Bjorklund, D. F. (Eds.). (2005). *Origins of the social mind; evolutionary psychology and child development*: Guilford Press.

No abstract.

Notes: Editors Ellis and Bjorklund (respectively, U. of Arizona and Florida Atlantic U.) gather ideas behind the synthesis of evolutionary biology and developmental psychology, bringing together 19 contributions from developmental scientists whose work is moved by an evolutionary perspective. Arrangement is in three sections on conceptual foundations of the emerging field; personality and social development; and cognitive development. The contributions address the role of developmental plasticity in the evolution of human cognition (evidence from enculturated apes); early stress; behavioral genetics; determinants of pubertal timing; functional aspects of human adolescence; play; infant perception; language evolution; religious causal beliefs in children and adults; a revision of Simon Baron-Cohen's 1994 model of the "mindreading system," and folk knowledge and academic learning, among other topics.

Relates to evolutionary psychology and has clear implications for the development of selfhood/ personhood.

100. Ermer, E. ; Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (2008). Relative status regulates risky decision making about resources in men: Evidence for the co-evolution of motivation and cognition. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 29(2), 106-118. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S109051380700116X>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.11.002>

Abstract: Relative social status strongly regulates human behavior, yet this factor has been largely ignored in research on risky decision making. Humans, like other animals, incur risks as they compete to defend or improve their standing in a social group. Among men, access to culturally important resources is a locus of intrasexual competition and a determinant of status. Thus, relative status should affect men's motivations for risk in relevant domains. Contrasting predictions about such effects were derived from dominance theory and risk-sensitive foraging theory. Experiments varied whether subjects thought they were being observed and evaluated by others of lower, equal or higher status, and whether decisions

involved resources (status relevant) or medical treatments (status irrelevant). Across two experiments, men who thought others of equal status were viewing and evaluating their decisions were more likely to favor a high-risk/high-gain means of recouping a monetary loss over a no-risk/low-gain means with equal expected value. Supporting predictions from dominance theory, this motivation for risk taking appeared only in the equal status condition, only for men, and only for resource loss problems. Taken together, the results support the idea that motivational systems designed to negotiate a status-saturated social world regulate the cognitive processes that generate risky decision making in men.

Notes: Experimental study of the relationship between risky decision making, relative status and competition for resources. Males were found to be sensitive to the status level of those judging their efforts and so chose riskier strategies when believing that equal status level peers were judging them. Relates to evolutionary psychology and development of male personhood as it relates to risky decision-making.

101. Essock-Vitale, S. M. & McGuire, M. T. (1980). Predictions derived from the theories of kin selection and reciprocity assessed by anthropological data. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 1(3), 233-243. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309580900102>. doi:10.1016/0162-3095(80)90010-2

Abstract: A review of the anthropological exchange literature indicates that predictions following from the evolutionary biological theories of kin selection and reciprocity are nearly always supported. For example, studies suggest that kin are more likely than nonkin to be the recipients of assistance for which no reciprocity is expected. While most of the data on differences in helping and reciprocity with closeness of kinship are qualitative rather than quantitative, the frequency of quantitative studies appears to be increasing. Hence, the behavioral observations and systematic subject questioning by anthropologists may be of increasing usefulness to human ethologists and evolutionary biologists.

Notes: An early study that argues that anthropological evidence supports kin selection theories of helping behaviour. Relates to evolutionary psychology.

102. Fabrega, H. (1994). Personality-disorders as medical entities - A cultural interpretation. *Journal of Personality Disorders*, 8(2), 149-167. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1994NU40000008

Abstract: This paper touches on four related but analytically different ways in which the personality disorders can be conceptualized. Viewed from a classical "biomedical" point of view, they constitute medical entities for which there exists a growing neurobiological rationale and validation. In this view, PDs have a legitimate claim to being bonafide psychiatric entities. From a cultural constructionist point of view, PDs are based on conceptions of personhood and standards of culturally appropriate behavior that have evolved in Anglo-American societies. In this view, PDs are quintessential cultural products that owe their meaning and descriptive content to a distinctive cultural tradition. From a social-historical point of view, the PDs illustrate dramatically the process of medicalization that has taken place in Anglo-American societies, especially as this pertains to social

behavior. In a society in which characterological factors have become criteria not only for normality as compared to deviance but also for the pathological, the idea that the label 'disorders' can be applied to aspects of personhood follows logically. (This aspect of PDs is implied in this paper and is more explicitly dealt with elsewhere-see Fabrega, 1989, for a summary and also Foucault, 1965, and Kittrie, 1972.) Finally, as is illustrated in this paper, the PDs pose a philosophical conundrum insofar as it is conceptually difficult to draw a sharp line between the scientific (i.e., evolutionary/psychological) and the culturally standard (i.e., Anglo-American conventions). The parallelism of meaning of the descriptors of the language of evolutionary psychology and of a local cultural psychology makes it difficult to refute the reductionist position that the PDs are based on ethnocentric assumptions. The notion of a dialectical interplay between culture, biology, and history in the formation of personality and personality disorders is basic to contemporary psychiatric theory and highlights the limitations of biological and cultural reductionism.

Notes: Argues that personality disorders are hard to distinguish from culturally based preferences for aspects of personhood. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

103. Farnell, B. (1999). Moving bodies, acting selves. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 28, 341-373. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/199819200?accountid=27890>

Abstract: This review describes a paradigmatic shift in anthropological studies in human movement, from an observationist view of behavior to a conception of body movement as dynamically embodied action. After outlining the scope of such study, historical and cultural reasons for the relative neglect of body movement in anthropological enquiry are examined critically and placed in the wider context of recent cultural and social theorizing about the body and the problem of dynamic embodiment. A historical overview situates earlier approaches such as kinesics and proxemics, in relation to more recent developments in theory and method such as those offered by semasiology and the concept of the "action" sign. Overlapping interests with linguistic and cognitive anthropology are described. The emergence of a holistic "anthropology of human movement" has raised new research questions that require new resources. Theoretical insights have challenged researchers to devise new methods and to adopt or devise new technologies, such as videotape and an adequate transcription system. An example of the latter illustrates the analytic advantages of literacy in the medium.

Notes: A useful article aimed to be accessible to the general reader which focuses on an anthropological understanding of the nature of action as thoroughly embodied. Relates to personhood and has implications for evolutionary psychology.

104. Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. & Gowdy, J. M. (2007). Environmental degradation and happiness. *Ecological Economics*, 60(3), 509-516. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800905005835>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.12.005>

Abstract: The focus of this paper is the relationship between subjective measures of well-being and individual environmental attitudes. We use an ordered probit model to examine

the relationship between measures of subjective well-being and attitudes regarding ozone pollution and species extinction. Using data from the British Household Panel Survey we find a negative coefficient for concern about ozone pollution on individual's well-being and a positive one for concern about species extinction. These results hold when explanatory variables are included indicating whether or not the person lives in a polluted environment, whether or not the person engages in outdoor leisure activities, and the region where an individual lives. These results also hold when we control for individual psychological traits.

Notes: Argues that individual well-being has different relationships to different environmental attitudes. Relates to well-being.

105. Fiske, A. P. (2000). Complementarity theory: Why human social capacities evolved to require cultural complements. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 4(1), 76-94. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000086668300007

Abstract: This article introduces complementarity theory, which explains the psychology of cultural diversity as a product of evolved social proclivities that enable-and require people to coordinate action in culture-specific ways. The theory presents evolutionary process and psychological mechanisms that may account for the cultural variability of social coordination devices such as language, relational models, rituals, moral interpretations of misfortune, taboos, religion, marriage, and descent systems. Human fitness and well-being depend on social coordination characterized by complementarity among the participants' actions. This complementarity is based primarily on coordination devices derived from the conjunction of cultural paradigms and specific, highly structured, evolved proclivities. The proclivities have no adaptive value without the paradigms, and the paradigms have no meaning without the proclivities. They are coadapted to function together. Operating in conjunction with each other, proclivities and paradigms jointly define the generative structures for meaningful coordination of social interaction in each particular culture.

Notes: This article notes the relationship between proclivities and specific cultural practices and paradigms as a means of explaining cultural diversity. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

106. Fitzgerald, C. J. & Danner, K. M. (2012). Evolution in the office: How evolutionary psychology can increase employee health, happiness, and productivity. *Evolutionary Psychology*, 10(5), 770-781. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000313204100002

Abstract: We review the empirical literature that has implemented aspects of our ancestral environment into the workplace and discuss the positive influence these factors have had on employees' physical and psychological health. We focus upon several components of our ancestral environment, including sunlight, greenery, sleep, physical movement, and social interaction with fellow humans as well as animals (specifically, dogs). Employers who are willing to adopt an evolutionary psychological approach to organizing their workplaces may drastically improve their workers' overall physical and psychological health as well as their overall productivity. This will, in turn, decrease employer costs related to medical care,

absenteeism, and lack of productivity. Suggestions regarding how to implement these evolutionary psychological methods to the workplace are also discussed.

Notes: Review of the application of insights from evolutionary psychology into the modern workplace to improve employee well-being. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

107. Fivush, R. (2010). Speaking silence: The social construction of silence in autobiographical and cultural narratives. *Memory*, 18(2), 88-98. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000277649800002. doi:10.1080/09658210903029404

Abstract: Voice and silence are socially constructed in conversational interactions between speakers and listeners that are influenced by canonical cultural narratives which define lives and selves. Arguing from feminist and sociocultural theories, I make a distinction between being silenced and being silent; when being silenced is contrasted with voice, it is conceptualised as imposed, and it signifies a loss of power and self. But silence can also be conceptualised as being silent, a shared understanding that need not be voiced. More specifically, culturally dominant narratives provide for shared understandings that can remain silent; deviations from the norm call for voice, and thus in this case silence is power and voice expresses loss of power. At both the cultural and the individual level, there are tensions between culturally dominant and prescriptive narratives and narratives of resistance and deviation, leading to an ongoing dialectic between voice and silence. I end with a discussion of why, ultimately, it matters what is voiced and what is silenced for memory, identity and well-being.

Notes: An interesting conceptual analysis of how silence in discourse can either be positive or negative in relation to identity and well-being. Relates to personhood and well-being.

108. Flinn, M. V. ; Geary, D. C. & Ward, C. V. (2005). Ecological dominance, social competition, and coalitionary arms races: Why humans evolved extraordinary intelligence. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 26(1), 10-46. Retrieved from <http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1090513804000595?showall=true>

Abstract: Human cognitive abilities are extraordinary. Our large brains are significantly modified from those of our closest relatives, suggesting a history of intense natural selection. The conditions favoring the evolution of human cognitive adaptations, however, remain an enigma. Hypotheses based on traditional ecological demands, such as hunting or climatic variability, have not provided satisfying explanations. Recent models based on social problem solving linked with ecological conditions offer more convincing scenarios. But it has proven difficult to identify a set of selective pressures that would have been sufficiently unique to the hominin lineage. What was so special about the evolutionary environments of our ancestors that caused them, and them alone, to diverge in such astonishing ways from their close relatives and all other life forms? Richard Alexander proposed a comprehensive integrated explanation. He argued that as our hominin ancestors became increasingly able to master the traditional "hostile forces of nature," selective pressures resulting from

competition among conspecifics became increasingly important, particularly in regard to social competencies. Given the precondition of competition among kin- and reciprocity-based coalitions (shared with chimpanzees), an autocatalytic social arms race was initiated, which eventually resulted in the unusual collection of traits characteristic of the human species, such as concealed ovulation, extensive biparental care, complex sociality, and an extraordinary collection of cognitive abilities. We term this scenario the “ecological dominance–social competition” (EDSC) model and assess the feasibility of this model in light of recent developments in paleoanthropology, cognitive psychology, and neurobiology. We conclude that although strong or direct tests are difficult with current data, Alexander's model provides a far-reaching and integrative explanation for the evolution of human cognitive abilities that is consistent with evidence from a wide range of disciplines.

Notes: An article supportive of a social genesis of increased cognitive capacity in humans. Relates to environmental psychology and personhood.

109. Forgeard, M. J. C. & Seligman, M. E. P. (2012). Seeing the glass half full: A review of the causes and consequences of optimism. *Pratiques Psychologiques, 18*(2), 107-120. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S126917631200003X>. doi:10.1016/j.prps.2012.02.002

Abstract: During the past few decades, the psychological trait of optimism has garnered an increasing amount of interest from scientists, and numerous studies have now shown that optimism is associated with important benefits. The present review summarizes the main findings from this body of research. We begin by describing the two main ways in which researchers have defined and operationalized optimism, as “optimistic explanatory style” and as “dispositional optimism”. Second, we provide an overview of the various studies documenting the benefits of optimism. Optimism indeed appears to be associated with higher levels of subjective well-being, better health, and more success. In addition, we describe some of the ongoing controversies in this area of research. Third, we summarize what researchers currently know about the causes of optimism, and how optimism can be fostered in adults as well as in youth. Finally, the present review highlights the adaptive nature of optimism, while recognizing that being optimistic under all circumstances may not always be best. Cultivating flexible and realistic optimism may therefore be most advantageous. We conclude by pointing out important areas of research for the future. These include continuing the search for the biological and brain substrates of optimism, and investigating the psychological and physiological benefits of adopting a flexible (as opposed to rigid) optimistic outlook on life.

Notes: The article focuses on the role of optimism in well-being. Given the conceptual relationship between optimism and agency it also has implications for understanding personhood. Overall, a useful article contributing to the research on well-being, personhood and evolutionary psychology.

110. Fredrickson, B. L. (2004). The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B. Biological Sciences*, 359(1449, September 29), 1367–1378

Abstract: The broaden-and-build theory describes the form and function of a subset of positive emotions, including joy, interest, contentment and love. A key proposition is that these positive emotions broaden an individual's momentary thought-action repertoire: joy sparks the urge to play, interest sparks the urge to explore, contentment sparks the urge to savour and integrate, and love sparks a recurring cycle of each of these urges within safe, close relationships. The broadened mindsets arising from these positive emotions are contrasted to the narrowed mindsets sparked by many negative emotions (i.e. specific action tendencies, such as attack or flee). A second key proposition concerns the consequences of these broadened mindsets: by broadening an individual's momentary thought-action repertoire--whether through play, exploration or similar activities--positive emotions promote discovery of novel and creative actions, ideas and social bonds, which in turn build that individual's personal resources; ranging from physical and intellectual resources, to social and psychological resources. Importantly, these resources function as reserves that can be drawn on later to improve the odds of successful coping and survival. This chapter reviews the latest empirical evidence supporting the broaden-and-build theory and draws out implications the theory holds for optimizing health and well-being.

Notes: A significant theory in the areas of well-being and the evolutionary adaptiveness of both negative and positive emotions. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and the development of personhood.

111. Freeman, L. (2011). Reconsidering relational autonomy: A feminist approach to selfhood and the other in the thinking of Martin Heidegger. *Inquiry-an Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, 54(4), 361-383. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000294116100003. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2011.592342

Abstract: This paper examines a convergence between Heidegger's reconceptualization of subjectivity and intersubjectivity and some recent work in feminist philosophy on relational autonomy. Both view the concept of autonomy to be misguided, given that our capacity to be self-directed is dependent upon our ability to enter into and sustain meaningful relationships. Both attempt to overturn the notion of a subject as an isolated, atomistic individual and to show that selfhood requires, and is based upon, one's relation to and dependence upon others. The paper argues that Heidegger's notion of authentic *Mitsein* (being-with) rejects traditional notions of autonomy and subjectivity in favor of a relational model of selfhood. Ultimately, it provides a new point of entry into contemporary debates within feminist philosophy on Heidegger's thinking and defends Heidegger from certain feminist critiques.

Notes: Conceptually challenges the notion of autonomy as independence from others. It connects work in feminism on autonomy with the philosophy of Heidegger. Relates to personhood.

112. Freeman, M. (1995). Groping in the light. *Theory & Psychology*, 5(3), 353-360. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1995RJ22100002. doi:10.1177/0959354395053002

Even though Fisher's (1995) own 'solution' to the alleged problems brought on by social constructionism in regard to the self is questionable in that positing internal causes leads to much the same moral impasse as those more external formulations he seeks to criticize, it is nevertheless of value both to call attention to the limits of the movement and to imagine alternatives that might better allow human agency and moral responsibility into their reach. He is therefore to be commended for thinking against the grain as well as for following his apparent intuition that there may be more to selfhood and moral life than the conventional wisdom would indicate. After having drawn out the implications of this intuition, some direction is provided for thinking about moral life in a manner different from the social constructionists and from Fisher himself.

Notes: Part of a debate in the journal over internalist, Cartesian views of the self and social constructionist accounts of the self. Relates to selfhood/ personhood.

113. Freeman, M. (1998). Mythical time, historical time, and the narrative fabric of the self. *Narrative Inquiry*, 8(1), 27-50. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000078062500003. doi:10.1075/ni.8.1.03fre

Abstract: Despite the belief that narrative may serve as an important vehicle for exploring human experience and selfhood, there frequently exists the paradoxical supposition that narrative accounts cannot help but falsify life itself: Insofar as time is viewed in fundamentally linear terms and experience, in turn, is viewed as that which simply "goes on" in time, narratives may be viewed as entailing an imposition of literary form upon that which is ostensibly formless. After considering the idea of mythical time, tied to the image of the circle, and the idea of historical time, tied to the image of the line, it is suggested that human experience and selfhood are themselves woven out of the fabric of narrative. In light of contemporary understandings of the self, particularly those promoted in certain quarters of post-structuralist and social constructionist thought, it is further suggested that the narrative fabric of the self has become frayed. By rethinking the interrelationship of time, experience, and self via the idea of narrative, there emerges the opportunity to recognize more fully the profound continuities between myth and history as well as life and literature.

Notes: A conceptual consideration of the relationship between narrative form and human experience of the self. Relates to personhood.

114. Freeman, M. (1999). Culture, narrative, and the poetic construction of selfhood. *Journal of Constructivist Psychology*, 12(2), 99-116. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000079275900002. doi:10.1080/107205399266136

Abstract: Recent explorations of the relationship between narrative and self, particularly those tied to social constructionism, have served as a valuable corrective to the still-

prevalent tendency in psychology to divorce the self from its social surround. Yet certain of these explorations, by privileging the social over the individual, have led to a vision of selfhood that is problematic in its own right. Specifically, it is argued that, even though the "tools" employed in the construction of selfhood are social in nature, the configurational acts through which this construction occurs are better conceived in poetic terms, as imaginative labor seeking to give form and meaning to experience. In considering the poetic construction of selfhood, this article attempts to articulate further the relationship between narrative and self, the cultural dimension of personal experience, and the importance of the idea of narrative for expanding the scope of psychological knowledge.

Notes: The argument is made that social constructionist approaches to the self involve their own conceptual difficulties which can be overcome by a poetic understanding of the process of self formation. In that understanding, social processes represent the *means* by which the self is constructed and do not amount to the process of construction itself. Relates to personhood.

115. Freese, J. ; Jui-Chung Allen, L. & Wade, L. D. (2003). The potential relevances of biology to social inquiry. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 29, 233-256. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/199610521?accountid=27890>
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&rft_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Aassocjournals&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Annual+Review+of+Sociology&rft.atitle=The+potential+relevances+of+biology+to+social+inquiry&rft.au=Freese%2C+Jeremy%3BJui-Chung+Allen+Li%3BWade%2C+Lisa+D&rft.aulast=Freese&rft.aufirst=Jeremy&rft.date=2003-01-01&rft.volume=29&rft.issue=&rft.spage=233&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.title=Annual+Review+of+Sociology&rft.issn=03600572

Abstract: Sociologists often react with hostility to explanations that evoke biology, and some critics of the discipline contend that this "biophobia" undermines the credibility of sociology and makes it seem increasingly irrelevant in larger public debates. The negative reactions are many times diffuse and undiscerning of the different endeavors lumped together whenever one speaks broadly of biological (or "biosocial") explanations. We seek to introduce greater awareness of these distinctions with a review organized in terms of some of the distinct ways that the biological can be asserted to be relevant to the conduct of social inquiry. The review has three sections. First, we discuss assertions of the relevance of the human evolutionary past for understanding the character of human nature, for which evolutionary psychology currently receives the most attention. Second, we consider the work of behavioral genetics and the assertion of the relevance of genetic differences between persons for understanding differences in behaviors and outcomes. Third, we consider assertions of the relevance of particular proximate bioindicators for understanding how the biological and social interact, focusing particularly on studies of testosterone and the prospects of developments in neuroscientific measurement. We do not believe that developments in these fields will force sociologists to acquire considerable biological

expertise to pursue questions central to the discipline, but we do advocate further efforts from biologically minded sociologists to articulate understandings of the relationship between sociology and biology that will continue to push us past the commonplace view that biological and sociological explanations are inevitably opposed.

Notes: Provides an argument in support of theoretical connections between sociological and biological understandings of people and argues that these are not necessarily incompatible views. Relates to evolutionary and biological approaches to the explanation of human social behaviour.

116. Furlanetto, T. ; Bertone, C. & Becchio, C. (2013). The bilocated mind: New perspectives on self-localization and self-identification. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, 7, 1-6. Perspective. Retrieved from http://www.frontiersin.org/Journal/Abstract.aspx?s=537&name=human_neuroscience&ART_Doi=10.3389/fnhum.2013.00071. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00071

Abstract: Does the human mind allow for self-locating at more than one place at a time? Evidence from neurology, cognitive neuroscience, and experimental psychology suggests that mental bilocation is a complex, but genuine experience, occurring more frequently than commonly thought. In this article, we distinguish between different components of bilocated self-representation: self-localization in two different places at the same time, self-identification with another body, reduplication of first-person perspective. We argue that different forms of mental bilocation may result from the combination of these components. To illustrate this, we discuss evidence of mental bilocation in pathological conditions such as heautoscopy, during immersion in virtual environments, and in everyday life, during social interaction. Finally, we consider the conditions for mental bilocation and speculate on the possible role of mental bilocation in the context of social interaction, suggesting that self-localization at two places at the same time may prove advantageous for the construction of a shared space.

Notes: An interesting study of the possibility for 'bi-location' of the mind – locating oneself in more than one place at once. Relates to personhood.

117. Gaertner, L. ; Sedikides, C. ; Luke, M. ; O'Mara, E. M. ; Iuzzini, J. ; Jackson, L. E. ; et al. (2012). A motivational hierarchy within: Primacy of the individual self, relational self, or collective self? *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 48(5), 997-1013. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103112000571>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.03.009>

Abstract: The individual self, relational self, and collective self are important and meaningful aspects of identity. However, they plausibly differ in their relative importance such that one self lies closer to the motivational core of the self-concept, better represent the "home base" of selfhood, or, simply stated, is motivationally primary. Four multi-method studies tested the relative motivational-primacy of the selves. Despite their disparate methods, the studies yielded consistent evidence of a three-tiered hierarchy with the individual self at the

top, followed by the relational self, and trailed at the bottom by the collective self. The same hierarchy emerged in the Eastern culture of China and the Western cultures of the US and UK. Such pancultural consistency suggests that the motivational hierarchy is a fundamental pattern of the human self.

Notes: Investigates the motivational relationships between various 'selves', from the individual to the collective self and concludes that the individual self is motivationally fundamental. Relates to evolutionary psychology and selfhood/ personhood.

118. Gangestad, S. W. & Scheyd, G. J. (2005). The evolution of human physical attractiveness. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 34, 523-548. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/199820444?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Everywhere the issue has been examined, people make discriminations about others' physical attractiveness. Can human standards of physical attractiveness be understood through the lens of evolutionary biology? In the past decade, this question has guided much theoretical and empirical work. In this paper, we (a) outline the basic adaptationist approach that has guided the bulk of this work, (b) describe evolutionary models of signaling that have been applied to understand human physical attractiveness, and (c) discuss and evaluate specific lines of empirical research attempting to address the selective history of human standards of physical attractiveness. We also discuss ways evolutionary scientists have attempted to understand variability in standards of attractiveness across cultures as well as the ways current literature speaks to body modification in modern Western cultures. Though much work has been done, many fundamental questions remain unanswered.

Notes: Examines the literature on physical attractiveness as an evolved preference. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

119. Gergen, K. J. (1991). *The saturated self: Dilemmas of identity in contemporary life*: Basic Books.

No abstract.

Notes: This is a major work in the social constructionist literature on the nature of (post)modern selves. Gergen argues that the unity of the self is now increasingly challenged by the many identities and roles expressed in a world of greater contact with diverse other selves, cultures and mediated experiences. Relates to personhood.

120. Gergen, K. J. & Gergen, M. M. (1988). Narrative and the self as relationship. In B. Leonard (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. Volume 21, pp. 17-56): Academic Press. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0065260108602233>. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601\(08\)60223-3](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60223-3)

No Abstract.

Publisher Summary: This chapter explores the nature of stories of self, both as they are told and lived in social life. It examines the story form—or more formally, the structure of narrative accounts. It then describes the way narratives of the self are constructed within social life and the uses to which they are put. As story advances, it becomes increasingly clear that narratives of the self are not fundamentally possessions of the individual; rather they are products of social interchange—possessions of the socius. This analysis sets the stage for a discussion of lived narrative. The chapter proposes the traditional concept of individual selves is fundamentally problematic. What have served as individual traits, mental processes, or personal characteristics can promisingly be viewed as the constituents of relational forms. The form of these relationships is that of the narrative sequence. Thus, by the end of story it can be found that the individual self has all but vanished into the world of relationship.

Notes: Emphasises the relational nature of selves and their constant (re)construction through changing relations. Relates to personhood, especially narrative accounts of selves and persons.

121. Ghiselin, M. T. (2009). Darwin and the evolutionary foundations of society. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 71(1), 4-9. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109000596>. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2006.10.015

Abstract: Although Charles Darwin never presented an explicit theory of society he wrote extensively on topics related to the origin and evolution of society. His ideas were influenced by classical economists, especially Adam Smith. His naturalistic and comparative studies on diverse societies affected his views on social and economic progress. His research on developmental psychology addressed fundamental issues in the evolution of social behavior. Much influenced by Adam Smith, he related the origin of the moral sentiments and the social instincts to evolutionary theory. Recognizing that families as well as organisms are ontological individuals that can be selected, he explained self-sacrifice largely by competition between groups, and downplayed reciprocity.

Notes: Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

122. Gilbert, P. (2003). Evolution, social roles, and the differences in shame and guilt. *Social Research*, 70(4), 1205-1230. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/209671886?accountid=27890>

No abstract.

Notes: The fear of shame and ridicule can be so strong that people will risk serious physical injury or even death to avoid it because shame can indicate serious damage to social acceptance and a breakdown in a variety of social relationships. Gilbert traces the evolutionary root of shame and presents a comprehensive differentiation between shame and guilt. He concludes that evolutionary considerations can aid in the search for underpinning basic strategies, motives, and competencies for behavior, and also points to the fact the human evolution has been marked by major developments in one's capacities

for symbolic self-other awareness, theory of mind, and metacognitions. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

123. Gillett, G. (2002). You always were a bastard. *The Hastings Center Report*, 32(6), 23-28. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/220164120?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Are the aggressive remarks of a person with dementia expressions of real feelings, now visible only because a polite veneer has been stripped away? A careful understanding of the nature of personhood suggests otherwise. The self is an intricate story, constructed of casual encounters with the world, the conceptual categories with which we understand the world and the meanings we then attach to our encounters with the world, all reworked and edited in light of our values. The person with dementia has lost control of the editing.

Notes: An interesting insight into the nature of personhood, and of how the self is subtly altered through a disease such as Alzheimers. Relates to personhood.

124. Giovanola, B. (2005). Personhood and human richness: Good and well-being in the capability approach and beyond. *Review of Social Economy*, 63(2), 249+. Article. Retrieved from <http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA134677735&v=2.1&u=lincoln1&it=r&p=ITOF&sw=w>

Abstract: This paper aims at developing the Capability Approach's (CA) underlying philosophical anthropology and ethics by focusing on the work of its major exponents, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. I first discuss CA's critique of happiness as subjective well-being and defend the idea of 'flourishing' which ultimately refers to the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia. I then focus on the notions of 'good' and 'well-being' and address the problem of the compatibility between a substantive notion of the Good (expressed through universal moral values) and individual preferences. I thus tackle the issue of adaptive preferences (which is investigated both from a methodological and an ethical perspective) and suggest that the process of adaptation should be thought in the dynamic frame of the constitution of the self. Therefore, in the second half of the paper I investigate the CA's idea of personhood and focus on some important assumptions behind its underlying anthropological model--above all the notion of 'human richness'. As a result, I first point out the dynamic dimension of personhood, according to which individuals are 'becoming themselves' in search of self-realisation and construction of their identities. Second, I highlight its relational dimension, according to which every one is the expression of the anthropological richness and at the same time represents the highest possibility of richness for every other one.

Notes: A discussion of the 'capability approach' taken from welfare economics in terms of its understanding of personhood and identity construction through use of 'capabilities' to operate effectively in society. Relates to personhood and well-being.

125. Giovanola, B. (2009). Re-thinking the anthropological and ethical foundation of economics and business: Human richness and capabilities enhancement. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 88(3), 431-444. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/198223715?accountid=27890>

Abstract: This article aims at showing the need for a sound ethical and anthropological foundation of economics and business, and argues the importance of a correct understanding of human values and human nature for the sake of economics and of businesses themselves. It is suggested that the ethical-anthropological side of economics and business can be grasped by taking Aristotle's virtue ethics and Amartya Sen's capability approach (CA) as major reference points. We hold that an "Aristotelian economics of virtues", connected with the CA's notion of human richness, can promote the shift to the concept of personhood, and can lead to a more "humanized" business, by fostering human flourishing, the enhancement of human capabilities, and the pursuit of a more humane development for each and every person.

Notes: Emphasises the need to consider personhood to ensure a humane business world that fosters human flourishing. Demonstrates the application of particular understandings of personhood to social settings. Relates to personhood and well-being.

126. Giovanola, B. (2010). Human flourishing beyond economic well-being: The contribution of phenomenology towards a "richer" idea of personhood. *In Heralding the New Enlightenment*(Vol. 105), pp. 339-351. Dordrecht: Springer.

Abstract: The paper aims at showing the necessity of a sound anthropological and ethical foundation of economics. In this framework it is also discussed whether Phenomenology can contribute to a renewed interpretation of economic and ethical issues and, in particular, of the relationship between ethics and economics. More specifically, the phenomenological approach is taken into account with regard to its contribution to the development of a complex and dynamic idea of personhood, which relies on the notion of human flourishing and underlies the relationship between ethics and economics.

Notes: A phenomenological approach to the incorporation of ethics into an economic perspective that emphasises a dynamic, flourishing view of personhood. Relates to personhood and well-being.

127. Glas, G. (2006). Person, personality, self, and identity: A philosophically informed conceptual analysis. *Journal of Personality Disorders*, 20(2), 126-138. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000237301400003. doi:10.1521/pedi.2006.20.2.126

Abstract: Who is the person, or self, associated with personality disorder and its treatment? How are we to account for a self conceptualized in terms of schemas and representations, that at the same time-as self-scrutinizes these schemas and representations (as in cognitive therapy for personality disorders)? Five approaches to personhood are examined: metaphysical, empirical, transcendental, hermeneutical, and phenomenological. An

elementary sense of selfhood is tied to all one's experiences and activities, this sense of self is experientially irreducible and conceptually connected to a primordial form of self-relatedness. After examining these issues, I formulate four provisional conclusions: (a) the separation between person and roles (functions, personality features) is a modern fiction—persons are not neutral bearers of roles and functions; (b) the concept of personality in DSM-IV refers to nonhomogeneous behaviors such as feelings, moods, inclinations, temperaments, and habits, and these behaviors differ with respect to their distance to the core self, (c) there exists an enormous variety of ways of self-relating and this variety may affect the contents of the core self under certain circumstances; and (d) the concept of person may be primitive; that is, irreducible and referring to a background of unity and integrity.

Notes: A conceptual analysis of the self as 'experientially irreducible'. Relates to personhood.

128. Godoy, R. ; Eisenberg, D. T. A. ; Reyes-García, V. ; Huanca, T. ; Leonard, W. R. ; McDade, T. W.; et al. (2008). Assortative mating and offspring well-being: theory and empirical findings from a native Amazonian society in Bolivia. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 29(3), 201-210. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513807001419>. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.003

Abstract: Mate choice matters for inclusive fitness, household economic efficiency, assimilation, stratification, and economic inequalities in society. In positive assortative mating, people pair with someone who resembles them along a trait, whereas in negative assortative mating, people pair with someone who differs from them along a trait. In industrial nations, people tend to follow positive assortative mating for fundamental demographic dimensions (e.g., age, schooling) and might practice negative assortative mating for economic outcomes (e.g., earnings). Research on assortative mating has focused on industrial nations, generally compared only one trait between couples, and paid scant attention to the effects of assortative mating for offspring well-being. If assortative mating enhances inclusive fitness, it might also enhance offspring well-being. Drawing on data from a farming–foraging society in the Bolivian Amazon (Tsimane') that practices preferential cross-cousin marriage, we (a) identify six parental traits (age, knowledge, wealth, schooling, height, and smiles) for which Tsimane' might practice assortative mating and (b) test the hypothesis that assortative mating enhances offspring well-being. Proxies for offspring well-being include height and school attainment. Tsimane' resemble people of industrial nations in practicing mostly positive assortative mating. Pairwise, mother–father and Pearson correlations of age, schooling, and earnings among Tsimane' resemble correlations of industrial nations. Correlation coefficients for the six parental traits were far higher than correlations that might have happened just by chance. We found weak support for the hypothesis that assortative mating improves offspring well-being.

Notes: Examines assortative mating in a farming-foraging society with a focus on child well-being outcomes. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

129. Gordon, G. & Esbjörn-Hargens, S. (2007). Are we having fun yet? An exploration of the transformative power of play. *Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 47*(2), 198-222. Retrieved from <http://jhp.sagepub.com/content/47/2/198.abstract>. doi:10.1177/0022167806297034

Abstract: In an effort to understand the transformative potential of adult play, this article explores a developmental model that outlines the unfolding complexity of play in light of the evolution of consciousness. It correlates specific play forms with developmental stages and shows how forms of play can both instigate and support transitions between stages. It further outlines how characteristics intrinsic to play support the evolution of consciousness.

Notes: Argues for the fundamental role of play in the evolution of consciousness. Relates to personhood and well-being.

130. Gorelik, G. ; Shackelford, T. K. & Salmon, C. A. (2010). New horizons in the evolutionary science of the human family. *Review of General Psychology, 14*(4), 330-339. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000285403600005. doi:10.1037/a0021438

Abstract: Familial relationships cannot be properly understood outside of an evolutionary framework. Pseudoscientific and traditional modes of thought have steered us away from an accurate account of ourselves and our kin. Recent theoretical and empirical advances in the evolutionary sciences, such as the theories of inclusive fitness, parental investment, and parent-offspring conflict, have aided our understanding of familial conflict and cooperation. We suggest that a gene's eye perspective of human families can likewise illuminate much of human psychology and behavior by contrasting individual interests with genetic interests. Furthermore, theoretical and empirical work on genetic imprinting and extended phenotypic action-at-a-distance have unveiled the extent to which co-evolutionary arms races and manipulation lie at the heart of familial interactions and psychological disorders. We posit that human cultural trends and morals can ultimately be grounded on an evolutionary foundation: not only do human laws and institutions reflect group-level manifestations of gene-level cooperative adaptations, but also they may reflect gene-level manipulative adaptations. An awareness of evolutionary dynamics can advance human well-being and unveil the hidden mechanisms beneath all human and nonhuman relationships.

Notes: Argues for an evolutionary and genetic understanding of human familial relationships as a means of advancing human well-being. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and personhood.

131. Gove, W. R. (1994). Why we do what we do: A biopsychosocial theory of human motivation. *Social Forces, 73*(2), 363-363. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/229857396?accountid=27890>

Abstract: This article presents an outline of a theory of human motivation that draws on biological, psychological, and social processes. It focuses on the following issues: (1) the intrinsic unpredictability of the world that people experience, (2) the innate and noninnate

differences in the attributes of individuals, (3) the premise that persons can reasonably be viewed as responsible for their actions, (4) the importance of a meaningful life and how this life is obtained, (5) reformulating learning theory by including the principle that behaviour activates a physiologic process that is intrinsically rewarding, a process that raises questions about basic suppositions of symbolic interactionism, cognitive psychology, and rational choice theory, (6) the causes and consequences of gender differences in instrumental and nurturant behaviour, (7) and examination of why the positive states of psychological well-being are often associated with a high level of stress and a lack of personal control, (8) the process of adult psychological maturation, which indicates that as persons age they become more contented with their lives and more concerned with the well-being of others, and (9) the limitations of the concept of "agency" in structuration theory, as it is not attentive to the differences among individuals in their capabilities, personalities, and unique life experiences.

Notes: Argues that sociologists need to pay attention not only to social forces but also to biological and psychosocial processes, because they all play a part in motivating and shaping behaviour. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and personhood.

132. Graham, R. G. & Martin, G. I. (2012). Health behavior: A darwinian reconceptualization. *American Journal of Preventive Medicine*, 43(4), 451-455. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749379712004503>. doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2012.06.016

No abstract.

Notes: The authors investigate why humans act irrationally and persist in unhealthy behaviours even when the evidence is clear of the dangers to health of indulging in the behaviours. They argue that much of the modern health agenda is at odds with "behaviours that often lack meaning and value in an ancestral sense." For example, smoking is pleasurable for those who partake, and is often undertaken in a social context, which according to a Darwinian perspective "contributes to survival through social desirability and is therefore widespread." The reason why many smoking -cessation campaigns are successful can also be understood from a Darwinian perspective- as smoking is banned in public places, the social benefits are undermined. An interesting perspective on evolutionary psychology and well-being, arguing that psychological models of human health behaviour need to be "infused with Darwinianism" for greater success in programs aimed at creating more healthy behaviours. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being.

133. Greene, J. & Haidt, J. (2002). How (and where) does moral judgment work? *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 6(12), 517-523.

Abstract: Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the

functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.

Notes: The author concludes that as all the brain regions discussed in the article have also been implicated in non-moral processes it is becoming increasingly clear that there is no specifically moral part of the brain. Relates to evolutionary psychology/ neuropsychology and the development of the moral dimension of personhood.

134. Gregor, B. (2005). Selfhood and the three r's: Reference, repetition, and refiguration. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 58(2), 63-94. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000233879700001. doi:10.1007/s11153-005-1594-1

No abstract.

Beginning of Introduction: "This paper examines the problem of the self in time, and the role that writing plays therein. Because the self is a temporal phenomenon, questions arise regarding its continuity in time: Does personal identity endure over time? What sort of integrity might the self have if it is always changing? This raises the further problem of reference, particularly if one rejects the notion of a substantial self: what resources do we have to refer to the self? Søren Kierkegaard and Paul Ricoeur both situate this discussion within the boundaries of writing. While recognizing the limitations of thought, reference, and writing, both authors push these boundaries in the hope that new possibilities of meaning might emerge through creative modes of discourse ..."

Notes: A philosophical discussion of the stability of selfhood and the self. Relates to selfhood/ personhood.

135. Grinde, B. (1996). Darwinian happiness: Biological advice on the quality of life. *Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems*, 19(3), 249-260. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1061736196900351>. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1061-7361\(96\)90035-1](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1061-7361(96)90035-1)

Abstract: There is an increasing interest in understanding human behavior from a biological or evolutionary point of view. I believe this perspective on human nature may help us improve the life of the individual, and design a better society. The present article suggests a biologically-based understanding of what constitutes the quality of life, which I refer to as Darwinian happiness. The key concepts are: one, to avoid stress by adjusting the conditions of life to our inborn tendencies; and two, to utilize the reward mechanisms offered by the brain. The concepts and their implications are discussed.

Notes: The author presents ideas and examples of why he thinks society is not organised in a way that will allow humans to thrive and experience greater well-being. He discusses how "adapting society to human nature may be an equally important principle for improving the conditions of the human species" and "an understanding of the behavioral biology of humans should help us improve the way we organize our societies." The discussion targets

all the interfaces considered in this bibliography. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being.

136. Grinde, B. (1998). The biology of religion: A Darwinian gospel. *Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems*, 21(1), 19-28. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1061736199800046>. doi:10.1016/s1061-7361(99)80004-6

Abstract: The vigor of religious feelings, and the fact that most, if not all, cultures include a system of spiritual belief, suggest that humans have an innate predisposition towards religiousness. There are several possible adaptive advantages that may help explain such a disposition; religions promote cooperative relations, they induce people to obey sensible rules, and they soothe the minds of their followers. These advantages could very well have directed evolution towards the design of a spiritually inclined brain. Accepting that God is inside our heads, the important question is not if he exists, but rather: What can he do for us? As a rule of thumb humans are advised to conform to their inborn tendencies, implying that we ought to believe in spirits. Religiousness offers both direct rewards, for example the joy associated with communicating with a god, as well as indirect benefits such as those suggested above.

Notes: The author looks at how religiousness seems to be an inborn tendency, that religions have survived despite often strong adverse forces, and humans have and still do put a lot of energy into religious behaviour, either emotional, or physical (great works of art, structures that have survived from previous cultures). As well as contributing to the well-being of individuals, religious communities can help our social needs, an element of life that he claims is not as well addressed in today's society as in tribal settings. He argues that finding a God that meets the needs of the individual and society, can be beneficial to well-being. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being.

137. Grinde, B. (2000). A biological perspective on musical appreciation. *Nordisk Tidsskrift for Musikterapi*, 9(2), 18-27.

Abstract: Music has a powerful effect on the human psyche, an effect that can be used for therapeutic purposes. As the capacity to respond to and enjoy music appears to be innate, it is relevant to look for an evolutionary explanation. I suggest that a preoccupation with certain types of sounds has been adaptive, and that the main evolutionary advantage is related to play and exploratory behaviour associated with our dependence on language. The human brain employs agreeable and punitive sensations in order to influence behaviour. I propose that the brain induces us to concentrate on sounds, by offering pleasant sensations, in order to improve our ability to hear and to vocalise, and that one reason why we appreciate music is because it has the particular qualities required for maximum exploitation of these sensations.

Notes: Provides an evolutionary explanation of the appeal of music, and its pleasurable qualities. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

138. Grinde, B. (2002). Happiness in the perspective of evolutionary psychology. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 3(4), 331-354. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1021894227295>.
doi:10.1023/a:1021894227295

Abstract: The human capacity for positive and negative feelings is shaped by the forces of evolution, thus the evolutionary perspective should be relevant to the study of happiness. This paper attempts to identify the more pertinent innate qualities of the human brain, and discusses how the evolutionary perspective can be used to relate these qualities to the study of happiness. Two aspects of our evolutionary legacy appear to be particularly relevant: One, the consequences of discords between the present way of living and the environment of evolutionary adaptation; and two, the presence of feelings designed to influence behaviour. The purpose of the present paper is to both expand on these two aspects and thereby arrive at an evolutionary based description of happiness; and to discuss the relationship between this biological account and some current approaches to the study of happiness.

Notes: The article discusses the relevance of the evolutionary perspective to the study of happiness. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

139. Grinde, B. (2004). Darwinian Happiness: can the evolutionary perspective on well-being help us to improve society? *World Futures: The Journal of Global Education*, 60, 317-329.

Abstract: The concept of Darwinian Happiness was coined to help people take advantage of knowledge on how evolution has shaped the brain; as processes within this organ are the main contributors to well-being. Fortuitously, the concept has implications that may prove beneficial for society: Compassionate behavior offers more in terms of Darwinian Happiness than malicious behavior; and the probability of obtaining sustainable development may be improved by pointing out that consumption beyond sustenance is not important for well-being. It is difficult to motivate people to act against their own best interests. Darwinian Happiness offers a concept that, to some extent, combines the interests of the individual with the interests of society.

Notes: "One of the main challenges of industrialized societies is to persuade people to behave in a manner that is for the common good. Cooperative behavior was presumably easier to achieve in the Stone Age, at least within the tribe, due to the strong bonds between individual members. Studies on contemporary tribal societies support this contention (Keesing, 1981). In the present world, most social groups lack this intimacy, whether one looks at local units such as a work place or large groups such as nations. To make matters even more difficult, we need people to behave to the benefit of not only their local community, but to the benefit of the entire world in an effort to help create a sustainable Earth for future generations. The task requires considerable effort; thus, any factor that can contribute in a positive direction should be exploited."

The author has previously put forward a particular appreciation of quality of life based on a biological perspective, and he has referred to this as Darwinian Happiness (Grinde, 1996, 2002a, 2002b). In this article the author advances the idea that "knowledge about Darwinian Happiness may help people make choices that improve their quality of life while at the same time acting to the benefit of society". Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

140. Grinde, B. (2005). An approach to the prevention of anxiety-related disorders based on evolutionary medicine. *Preventive Medicine, 40*, 904-909.

Abstract: Anxiety-related disorders are among the more common ailments of modern societies. Presumably, their prevalence is partly due to environmental factors, which suggests that anxiety may be one of the health problems that are aggravated by discords (adverse mismatches) between the present way of life and what our genes are adapted to. Consequently, it may be possible to find preventive measures by using the perspective of evolutionary medicine. I shall argue that the prevalence of anxiety-related problems reflects that the nerve circuitry and endocrine activity associated with the fear function have developed beyond normal. Moreover, that this expansion is due to excessive or abnormal triggering, particularly at an early age. Possible discords that may be responsible, such as present child care practices, will be discussed.

Notes: Argues that anxiety disorders are, in part, the result of a mismatch between evolved functions of the nervous and endocrine systems and current practices. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and personhood.

141. Grinde, B. (2009). An evolutionary perspective on the importance of community relations for quality of life. *The Scientific World Journal, 9*, 588-605.

Abstract: The evolutionary perspective is relevant for the study of quality of life in that the brain, including its capacity for positive and negative states of mind, has been shaped by the forces of evolution. The present text uses this perspective to discuss three questions related to the observation that human interactions are a particularly important factor for well-being: (1) What is known about the inherent nature of our social propensities? (2) Is the present situation responsible for a suboptimal quality of life? (3) Are there alternatives to the organisation of mainstream Western society? Based on this discussion, the question is raised as to whether it is possible to suggest improvements. Briefly, it seems possible to create conditions that enhance social relations and to the extent that happiness is considered an important objective, this is a relevant endeavour.

Notes: An analysis of the centrality of social relations to quality of life and a discussion of the implications for this in today's society. Relates to evolution, personhood and well-being.

142. Grinde, B. (2010). An evolutionary perspective on happiness as understood in the tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. *The Open Behavioral Science Journal, 4*, 31-36.

Abstract: Buddhism is one of the oldest spiritual traditions that have retained considerable influence. The Tibetan version offers distinct advice as to the pursuit of happiness. The present text evaluates this advice in the context of a biological approach to understanding what happiness is. Briefly, the notion that it is possible to develop the brain's capacity for positive feelings and that meditative techniques are a useful tool, can be substantiated. Consequently, with sufficient training, happiness can, at least in theory, be achieved regardless of external circumstances. To this purpose, it is essential to avoid excessive

activity in nerve circuits causing negative feelings, either by avoiding situations that activate these feelings, or by using cognitive techniques that impede the underlying neurology. Finally, the emphasis on compassion as a route to happiness appears to be not just "politically correct", but to reflect particular qualities of the human brain.

Notes: Argues that Tibetan Buddhist meditative practices can be supported by an evolutionary analysis of the functions and operations of positive affects. Relates to evolution, personhood and well-being.

143. Grinde, B. (2012). An evolutionary perspective on happiness and mental health. *Journal of Mind and Behavior*, 33(1-2), 49-67. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000309439100003

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to present a model of well-being based on current research in neurobiology and psychology, integrated in an evolutionary perspective of the human mind. Briefly, the primary purpose of nervous systems is to direct an animal toward behavior should be conducive to survival and procreation, and as a rule of thumb this implies either approach or avoidance. While behavior originally was based on reflexes, in humans the brain contains a system of negative and positive affect. Although an array of functions has evolved that employ emotions in order to handle various pursuits, recent studies suggest that they converge on shared neural circuits involved in mood, that is, they converge on circuits designed to generate reward and punishment. Happiness can be construed as the net output of these brain modules. Neural circuits tend to gain in strength and influence upon frequent activation, which suggests a strategy for improving happiness and mental health: to avoid excessive stimulation of negative modules, to use cognitive interference to enhance the "turn off" function of these modules, and to exercise modules involved in positive feelings.

Notes: An evolutionary and neurobiological investigation of well-being and ways to enhance positive affects. Relates to evolutionary and biological psychology and well-being.

144. Gruber, J. ; Mauss, I. B. & Tamir, M. (2011). A dark side of happiness? How, when, and why happiness is not always good. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 6(3), 222-233. Retrieved from <http://pps.sagepub.com/content/6/3/222.abstract>. doi:10.1177/1745691611406927

Abstract: Happiness is generally considered a source of good outcomes. Research has highlighted the ways in which happiness facilitates the pursuit of important goals, contributes to vital social bonds, broadens people's scope of attention, and increases well-being and psychological health. However, is happiness always a good thing? This review suggests that the pursuit and experience of happiness might sometimes lead to negative outcomes. We focus on four questions regarding this purported "dark side" of happiness. First, is there a wrong degree of happiness? Second, is there a wrong time for happiness? Third, are there wrong ways to pursue happiness? Fourth, are there wrong types of happiness? Cumulatively, these lines of research suggest that although happiness is often highly beneficial, it may not be beneficial at every level, in every context, for every reason, and in every variety.

Notes: An overview of relevant literature that cautions against the general goal of happiness. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being.

145. Guhn, M. & Goelman, H. (2011). Bioecological theory, early child development and the validation of the population-level early development instrument. *Social Indicators Research*, 103(2), 193-217. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/880351076?accountid=27890>

Abstract: The Early Development Instrument (EDI; Janus and Offord in Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 39:1–22, 2007) project is a Canadian population-level, longitudinal research project, in which teacher ratings of Kindergarten children’s early development and well-being are linked to health and academic achievement variables at the individual level, and to demographic, cultural, and socioeconomic variables at the community level. In this article, we draw from Bronfenbrenner’s bioecological theory of human development to create a coherent theoretical framework for guiding validation research within a population level approach to child development research in general and for the EDI project in particular. The discussion draws from a range of social and health sciences as well as validity theory. The paper seeks to align complex conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and psychometric considerations, to provide specific design, methodology, and validation recommendations for a population-level approach to studying children’s development and well-being, and to discuss the strengths and challenges of this approach.

Notes: Discusses measurement and validation of population level well-being indicators. Relates to personhood development and well-being.

146. Guignon, C. (2012). Becoming a person: Hermeneutic phenomenology's contribution. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 30(1), 97-106. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X09000750>. doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2009.11.005

Abstract: Hermeneutic phenomenology sets out to describe human beings as they show up in “average everydayness,” prior to high-level theorizing and reflection. From this standpoint, human existence is found to be meaning- and value-laden, and so in need of interpretation in order to be properly understood. The description of everydayness leads to a critique of the “substance ontology” presupposed by many natural sciences, and instead characterizes a human being as an “event” or “life story” unfolding between birth and death. Working within this approach to understanding humans as events, the philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) gives an account of what he calls an “authentic” (literally, “proper” or “owned”) individual. This account gives us a distinctive way of understanding what it is to be a “person” in the fullest sense of this word. A person, on this account, is an individual who can assess her primary desires in the light of “higher” or “second-order” motivations concerning what sort of person she wants to be. As a participant in a social context, she is indebted to the historical tradition of a community for her possibilities of self-interpretation and self-evaluation. In a social context, she can be a “respondent,” answerable for what she does. And she is equipped to be an effective moral agent in facing situations demanding decisions. An authentic individual or “person” has a kind of freedom that makes meaningful choice possible.

Notes: A conceptual consideration of personhood based on a Heideggerian framework. Relates to personhood.

147. Gusnard, D. A. (2005). Being a self: Considerations from functional imaging. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 14(4), 679-697. Review. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000234124000003. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.04.004

Abstract: Having a self is associated with important advantages for an organism. These advantages have been suggested to include mechanisms supporting elaborate capacities for planning, decision-making, and behavioral control. Acknowledging such functionality offers possibilities for obtaining traction on investigation of neural correlates of selfhood. A method that has potential for investigating some of the brain-based properties of self arising in behavioral contexts varying in requirements for such behavioral guidance and control is functional brain imaging. Data obtained with this method are beginning to converge on a set of brain areas that appear to play a significant role in permitting conscious access to representational content having reference to self as an embodied and independent experiencer and agent. These areas have been identified in a variety of imaging contexts ranging from passive state conditions in which they appear to manifest ongoing activity associated with spontaneous and typically 'self-related' cognition, to tasks targeting explicitly experienced properties of self, to demanding task conditions where activity within them is attenuated in apparent redirection of cognitive resources in the service of task guidance and control. In this paper, these data will be reviewed and a hypothesis presented regarding a significant role for these areas in enabling degrees of self-awareness and participating in the management of such behavioral control.

Notes: An investigation of research on the neural bases of the self and self-related cognition. Relates to biological psychology and selfhood/ personhood.

148. Gutiérrez, F. ; Gárriz, M.; Peri, J. M. ; Ferraz, L.; Sol, D.; Navarro, J. B. ; et al. (2012 (in press)). Fitness costs and benefits of personality disorder traits. *Evolution and Human Behavior*. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513812000906>. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2012.09.001

Abstract: Extreme personality traits in humans often have detrimental life consequences, so they have long been supposed to be diseases. However, many other species display personality variants that are maintained due to their fitness advantages; in this case, they are construed as strategies. To examine the fitness costs and benefits of pathological personality traits in humans, we measured features of the A (socially odd, distrustful), B (incentive-seeking, selfish) and C (fearful, inhibited) clusters with the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire-4 + (PDQ-4 +) in a sample of 738 outpatients. Fitness relevant parameters like mating success, reproductive output, self preservation, and access to status were assessed with the Life Outcome Questionnaire. No fitness advantages were found for high-A subjects. In contrast, high-B subjects tripled low-B subjects with regard to mating success and had 39% more offspring. Further, high-C subjects outperformed low-C subjects in attaining status and avoiding risks. These findings help explain the commonness of some extreme personality

traits in humans, and suggest that they should be seen as evolutionary strategies rather than as diseases.

Notes: Suggests that some extreme personality traits in humans should be seen as evolutionary strategies (as types of selves) rather than as diseases. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being.

149. Haller, M. . & Hadler, M. (2006). How social relations and structures can produce happiness and unhappiness: An international comparative analysis. *Social Indicators Research*, 75(2), 169-216. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11205-004-6297-y>. doi:10.1007/s11205-004-6297-y

Abstract: In this paper, subjective well being, as measured by survey questions on happiness and life satisfaction, is investigated from a sociological-comparative point of view. The central thesis is that happiness and satisfaction must be understood as the outcome of an interaction process between individual characteristics and aspirations on the one side, and social relations and macrosocial structures on the other side. A distinction is made between life satisfaction and happiness; the former is more seen as the outcome of an evaluation process including material and social aspirations and achievements, the latter as an outcome of positive experiences, particularly close personal relationships. The focus of this paper is on micro- and macrosocial conditions favouring or inhibiting the emergence of happiness and satisfaction. It is hypothesized that dense and good basic social relations, occupational involvement and success, sociocultural (religious and altruistic) orientations and participation are conducive to happiness and life satisfaction; the same should be true at the macrolevel for economic prosperity, relatively equal social structures, a well-established welfare state and political democracy. The latter conditions, however, should be more important for life satisfaction than for happiness. A comparative, multilevel regression analysis of happiness in 41 nations around the world is carried out (using the World Value Survey 1995–1997). Both our general assumption and most of the specific hypotheses could be confirmed. It turned very clearly that “happiness” and “life satisfaction” are two different concepts. It could be shown that microsocial embedding and sociocultural integration of a person are highly relevant for happiness. However, contrary to earlier studies, we find that macrosocial factors like the economic wealth of nation, the distribution of income, the extent of the welfare state and political freedom are also relevant, particularly for satisfaction. What counts most is the ability to cope with life, including subjective health and financial satisfaction, close social relations, and the economic perspectives for improvement in the future, both at the level of the individual and at that of the society. These abilities are certainly improved by favourable macrosocial conditions and institutions, such as a more equal income distribution, political democracy and a welfare state.

Notes: An investigation of the differences between individual attributions of happiness and life satisfaction, in relation to social relations and macrosocial factors. Relates to well-being.

150. Hara Estroff, M. (1999). The power of play. *Psychology Today*, 32(4), 36-40+. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/214496001?accountid=27890>

No abstract.

Notes: On frontispiece: "Most of us think of adult play as respite or indulgence, but having fun is no trivial pursuit. In fact it's crucial to our mental creativity, health, and happiness." Discusses the role of play in creativity and well-being. Relates to well-being.

151. Hardcastle, V. G. (2000). The development of the self. *Cognitive Systems Research*, 1(2), 77-86. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S138904179900008X>. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1389-0417\(99\)00008-X](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1389-0417(99)00008-X)

No Abstract.

Notes: A discussion of children's narratives as viewed through their journal entries. Relates to personhood.

152. Harré, R. (1983). *Personal being: A theory for individual psychology*. Oxford: Blackwell.

No abstract.

Notes: An early and comprehensive theoretical account of the social origins of personal being and personhood. Harré provides an account that emphasises the 'continuities' of personhood: consciousness; biography; and, agency. Relates to personhood.

153. Harré, R. (1998). *The singular self: An introduction to the psychology of personhood*. London: Sage.

No abstract.

Notes: A further development of Harre's ideas on personhood, with consideration of three selves: Self 1; Self 2; and Self 3. Self 1 is the unique point of view that defines each person as a distinct, continuous singularity. Self 2 – in its restricted sense – is that set of attributes that a person has which is a unique set (no other person has just that set). The unrestricted sense of Self 2 also includes those attributes that a person has had or will have over a lifetime. (The difference between the restricted and unrestricted versions of Self 2 is, Harre claims, important in conceptualising Alzheimer's and related experiences). Self 3 is a complex production or persona – not just the persona the person believes they are presenting (of their Self 1 and Self 2) but also those personae that are interpreted by the diverse groups that encounter the person. Relates to personhood.

154. Harris, P. B. & Keady, J. (2009). Selfhood in younger onset dementia: Transitions and testimonies. *Aging & Mental Health*, 13(3), 437-444. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000266489900015. doi:10.1080/13607860802534609

Abstract: Younger people with dementia and their carers are an overlooked population for research, policy and practice attention. In this study, data were collected from both the United States and the UK in order to explore the meaning and construction of selfhood and identity. The US data collection included in-depth interviews with 23 people diagnosed with younger-onset dementia, while the UK data collection comprised 15 face-to-face interviews with younger carers of younger people with dementia; all carers were/had been caring for a younger person with dementia diagnosed through the DSM-IV-R criteria. A grounded theory analysis of the data resulted in the emergence of five themes to explain the interview data, these were: (1) identity as a worker; (2) identity of abandoned individual; (3) sexual identity; (4) family identity; and (5) identity as an individual engaged in living. Additional research is necessary to further develop the attributes and application of these identity profiles.

Notes: Considers the multiple identities of young people with dementia, and their carers. Important consideration in relation to the development of personhood. Relates to personhood and well-being.

155. Heinamaa, S. (2012). The self and the others: Common topics for Husserl and Wittgenstein. *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 50(2), 234-249. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000304805400007. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2012.00099.x

Abstract: Several commentators have argued that Husserl's phenomenological project is compromised or even destroyed by Wittgenstein's critical inquiries into our use of psychological concepts. In contrast to oppositional interpretations, this paper explicates certain crucial connections between Husserl's phenomenology and Wittgenstein's late thinking shared views that concern the embodied nature of selfhood and our relations to other selves. In line with certain recent contributions, I argue that there are important similarities between Husserl's analysis of these phenomena and Wittgenstein's remarks on our use of language and that these connections, when noticed and explicated, can help us avoid simplified, barren contrasts and get clear about our actual philosophical alternatives.

Notes: Argues that phenomenological and Wittgensteinian analyses of selfhood converge in relation to its embodied aspect. Relates to personhood.

156. Heins, V. . (2010). Of persons and peoples: Internationalizing the critical theory of recognition. *Contemporary Political Theory*, 9(2), 149-170. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/237002644?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Although Axel Honneth's critical theory of recognition continues to resonate among political theorists, its relationship to the debate on political and moral cosmopolitanism remains unclear. The paper aims to fill this gap by defining a few

guideposts to a 'recognition-theoretical' conception of the international. My argument is that Honneth's theory oscillates between a liberal-cosmopolitan model of the global spread of human rights and an alternative model that is closer to the anti-cosmopolitanism of the late Rawls. Both models reflect certain assumptions about the moral standing of political communities or 'peoples', even if those assumptions remain implicit and unexamined. I begin by discussing the premise that recognition theory is all about 'natural' persons instead of 'artificial' persons such as states or peoples. I proceed by comparing Rawls's notion of a distinct logic of the international to Honneth's more ambiguous gestures toward an international political theory. Finally, I offer some thoughts on the place of peoples and sovereign statehood in the theory of recognition.

Notes: Are 'peoples' also persons and should they be recognised as such? An interesting debate on personhood and the extent to which it can be expanded to entities more extensive than individual human beings. Relates to personhood.

157. Helliwell, J. F. & Putnam, R.D. (2004). The social context of well-being. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B. Biological Sciences.*, 359(1449, September 29), 1435–1446.

Abstract: Large samples of data from the World Values Survey, the US Benchmark Survey and a comparable Canadian survey are used to estimate equations designed to explore the social context of subjective evaluations of well-being, of happiness, and of health. Social capital, as measured by the strength of family, neighbourhood, religious and community ties, is found to support both physical health and subjective well-being. Our new evidence confirms that social capital is strongly linked to subjective well-being through many independent channels and in several different forms. Marriage and family, ties to friends and neighbours, workplace ties, civic engagement (both individually and collectively), trustworthiness and trust: all appear independently and robustly related to happiness and life satisfaction, both directly and through their impact on health.

Notes: Explores correlations between how the networks of interaction between people – 'social capital' – affects subjective well-being. Relates to well-being.

158. Henrich, J. , & McElreath, R. (2003). The evolution of cultural evolution. *Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews*, 12(3), 123-135. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/evan.10110>. doi:10.1002/evan.10110

Abstract: Humans are unique in their range of environments and in the nature and diversity of their behavioral adaptations. While a variety of local genetic adaptations exist within our species, it seems certain that the same basic genetic endowment produces arctic foraging, tropical horticulture, and desert pastoralism, a constellation that represents a greater range of subsistence behavior than the rest of the Primate Order combined. The behavioral adaptations that explain the immense success of our species are cultural in the sense that they are transmitted among individuals by social learning and have accumulated over generations. Understanding how and when such culturally evolved adaptations arise requires understanding of both the evolution of the psychological mechanisms that underlie human social learning and the evolutionary (population) dynamics of cultural systems.

Notes: Discusses the adaptive abilities of humans to exist in many conditions through a process of cultural adaptation and evolution. It is claimed that cultural evolution depends, in part, upon the evolution of psychological mechanisms. Relates to evolutionary psychology.

159. Herman, L. M. (2012). Body and self in dolphins. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 21(1), 526-545. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810011002650>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.10.005>

Abstract: In keeping with recent views of consciousness of self as represented in the body in action, empirical studies are reviewed that demonstrate a bottlenose dolphin's (*Tursiops truncatus*) conscious awareness of its own body and body parts, implying a representational "body image" system. Additional work reviewed demonstrates an advanced capability of dolphins for motor imitation of self-produced behaviors and of behaviors of others, including imitation of human actions, supporting hypotheses that dolphins have a sense of agency and ownership of their actions and may implicitly attribute those levels of self-awareness to others. Possibly, a mirror-neuron system, or its functional equivalent to that described in monkeys and humans, may mediate both self-awareness and awareness of others.

Notes: A study that extends personhood attributes to an investigation of dolphins which raises the question of the evolutionary and neurological basis of self-awareness in the animal kingdom. Relates to selfhood/ personhood and evolutionary psychology.

160. Herrmann-Pillath, C. (2009). Elements of a neo-Veblenian theory of the individual. *Journal of Economic Issues*, 43(1), 189-214. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/208778744?accountid=27890> http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&rft_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Aasocscijournals&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Journal+of+Economic+Issues&rft.atitle=Elements+of+a+Neo-Veblenian+Theory+of+the+Individual&rft.au=Herrmann-Pillath%2C+Carsten&rft.aulast=Herrmann-Pillath&rft.aufirst=Carsten&rft.date=2009-03-01&rft.volume=43&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=189&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.title=Journal+of+Economic+Issues&rft.issn=00213624

Abstract: Neuroeconomics and behavioral economics (NEBE) is one of the most dynamic fields in contemporary economics. However, from the viewpoint of economic methodology there are still substantial reasons why NEBE is irrelevant for economic theory. This paper argues that they will only become an essential part of economics if they are embedded into a fully-fledged institutional and evolutionary paradigm. I develop a Neo-Veblenian theory of the individual that starts out from the observation that modern brain sciences do not support the notion of the brain to be an integrated and consistent rational decision apparatus. An evolutionary explanation is offered for this, which reinstates Veblen's distinction between adaptation as engineering optima and social selection. Individual

identity does only emerge through communication and interaction among brains, in particular via language. The concept of the "extended brain" is proposed, which is applied to define human individuality as a social phenomenon. Thus, the systematic unity of neuroeconomics and institutional economics is established.

Notes: A conceptual investigation of how an evolutionary and institutional understanding of neuroeconomics and behavioural economics might help to understand individuality in social terms and, so, unite neuroeconomics with institutional economics. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

161. Ho, D. Y. F. ; Fu, W. & Ng, S. M. (2004). Guilt, shame and embarrassment: Revelations of face and self. *Culture & Psychology*, 10(1), 64-84. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000221723200004. doi:10.1177/1354067x04044166

Abstract: The authors derive evidence on guilt, shame and embarrassment from (a) Chinese and Japanese cultural data on expressions of emotion, (b) empirical studies of losing face, and (c) multilingual-multicultural clinical experiences. A scheme that has transcultural applicability is proposed for differentiating guilt, shame and embarrassment. The evidence supports the conclusion that these three emotions are marked by qualitatively different attributes. Probes into emotional life serve to reveal aspects of face and self. Face defined both as self presented to others, and as self perceived by others, mirrors the duality of self. Two methodological issues are discussed: what is meant by 'private experience'; and the need for an extended conception of selfhood.

Notes: An investigation of the concept of self in relation to the social emotions of shame, guilt and embarrassment in different cultural and multicultural settings. Raises issues about what is meant by 'private experience' and suggests the need to understand selfhood beyond the individual level. Relates to selfhood/ personhood.

162. Horelli, L. (2006). Environmental human-friendliness as a contextual determinant for quality of life. *Revue Européenne de Psychologie Appliquée/European Review of Applied Psychology*, 56(1), 15-22. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1162908805000800>. doi:10.1016/j.erap.2005.02.012

Abstract: The aim of the article is to define some criteria of human-friendly environments and to explain why the concept of environmental human-friendliness (EHF) is important in the analysis and improvement of the quality of people's lives. EHF is a complex multi-dimensional and multi-level concept that refers to environments or settings which provide support to individuals and different groups so that they can implement their goals or projects, with a potential impact on the subjective well-being. EHF can be described and assessed by an individual criterion (person–environment fit) and a group criterion (collective environment fit). A heuristic model of the conditions for EHF is presented that can be applied in the analysis of the context of well-being and in the envisioning phase of the improvement of conditions for the quality of life.

Notes: This article gives some examples of patterns and structures to show that environmental human-friendliness is a significant contextual determinant of quality of life. Useful in the context of well-being and also suggestive of the importance of the relationship between persons and environments. Relates to well-being and personhood.

163. Hornung, B. R. . (2006). Happiness and the pursuit of happiness: A sociocybernetic approach. *Kybernetes*, 35(3/4), 323-346,280-281. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/213915239?accountid=27890>

Abstract: To provide a coherent theoretical framework for interdisciplinary research on happiness, integrating the psychological, physiological/biological, and social/cultural levels, permitting integration of disparate approaches within and across disciplines. Principles and findings of cybernetics are combined to shed light on difficulties encountered by research on happiness. Using a problem-oriented approach, the reference system is defined as a psychological information-processing and decision-making system. This is an actor system in the social world needing orientation to act. Bossel's systems theory of orientation is applied to emotionality as a subsystem of the psychological system. Happiness, in terms of orientation theory, can be conceived as a meta-orientor indicating wholeness, health, and the functioning of the overall-system. Emotionality and rationality are complementary decision-making systems. Conditions are identified for developing the capability for emotional orientation and happiness in individuals. These conditions are strongly dependent on the social/cultural environment. Among them are the need for diversity in real-life experience and for psychological acceptance of both oneself and the (sociocultural) environment. They can permit (relative) stability of happiness defined as an emotional state. Further research can produce methods to improve happiness both by coaching individuals and by developing social conditions more conducive to happiness, e.g. in education. Happiness is a subjective indicator for physical, psychological, and social well-being taken together, which is the definition of health of WHO. This sociocybernetic approach, combining systems concepts with orientation theory, can serve as an integrative theoretical framework for so far separate theoretical approaches.

Notes: A 'sociocybernetic' theory that grounds happiness and well-being within a systems and orientation theory framework, highlighting the role of social and cultural environment in producing well-being. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

164. Hughes, C. & Dunn, J. (1997). "Pretend you didn't know": Preschoolers' talk about mental states in pretend play. *Cognitive Development*, 12(4), 477-497. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0885201497900198>. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014\(97\)90019-8](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014(97)90019-8)

Abstract: Fifty preschoolers (mean age = 47 months; SD = 5 months) were recruited from local inner-city nurseries to take part in a study of early friendships and the development of social understanding. Friendship pairs (10 boy-boy pairs; 10 girl-girl pairs and 5 boy-girl pairs) were filmed playing together for 20 minutes in a quiet room supplied with toys and dressing-up materials. The videos were then transcribed and coded for mental-state talk and pretend play. The children were also given a battery of tests tapping theory-of-mind skills and verbal

ability. The results indicated a strong association between children's engagement in pretend play, and the frequency and nature of mental-state talk. This association is discussed in relation to (1) effects of context, (2) individual differences in children's understanding of mind and verbal ability, and (3) the social nature of pretend play.

Notes: An interesting study of the way in which, through play, 'mental-state talk' is rehearsed. Emphasises the relationship between social play and 'theory of mind' attribution and mentation. Relates to personhood development.

165. Huppert, F. A. & Baylis, N. (2004). Well-being: towards an integration of psychology, neurobiology and social science. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B. Biological Sciences*, 359(1449; September 29), 1447–1451. .

No abstract.

Notes: Introduction to article: The study of well-being is a rapidly evolving field, and an exquisite example of a truly multidisciplinary endeavour. Two of the strongest strands have emerged from recent research on positive psychology and on social capital, but the field reaches well beyond these domains. We summarise some of the major themes that unite these different approaches and disciplines, highlighting both commonalities and controversies. The five themes on which we focus are (i) evolution and development; (ii) the nature of well-being, (iii) well-being and capabilities; (iv) the relationship between health and well-being; and (v) the implications of the findings of the research for intervention strategies and public policies.

Relates to well-being and evolutionary psychology.

166. Jackson, T. (2002). Evolutionary psychology in ecological economics: Consilience, consumption and contentment. *Ecological Economics*, 41(2), 289-303. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092180090200040X>. doi:10.1016/s0921-8009(02)00040-x

Abstract: This paper makes the case that if ecological economics seeks 'consilience' with biology it must acquaint itself with evolutionary theories about social development and human behaviour. The author reviews some of the literature in this area. Particular attention is paid to the newly emerging discipline of evolutionary psychology, which sets out a neo-Darwinian view of human nature in which individual and social behaviour is dominated by the evolutionary strategies of the 'selfish gene'. The paper discusses the relevance of this perspective for two specific 'problem areas' in ecological economics. The first of these is the question of consumption and consumer behaviour. The second is the problem of 'mismatch' between the pursuit of economic growth and social well-being or contentment. These examples illustrate that evolutionary psychology may sometimes provide a natural ally for ecological economics, in particular pointing up certain failures of conventional economics. On the other hand, it also offers harsh lessons concerning the difficulty of changing evolved behaviour patterns. The paper suggests three possible avenues of response by ecological economists to the insights of evolutionary psychology.

Notes: This article looks at the relevance of evolutionary psychology and the selfish gene for "two specific 'problem areas' in ecological economics. The first of these is the question of consumption and consumer behaviour. The second is the problem of 'mismatch' between the pursuit of economic growth and social well-being or contentment." Suggests both that the way people live in today's society does not allow them necessarily to thrive and experience greater well-being and that this situation may be difficult to change. Seems to oversimplify evolutionary psychology as 'selfish gene' theory.

Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

167. Jackson, T. (2005). Live better by consuming less? Is there a "double dividend" in sustainable consumption? *Journal of Industrial Ecology*, 9(1-2), 19-36. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000231609200005. doi:10.1162/1088198054084734

Abstract: Industrial ecology has mainly been concerned with improving the efficiency of production systems. But addressing consumption is also vital in reducing the impact of society on its environment. The concept of sustainable consumption is a response to this. But the debates about sustainable consumption can only really be understood in the context of much wider and deeper debates about consumption and about consumer behavior itself. This article explores some of these wider debates. In particular, it draws attention to a fundamental disagreement that runs through the literature on consumption and haunts the debate on sustainable consumption: the question of whether, or to what extent, consumption can be taken as "good for us." Some approaches assume that increasing consumption is more or less synonymous with improved well-being: the more we consume the better off we are. Others argue, just as vehemently, that the scale of consumption in modern society is both environmentally and psychologically damaging, and that we could reduce consumption significantly without threatening the quality of our lives. This second viewpoint suggests that a kind of "double dividend" is inherent in sustainable consumption: the ability to live better by consuming less and reduce our impact on the environment in the process. In the final analysis, this article argues, such "win-win" solutions may exist but will require a concerted societal effort to realize.

Notes: A discussion of the dilemma over the role of consumption in relation to well-being: its positive versus negative affects on well-being and its effects on environmental conditions. Relates to well-being.

168. Johnson, B. E. (1992). Learning in school - Facilitating the child's emerging construction of self. *Education*, 112(3), 439-442. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1992HQ48100020

Abstract: The self is the sum of the individual's learning capacity and the goal of education is its development. A child's emerging construction of self is dependent on social activity for sustained growth and development. The social institution of the school provides this social activity in the form of schooling. The impact of schooling on a child's developing sense of self needs to be explored, so that this interrelationship is directed in the child's best interests. Looking at learning from the view of the child's developing selfhood provides us with an inherently social frame of reference and an understanding from the perspective of what the

learner needs in order to grow. This approach serves as a salient reminder that school learning is a social experience for the maximizing of the child's intellectual potential. The claim is made that learning in school can more comprehensively facilitate the emergent development of self through daily language experiences encountered in listening to literature.

Notes: Argues that schooling is an important social setting within which children, today, construct their sense of selves. Selfhood is seen as inherently social. Relates to selfhood/personhood.

169. Johnson, E. L. (2013). Mapping the field of the whole human: Toward a form psychology. *New Ideas in Psychology, 31*(2), 130-150. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X12000505>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2012.09.002>

Abstract: The concept of personality has served as the model of the whole human being within modern psychology for most of the 20th century. However, the original reasons for this selection were based on philosophical assumptions that have since come to be rejected by philosophers of science. Other approaches to the whole human have been identified within psychology, as well as philosophy and theology, which can also serve as models of the whole human in psychology, and which highlight additional, distinctly human kinds of psychological wholeness. The value of a number of the most important models will be discussed, and it will be suggested that the concept of form could serve as a higher-order concept for the psychological subdiscipline of the whole human being.

Notes: Considers the way in which the whole human being is captured by the notion of personality and suggests that it fails in this task. Alternative approaches are considered, with the notion of 'form' suggested as a potential higher-order concept to enable the whole human being to be understood. Relates to personhood.

170. Jones, C. J. ; Livson, N. & Peskin, H. (2006). Paths of psychological health: Examination of 40-year trajectories from the Intergenerational Studies. *Journal of Research in Personality, 40*(1), 56-72. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0092656605000644>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2005.09.006>

Abstract: Patterns of stability and change in psychological health, as assessed via the California Psychological Inventory's v3 scale, are examined in two long-term longitudinal samples (N = 279). Longitudinal hierarchical linear modeling analyses indicate a modest, but significant, linear increase in v3 from age 33 to 75 for the sample as a whole, with significant individual differences in v3 change also evident. When psychological health is categorized as either high or low, using a v3 cut-off score of 36, the majority of individuals show stable high psychological health from age 33 to 75; significant minorities show stable low, increased, and decreased psychological health with age. Differential patterns of psychological health change are successfully predicted by preadult psychological health resources, adult cognitive and social resources, and early adult norm-orientation. Overall, results illustrate the

complexity of normal adult development, and the differential mechanisms involved in maintaining, attaining, and losing psychological health over a 40-year period.

Notes: An interesting and significant longitudinal study of psychological health tracking adults from 33 to 75 years old. Generally, health modestly increases. Psychological health is partly dependent upon cognitive and social resources. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being.

171. Jones, D. (1999). Evolutionary psychology. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 28, 553-575. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/199842377?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Studying human behaviour in the light of evolutionary theory involves studying the comparative evolutionary history of behaviors (phylogeny), the psychological machinery that generates them (mechanisms), and the adaptative value of that machinery in past reproductive competition (natural selection). To show the value of a phylogenetic perspective, I consider the ethology of emotional expression and the cladistics of primate social systems. For psychological mechanisms, I review evidence for a pan-human set of conceptual building blocks, including innate concepts of things, space, and time, of number, of logic, of natural history, and of "other minds" and social life, which can be combined to generate a vast array of culture-specific concepts. For natural selection, I discuss the sexual selection of sex differences and similarities, and the social selection of moral sentiments and group psychology.

Notes: Investigates the evolutionary approach in the context of anthropological concerns with the development of human behaviours, using emotional expression and primate social systems as examples. Relates to evolutionary psychology.

172. Kall, L. F. (2009). Expression between self and other. *Idealistic Studies*, 39(1-3), 71-86. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000278902200006

Abstract: In discussions concerning intersubjectivity the notion of expression has come to play a part of increasing significance. Expression shifts our point of departure away from subjectivity as something mysterious hidden within the body to subjectivity as altogether embodied and embedded in the world. In this article I engage writings by Maurice Merleau-Ponty to argue that expression is essentially something that happens in a communicative space in between self and other while at the same time giving rise to both. I show how locating expression in a shared space between self and other is a way of emphasizing that self and other are not only expressive of selfhood, but are also expressed by one another and emerge in relation to one another. I point to this understanding of expression as a way of recognizing that there is both a fundamental reciprocity and asymmetry between self and other.

Notes: Argues that expressivity is located in shared space rather than emanating from within. Uses Merleau-Ponty to argue for an embodied and socially situated arena of expression. Compatible with a highly social reading of personhood. Relates to personhood.

173. Kane, R. (2009). Free will and the dialectic of selfhood: Can one make sense of a traditional free will requiring ultimate responsibility? *Ideas Y Valores*, (141), 25-43. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000281288400003

Abstract: For four decades, I have been developing a distinctive view of free will according to which agents are required to be ultimately responsible for the creation or formation of their own wills (characters and purposes). The aim of this paper is to explain how a free will of this traditional kind-which I argue is incompatible with determinism-can be reconciled with modern developments in the sciences and philosophy. I address criticisms that a nondeterminist free will of this kind does not allow sufficient agent control, reduces to mere chance or randomness, fails to account of moral responsibility, and cannot be reconciled with modern science; and I relate such a free will to the nature of the self or person by developing what I call a "dialectic of selfhood."

Notes: An interesting discussion of the controversial notion of a nondeterministic theory of free will. Provides a defence of such a formulation of personhood. Relates to personhood.

174. Kaposy, C. (2009). Will neuroscientific discoveries about free will and selfhood change our ethical practices? *Neuroethics*, 2(1), 51-59. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000284868400006. doi:10.1007/s12152-008-9020-x

Abstract: Over the past few years, a number of authors in the new field of neuroethics have claimed that there is an ethical challenge presented by the likelihood that the findings of neuroscience will undermine many common assumptions about human agency and selfhood. These authors claim that neuroscience shows that human agents have no free will, and that our sense of being a "self" is an illusory construction of our brains. Furthermore, some commentators predict that our ethical practices of assigning moral blame, or of recognizing others as persons rather than as objects, will change as a result of neuroscientific discoveries that debunk free will and the concept of the self. I contest suggestions that neuroscience's conclusions about the illusory nature of free will and the self will cause significant change in our practices. I argue that we have self-interested reasons to resist allowing neuroscience to determine core beliefs about ourselves.

Notes: A discussion of the implications of advances in neurosciences for the understanding of selves and persons and, more importantly, for our practices in relation to persons, seeing them primarily as objects. The position is defended that this will not occur for self-interested reasons. [Begg the question of whether or not it will be our understanding of objects, rather than persons, that is likely to change.] Relates to personhood and biological/evolutionary psychology.

175. Kay, M. (2005). Emotion (or life, the universe, everything). *The Australian Journal of Anthropology*, 16(2), 198-211. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/212597156?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Emotions are fundamental to human life; they define its quality and motivate action. In the past, social scientists who have studied emotions have treated them as biological, cultural or social phenomena. These approaches have tended to fall on either side of the culturally recognised division between nature and culture, and so have failed to recognise that emotions bridge this division, that they are thought of as both biological and cultural, as consisting of both physical feeling and cultural meaning. In this article, an alternative approach is presented in which emotions are treated as ecological mechanisms that operate in the relationship between an individual human being and their environment. In this approach, which draws on models of emotion proposed by William James and Antonio Damasio, emotions connect individual human beings to their surroundings and play an important role in learning. A focus on the individual as the centre of analytical attention—often referred to as 'methodological individualism'—is a logical consequence of the ecological approach to emotion, which also has significant implications for the relationships between ecological anthropology and other branches of the discipline, and between anthropology and other disciplines. In the face of an ecological understanding of emotion, all relations, including social relations, become ecological and social anthropology melts into and is subsumed by ecological anthropology. At the same time, anthropology tends to lose its distinctiveness from biology, psychology and other disciplines by focusing on a phenomenon that is of common interest to all the human sciences.

Notes: The author argues that the study of emotion is the key to understanding something fundamental about the 'big' questions, such as, how do humans operate, how do they live together, what kinds of beings are they? Concludes that we need an ecological approach to emotion. "The key to understanding human action is to understand people's emotional commitments - what they care most about and why, how they come to care about particular things". Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

176. Keating, C. F. ; Mazur, A. & Segall, M. H. (1981). A cross-cultural exploration of physiognomic traits of dominance and happiness. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 2(1), 41-48. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309581900212>. doi:10.1016/0162-3095(81)90021-2

Abstract: Morphological traits may convey social messages among humans as they do among other species. This study presents data from observers in 11 national/cultural settings who viewed 19 pairs of portrait photographs and selected either more dominant-looking or happier-looking pair members. Significant cross-sample agreement in dominance attributions emerged for eight portrait pairs. Significant cross-sample agreement in happiness attributions occurred for nine portrait pairs. Post hoc, among the characteristics of dominant faces were receded hairlines and relatively broad faces. The traits of happier-looking faces frequently included relatively dark eyes and thick lips, with some exceptions.

Notes: An investigation of cross-cultural 'universals' for dominance and happiness attributions to human facial expressions. Concludes that there is significant agreement on

such attributions and, therefore, that they amount to an evolved universal. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

177. Keenan, T. & Ellis, B. J. (2003). Children's performance on a false-belief task is impaired by activation of an evolutionarily-canalized response system. *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, 85(3), 236-256. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022096503000729>. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0965\(03\)00072-9](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0965(03)00072-9)

Abstract: We examine whether children's performance on a false-belief task is impaired by task content that activates an early-developing, prepotent motivational system: predator-avoidance. In two studies (N=46 and N=37), children aged 3–4 years completed variants of a false-belief task that involved predator-avoidance, playmate-avoidance, prey-seeking, and playmate-seeking, respectively. The proportion of correct answers on the playmate-avoidance task (Study 1: 52%; Study 2: 51%) was significantly greater than the proportion of correct answers on the analogous predator-avoidance task (Study 1: 28%; Study 2: 22%). This difference was not an artifact of children generally performing better on playmate stories than on predator–prey stories. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that activation of the predator-avoidance system generates prepotent response patterns that pre-empt full consideration of the mental states of the prey characters in false-belief stories.

Notes: An evolutionary approach to cognitive performance related to evolved motivational systems, in particular the attribution of mental states to others. Suggests that evolutionary imperatives for predator-avoidance over-ride such attributions. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

178. Keller, H. (2000). Human parent-child relationships from an evolutionary perspective. *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 43(6), 957-969. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/214769712?accountid=27890>

Abstract: In this article, a proximate conception of parental investment for humans is developed. Parenting investment is introduced as a part of life histories, specifying the optimization of reproductive success in terms of inclusive fitness. Contextual, parental and children's characteristics that influence investment decisions are specified. We can distinguish between four systems of parenting: primary care, body stimulation, body contact and face-to-face interaction, which prompts different socialization experiences with different psychological consequences. Parental behaviors within these different systems may vary in terms of the expression of warmth and contingency. Parenting is described here as an inter-generational transmission mechanism of psychological characteristics as well as reproductive styles.

Notes: Examines parental investment in the details of interactions between parents and offspring. Through these details of interaction, psychological characteristics as well as parenting styles are transmitted to the offspring. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and has implications for well-being.

179. Kenrick, D. T. ; Griskevicius, V. ; Sundie, J. M. ; Li, N. P. ; Li, Y. J. & Neuberg, S. L. (2009). Deep rationality: The evolutionary economics of decision making. *Social Cognition*, 27(5), 764-785. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/229588216?accountid=27890>. doi:10.1037/0033-295x.113.3.628.2006-08257-00810.1037/0033-295x.113.3.62810.1037/0033-295x.99.4.68910.1037/0022-3514.92.1.151 10.1037/10.1037/0022-3514.92.1.42 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01842.x

Abstract: What is a "rational" decision? Economists traditionally viewed rationality as maximizing expected satisfaction. This view has been useful in modeling basic microeconomic concepts, but falls short in accounting for many everyday human decisions. It leaves unanswered why some things reliably make people more satisfied than others, and why people frequently act to make others happy at a cost to themselves. Drawing on an evolutionary perspective, we propose that people make decisions according to a set of principles that may not appear to make sense at the superficial level, but that demonstrate rationality at a deeper evolutionary level. By this, we mean that people use adaptive domain-specific decision-rules that, on average, would have resulted in fitness benefits. Using this framework, we re-examine several economic principles. We suggest that traditional psychological functions governing risk aversion, discounting of future benefits, and budget allocations to multiple goods, for example, vary in predictable ways as a function of the underlying motive of the decision-maker and individual differences linked to evolved life-history strategies. A deep rationality framework not only helps explain why people make the decisions they do, but also inspires multiple directions for future research.

Notes: Argues that the understanding of human economic rationality needs to take account of the particularities that evolution has designed into domain-specific decision making in humans. Supposedly non-rational decisions can, from this perspective, be understood as demonstrating an evolutionarily adaptive 'deep rationality' that would have served humans well over evolutionary time. Relates to evolutionary psychology, aspects of personhood (agent decision making) and well-being

180. Keverne, E. (2004). Understanding well-being in the evolutionary context of brain development. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B. Biological Sciences.*, 359(1449, September 29), 1349–1358. .

Abstract: Much of the work on well-being and positive emotions has tended to focus on the adult, partly because this is when problems are manifest and well-being often becomes an issue by its absence. However, it is pertinent to ask if early life events might engender certain predispositions that have consequences for adult well-being. The human brain undergoes much of its growth and development postnatally until the age of seven and continues to extend its synaptic connections well into the second decade. Indeed, the prefrontal association cortex, areas of the brain concerned with forward planning and regulatory control of emotional behaviour, continue to develop until the age of 20. In this article, I consider the significance of this extended postnatal developmental period for brain maturation and how brain evolution has encompassed certain biological changes and predispositions that, with our modern lifestyle, represent risk factors for well-being. An

awareness of these sensitive phases in brain development is important in understanding how we might facilitate secure relationships and high self-esteem in our children. This will provide the firm foundations on which to develop meaningful lifestyles and relationships that are crucial to well-being.

Notes: An integration of neurobiology, neurodevelopment, well-being and aspects of the self (e.g., self-esteem). The argument is made that the postnatal period, up to about the age of 20 years, represents an important neurodevelopmental period that has implications for later well-being. Importantly, the social environment during this time acts as a potentially damaging influence on neurodevelopment. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being.

181. Kim, Y. Y. (2008). Intercultural personhood: Globalization and a way of being. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 32(4), 359-368. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147176708000278>. doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2008.04.005

Abstract: This theoretical essay makes a case for “intercultural personhood” as a viable model for human development in today's increasingly integrated world. Critiquing the largely static, monolithic, and value-laden perspective on cultural identity prevalent in social science literature, the author emphasizes the complex and evolving nature of identity. The term, intercultural identity, is employed as a counterpoint to, and as an extension of, cultural identity, and as a concept that represents the phenomenon of identity adaptation and transformation beyond the perimeters of the conventional, categorical conception of cultural identity. The stress–adaptation–growth dynamic in the author's integrative theory of cross-cultural adaptation provides a systemic account for the identity development process as the interplay of acculturation and deculturation. The author argues that, through prolonged and cumulative intercultural communication experiences, individuals around the world can, and do, undergo a gradual process of intercultural evolution. The emerging intercultural personhood is characterized by two interrelated key patterns in self-other orientation: individuation and universalization. Empirical evidence for this theoretical argument is offered through some of the pertinent research findings as well as case illustrations based on publicly available personal testimonials and biographic narratives.

Notes: The author argues that through intercultural communication in a globalising world, individuals experience a gradual process of intercultural evolution, and also that the emerging intercultural personhood is characterised by individuation and universalization. Relates to personhood.

182. Kins, E. ; Beyers, W. ; Soenens, B. & Vansteenkiste, M. (2009). Patterns of home leaving and subjective well-being in emerging adulthood: The role of motivational processes and parental autonomy support. *Developmental Psychology, 45*(5), 1416-1429. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000269366900018. doi:10.1037/a0015580

Abstract: In Western, postindustrial societies, the timing of home leaving is increasingly delayed. The diversity of home-leaving patterns, resulting from this evolution, has not yet been systematically studied from a psychological perspective. In this study, the authors aimed to examine how emerging adults' living arrangements-and the motives underlying those arrangements, as conceptualized in self-determination theory-relate to subjective well-being. A Belgian sample of 224 emerging adults and their parents completed self-report questionnaires. Analyses that used structural equation modeling showed that autonomous motivation for one's living arrangement is more strongly related to emerging adults' well-being than the living arrangement per se. Further, autonomy-supportive parenting was found to relate positively to an autonomously regulated residential status. Implications for the meaning and development of autonomy during emerging adulthood are discussed.

Notes: Through a study of home-leaving patterns and their effect on subjective well-being, it is concluded that autonomous motivation, rather than the nature of the living arrangement is most closely correlated with well-being. This aligns with studies of the importance of autonomy in the development of personhood in modern societies and suggests that, therefore, the development of autonomy in such settings is subsequently important for well-being. Relates to personhood and well-being.

183. Kirkwood, T. B. L. (2002). Evolution of ageing. *Mechanisms of Ageing and Development, 123*(7), 737-745. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047637401004195>. doi:10.1016/s0047-6374(01)00419-5

Abstract: Explaining why ageing occurs is a solution to the longstanding enigma of the role of senescence in nature. Even after half a century of progress, this solution continues to unfold. Evolution theory argues strongly against programmed ageing, suggesting instead that organisms are programmed for survival, not death. In the current view, ageing results from the twin principles that (i) the force of natural selection declines with age, and (ii) longevity requires investments in somatic maintenance and repair that must compete against investments in growth, reproduction and activities that might enhance fitness. In addition to explaining why ageing occurs, the evolutionary theory also provides insight into the mechanisms underlying the complex cellular and molecular changes that contribute to senescence, as well as an array of testable predictions. Some of the most interesting current problems are to understand how the genetic factors influencing ageing and longevity are predicted to respond to fluctuating environments, such as temporary periods of famine, as well as to other kinds of spatial and/or temporal heterogeneity. Rapid progress in human genomics raises the prospect of greatly increasing our knowledge of the determinants of human longevity. To make progress in understanding the role and evolution of genetic and non-genetic factors in human longevity, we need more detailed theoretical studies of how

intra-population variables, such as socio-economic status, influence the selection forces that shape the life history.

Notes: A conceptual discussion of the nature and role of ageing in nature, especially humans. Evolutionary arguments are considered and genetic bases of senescence considered. Given the role of ageing and death in the life course and its relationship with well-being, this discussion also has implications for notions of self, personhood and well-being. As the authors state, "The message 'we are not programmed to die, merely insufficiently programmed to survive' focuses attention on genetic mechanisms of 'longevity assurance' that may, in future, enable research in this field to enhance quality of later life." Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being.

184. Kirkwood, Thomas B. L. & Melov, S. (2011). On the programmed/non-programmed nature of ageing within the life history. *Current Biology*, 21(18), R701-R707. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982211007895>. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2011.07.020

Abstract: Understanding why and how senescence evolved is of great importance in investigating the multiple, complex mechanisms that influence the course of ageing in humans and other organisms. Compelling arguments eliminate the idea that death is generally programmed by genes for ageing, but there is still a widespread tendency to interpret data in terms of loosely defined 'age regulation', which does not usually make either evolutionary or mechanistic sense. This review critically addresses the role of natural selection in shaping ageing within the life history and examines the implications for research on genetic pathways that influence the life span. It is recognised that in exceptional circumstances the possibility exists for selection to favour limiting survival. In acknowledging that, at least in theory, ageing might occasionally be adaptive, however, the high barriers to validating actual instances of adaptive ageing are made clear.

Notes: Another discussion of the process of ageing and its relationship to evolutionary processes of selection and adaptation. Ageing is not thought to be related to genetic triggers and, the authors argue, is only adaptive in extreme cases. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood (as ageing is a stage of personhood) and well-being.

185. Kjell, O. N. E. (2011). Sustainable well-being: A potential synergy between sustainability and well-being research. *Review of General Psychology*, 15(3), 255-266. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000294370100006. doi:10.1037/a0024603

Abstract: This article outlines a potential synergy between sustainability and well-being research. Currently aims within well-being and sustainability research focus on increasing well-being. First, sustainability is defined and important concepts within it highlighted, that is, aims, interdependencies, constraints, values and balanced adaptive processes. It is suggested that positioning well-being more clearly within the sustainability framework can enhance the role of sustainability: for example, in terms of aims and monitoring progress. In turn, the sustainability framework outlined, guides the second part of the article, illustrating how it can reciprocally enhance well-being research. That is, comprehensive empirical,

evolutionary, cross-cultural, and self-conceptual evidence illustrate individuals' interdependencies with other people and nature. Despite this, contemporary hedonic and eudaimonic well-being approaches and accompanying measures are demonstrated to be isolating; investigating well-being individualistically and in a decontextualized manner. This is in line with the individualistic and independent values of Western cultures. Therefore, it is suggested that employing the sustainability framework emphasizing interdependencies within well-being research can be beneficial; perhaps even resulting in an all-inclusive increase in well-being. Limitations are also raised and future research directions suggested. The author concludes that both sustainability and well-being research can benefit from the synergy toward sustainable well-being.

Notes: Argues that well-being research has focused too much on the disconnected, individualised experiences of people rather than emphasising their interconnectedness with each other and with nature and the environment more generally. Calls for synergy between sustainability and well-being research so that an understanding of 'sustainable well-being' can be developed. Relates to well-being and personhood.

186. Klemm, W. R. (2011). Neural representations of the sense of self. *Advances in cognitive psychology / University of Finance and Management in Warsaw, 7*, 16-30. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://MEDLINE:21826192

Abstract: The brain constructs representations of what is sensed and thought about in the form of nerve impulses that propagate in circuits and network assemblies (Circuit Impulse Patterns, CIPs). CIP representations of which humans are consciously aware occur in the context of a sense of self. Thus, research on mechanisms of consciousness might benefit from a focus on how a conscious sense of self is represented in brain. Like all senses, the sense of self must be contained in patterns of nerve impulses. Unlike the traditional senses that are registered by impulse flow in relatively simple, pauci-synaptic projection pathways, the sense of self is a system-level phenomenon that may be generated by impulse patterns in widely distributed complex and interacting circuits. The problem for researchers then is to identify the CIPs that are unique to conscious experience. Also likely to be of great relevance to constructing the representation of self are the coherence shifts in activity timing relations among the circuits. Consider that an embodied sense of self is generated and contained as unique combinatorial temporal patterns across multiple neurons in each circuit that contributes to constructing the sense of self. As with other kinds of CIPs, those representing the sense of self can be learned from experience, stored in memory, modified by subsequent experiences, and expressed in the form of decisions, choices, and commands. These CIPs are proposed here to be the actual physical basis for conscious thought and the sense of self. When active in wakefulness or dream states, the CIP representations of self act as an agent of the brain, metaphorically as an avatar. Because the selfhood CIP patterns may only have to represent the self and not directly represent the inner and outer worlds of embodied brain, the self representation should have more degrees of freedom than subconscious mind and may therefore have some capacity for a free-will mind of its own. Several lines of evidence for this theory are reviewed. Suggested new research includes identifying distinct combinatorially coded impulse patterns and their temporal coherence shifts in defined circuitry, such as neocortical microcolumns. This task might be facilitated by identifying the micro-topography of field-potential oscillatory coherences among various regions and between different frequencies associated with specific conscious mentation. Other

approaches can include identifying the changes in discrete conscious operations produced by focal trans-cranial magnetic stimulation.

Notes: A conceptual investigation of how the neurology underpinning a conscious sense of self might be studied. Relates to selfhood/ personhood.

187. Knoblich, G. ; Elsner, B. ; Aschersleben, G. & Metzinger, T. (2003). Grounding the self in action. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 12(4), 487-494. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810003000990>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2003.08.009>

No Abstract.

Notes (from introduction): This special issue aims at providing a state-of-the-art account of a new multidisciplinary perspective on the self. "Some controversial issues are discussed in commentaries and the author's responses. The contributions are arranged according to five broad research areas, all of which have explored the significance of action for being a self and becoming a self. The first section addresses different conceptual frameworks that aim at grounding the self in action. (Proust; Prinz; Newen & Voegeley; Metzinger & Gallese). The second section addresses the cognitive and neural systems that underlie action identification, including the ability to distinguish between self-produced and other-produced actions (Decety & Chaminade; Leube et al.; Farrer et al.; Knoblich & Flach; Jordan). The third section is concerned with the role of action for explaining disorders of the self (Blakemore, Daprati et al., Kircher & Leube). The fourth section explores the role of volition and intention in shaping the experience of oneself, and the awareness of one's own actions (Wegner & Erskine; Haggard & Clark; Wohlschläger et al.). Finally, the fifth section addresses the role of action in self-development (Rochat; Elsner & Aschersleben; Kiraly et al.; Sodian et al.), which is an important issue in developmental psychology."

Notes: Overview of a special issue of the journal *Consciousness and Cognition* on action and the self. The special issue is a comprehensive update (in 2003) of work on the centrality of action to notions of selfhood/ personhood. It ranges broadly over the consequences for our understandings of the self from adopting an action-oriented perspective, including the nature of agency and the development of the self. Relates to personhood.

188. Kockelman, P. (2006). Agent, person, subject, self. *Semiotica*, 162(1-4), 1-18. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000242336700001. doi:10.1515/sem.2006.072

Abstract: Building on ideas developed in 'The semiotic stance' (2005), this essay outlines a social and semiotic theory of four seemingly human-specific and individual-centric capacities that, while essential for understanding modern social processes, are often confused and conflated. Loosely speaking, agency is a causal capacity: say, the relatively flexible wielding of means towards ends. Subjectivity is a representational capacity: say, the holding of intentional states such as belief and desire. Selfhood is a reflexive capacity: say, being the means and ends of one's own actions, or being the object of one's own beliefs and desires.

And personhood is a sociopolitical capacity: say, rights and responsibilities attendant on being an agent, subject or self.

Notes: A very useful conceptual clarification of the various meanings of concepts associated with selfhood/ personhood including agency and subjectivity. It places the 'person' as a sociopolitical capacity. Relates to selfhood/ personhood.

189. Kogler, H. H. (2012). Agency and the other: On the intersubjective roots of self-identity. *New Ideas in Psychology, 30*(1), 47-64. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000297874700004. doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2010.03.010

Abstract: The essay argues that a systematic reconstruction of the intersubjective grounds of self-consciousness and self-identity will yield a complex non-reductive notion of agency. Core features of human agency include intentional causality, conscious understanding thereof, as well as the capacity to distinguish self-caused from externally caused phenomena. By analyzing how self-consciousness emerges from intersubjective perspective-taking and dialogue, a socially embedded and symbolically mediated notion of self-identity-one which is able to preserve the core features of human agency-becomes viable. G.H. Mead's work serves as heuristic framework to articulate the extent to which the Other's irreducible agency is constitutive of the self's capacity to establish an identity, now understood as a socially situated narrative self-interpreting process. Self-identity reveals to be an essential open yet not fragmented dynamic, a socially situated yet agent-driven phenomenon, and ethically indebted to the Other as providing the essential gift of selfhood.

Notes: Presents an account of agency that is claimed to avoid reduction and to situate the self in relation to the Other through a Meadian analysis. Relates to selfhood/ personhood.

190. Kontos, P. C. & Naglie, G. (2009). Tacit knowledge of caring and embodied selfhood. *Sociology of Health & Illness, 31*(5), 688-704. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000268535400005. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9566.2009.01158.x

Abstract: The tacit knowledge paradigm is gaining recognition as an important source of knowledge that informs clinical decision-making. It is, however, limited by an exclusive focus on knowledge acquired through clinical practice, and a consequent neglect of the primordial and socio-cultural significance of embodied selfhood, precisely what provides the foundational structure of tacit knowledge of caring and facilitates its manifestation. Drawing on findings from a qualitative study of 43 dementia care practitioners in Ontario, Canada that utilised research-based drama and focus group methodology, we argue that embodied selfhood is fundamental to tacit knowledge of caring. Results are analysed drawing upon the theoretical precepts of embodied selfhood that are rooted in Merleau-Ponty's (1962) reconceptualisation of perception and Bourdieu's (1977, 1990) notion of habitus. We conclude with a call for further exploration of the body as a site of the production of tacit knowledge.

Notes: Links the role of tacit knowledge gained from embodied personhood to insights of Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu in the care setting. Relates to personhood and caring/ well-being.

191. Kovach, J. (2002). The body as the ground of religion, science, and self. *Zygon*, 37(4), 941-961. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000179816100011. doi:10.1111/1467-9744.00466

Abstract: The human body is both religious subject and scientific object, the manifest locus of both religious gnosis and secular cognition. Embodiment provides the basis for a rich cross-fertilization between cognitive science and comparative religion, but cognitive studies must return to their empiricist scientific roots by reembodying subjectivity, thus spanning the natural bridge between the two fields. Referencing the ritual centrality and cognitive content of the body, I suggest a materialist but nonreductionist construct of the self as a substantial cognitive embodiment that embraces not just perception and cognition, mind and spirit, but the forceful physicality of the moving body. Proprioception of the body's moving mass constitutes a mode of knowing that resonates strongly with the experience of self, not only across religious traditions but also within the physical sciences. By way of illustration, two directions are suggested in which a construct of the self as a substantial cognitive embodiment might lead us: first, a body-based interpretation of the Islamic myth of Adam and Iblis that reveals an internal substantiality as constitutive of the divinely imaged Self, and second, a new, religious direction for human evolutionary theory based on the implications of an embodied intentionality.

Notes: An analysis of self experience that strongly emphasises the moving body as central to that experience and important in bridging from the cognitive sciences to religious traditions' understandings of self. Relates to selfhood/ personhood.

192. Kringelbach, M. L. & Berridge, K. C. (2010). The neuroscience of happiness and pleasure. *Social Research*, 77(2), 659-678,772. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/742657519?accountid=27890>. doi:10.371/journal.pone.0001664.

No abstract.

Notes: “[...] as positive affect contributes to happiness, then considerable progress has been made in understanding the neurobiology of pleasure in ways that might be relevant. [...] happiness of course springs not from any single component but from the interplay of higher pleasures, positive appraisals of life meaning and social connectedness, all combined and merged by interaction between the brain's default networks and pleasure networks.”

A generic treatment of the relationship between evolved neurology and well-being. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

193. Kristjansson, K. (2012). Selfhood, morality, and the five-factor model of personality. *Theory & Psychology, 22*(5), 591-606. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000309936300004. doi:10.1177/0959354311431193

Abstract: We often say that persons need to change themselves. But what is this "self" that needs to change, and why do "selves" seem to be so resistant to change? I have argued elsewhere that who I really am, in an everyday practical sense, is who I really am with respect to the moral evaluation of me. In other words, the everyday self that (often) needs changing is a moral self. In this article, I am offering further indirect evidence for this thesis by exploring an alternative possibility—that who I really am is my personality in the fashionable "Big Five" or "Five-Factor Model" sense—and showing that this suggestion does not bear scrutiny. I argue that although Big-Five theory has identified relatively stable within-person patterns, it has not shown these patterns to be psychologically meaningful, except to the extent that they are morally salient. I argue further that the nature of our diachronic moral selves suggests that moral philosophy needs to take a developmental and educational turn: a turn for which it may, however, not be well equipped.

Notes: A well-argued analysis of the inadequacy of a 'personality'-based account of what needs to be changed in relation to personhood. The point is emphasised that the everyday, moral self – as opposed to one's personality – is the subject of requirements or suggestions to 'change oneself'. Relates to personhood.

194. Kronqvist, C. (2012). Lost and found: Selfhood and subjectivity in love. *Philosophical Investigations, 35*(3-4), 205-223. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000309071700003. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9205.2011.01468.x

Abstract: Sartre's conception of bad faith suggests that every desire to be someone in love is self-deceptive in the attempt to define my factual being. Departing from Ilham Dilman's discussion of personal identity, I argue that this view on selfhood is inattentive to the kind of personal and moral reflection inherent in asking who I am. There is a temptation in love to deceive myself and you by renouncing responsibility. Yet the concept also embodies demands that allow me to continuously shape myself into a loving subject by scrutinising my responses and by asking whether they are expressive of love or not.

Notes: A philosophical discussion about how the self-understanding of being in love acts to direct responses and shape the self through moral reflection on one's enactment of being loving. Relates to personhood.

195. Le, T. N. (2011). Life satisfaction, openness value, self-transcendence, and wisdom. *Journal of Happiness Studies, 12*(2), 171-182. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10902-010-9182-1>. doi:10.1007/s10902-010-9182-1

Abstract: Prior studies suggest a positive association between life satisfaction and wisdom. In a sample with 123 European American community-dwelling adults, the results suggest

that wisdom and life satisfaction are positively intertwined, and that openness value is an important factor for life satisfaction, a self-transcendence orientation, and wisdom.

Notes: An empirical study of the relationship between life satisfaction and measures of wisdom. It found that there is a positive relation between the two. Relates to personhood and well-being.

196. Le, T. N. & Levenson, M. R. (2005). Wisdom as self-transcendence: What's love (& individualism) got to do with it? *Journal of Research in Personality, 39*(4), 443-457. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0092656604000406>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2004.05.003>

Abstract: Certain spiritual and contemplative traditions (e.g., Mahayana Buddhism, and Sufism) suggest that love or compassion may be one path toward wisdom. Fromm (1956) argued that certain cultures, particularly capitalistic ones, hinder productive and mature forms of love, and thus perhaps wisdom. In the first study, 90 Southeast Asian, Russian/Slavic, and Tibetan community participants completed a survey containing measures of cultural syndromes, immature love, and self-transcendence, an aspect of wisdom. The second study collected similar data on 164 undergraduate students. The results of these two studies revealed that one cultural syndrome, vertical individualism, was negatively associated with self-transcendence and positively with immature love. An egalitarian cultural stance was also related to self-transcendence among college students. The results did not support a mediating role for immature love between vertical individualism and self-transcendence. Future studies, particularly longitudinal ones, are needed to establish the causal or reciprocal relationships among culture, love, and self-transcendence.

Notes: Empirical study of the relationships between culture, wisdom, immature love and self-transcendence. Relates to personhood and well-being

197. Learmonth, M. (2009). The evolution of theory, the theory of evolution: Towards new rationales for art therapy. *International Journal of Art Therapy, 14*(1), 2-10. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17454830903006075>. doi:10.1080/17454830903006075

Abstract: This paper is an attempt to locate art psychotherapy theory in the context of evolutionary psychology. Art psychotherapists have often touched upon an argument for art making, and healing through art making, as having deep roots in the human past, but have seldom expanded this into specific constructs relevant to everyday practice. Recent work in related fields such as archaeology, anthropology and evolutionary psychology is yielding specific formulations that enable this development. The paper looks both at earlier and current thinking about art making as an adaptive process, in both the evolutionary and personal senses. Drawing particularly on the work of Ellen Dissanayake and Steven Mithen, it relates their concepts of 'making special' and 'cognitive fluidity' to an endeavour to outline a rationale for art psychotherapy rooted in human 'natural history' ?.

Notes: An attempt to conceptualise the therapeutic aspects of art-making from an evolutionary perspective. The adaptive functions, personally and evolutionarily, of art are considered. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

198. Leary, M. R. (2007). Motivational and emotional aspects of the self. In *Annual Review of Psychology* (Vol. 58, pp. 317-344). Palo Alto: Annual Reviews. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000243900200013. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085658

Abstract: Recent theory and research are reviewed regarding self-related motives (self-enhancement, self-verification, and self-expansion) and self-conscious emotions (guilt, shame, pride, social anxiety, and embarrassment), with an emphasis on how these motivational and emotional aspects of the self might be related. Specifically, these motives and emotions appear to function to protect people's social well-being. The motives to self-enhance, self-verify, and self-expand are partly rooted in people's concerns with social approval and acceptance, and self-conscious emotions arise in response to events that have real or imagined implications for others' judgments of the individual. Thus, these motives and emotions do not operate to maintain certain states of the self, as some have suggested, but rather to facilitate people's social interactions and relationships.

Notes: Reviews the literature on self-related motives and emotions and concludes that they function as a means to regulate social interactions. An important review of the social aspects of self that emphasises the significance of sociality to self and personhood. Relates to personhood.

199. Leary, M. R. & Buttermore, N R. (2003). The evolution of the human self: Tracing the natural history of self-awareness. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 33(4), 365-404. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1468-5914.2003.00223.x>. doi:10.1046/j.1468-5914.2003.00223.x

Abstract: Previous discussions of the evolution of the self have diverged greatly in their estimates of the date at which the capacity for self-thought emerged, the factors that led self-reflection to evolve, and the nature of the evidence offered to support these disparate conclusions. Beginning with the assumption that human self-awareness involves a set of distinct cognitive abilities that evolved at different times to solve different adaptive problems, we trace the evolution of self-awareness from the common ancestor of humans and apes to the beginnings of culture, drawing upon paleontological, anthropological, biological, and psychological evidence. These data converge to suggest that that modern self-thought appeared just prior to the Middle-Upper Paleolithic transition, approximately 60,000 years ago. Recto running head: *Evolution of the Self*.

Notes: Provides an account of the evolution of various aspects and components of the self in relation to awareness of the self. Engages with the palaeoanthropological literature to infer a period of around 60,000 years ago as the time at which modern versions of self-thought emerged. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood

200. Leary, M. R. ; Gallagher, B. ; Fors, E. ; Buttermore, N. ; Baldwin, E. ; Kennedy, K. ; et al. (2003). The invalidity of disclaimers about the effects of social feedback on self-esteem. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 29(5), 623-636. Retrieved from <http://psp.sagepub.com/content/29/5/623.abstract>. doi:10.1177/0146167203029005007

Abstract: Despite the fact that several theories suggest that people's self-esteem is affected by social approval and disapproval, many individuals steadfastly maintain that how other people regard them has no effect on how they feel about themselves. To examine the validity of these beliefs, two experiments compared the effects of social approval and disapproval on participants who had indicated either that their self-esteem is affected by how other people evaluate them or that their self-esteem is unaffected by interpersonal evaluation. Results of both studies converged to show that approval and disapproval clearly affected the self-esteem of even those individuals who denied that social evaluations affected their feelings about themselves.

Notes: Reports empirical studies that evidence the deep-seated psychological responses to others' evaluations of oneself. Even claims to be unaffected by such evaluations do not indicate indifference to them. Relates to the social aspects of selfhood/ personhood and implies a relationship with well-being.

201. Lebow, R. N. (2005). Reason, emotion and cooperation. *International Politics*, 42(3), 283-313. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/203113600?accountid=27890>

Abstract: The realist, liberal institutionalist, social capital, 'tit-for-tat' and 'thin' constructivist explanations for cooperation rely on the same explanatory mechanisms imported from micro-economics. They further assume that international cooperation should be studied from the perspective of egoistic, individual actors responding primarily to external stimuli. These several explanations assume much of the cooperation they purport to explain. They also rest on questionable ontological assumptions, as their unit of analysis, the autonomous, egoistic individual is a fiction of the Enlightenment. Most actors, states included, have social commitments that lead them to frame their identities and interests at least in part in collective terms. Collective identities lead to a general propensity to cooperate with another group of actors. They explain why actors may cooperate in instances that may not appear to be in their interest if cooperation is studied on a case-by-case basis - as it is by the approaches I critique. To understand how a propensity to cooperate develops, we must look at the ways in which reason and emotions interact to create and sustain common identities.

Notes: Analyses, at the political level, the accounts of cooperation proffered to explain international cooperation. These are criticised for being individualistic and egoistic and imported from economics. Provides an insight into explanations of cooperative behaviours that emphasise collective identities rather than individual/personal identities. Relates to personhood and the evolution of cooperation.

202. Levin, B. W. & Browner, C. H. (2005). The social production of health: Critical contributions from evolutionary, biological, and cultural anthropology. *Social Science and Medicine*, 61(4), 745-750. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953604004599>. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.08.048

Abstract: In 1946, the newly formed World Health Organization boldly sought to conceptualize “health” as well-being in the positive sense, “not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” Yet nearly six decades later, researchers are still principally concerned with pathology and its characteristics and consequences. This special issue is the result of an effort to broaden the focus. Anthropologists working from evolutionary, biological and sociocultural perspectives and in diverse geographic regions were asked to examine meanings associated with health and/or to identify social conditions and practices that have contributed to positive physiological and psychological states in particular cultures, times, or across time. Most notable, perhaps, was discovering how difficult it is for Western social scientists to move beyond pathology-based thinking; most authors represented here regard health primarily as the absence of disease. Still, these papers articulate and address questions key to understanding health in and of itself, including: How is health conceptualized? What kinds of social conditions lead to health? And, how do social inequalities affect health? This introduction critically discusses previous work on the subject to contextualize the original research papers offered here.

Notes: The article is a discussion of efforts to broaden the focus of the way health is conceptualised into the more positive concept of well-being. Relates to well-being.

203. Lewis, C. A. (1995). Human health and well-being: The psychological, physiological, and sociological effects of plants on people. In E. Matsuo & P. D. Relf (Eds.), *Horticulture in Human Life, Culture, and Environment* (pp. 31-39). Leuven 1: International Society Horticultural Science. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000071637300002

Abstract: Evolutionary origins are suggested for the affinity of people with plants. Plants enter the human psyche through observation and/or participation. Given a choice, people prefer settings with vegetation over those lacking vegetation. Research indicates such settings reduce stress, promote peace, tranquility, enhanced self-esteem, and sense of mastery of the environment. Horticultural therapy is cited for its history of using plants as a treatment modality. Settings of vegetation reduce blood pressure and heart rate, speed recovery from surgery and other forms of stress, and enhance sense of well-being. They ameliorate the institutional effects of geriatric centers. Community gardening and tree planting lead urban residents to social and physical actions for improving neighborhoods. Gardening also positively affects self-image and social relationships of prison inmates.

Notes: A collation of evidence for the positive effect of plants and natural settings on human well-being. Relates to well-being.

204. Lewis, K. & Barton, R. (2004). Playing for keeps. *Human Nature*, 15(1), 5-21. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-004-1001-0>. doi:10.1007/s12110-004-1001-0

Abstract: The hypothesis that play behavior is more prevalent in larger-brained animals has recently been challenged. It may be, for example, that only certain brain structures are related to play. Here, we analyze social play behavior with regards to the cerebellum: a structure strongly implicated in motor-development, and possibly also in cognitive skills. We present an evolutionary analysis of social play and the cerebellum, using a phylogenetic comparative method. Social play frequency and relative cerebellum size are positively correlated. Hence, there appears to be a link between the evolutionary elaboration of social play and the cerebellum.

Notes: A study of the relationship between social play and cerebellum size, that finds a positive relationship. Given the role of play in both personhood development and well-being, an interesting finding that connects it to motor development and cognitive skill development. Relates to personhood and well-being.

205. Little, B. R. (2005). Personality science and personal projects: Six impossible things before breakfast. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 39(1), 4-21. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0092656604000789>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2004.09.003>

Abstract: Personality science pursues the paradoxical project of specializing in comprehensiveness, a pursuit that some may see as an inherently impossible undertaking. Accompanied by one such contrarian, a hypothetical "Reviewer C," I explore six possible "impossibilities" in personality science. Together we examine our epistemological assumptions, conceptual units of analysis, assessment methodologies, psychometric techniques, social impact, and organizational viability. I focus on "personal projects" (Little, 1972, 1983) as core integrative units of analysis that provide linkages with other integrative units. I propose that personality science will assume increasing importance at the very center of university curricula, as a hub of scientific progress and as a stimulant for a diversity of applied fields. Its paradoxes and perplexities notwithstanding, personality science is an audacious project that is already advancing our understanding of the depth and subtleties of human natures and nurturing attempts to enhance the quality of lives.

Notes: An insightful commentary on how personality science characterises the complexity of human beings and its potential for helping to enhance lives. Relates to personhood and well-being.

206. Locke, J. L. & Bogin, B. (2006). Language and life history: A new perspective on the development and evolution of human language. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 29(03), 259-280. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0600906X>. doi:doi:10.1017/S0140525X0600906X

Abstract: It has long been claimed that *Homo sapiens* is the only species that has language, but only recently has it been recognized that humans also have an unusual pattern of growth and development. Social mammals have two stages of pre-adult development: infancy and juvenility. Humans have two additional prolonged and pronounced life history stages: childhood, an interval of four years extending between infancy and the juvenile period that follows, and adolescence, a stage of about eight years that stretches from juvenility to adulthood. We begin by reviewing the primary biological and linguistic changes occurring in each of the four pre-adult ontogenetic stages in human life history. Then we attempt to trace the evolution of childhood and juvenility in our hominin ancestors. We propose that several different forms of selection applied in infancy and childhood; and that, in adolescence, elaborated vocal behaviors played a role in courtship and intrasexual competition, enhancing fitness and ultimately integrating performative and pragmatic skills with linguistic knowledge in a broad faculty of language. A theoretical consequence of our proposal is that fossil evidence of the uniquely human stages may be used, with other findings, to date the emergence of language. If important aspects of language cannot appear until sexual maturity, as we propose, then a second consequence is that the development of language requires the whole of modern human ontogeny. Our life history model thus offers new ways of investigating, and thinking about, the evolution, development, and ultimately the nature of human language.

Notes: A developmental, evolutionary approach to understanding life stages in relation to linguistic competencies and adaptations. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

207. Lu, L. (2008). Culture, self, and subjective well-being: Cultural, psychological and social change perspectives. *Psychologia*, 54(4), 290-303. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000266470000006

Abstract: Culture serves as a major force shaping the way people conceptualize the self, think about happiness, and cope with difficulties and upheavals in life. The present paper starts with a conceptual analysis of traditional Chinese and modern Western views of the self, to contrast the social-oriented versus individual-oriented nature of the self embedded in the two cultural traditions. These culture-specific modes of self construction can then shed light on the diverse meanings people hold for happiness and well-being in different societies. Building on the social-oriented view of the self, which emphasizes relatedness, fluidity, morality, self-constraint, harmony, and sensitivity to others, subjective well-being for the Chinese is construed around fulfilling one's obligations and maintaining homeostasis (dialectical balance). In contrast, emanating from an individual-oriented view of the self, which emphasizes independence, self-determination, consistency, and personal striving, happiness is a prize to be fought over, and entirely one's responsibility to accomplish this ultimate goal of life. Similarly, culture-specific preferences in individual-society and/or interpersonal alignment mirror the two contrasting views of the self, and link up with the collaborative project of pursuing happiness.

Notes: Explores the intricate relationships between culture, understandings of self (collectivist and individualistic) and their implications for happiness and well-being. Relates to selfhood/ personhood and well-being.

208. Lutz, M. A. (2008). The 'dismal science' – Still? economics and human flourishing. *Review of Political Economy*, 20(2), 163-180. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09538250701819594>.
doi:10.1080/09538250701819594

Abstract: This paper is an attempt to evaluate critically standard economic theory from the point of view of self-realization ethics and psychology. In doing so, there is considerable reliance on Abraham Maslow's well-known theory of personality development. According to his penetrating insight, it is insecurity that keeps a person trapped in a world of materialism - be it a desperate survival mentality, a preoccupation with excessive sexuality, or an unabashed and omnipresent consumerism. Feeling secure, on the other hand, opens the gates to psychological health and real personal autonomy. Over time there has accumulated a considerable amount of empirical evidence supporting such a Maslowian insecurity-materialism link. The present paper surveys the problem of economic insecurity, especially the anxiety of job loss. Since there is ample evidence that, in today's globalized world, this problem is quite serious and increasingly widespread, it would follow that Maslowian personality theory predicts a large part of the population finding it increasingly hard to embark on a life of personal flourishing. Economic theory, with its traditional emphasis on competitive markets for both output and input, its unflagging support of unregulated international trade and outsourcing, its tacit consent for the new lean, mean, and flexible corporation, and its purely instrumental treatment of work and workers, for all these reasons, must share much of the blame for what appears to be a massive stunting of personality development. In this regard, the dismal science of the nineteenth century may still warrant the same designation today.

Notes: Argues that well-being has been adversely affected by the promotion of an economic environment that increases insecurity – in a Maslowian sense – and so reduces flourishing. Relates to well-being.

209. Lyon, P. (2007). From quorum to cooperation: lessons from bacterial sociality for evolutionary theory. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences*, 38(4), 820-833. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369848607000520>.
doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2007.09.008

Abstract: The study of cooperation and altruism, almost since its inception, has been carried out without reference to the most numerous, diverse and very possibly most cooperative domain of life on the planet: bacteria. This is starting to change, for good reason. Far from being clonal loners, bacteria are highly social creatures capable of astonishingly complex collective behaviour that is mediated, as it is in colonial insects, by chemical communication. The article discusses recent experiments that explore different facets of current theories of the evolution and maintenance of cooperation using bacterial models. Not only do bacteria

hold great promise as experimentally tractable, rapidly evolving systems for testing hypotheses, bacterial experiments have already raised interesting questions about the assumptions on which our current understanding of cooperation and altruism rests.

Notes: "Collectively, the experiments show that cooperation is far more robust and the mechanisms for maintaining it more varied than previously thought..... If cooperative behaviour is indeed common in the microbial world, then the conditions that give rise to cooperation— including extreme forms of self-sacrifice—are not rare. If fossil stromatolites were indeed formed by ancient microbes acting together, as recently suggested, cooperation may also be an evolutionarily ancient strategy. If cooperation is widespread and ancient, then it cannot be puzzling. Accordingly, some of the assumptions about how natural selection works, which have led to the 'enduring paradox of collateral altruistic behaviour', require modification. Recent experience suggests that bacterial models will help provide the means for testing those assumptions and provide some, perhaps many, of the insights necessary for shaping the evolutionary theory of the future."

A fascinating argument that cooperativity might be a fairly simple phenomenon that does not require extensive evolutionary explanation. Far from being an oddity, it may be integral to the evolutionary process. Relates to evolutionary psychology and, potentially, social aspects of personhood and well-being.

210. Lyubomirsky, S. & Boehm, J. K. (2010). Human motives, happiness, and the puzzle of parenthood: commentary on Kenrick et al. (2010). *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 5(3), 327-334. Editorial Material. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000278367000011. doi:10.1177/1745691610369473

Abstract: It is presumed that happiness, and its associated positive emotions, signal to the individual that an adaptive problem has been solved, thus allowing her to shift attention to other concerns, perhaps those "higher" on the revised motivational hierarchy proposed by Kenrick et al (2010, this issue). In this commentary, we present a sampling of longitudinal and experimental evidence supporting two predictions: (a) that people will feel happy after realizing fundamental human motives, and (b) that in turn, the experience of happiness will galvanize people to fulfill these very motives. However, one conspicuous exception to our argument that happiness is both a consequence and a stimulus of human motives is parenthood, which paradoxically is associated with decrements in well-being. Two broad sets of explanations to account for this puzzle are discussed. The first involves evolutionary accounts: that children interfere with lower level needs, that short-term costs of having children are outweighed by long-term benefits, and that the modern-day context of raising children is at odds with our ancestors' environments. The second possibility involves measurement: namely, problems with study designs and the difficulty of capturing on paper or computer screen what is precisely so wonderful and elusive that children grant their parents.

Notes: An interesting evolutionary analysis of the conflicting feelings associated with parenthood. While lower well-being is correlated with having children there are clearly evolutionary benefits in terms of fitness. The puzzle is why something so adaptively beneficial should result in lower well-being given that happiness is usually understood as a means by which evolution reinforces adaptive behaviours. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

211. Machery, E. (2008). Origins of the social mind: evolutionary psychology and child development. Edited by Bruce J. Ellis and David F. Bjorklund. Guilford Press, New York, London, 2005. . *Infant and Child Development*, 17(5), 553-556. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/icd.567>. doi:10.1002/icd.567

No abstract.

Notes: Book Review of Origins of the social mind: evolutionary psychology and child development. Edited by Bruce J. Ellis and David F. Bjorklund. Guilford Press, New York, London, 2005. pp. 540. Price: £49.95; \$65.00. ISBN 1593851030. [Links to Ellis and Bjorklund (2005), above]. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood development.

212. Maclaren, K. (2008). Embodied perceptions of others as a condition of selfhood? Empirical and phenomenological considerations. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 15(8), 63-93. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000258162800003

Abstract: Against recent claims that infants begin with a sense of themselves as distinct selves, I propose that the infant's initial sense of self is still indeterminate and ambiguous, and is only progressively consolidated, beginning with embodied perceptions of others. Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception and Hegel's notion of mutual recognition, and with reference to empirical studies in developmental psychology, I argue that perceiving other persons is significantly different from perceiving inanimate things. Until sufficient motor capacities have developed for exploring and perceptually disambiguating inanimate things, it is only in perceiving others who recognize her that the infant is able to realize herself as a self. As the physiological and behavioural evidence suggests, whereas inanimate things initially captivate and dispossess the young infant, other people return her to herself. This paper lends support to the ideas that humans are ontologically social beings, and that selfhood is socially conditioned rather than given with consciousness.

Notes: Argues that the developmental evidence is in favour of the development of a sense of self only through social interaction, rather than as a developmental given. It depends fundamentally upon the ability to recognise others as others which then allows establishment of a sense of self. Relates to the developmental origins of selfhood/personhood.

213. Mageo, J. M. (2002). Toward a multidimensional model of the self. *Journal of Anthropological Research*, 58(3), 339-365. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000178379100002

Abstract: This article presents a multidimensional model of the self that recognizes cultural variety while providing a comparative framework-giving translatability to difference. In this model, cultures of self can be mapped on an array of continua that represent modes of variation in a multidimensional field. These continua enable us to figure the position of one culture relative to others, while allowing for the possibility that dimensions of self do not co-vary among cultures. Continua also make it possible to plot variance in styles of selfhood

within a single culture that could occur between contexts, through historical time, or among subgroups of class, caste, gender, or ethnicity. In the process of delineating this model, I interrogate theories, both venerable and contemporary, concerning experience and embodiment, ranking and gender, morality, emotion and cognition, attachment and need, asking how these elements of self articulate with one another and in what sense their cultural divergence is meaningful.

Notes: Explores and attempts to explain the cultural diversity of selfhood through consideration of continua associated with aspects of self present in cultures and between cultures. Relates to selfhood/ personhood.

214. Mahfouz, A. Y. ; Philaretou, A. G. & Theocharous, A. (2008). Virtual social interactions: Evolutionary, social psychological and technological perspectives. *Computers in Human Behavior*, 24(6), 3014-3026. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0747563208001052>. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2008.05.008

Abstract: This paper represents an exploratory and quantitative investigation into online dating from evolutionary, psychological, and technological points of view. In the past decade, the relatively inexpensive availability of user-friendly, fast, and reliable Internet technology has appealed to millions of consumers who suddenly found themselves engrossed by this sensational medium of communication, information, consumerism, and service. The majority of Internet users tend to be either recreational or utilitarian oriented, using such medium for a wide variety of tasks ranging from corresponding with friends and significant others, information gathering, purchasing goods and services, and, increasingly so, seeking and securing suitable dating and marital partners. The following research questions constitute the driving force for the current investigation: What are the evolutionary and social psychological intricacies of online dating? What are the technological variants or dimensions that render the consumption of online dating services appealing to users? An online survey was administered to 247 subjects to explore these questions and determine the technological dimensions of virtual social interaction. Exploratory factor analysis was then conducted to analyse the data. Eight technological dimensions emerged as a result of the analysis and served as the basis for the study's technological perspectives model of virtual social interactions.

Notes: Discusses online dating/courtship partly from an evolutionary perspective. It also has implications for experiences of personhood in a information technology infused world. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

215. Maitland, I. (2002). The human face of self-interest. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 38(1/2), 3-17. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/197995848?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Moralists tend to have a low opinion of self-interest. It is seen as force that has to be controlled or transcended. This essay tries to get beyond the bifurcation of human motivations into self-interest (which is seen as vicious or non-moral) and concern for others (which is virtuous). It is argued that there are some surprising affinities between self-interest

and morality. Notably the principal force that checks self-interest is self-interest itself. Consequently, self-interest often coincides with and reinforces the commands of morality and promotes civility and consideration for others. Therefore it provides one with resources for constructing a more humane and civil society.

Notes: Explores the moral dimensions of self-interest, relying on an evolutionary, utilitarian and economic logic concerning the relationship between self-interest and demands for civil and moral behaviour. Relates to personhood.

216. Malafouris, L. (2008). Between brains, bodies and things: tectonoetic awareness and the extended self. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences*, 363(1499), 1993-2002. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000255442700007. doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0014

Abstract: This paper presents the possible outline of a framework that will enable the incorporation of material culture into the study of the human self. To this end, I introduce the notions of extended self and tectonoetic awareness. Focusing on the complex interactions between brains, bodies and things and drawing a number of different and usually unconnected threads of evidence from archaeology, philosophy and neuroscience together, I present a view of selfhood as an extended and distributed phenomenon that is enacted across the skin barrier and which thus comprises both neural and extra-neural resources. Finally, I use the example of a gold Mycenaean signet ring to explore how a piece of inanimate matter can be seen (sometimes) as a constitutive and efficacious part of the human self-system.

Notes: Investigates the possible role of material culture in the study of the self. It relies on the notion of a self extended into the world and arising out of interactions with and uses of that world. Relates to selfhood/ personhood.

217. Manner, M. & Gowdy, J. (2010). The evolution of social and moral behavior: Evolutionary insights for public policy. *Ecological Economics*, 69(4), 753-761. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000275003800010. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.04.021

Abstract: This paper explores the evolution of humans as social beings and the implications of this for economic theory and policy. A major flaw in Walrasian economics is the assumption of "self-regarding" agents-economic actors make decisions independently of social context and without regard to the behavior of other consumers and firms. Truly other-regarding behavior, such as altruism and altruistic punishment, cannot be fully captured in the standard economic model. Standard economic assumptions about human behavior make pure altruism an irrational "anomaly" that cannot survive the evolutionary selection process. However, recent findings from neuroscience, behavioral economics, evolutionary game theory and animal behavior have paved the way for a realistic, science-based, and policy-relevant foundation for economic theory. Other-regarding emotions such as altruism, love, and envy are an essential part of the human experience. We use the Price equation, showing the feasibility of the evolution of group selection of altruistic preferences, to explore some of the implications of this phenomenon for economic theory and policy. We

explore evidence that the human capacity for empathy evolved from primates and suggest that this was the precursor for human morality. We suggest that if we drop the assumption that fitness is equated with the consumption of market goods, pure altruism is no longer fitness reducing, particularly in western societies. We also examine individual preferences for altruism in terms of their effect on well being.

Notes: A critical analysis of the economic view of persons as 'self-regarding' and of 'fitness' as equated with consumption of market goods. It argues for an evolutionary understanding of how altruistic behaviour might emerge through group selection processes and explores the consequences of the inclusion of such an account of altruism into economic theory. Relates to selfhood/ personhood and well-being.

218. Markowitsch, H. J. & Staniloiu, A. (2011). Memory, auto-noetic consciousness, and the self. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 20(1), 16-39. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810010001716>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.005>

Abstract: Memory is a general attribute of living species, whose diversification reflects both evolutionary and developmental processes. Episodic-autobiographical memory (EAM) is regarded as the highest human ontogenetic achievement and as probably being uniquely human. EAM, auto-noetic consciousness and the self are intimately linked, grounding, supporting and enriching each other's development and cohesiveness. Their development is influenced by the socio-cultural-linguistic environment in which an individual grows up or lives. On the other hand, through language, textualization and social exchange, all three elements leak into the world and participate to the dynamic shaping and re-shaping of the cultural scaffolding of the self, mental time traveling and EAM formation. Deficits in self-related processing, auto-noetic consciousness, emotional processing and mental time traveling can all lead to or co-occur with EAM disturbances, as we illustrate by findings from EAM impairments associated with neurological or psychiatric disorders.

Notes: Explores the links between episodic-autobiographical memory, self and 'auto-noetic consciousness', their reliance on evolutionary and developmental settings and their interactions with the world through linguistic and social interaction. Relates to evolutionary psychology and selfhood/ personhood.

219. Martin, J. (2003). Emergent persons. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 21(2), 85-99.

Abstract: Recent psychological theorizing about the emergence of persons makes a number of ontological claims that are not always explicit. A critical consideration of such claims reveals both considerable convergence and some points of disagreement across different psychological theories of emergent personhood. What is clear is that all such theories resist the reduction of persons to biophysical or sociocultural properties, conditions, and processes. In various ways, they each call for a nonreductionistic recognition of the sociocultural constitution of important aspects of personhood, without denying the necessity of biophysical requirements of personhood. Because standard emergentist positions in physical science and the philosophy of physical science mostly ignore the

sociocultural level of reality, psychological theorizing about the emergence of persons requires an alternative ontological framework. It is proposed that an ontology of levels of reality that includes the physical, chemical, biological, sociocultural, and personal/psychological is appropriate for understanding how persons are both substantively and relationally emergent within the biophysical, sociocultural world. With such an ontological framework in place, it is possible to understand human activity in the world as the primary vehicle for both the phylogenetic evolution and ontogenetic development of persons.

Notes: People both influence and are influenced by the biophysical and sociocultural world they inhabit. Martin concludes that understanding of recent theories on the emergence of persons requires the recognition of human activity/agency in the biophysical and biocultural world. Relates to personhood.

220. Martin, J. (2004). The educational inadequacy of conceptions of self in educational psychology. *Interchange*, 35(2), 185-208. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02698849>. doi:10.1007/bf02698849

Abstract: Disciplinary and professional psychology have exercised considerable influence over the ways in which Western individuals and societies understand what it is to be a person. During the last half of the 20th century, educational psychologists advanced scientific and humanistic conceptions of the self that removed personhood from the historical, socio-cultural traditions and related moral and political practices within which the self develops. In consequence, the theoretical and practical models of self-enhancement and self-management offered by educational psychologists are inadequate with respect to the education of persons who, if they are to function as effective citizens, must participate in complex, contested socio-cultural, moral, and political contexts with others.

Notes: Argues that accounts of personhood provided by scientific and professional psychologists are abstracted from the nature of persons as historically, politically, morally and socially situated actors. These influential accounts undermine the prospects of producing persons who are capable of dealing effectively with the realities of the contexts of being a person. Relates to personhood.

221. Martin, J. (2005). Real perspectival selves. *Theory & Psychology*, 15(2), 207-224. Retrieved from <http://tap.sagepub.com/content/15/2/207.abstract>. doi:10.1177/0959354305051364

Abstract: The psychological self has been dismissed by some scientific naturalists and social constructionists as either illusory or fictitious. Arguments against strong forms of naturalism and constructionism that would deny the reality of the self are presented. More positively, the self is conceptualized as an embodied first-person perspective (an 'I') and understanding (a 'me'), and a theory of its development during ontogenesis is presented. Following further discussion about the 'reality status' of the self thus understood, it is concluded that such a self is a legitimate target for expanded forms of psychological inquiry.

Notes: Provides an ontogenetic account of the self that counters naturalistic and social constructionist denials of the reality of the self. Relates to personhood.

222. Martin, J. (2006). Reinterpreting internalization and agency through G.H. Mead's perspectival realism. *Human Development*, 49(2), 65-86. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/224017550?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Toward the end of his life, George Herbert Mead developed a theory of perspectives that may be used to reinterpret his social, developmental psychology. This paper attempts such a reinterpretation, leading to the emergence of a theory of perspective taking in early childhood that looks quite different from that which is assumed in most extant work in developmental psychology. Theoretical and empirical implications of Mead's perspectivism and perspective taking are also explored, with particular focus on questions of internalization and agency. In addition, important distinctions are drawn between Mead's view of human development and most contemporary theories.

Notes: Provides an account of the role of perspective taking in development of the self and contrasts this account with standard developmental theories. Relates to personhood.

223. Martin, J. (2006). Positions, perspectives, and persons. *Human Development*, 49(2), 93-95. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/224017403?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Gillespie's commentary is helpful to Martin for at least two reasons. First, he provides a very clear discussion of how repetitive positional exchange might drive the differentiation, integration, and coordination of perspectives during ontogenesis. Secondly, his discussion of hide-and-seek, together with its developmentally more basic and advanced forms, provides an excellent illustration of positional exchange and perspective taking as envisioned by Mead. In his response, Martin discusses one significant difference between his and Gillespie's neo-Meadian theoretical treatment of relations between social positions and perspectives.

Notes: A response to a commentary on a previous article by Martin (see above). Relates to personhood and its development.

224. Martin, J. (2006). Self research in educational psychology: A cautionary tale of positive psychology in action. *The Journal of Psychology*, 140(4), 307-316. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/213832759?accountid=27890>
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF8&rft_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Aabiglobal&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Psychology&rft.atitle=Self+Research+in+Educational+Psychology%3A+A+Cautionary+Tale+of+Positive+Psychology+in+Action&rft.au=Martin%2C+Jack&rft.aulast=Martin&rft.aufirst=Jack&rft.date=2006-07-01&rft.volume=140&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=307&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.title=The+Journal+of+Psychology&rft.issn=00223980

Abstract: Recent calls for a positive psychology that would deemphasize human pathology and dysfunction in favor of building an understanding of positive features of human life and human flourishing make two assumptions that the author questions in this article. First, he challenges the assumption that disciplinary psychology has been fixated on pathology and dysfunction by considering work in educational psychology that, both historically and currently, espouses the characteristics of positive psychology as articulated by its major advocates. Second, through a brief, critical consideration of research on the self in educational psychology, he contests the assumption that psychology has sufficient resources to develop into the positive psychology envisioned by its promoters. He argues that psychology's emphasis on the individual, whose core self resides in a deep, internal psyche, radically strips psychology of the historical and sociocultural resources that enable self-development, constrain self-understanding, and constitute the self.

Notes: Criticises positive psychology on two fronts: its claim that psychology has focused on dysfunction at the expense of flourishing; the project of positive psychology itself, given a claimed inadequate understanding of the self that underpins work in the area. That latter inadequacy, he argues, stems from the individualistic and internalist assumptions about the nature of the self and, consequently, a lack of consideration of the sociocultural and historical contexts needed to make sense of the self. Relates to personhood and well-being.

225. Martin, J. (2007). Educating communal agents: Building on the perspectivism of G.H. Mead. *Educational Theory*, 57(4), 435-452. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2007.00267.x>
[doi:10.1111/j.1741-5446.2007.00267.x](http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2007.00267.x)

Abstract: In their search for more communal forms of agency that might guide education, contemporary educational psychologists have mostly neglected the theorizing of George Herbert Mead. In this essay, Jack Martin aims to remedy such oversight by interpreting Mead's social-psychological and educational theorizing of selfhood and agency through the lenses of the perspectival realism Mead developed in the last decade of his life. This interpretation understands education as concerned with the cultivation and coordination of cultural, societal, interpersonal, and personal perspectives. Within this framework, communal agency is understood as a self-interpreting, self-determining capability of persons. This agentic capability derives from immersion and participation with others

within sociocultural practices and perspectives, but also includes reactivity to those same practices and perspectives. The education of communal agents as envisioned here emphasizes the social nature of education, students' experience and development, and the critical role of the teacher as a mediator between student development and social process. Such an education is grounded in the immediate experiences and perspectives of learners, but increasingly assists learners to move beyond their own experiences through engaged interaction with others and with resources for acquiring broader, more organized perspectives on themselves, others, and the world.

Notes: Applies a Meadian account of perspective taking to understand the educational process as a social, interactive process performed by 'communal agents'. Education is understood as an acquisition of various other perspectives, including those well-organised perspectives on themselves and the rest of the world. Relates to personhood and its educational development.

226. Martin, J. (2007). Interpreting and extending G. H. Mead's "Metaphysics" of selfhood and agency. *Philosophical Psychology*, 20(4), 441-456. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000247761500002. doi:10.1080/09515080701385826

Abstract: G. H. Mead developed an alternative "metaphysics" of selfhood and agency that underlies, but is seldom made explicit in discussions of, his social developmental psychology. This is an alternative metaphysics that rejects any pre-given, fixed foundations for being and knowing. It assumes the emergence of social psychological phenomena such as mind, self, and deliberative agency through the activity of human actors and interactors within their biophysical and sociocultural world. Of central importance to the emergence of self-consciousness and deliberative forms of human agency is the ability of developing individuals to take the perspectives of others within their own conduct. However, precisely what is involved in this process, and whether or not it assumes the preexistence of exactly those forms of selfhood and agency, the emergence of which it seeks to explain, have been much disputed. In this essay, recent reinterpretations of Mead's "metaphysics" are used to argue that his overall theoretical program contains resources necessary to overcome charges of ontological and epistemological circularity. In particular, once his interactionism, perspectivism, emergentism, and compatibilism are explicated, it is possible to see that Mead's "taking the perspective of the other" is not primarily a process of internalization that requires a preexisting "internalizer," but a process of participation with others within conventionalized sequences of interactivity. This participatory process enables the development of prereflective forms of perspective taking and self-other differentiation that serve as necessary conditions for the further emergence of more reflective forms of perspective taking, self-consciousness, and deliberative agency. Compatibilist interpretations of deliberative agency, thus understood, also are discussed.

Notes: Advances a reinterpretation of Mead's notion of taking a perspective and defends it against charges of presuming what it hopes to explain. This is done by arguing that perspectives are initially prereflective and emerge in interaction with others. Only at that point does a 'perspective taker' emerge. Relates to personhood.

227. Martin, J. (2007). The selves of educational psychology: Conceptions, contexts, and critical considerations. *Educational Psychologist, 42*(2), 79-89. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000247391800001

Abstract: This article begins with an interpretation and description of conceptions of selfhood that are assumed in educational psychologists' programs of theory, research, and practice in the area of student self-development. Three underlying conceptions of the self are considered: (a) the expressive self (found mostly in research and theory on self-esteem and self-concept), (b) the managerial self (found mostly in research and theory on self-regulation and self-efficacy), and (c) the communal self (found to some extent in sociocultural research and theory in educational psychology, but not typically emphasized or evident in studies of self-esteem, self-concept, self-regulation, and self-efficacy). This overview is followed by an interpretation of the sociocultural context (in Western societies and schools) within which these conceptions of selfhood have flourished. Three dimensions are especially helpful in interpreting the sociocultural and school contexts within which self-related studies in educational psychology are positioned: (a) a psychological dimension of self-control versus self-fulfillment, (b) a social political dimension of individual freedom versus civic responsibility, and (c) an educational dimension of personal development versus institutional socialization. A critical assessment of the current state of self-related studies in educational psychology is then undertaken that focuses on the relative absence of, and need for, more communal conceptions of selfhood in these areas of inquiry. Finally, possibilities for the development of viable conceptions of communal selfhood and agency are considered briefly.

Notes: Argues that the educational setting has focused on three basic views of self which can be conceptually related to three dimensions of selves. In this framework it becomes clear that a 'communal selfhood' has been relatively neglected. Relates to personhood and its educational development.

228. Martin, J. (2010). The psychology of personhood: Conditions for a viable, neo-meadian pluralism. *New Ideas in Psychology, 28*(2), 219-226.

Abstract: Two conditions for a potentially viable pluralism, based on recent interpretations of the work of George Herbert Mead, are discussed: (1) a shared conception of the psychological person acting in the biophysical and sociocultural world, and (2) a willingness to engage across differing sub-disciplinary perspectives. Even with these conditions in place, any such pluralism still faces significant challenges in avoiding ever-present challenges of creeping imperialism and interdisciplinary gloss.

Notes: A suggestion that theoretical pluralism could be based upon a shared view of a broad notion of the psychological person acting within various biological and social contexts. Relates to personhood.

229. Martin, J. (2011). The interactivist social ontology of persons: A descriptive and evaluative synthesis, with two suggestions. *Axiomathes*, 21(1), 173-183. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000288022700007. doi:10.1007/s10516-009-9095-y

Abstract: Within the interactivist, process approach to metaphysics, Bickhard (Social life and social knowledge: toward a process account of development. Lawrence Erlbaum, New York, 2008a; *Topoi* 27: 139-149, 2008b; *New Ideas Psychol*, in press) has developed a social ontology of persons that avoids many well-known philosophical difficulties concerning the genesis, development, and application of the rational and moral capabilities and responsibilities that characterize persons. Interactivism positions developing persons inside sets of social conventions within which they participate in their own constitution as rational and moral agents who constantly transform themselves and their world. Following a description of Bickhard's social ontology and an evaluation of its philosophical merits, two suggestions are offered with the intention of extending the explanatory reach of an interactivist ontology of persons. One of these suggestions concerns a recommended shift from processes of interaction and constructivism to processes of coordination and constitutionism. A second, related recommendation concerns the need for a more precise detailing of processes of coordinated constitution that explain the developing person's embodied and enactive transformation from a social to a psychological being.

Notes: Combines a social ontology of persons (i.e., persons are entities in a social world) with an interactivist approach to produce a modified interactionism that emphasises coordination and constitution which, in turn, provides an explanation for the movement from a social being to a psychological one. Relates to personhood.

230. Martin, J. (2012). Coordinating with others: Outlining a pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 30(1), 131-143.

Abstract: In contrast to individualistic, cognitive-biological, and reductive psychologies, a pragmatic psychology of personhood takes the worldly activity of persons as its core subject matter. The pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood outlined herein offers theoretical frameworks for understanding the development and evolution of persons through their embodied coordination with objects and others in a world that is simultaneously biophysical and sociocultural. In both phylogenesis and ontogenesis, it is their active participation within coordinated, multi-perspectival sequences of interactive practices that constitutes human beings as psychological selves and communal agents who constantly transform the world and themselves. The constitution, emergence, and transformation of persons are accompanied and enabled by a holistic neurophysiological functioning that interacts constantly with, and owes much to, our history of interactivity within the world, especially our social participation with others and their actions and perspectives. A viable pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood demands the close study of our coordinated interactivity within sociocultural practices central to the life of communities and the communal agents who populate them.

Notes: Elaborates a theory of coordinated interactivity that is claimed to express both phylogenetically and ontogenetically the social interactive processes that lead to the development of personhood. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

231. Martin, J. , & Bickhard, M. H. (2012). An introduction to the special issue on "The New Psychology of Personhood". *New Ideas in Psychology*, 30(1), 86-88.

No abstract.

Notes: An editorial: "Disciplinary psychology claims the actions and experiences (albeit more typically rendered as the behaviors, cognitions, and emotions) of persons as its subject matter. It is surprising, therefore, how little attention most psychologists have given to conceptualizing and theorizing persons..... Given the centrality of personhood to psychological theory and inquiry, and the possibility that psychological theories, research, and practices are themselves strongly implicated in the personhood of many contemporary Westerners, a special issue of *New Ideas* devoted to current work in the psychology of personhood is both timely and important." A significant special issue that reintroduces the person – as a theoretical target - into psychology. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

232. Martin, J. , & Gillespie, A. (2010). A neo-meadian approach to human agency: Relating the social and the psychological in the ontogenesis of perspective-coordinating persons. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, 44(3), 252-272. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000280088400008. doi:10.1007/s12124-010-9126-7

Abstract: How can human agency be reconciled with bio-physical determinism? Starting with a discussion of the long standing debate between determinism and agency, we argue that the seeds of a reconciliation can be found in George Herbert Mead's ideas concerning social acts, perspectives, differentiation, self-other interactivity, and conscious understanding. Drawing on more recent reformulations of Mead's ideas, we present an integrated account of the ontogenesis of human agency. Human agency, we argue, should be conceptualized in terms of distancing from immediate experience, and we show how social interactions, institutions and symbolic resources foster the development of agency in increasingly complex ways. We conclude by situating our work in relation to other developmental accounts and the larger project of theorizing and empirically supporting a compatibilist rendering of human agency as the "determined" self-determination of persons.

Notes: Attempts to reconcile determinism with personal agency through a Meadian approach to perspective-taking and the availability of social and symbolic processes and institutions. An interesting contribution to the central question of the nature of personal agency. Relates to personhood.

233. Martin, J. , Sokol, B. W. & Elfers, T. (2008). Taking and coordinating perspectives: From prereflective interactivity, through reflective intersubjectivity, to metareflective sociality. *Human Development*, 51(5-6), 294-317. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000261830800002. doi:10.1159/000170892

Abstract: Despite being eclipsed in recent years by simulation theory, theory of mind and accounts of executive functioning, social-relational approaches to perspective taking and coordination based on the ideas of Jean Piaget and George Herbert Mead have never completely disappeared from the literature of developmental psychology. According to the social-relational view presented here, perspectives are holistic orientations to situations, within which individuals coordinate their actions and interactions with objects and others. The developmental processes by which perspectives are occupied, differentiated, and coordinated move from

(1) prereflective interactivity (i.e., positioning within routine, repetitive interactive sequences during infancy and early childhood), to (2) reflective intersubjectivity (i.e., the simultaneous consideration and use of multiple perspectives within the intersubjective transactions of later childhood and early adolescence - processes that are accelerated and extended through increasingly sophisticated uses of language), and finally to (3) metareflective sociality (i.e., the abstracted and generalized social engagement across a diversity of personal, interpersonal, and sociocultural perspectives witnessed in mature adult negotiations and problem solving). These social-relational processes are used to reinterpret, revise, and extend Robert Selman's theory of the development of perspective taking and coordination. The result is a developmental process of occupying, experiencing, coordinating, and engaging across a diversity of perspectives within interactive, intersubjective, and psychological-sociocultural transactions that spans the course of individuals' lives and captures some facets of the complex, transformative, and ongoing interplay between societies and persons.

Notes: An outline of a proposed developmental process of increasingly sophisticated perspective taking and its relationship to developing personhood in a complex social context. Relates to personhood.

234. Martin, J. & Sugarman, J. (1996). Bridging social constructionism and cognitive constructivism: A psychology of human possibility and constraint. *Journal of Mind and Behavior*, 17(4), 291-319. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1996WL28400001

Abstract: A theory intended to bridge social constructionist and cognitive constructivist thought is presented, and some of its implications for psychotherapy and education are considered. The theory is mostly concerned with understanding the emergence and development of the psychological (mind, selfhood, intentionality, agency) from its biological and sociocultural origins. It is argued that the psychological is underdetermined by the biological and sociocultural, and possesses a shifting, dynamic ontology that emerges within a developmental context. Increasingly sophisticated capabilities of memory and imagination

mediate and support the emergence of genuinely agentic psychological phenomena from appropriated sociocultural forms and practices.

Notes: Discusses the origins of psychological processes from the interaction of biological and sociocultural processes. The psychological processes, however, gain agentic independence from the other processes. Relates to personhood.

235. Martin, J. , Sugarman, J. , & Hickenbottom, S. (2010). *Persons: Understanding psychological selfhood and agency*. Springer: New York.

No abstract.

Notes: A recent and significant conceptual treatment of persons. Relates to personhood.

236. Martin, J. , Sugarman, J. , & Hickenbottom, S. (2010). The psychology of persons: An idea whose time has come (again). In *Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency* (pp. 155-173): Springer New York. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1065-3_10. doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-1065-3_10

Abstract: A recurrent theme in the history of psychology has been the failure of psychologists to focus their inquiries on the activity of persons in worldly context. In introspective, cognitive, and biological psychologies, thoughts, cognitive processes and structures, and/or patterns of neurophysiological activation have commanded the attention of investigators. In functional and behavioral psychologies, the “stripped-down” behaviors and reactions of research subjects in highly structured, narrowly construed, and mostly acultural, ahistorical contexts have prevailed as focal phenomena of interest. Much psychoanalytic, humanistic, phenomenological, and existentialist work in psychology has tended to elevate the inner experiences, struggles, and tensions of persons over their activity in the everyday contexts and circumstances of their lives. Even evolutionary psychologists, who might be expected to place considerable emphasis on the worldly activity of persons, tend mostly to retreat to a combination of narrative speculation and mathematical modeling. In short, psychological inquiry and practice mostly have been dominated by some combination of interior focus and/or environmental restriction and simplification. Of equal significance is a strongly dualistic tendency evident in most psychological theory and research that treats persons as separate from, and more or less over and against, the world in which they reside and act.

Notes: Emphasises the importance of the lived context of action for understanding the psychological nature of human beings as persons. In contrast, it is pointed out that much psychology assumes an ‘abstracted’ individual whose psychology is relatively independent of context. Relates to personhood.

237. Mason, W. A. & Mendoza, S. P. (1998). Generic aspects of primate attachments: Parents, offspring and mates. *Psychoneuroendocrinology*, 23(8), 765-778. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306453098000547>. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0306-4530\(98\)00054-7](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0306-4530(98)00054-7)

Abstract: We examine behavioral and physiological aspects of primate emotional attachments in the context of four relationships: infant-to-parent, parent-to-infant, and adult male-to-female and adult female-to-male in a monogamous New World species. Emotional attachments in each of these relationships show striking similarities at a basic functional level. The nature of these similarities suggests that they are produced by the same psychoneuroendocrine core, which appears to be present in all mammals. We also consider the development of each of kind of attachment. In contrast to fundamental similarities in the expression of attachment, their development in each case appears to be based on distinct, species-typical dispositions and constraints.

Notes: An examination of the biological underpinnings of emotional attachment in a range of primate species, revealing continuity of the behavioural and physiological bases of these processes. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

238. Massey, D. S. (2002). A brief history of human society: The origin and role of emotion in social life. *American Sociological Review*, 67(1), 1-29. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/218827279?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Human society emerged over 6 million years of hominid evolution. During this time, group size steadily increased, and to maintain group cohesion human beings gradually evolved a well-developed social intelligence based on the differentiation and refinement of emotions. The neurological structures for emotional expression are part of the primitive brain and developed long before the cognitive equipment for rational intelligence evolved. Indeed, full rationality came rather late in human evolution, and it has only been within the last 100 years that the social conditions emerged for a mass culture based on rationality. A review of the evolution of human society and human cognition illustrates the creation and workings of the human emotional brain and show how it operates independently of and strongly influences the rational brain. If sociology is to advance, research and theory must grapple with both rational and emotional intelligence and focus particularly on the interplay between them.

Notes: Argues that sociology is not well prepared to understand the nature and meaning of two important transitions; these being a) the bulk of the global population living in urban areas, and b) the demise of the last of the hunter-gathers. This, it is argued, is because of the following "three inter-related conceits", 1) "the elevation of the social over the biological"; 2) "our focus on the 'modern' rather than the 'traditional' " and 3) elevation of the 'rational' over the 'emotional', when the focus needs to be on the *interplay* between the rational and the emotional when attempting to explain and understand human behaviour. Reviews human society from its origins to the present. Examines the relationship between the evolution of individual cognitive capacities and emotions and the development of larger social groups and societies. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

239. Matsumoto, D. & Wilson, J. (2008). Chapter 23 - Culture, Emotion, and Motivation. In *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition Across Cultures* (pp. 541-563). San Diego: Academic Press. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123736949000234>. doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-373694-9.00023-4

No abstract.

Notes: Publisher Summary: This chapter describes a theory of how emotions serve as one important source of motivation by priming individuals to behave in certain ways. Culture, as a meaning and information system, influences emotion–behavior linkages. The function of culture is to prevent social chaos, maintain social order, and ensure group efficiency, given the ecological environment and the resources available in it to survive. It does this by identifying social roles, normative behaviors, expectations, value and belief systems related to interpersonal relationships and the environment, and with regard to emotion itself. It also creates a belief system involving worldviews and self-construals to help to reinforce, maintain, and achieve this purpose. When emotions are elicited, culture calibrates the primed individual to the behavioral repertoires available and necessary in that culture as identified by the social roles, norms, and expectations in order to serve as motivators for desired behaviors. Behaviors are viewed as occurring in specific situational contexts as role performances, and individuals as actors playing roles defined by culture. The functions of culture as a meaning and information system are to prevent social chaos, maintain social order, and ensure group efficiency, given the ecological environment and the resources available in it to survive. When emotions are elicited, culture calibrates the primed individual to the behavioral repertoires available and necessary in that culture as identified by the social roles, norms, and expectations in order to serve as motivators for desired behaviors. Culture also calibrates the behaviors of the perceivers of emotion, thereby ensuring the regulation of social interaction. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

Notes: Highlights the role of culture in priming particular behaviours that fit people to the ecological setting, especially through the calibration of emotional and motivational responses. Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology.

240. Mayer, F. S. & Frantz, C. M. (2004). The connectedness to nature scale: A measure of individuals' feeling in community with nature. *Journal of Environmental Psychology, 24*(4), 503-515. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272494404000696>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2004.10.001>

Abstract: Five studies assessed the validity and reliability of the connectedness to nature scale (CNS), a new measure of individuals' trait levels of feeling emotionally connected to the natural world. Data from two community and three college samples demonstrated that the CNS has good psychometric properties, correlates with related variables (the new environmental paradigm scale, identity as an environmentalist), and is uncorrelated with potential confounds (verbal ability, social desirability). This paper supports ecopsychologists' contention that connection to nature is an important predictor of ecological behavior and subjective well-being. It also extends social psychological research on self–other overlap, perspective taking, and altruistic behavior to the overlap between self and nature. The CNS

promises to be a useful empirical tool for research on the relationship between humans and the natural world.

Notes: A test of the connectedness to nature scale that supports the role of nature in fostering subjective-wellbeing. Relates to well-being.

241. McCabe, M. & Fabri, A. (2012). Vitamin practices and ideologies of health and the body. *International Journal of Business Anthropology*, 3(1), 39-61. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1018556113?accountid=27890>

Abstract: This article addresses people in the United States by examining beliefs and practices among people who take vitamins and supplements. The continuing rise of vitamin consumption calls for explanation given the lack of scientific consensus about the efficacy of vitamin pills in preventing disease and improving health. Taking vitamins contests biomedicine professionals and represents the choice for an alternative health practice that involves magical thinking, the emotions and sensory knowledge. Vitamins are self-medicating devices that lead to a culturally constituted experience of the self as a productive and whole person in a capitalist society. We pursue the notion of tactics to articulate the relationship between agency and structure. Vitamin practices reflect a nuanced concept of agency that shows how people navigate broader processes converging in the marketplace. Operating within this wider field, practices are transformative and lead to social change.

Notes: Why do so many people take vitamins when there is a lack of scientific consensus of their effectiveness in disease prevention and health improvement? This article attempts to understand the cultural beliefs and values motivating their increasing use. Why is magical thinking involved in something as important as health? "Vitamins embody capitalism by evoking ideas of energy, productivity and self-creation in the definition of personhood ... People speak of their vitamin rituals in terms of connecting mind and body ... Vitamin practices highlight re-conceptualization of personhood in Western society as a combination of individuality and sociality ... Current expansion of the vitamin and supplement market occurs with the rise of what Giddens calls the reflexive modern self where 'the self, like the broader institutional contexts in which it exists, has to be reflexively made.' " An interesting article that considers how a particular practice (taking vitamin supplements) connects to the formation of personhood and self in today's society. Relates to evolution, personhood and well-being.

242. McConnell, A. R. ; Shoda, T. M. & Skulborstad, H. M. (2012). The self as a collection of multiple self-aspects: Structure, development, operation, and implications. *Social Cognition, 30(4)*, 380-395. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1030252936?accountid=27890>. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.692
10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.493
10.1037/0033-295x.94.3.319
10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00819.x
10.1037/0033-295x.98.2.224
10.1037/0022-3514.46.5.961

Abstract: What is the self? This age-old question is one that, surprisingly, receives little attention even among researchers who study it. In our view, addressing this important question begins with acknowledging that the self is composed of multiple, context-dependent self-aspects represented in an interrelated memory network. These self-aspects develop in the service of pursuing important self-relevant goals (e.g., reproduction, achievement, belongingness) and reflect one's important qualities exhibited in these domains. Because context activates a goal-relevant self-aspect, discrete subregions of self-knowledge are activated at any given time, which limits the impact of core personality attributes and shapes the experience of current affect. This approach has broader implications for explaining how the self can be both stable yet variable, for the conditions under which self-concepts develop and change, for distinguishing between the self as the known and the knower, and for goal pursuit and self-regulatory activities.

Notes: Considers how different cognitive processes get recruited to perform the self in various contexts. In doing so, the claim is made that this provides insights into the fluidity of the self and its goal related orientations in those contexts. Relates to selfhood/ personhood

243. McCubbin, M. (2001). Pathways to health, illness and well-being: From the perspective of power and control. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 11(2)*, 75-81. Editorial Material. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000168607000001. doi:10.1002/casp.622

Abstract: This article introduces the special issue entitled 'Power, Control and Health'. The five articles in this issue, using qualitative observation and theory-building, deconstruct individualistic explanations of the roles of power, empowerment, control, self-efficacy, etc. in producing health and well-being outcomes, and reconstruct models and pathways to population health and well-being that are profoundly anchored in the social, economic and political dimensions of human life which create, structure, and reinforce power and powerlessness at individual and collective levels. The theory developed here contributes to the understanding of how population health and well-being are intimately related to and are consequences of power and powerlessness. This is the first published collection addressing the etiology of population health from the perspective of power and powerlessness; as such it not only advances knowledge about the determinants of population health, but provides a more scientific basis for interventions aimed at 'empowering' marginalized persons and classes of persons. The topics dealt with include a deconstruction of self-efficacy theory and

the 'socialization' of that concept, a model concerned with work and work stress for pathways to health and illness emphasizing class and gender, reflections on the meaning of empowerment in the prevention of unsafe sex practices, a study of empowerment and recovery in the context of changes in a community mental health system, and a systemic model based on the lifecourse perspective for child wellness and resilience centred around power and control. Those articles are followed by a commentary which stresses the need to 'depsychologize' community psychology, noting that even the articles in this special issue retain notable vestiges of reductionism to the individual level. This introduction describes the evolution of the public health field into the 'population health field' and the pertinence of a focus on power for understanding pathways to health, illness and well-being.

Notes: Concerns the power relationships underpinning health and well-being - and their neglect - in a literature which has emphasised individualistic assumptions and orientations. Connects notions of personhood to the processes that generate health and well-being. Relates to personhood and well-being.

244. McKay, R. T. & Dennett, D. C. (2009). The evolution of misbelief. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 32(06), 493-510. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09990975>.
doi:doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990975

Abstract: From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in the normal functioning of the belief formation system (e.g., delusions) and those arising in the normal course of that system's operations (e.g., beliefs based on incomplete or inaccurate information). The former are instances of biological dysfunction or pathology, reflecting "culpable" limitations of evolutionary design. Although the latter category includes undesirable (but tolerable) by-products of "forgivably" limited design, our quarry is a contentious subclass of this category: misbeliefs best conceived as design features. Such misbeliefs, unlike occasional lucky falsehoods, would have been systematically adaptive in the evolutionary past. Such misbeliefs, furthermore, would not be reducible to judicious – but doxastically noncommittal – action policies. Finally, such misbeliefs would have been adaptive in themselves, constituting more than mere by-products of adaptively biased misbelief-producing systems. We explore a range of potential candidates for evolved misbelief, and conclude that, of those surveyed, only positive illusions meet our criteria.

Notes: Assumes that belief systems have evolved which then raises the question of why some 'misbeliefs' survive and whether or not some sub-class of those misbeliefs (e.g., 'positive illusions') might be adaptive and, hence, be 'design features' of the mind. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

245. Meadows, S. (2010). *The child as a social person* Routledge.

No abstract.

Publisher's Notes: Questions about how children grow up in their social worlds are of enormous significance for parents, teachers, and society at large, as well as for children themselves. Clearly children are shaped by the social world that surrounds them but they also shape the social worlds that they, and those significant to them, encounter. But exactly how does this happen, and what can we do to ensure that it produces happy outcomes? This book provides a critical review of the psychological literature on the development of personality, social cognition, social skills, social relations and social outcomes from birth to early adulthood. It uses Bronfenbrenner's model of the development of the person and up-to-date evidence to analyse normal and abnormal social development, prosocial and antisocial behaviour, within and across cultures. As well as outlining the theory, the book addresses applied issues such as delinquency, school failure, and social exclusion. Using a coherent theoretical structure, *The Child as Social Person* examines material from across the biological and social sciences to present an integrated account of what we do and do not know about the development of the child as a social actor.

Notes: A presentation of the literature on the social psychology of development. Relates to personhood.

246. Mehu, M. ; Grammer, K. & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2007). Smiles when sharing. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 28(6), 415-422. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513807000645>. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.05.010

Abstract: One of the proposed functions of human smiling is to advertise cooperative dispositions and thereby increase the likelihood that a social partner would invest resources in a relationship. In particular, smiles involving an emotional component would be honest signals of altruistic dispositions because they are not easy to produce voluntarily. In this study, 60 people were covertly filmed while interacting with a friend in two conditions: control and sharing. Smiles were classified into Duchenne (spontaneous) and non-Duchenne smiles. Participants also completed a series of questionnaires, including the Altruism Scale and a self-report questionnaire of emotional state. Interestingly, Duchenne smiles were displayed at higher rates in the sharing situation as opposed to the control situation, whereas non-Duchenne smiles were unaffected by the type of interaction. Furthermore, Duchenne smiles in the sharing interaction were positively affected by a measure of altruism. Self-reported emotional states did not vary between conditions and were poorly related to smiling. This study shows that the Duchenne smile is relevant to situations that involve the sharing of material resources because it would reliably advertise altruistic intentions. The Duchenne smile could therefore be an important signal in the formation and maintenance of cooperative relationships.

Notes: An empirical study of the important relationship between cooperative use of resources (sharing) and the signalling of positive affect. It also assumes an evolutionary understanding of the adaptive nature of smiling. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

247. Meijsing, M. (2006). Being ourselves and knowing ourselves: An adverbial account of mental representations. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 15(3), 605-619. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810005001492>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2005.11.003>

Abstract: This paper takes an evolutionary approach to what we are, namely autopoietic systems with a first person perspective on our surroundings and ourselves. This in contrast with Thomas Metzinger's views in his Being No One. Though perception does involve internal processing and representations, it is argued that perception is direct. We track real features of the world, but fallibly, in a certain way. Moreover, it is claimed that mental representations are quite different from internal neural representations. They are best construed in an adverbial way. What we perceive, the object of perception, is the real world. Internal neural representations are the means by which we perceive the world. And mental representations are the way in which we experience the world, the adverbial content of perception. Finally, what goes for the world goes for ourselves as well: in self-consciousness we track real features of ourselves, but fallibly, in a certain way.

Notes: An interesting discussion of how self-perceptions reveal real aspects of ourselves (as mental representations) which are distinct from the neural representations which allow us to perceive in this way. This is based on a more general view of perception as direct perception combined with an 'adverbial' mental relationship to those perceptions. Neural representations, so to speak, correspond with aspects of the world while mental representations connect meaningfully with the world. Relates to personhood and our biological nature.

248. Meisenberg, G. (2004). Talent, character, and the dimensions of national culture. *Mankind Quarterly*, 45(2), 123-168. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/222487212?accountid=27890> http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&rft_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Aassocjournals&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Mankind+Quarterly&rft.atitle=Talent%2C+Character%2C+and+the+Dimensions+of+National+Culture&rft.au=Meisenberg%2C+Gerhard&rft.aulast=Meisenberg&rft.aufirst=Gerhard&rft.date=2004-12-01&rft.volume=45&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=123&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.title=Mankind+Quarterly&rft.issn=00252344. doi:10.1016/0191-8869(84)90110-7.1985-28060-00110.1016/0191-8869(84)90110-7 10.1037/0033-2909.116.1.21

Abstract: This study investigates the dimensions of cultural variation in the modern world as assessed by the World Values Survey. It confirms the previously reported existence of two major dimensions of cultural variation that can be described as modern and "postmodern," respectively. Modern values are characterized by skepticism and critical thinking, with a rejection of religion and traditional authority along with an interest in politics. In multiple

regression models, modern values are directly related to the IQ of the population. Postmodern values are characterized by trust, tolerance, and self-realization. In multiple regression models, they are inversely related to corruption. Subjective well-being is positively related to postmodern values and negatively to modern values. Modern values are interpreted as the emancipation of reason from the constraints of traditional custom and religion, and postmodern values as the emancipation of pleasure-seeking and social emotions from the constraints of dysfunctional social systems. The historical context and the roles of these value orientations in the evolution of contemporary societies are discussed.

Notes: The author suggests that two dimensions of values – modern and postmodern – are linked in various ways to subjective well-being and to the emergence of contemporary societies. Relates to well-being and has implications for the development of personhood/selfhood.

249. Mérida, J. A. M. & Jorge, M. L. M. (2009). The psychology of reasoning and human rationality: From standard logic to an ecological approach. *Studia Psychologica*, 51(4), 279-291. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/226906846?accountid=27890>. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(85)90014-3
10.1016/j.tics.2003.10.005
10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00085-8

Abstract: The psychological study of human reasoning is responsible for the conceptual evolution of this notion. Initially linked to the solution of standard logic tasks, later developments associated it with performance in the social environment, where individuals face problems with personal relevance. Along with the empirical results and theories proposed about reasoning, certain considerations have arisen around the topic of human rationality. As a part of the previous philosophical tradition the concept of rationality has specific implications for the conception of both human being and nature. The revision of some of the psychological approaches that appeared during the 20th century enables us to clarify the reformulation of the concept of reasoning, and gives us some clues about its relationship with the notion of rationality.

Notes: Examines how the psychological study of reasoning has affected how rationality is understood. Given the centrality of notions of 'reason' and 'rationality' are to various formulations of personhood in today's society, this is an interesting discussion of how views of rationality have changed as a result of psychological study. Relates to personhood.

250. Merrigan, T. (2012). Conscience and selfhood: Thomas More, John Henry Newman, and the crisis of the postmodern subject. *Theological Studies*, 73(4), 841-869. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1223341865?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Both Thomas More and John Henry Newman understood the human subject as a historically situated, responsible, and dynamic being that realizes itself through conscientious moral action amid the ambiguities of history. Both men were also obliged to come to terms with the tensile relationship between loyalty to conscience and loyalty to

tradition. Their lives and their work would seem to resonate with, and constitute a challenge to, the contemporary postmodern debate about the nature of selfhood.

Notes: Consideration of Thomas More and John Henry Newman's of human subjects (persons) juxtaposed with postmodern accounts of personhood. Relates to personhood.

251. Moller, L. (2000). Have dual survival systems created the human mind? *Psychiatry*, 63(2), 178-201. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/220694554?accountid=27890>

Abstract: This article reviews pertinent psychological theory to argue for two discrete human motivational tracts. These dual systems appear to draw from disparate constellations of emotional energies that normatively become interactive across development. The article stipulates eight premises from the accepted tenets of psychology, development and pathology along with corroborating evidence from laterality studies, neuropsychology and the neurosciences. These premises lead to a verifiable hypothesis reflecting Richard Leakey's proposal that *H.sapiens* emerged from an interpersonal shaping of adaptation across several million years of group living. The totality of the supportive evidence suggest that the flexibility, agility and creativity of the human mind was abetted by tensions and reconciliations between two disparate hemispheric perspectives, which express as a *Personal Self* and a *Social Self*, focused by a lens molded by survival pressures.

Notes: An interesting discussion of a range of evidence in support of the notion that the human mind evolved primarily in response to a 'creative social tension' that have given rise to both a personal and a social self. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

252. Narvaez, D. (in press). Development and socialization within an evolutionary context: Growing up to become "a good and useful human being." In D. Fry (Ed.), *War, Peace and Human Nature: The convergence of Evolutionary and Cultural Views*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Abbreviated Abstract: From birth, the social environment of small-band gatherer-hunters (SBGH) is vastly different from that of Western societies like the USA, creating distinctive social and moral personalities. SBGH have a companionship culture that is simultaneously deeply individualistic and collectivistic, highly pleasurable and cooperative, fostering natural virtue. Contrastingly, in Western societies like the USA, natural virtue is hard to develop because children are raised with a great deal of coercion and a minimalist approach to meeting their needs. Modern practices like these foster a self-protective brain and personalities far different from humanity's moral potential.

In comparison to our pre-agriculture foraging cousins we are far from virtuous and might even be considered to have lost our minds, if not our humanity (Sahlins, 2008). In fact, we are quite immoral, wicked and stupid if we use anthropological reports of those who live like our presumed nomadic foraging, gatherer-hunters¹ ancestors as a baseline. How did this come to be? How do modern Westerners differ socially and morally from those who live like our distant ancestors and what might account for the differences? In this chapter, I compare the ancestral social environment, as known from extant small-band gatherer-hunter cultures from around the world, with the contemporary Western social environment

(focused mostly on the USA which continues to export its views and lifestyle to the rest of the world).

Apprehending an appropriate baseline for judging social functioning is critical for understanding how cultural practices influence human nature and personality. Unfortunately, many popularized evolutionary theorists today ignore or keep shifting the baseline used for comparison. Most commonly, they assume that today's human behavior is normal and normative and then try to explain it as adaptive. There is a lack of awareness of how different the social environment was for our ancestors and how this forms a different human nature. Because the small-band gatherer-hunter context encompassed 99% of human genus existence, I take it as the baseline range for human society and human development with their corresponding influences on human nature.

Notes: Adopting a comparative perspective, the differences between the social worlds of human hunter-gatherer ancestors and the modern, western world are highlighted in relation to the moral actions of persons and 'natural virtue'. Relates to personhood and well-being.

253. Narvaez, D. & Lapsley, D. K. (2009). Chapter 8. Moral identity, moral functioning, and the development of moral character. In H. R. Brian (Ed.), *Psychology of Learning and Motivation* (Vol. Volume 50, pp. 237-274): Academic Press. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0079742108004088>. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0079-7421\(08\)00408-8](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0079-7421(08)00408-8)

Abstract: We review how the construct of the moral self has arisen within moral development theory and discuss the search for integrative linkages with other domains of psychology, including personality. Next, we describe moral personality and then programs and approaches to developing moral identity in children. Moral schema development and moral information - processing research is outlined, including mapping expert - novice differences. Finally, we conclude with two emerging integrative theories, one on educational intervention for moral skill development and the other a neurobiological model of moral functioning which draws on evolutionary themes in the development of a moral brain.

Notes: Investigates the literature on moral development and proposes a neurobiological model of moral action in the context of an evolutionary explanation of the development of a 'moral brain'. Relates to personhood.

254. Naue, U. (2008). 'Self-care without a self': Alzheimer's disease and the concept of personal responsibility for health. *Medicine Health Care and Philosophy*, 11(3), 315-324. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>:WOS:000272269900007. doi:10.1007/s11019-008-9125-3

Abstract: The article focuses on the impact of the concept of self-care on persons who are understood as incapable of self-care due to their physical and/or mental 'incapacity'. The article challenges the idea of this health care concept as empowerment and highlights the difficulties for persons who do not fit into this concept. To exemplify this, the self-care concept is discussed with regard to persons with Alzheimer's disease (AD). In the case of persons with AD, self-care is interpreted in many different ways-depending on the point of

view, for instance as an affected person or a carer. To prevent a marginalisation of the growing group of elderly persons with dementia, the article argues that concepts such as those of personhood, well-being, autonomy, rationality and normality have to be re-thought with regard to an increasingly ageing population. Taking into account that AD as a socio-medical construct has to be understood in the context of power relations, the article focuses on the mutual influence between the concepts of self-care and of AD and its possible impact on governing dementia and AD in particular. Michel Foucault's considerations on 'technologies of the self' provide the basis for the discussion of the self-care concept within existing societal power relations.

Notes: The author argues the need to rethink concepts such as those of personhood, well-being, autonomy, rationality and normality because of an increasingly ageing population. Highlights the relationship between understandings of personhood and the social and political contexts in which these understandings influence the marginalisation of some people – e.g., those with Alzheimer's Disease. Argues that a self understood as grounded in intersubjectivity, as opposed to individualised to particular persons, would alter the perceptions of people with dementia, an increasingly significant proportion of the population given demographic trends. An interesting example of how understandings of selves and persons has direct implications for people.

Relates to personhood and well-being.

255. Nelson, R. (2006). Evolutionary social science and Universal Darwinism. *Journal of Evolutionary Economics*, 16(5), 491-510. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/229561698?accountid=27890>

Abstract: How should social scientists, inclined to an evolutionary theory of aspects of human culture like science, technology, business organization and practice, react to proposals that they embrace a Universal Darwinism? The most prominent variety of Universal Darwinism argues for close counterparts between the variables and mechanisms of cultural evolution and biological evolution, for example proposing the concept of memes as units of culture. Other Universal Darwinists propose, more flexibly, that human culture and biological species both change over time through a process that involves variation and selection, but that the details of the processes may be very different. This essay argues that the narrower form of Universal Darwinism should not be acceptable to social scientists. The differences in the details of cultural evolution and biological evolution are considerable. On the other hand, if Universal Darwinism provides a roomy intellectual tent welcoming scholars studying a variety of topics, with the unifying element being a dynamic theory involving variation and selection, but with the key variables and mechanisms being recognized as perhaps differing greatly between biology and human culture, we can be happy in that camp. Evolutionary Social Science and Universal Darwinism.

Notes: Considers the scope of a Darwinian approach to cultural processes and argues that, while a broad claim of a process of variation and selection can be useful, the analogy between biological and cultural evolutionary processes needs considerable caution. Relates to evolutionary psychology.

256. Nesse, R. M. (1999). The evolution of hope and despair. *Social Research*, 66(2), 429-469. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/209667252?accountid=27890>

No abstract.

Notes: An argument against common intuitions about the desirability of hope and the condemnation of despair. Noting that evolution simply favours behaviours – including emotional responses – in terms of the benefits that accrue to them, it is argued that despair and hope are intricately interwoven and their resultant effects on happiness and well-being are therefore complex and particular. Most cultures have norms that specify the correct attitude towards hope and despair. This analysis describes ways to think about hope and despair outside of these norms. It suggests that hope at the individual level is fundamentally conservative, but hope at the social level deeply threatens those at the top. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being.

257. Nesse, R. M. (2004). Natural selection and the elusiveness of happiness. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B-Biological Sciences*, 359(1449), 1333-1347. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000224059600002. doi:10.1098/rstb.2004.1511

Abstract: The quest for happiness has expanded from a focus on relieving suffering to also considering how to promote happiness. However, both approaches have yet to be conducted in an evolutionary framework based on the situations that shaped the capacities for happiness and sadness. Because of this, the emphasis has almost all been on the disadvantages of negative states and the benefits of positive states, to the nearly total neglect of 'diagonal psychology', which also considers the dangers of unwarranted positive states and the benefits of negative emotions in certain situations. The situations that arise in goal pursuit contain adaptive challenges that have shaped domain-general positive and negative emotions that were partially differentiated by natural selection to cope with the more specific situations that arise in the pursuit of different kinds of goals. In cultures where large social groups give rise to specialized and competitive social roles, depression may be common because regulation systems are pushed far beyond the bounds for which they were designed. Research on the evolutionary origins of the capacities for positive and negative emotions is urgently needed to provide a foundation for sensible decisions about the use of new mood-manipulating technologies.

Notes: Emphasises the evolutionary utility of negative emotions as well as positive emotions, and the disutility of positive emotions as well as negative emotions. Argues that some current societies may well have pushed regulatory systems away from situations in which these utilities and disutilities are, on balance, effective. This might help to explain higher rates of adverse moods such as depression in such societies. Relates to evolutionary psychology, personhood and well-being.

258. Newson, L. ; Postmes, T. ; Lea, S. E. G. ; Webley, P. ; Richerson, P. J. & McElreath, R. (2007). Influences on communication about reproduction: The cultural evolution of low fertility. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 28(3), 199-210. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513807000049>. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.01.003

Abstract: The cultural norms of traditional societies encourage behavior that is consistent with maximizing reproductive success but those of modern post-demographic transition societies do not. Newson et al (2005) proposed that this might be because interaction between kin is relatively less frequent in modern social networks. Assuming that people's evaluations of reproductive decisions are influenced by a desire to increase their inclusive fitness, they will be inclined to prefer their kin to make fitness-enhancing choices. Such a preference will encourage the emergence of pronatal cultural norms if social networks are dense with kin. Less pronatal norms will emerge if contact between kin makes up a small proportion of social interactions. This article reports evidence based on role-play studies that supports the assumption of the kin influence hypothesis that evaluations of reproductive decisions are influenced by a desire to increase inclusive fitness. It also presents a cultural evolutionary model demonstrating the long-term effect of declining kin interaction if people are more likely to encourage fitness-enhancing choices when interacting with their kin than with nonrelatives.

Notes: A careful evolutionary analysis of the hypothesis that kin will be more likely to encourage reproductive, fitness-enhancing decisions than non-relatives because of the evolutionary effect of inclusive fitness. Given that it is proposed that people in modern societies interact less frequently with (close) kin than humans did in the past, the study examined this hypothesis in a contemporary sample and found support for it. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

259. Ng, A. K. ; Ho, D. Y. F. ; Wong, S. S. & Smith, I. (2003). In search of the good life: A cultural odyssey in the east and west. *Genetic Social and General Psychology Monographs*, 129(4), 317-363. Review. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000223164500001

Abstract: In the first part of this article, the authors argue that any conception of well-being is culturally embedded and depends on how the notions of "well" and "being" are defined and practiced in different cultural communities. To support this argument, they conduct a comprehensive review of the empirical literature, which shows that members of individualistic and collectivistic cultures differ in their emotional experience of well-being. This difference has been traced to the indigenous psychology of selfhood in those cultures. In the second part of the article, the authors debunk the myth of infinite cultural variability, while retaining the basic insight concerning the cultural constitution of well-being. They develop a theoretical model of well-being, in which agency and communion are universal dimensions of well-being, and people in different cultures require different combinations of agency and communion to experience well-being. Following this theoretical development, the authors examine cultural impediments to the good life in individualistic and collectivistic cultures. The mutual incompatibility of agency and communion is ruled out as a possible cause of why it is so difficult to live the good life. Instead, the authors propose a dialectical

synthesis of agency and communion as a way of dealing with this challenge of living the good life.

Notes: The authors argue for both a culturally embedded experience of well-being and a universal set of dimensions concerning agency and 'communion' that are central to the experience of well-being for humans. Relates to personhood and well-being but also suggests an evolutionary basis of the dimensions of well-being.

260. Nicholson, N. (1997). Evolutionary psychology: Toward a new view of human nature and organizational society. *Human Relations*, 50(9), 1053-1078. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/231471046?accountid=27890>
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&rft_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Aabiglobal&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Human+Relations&rft.atitle=Evolutionary+psychology%3A+Toward+a+new+view+of+human+nature+and+organizational+society&rft.au=Nicholson%2C+Nigel&rft.aulast=Nicholson&rft.aufirst=Nigel&rft.date=1997-09-01&rft.volume=50&rft.issue=9&rft.spage=1053&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.title=Human+Relations&rft.issn=00187267

This paper argues that evolutionary psychology offers a radical and challenging new perspective on human nature and organizational society. Its roots in a convergence of insights and scientific discoveries from diverse and natural and human sciences are described, as well as how it seeks to avoid common fallacies of earlier biological reasoning about human society. Recurrent themes in human nature and their manifestations are summarized, including sex and personality differences, cognitive and affective biases, social orientations, and preferred modes of social exchange. It is concluded that humans suffer the consequences of poor fit between their inherited natures and many of the constructed environments in organizational society, but that new emerging forms of organization may present opportunities for social relations closer to the ancestral paradigms of human psychology.

Notes: Considers how an evolutionary understanding has implications for how society and its sub-sets are organised. It suggests that while there may have been a mismatch between evolutionary 'nature' and organisational structures, current and emerging organisational forms may go some way towards correcting for this mismatch. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

261. Nixon, D. J. (2010). Should UK law reconsider the initial threshold of legal personality? A critical analysis. *Human Reproduction and Genetic Ethics, 16(2)*, 182-217. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/993188392?accountid=27890>

Abstract: At present UK Law states that the unborn child only becomes a legal person invested with legal rights and full protections, like other human persons, at birth. This article critiques the present legal position of setting the threshold for legal personality at birth, showing its inconsistencies and fundamentally pragmatic basis. Against this background, it is argued that a principled approach towards unborn life is necessary, which reflects in law the reality that the unborn child is a type of human person deserving protection as it develops through the continuum of human personhood—from embryonic personhood, to infant personhood and ultimately into adult personhood. Human personhood is defined as a union of a material and immaterial self meaning that at every stage of their development they are never a "potential person," but rather a "person with potential" even if it is not actualized through miscarriage, premature death, or disability. This moral and philosophical reasoning is what justifies protecting the sanctity of unborn life in law. The rest of the article explores and critiques the alternative static legal threshold for ascribing legal personality, at conception, implantation and viability. Having considered the practical moral, legal and philosophical problems of these alternatives; the final proposal for law reform combines all three of these thresholds in a proposal for a "dynamic" threshold for legal personality commencing at conception, which would render birth as an irrelevant threshold for moral and legal reasoning about the unborn.

Notes: A philosophical discussion of the legal definition of a 'person' in a developmental, pre-natal context. Argues for personhood beginning at conception and involving, from that point on, a case of a 'person with potential'. Relates to personhood.

262. Panksepp, J. & Northoff, G. . (2009). The trans-species core SELF: The emergence of active cultural and neuro-ecological agents through self-related processing within subcortical-cortical midline networks. *Consciousness and Cognition, 18(1)*, 193-215. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810008000330>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.002>

Abstract: The nature of "the self" has been one of the central problems in philosophy and more recently in neuroscience. This raises various questions: (i) Can we attribute a self to animals? (ii) Do animals and humans share certain aspects of their core selves, yielding a trans-species concept of self? (iii) What are the neural processes that underlie a possible trans-species concept of self? (iv) What are the developmental aspects and do they result in various levels of self-representation? Drawing on recent literature from both human and animal research, we suggest a trans-species concept of self that is based upon what has been called a "core-self" which can be described by self-related processing (SRP) as a specific mode of interaction between organism and environment. When we refer to specific neural networks, we will here refer to the underlying system as the "core-SELF." The core-SELF provides primordial neural coordinates that represent organisms as living creatures—at the lowest level this elaborates interoceptive states along with raw emotional feelings (i.e., the intentions in action of a primordial core-SELF) while higher medial cortical levels facilitate

affective-cognitive integration (yielding a fully-developed nomothetic core-self). Developmentally, SRP allows stimuli from the environment to be related and linked to organismic needs, signaled and processed within core-self structures within subcortical-cortical midline structures (SCMS) that provide the foundation for epigenetic emergence of ecologically framed, higher idiographic forms of selfhood across different individuals within a species. These functions ultimately operate as a coordinated network. We postulate that core SRP operates automatically, is deeply affective, and is developmentally and epigenetically connected to sensory-motor and higher cognitive abilities. This core-self is mediated by SCMS, embedded in visceral and instinctual representations of the body that are well integrated with basic attentional, emotional and motivational functions that are apparently shared between humans, non-human mammals, and perhaps in a proto-SELF form, other vertebrates. Such a trans-species concept of organismic coherence is thoroughly biological and affective at the lowest levels of a complex neural network, and culturally and ecologically molded at higher levels of neural processing. It allows organisms to selectively adapt to and integrate with physical and social environments. Such a psychobiologically universal, but environmentally diversified, concept may promote novel trans-species studies of the core-self across mammalian species.

Notes: Outlines a framework to understand the neural manifestation of various forms of 'trans-specific' versions of a 'self'. The authors differentiate between a 'core-self' that is primarily affective and more elaborate versions that can be developmentally and epigenetically enhanced. They argue that this framework indicates how the self can be organised to respond to both physical and social environments. Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology.

263. Pellegrini, A. D. (2008). The role of development on evolutionary psychology: Tinbergen revisited. *Psychological Inquiry*, 19(1), 38-40. Editorial Material. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000253095500007

No abstract.

Notes: The author discusses the choice of play in studying the role of ontogeny as it relates to evolutionary theory. Specifically, he argues that play is an arena that allows for a relatively low-cost mode of generating developmental diversity of behaviours which then provides alternatives for natural selection to work upon. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

264. Pellegrini, A. D. (2009). Research and policy on children's play. *Child Development Perspectives*, 3(2), 131-136. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000270262800012

Abstract: The role of play in human development is a source of controversy. Some view it as indispensable to children's healthy development and education, whereas others marginalize it as a topic unworthy of study and of questionable functional significance. This article suggests that differences in how researchers define play and conceptualize function have led to this disagreement. It also makes educational policy and research recommendations about the role of play in children's lives.

Notes: Considers the role of play in development, including social development. Relates to personhood.

265. Pellegrini, A. D. & Bjorklund, D. F. (2004). The ontogeny and phylogeny of children's object and fantasy play. *Human Nature*, 15(1), 23-43. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-004-1002-z>. doi:10.1007/s12110-004-1002-z

Abstract: We examine the ontogeny and phylogeny of object and fantasy play from a functional perspective. Each form of play is described from an evolutionary perspective in terms of its place in the total time and energy budgets of human and nonhuman juveniles. As part of discussion of functions of play, we examine sex differences, particularly as they relate to life in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness and economic activities of human and nonhuman primates. Object play may relate to foraging activities. Although fantasy play has been viewed as limited to humans, we speculate that certain types of fantasy play may be present in some nonhuman primates. Fantasy play may enable juveniles to see situations from different perspectives. We conclude that fantasy play may have immediate effects and object play may have deferred effects.

Notes: Considers the role of play in both development (ontogeny) and evolution (phylogeny) and argues that different forms of play have provided different evolutionary functions. In particular, object play involves practicing of skills that are beneficial in their later, adult functions, while fantasy play has immediate advantages in changing perspectives on current situations. Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology.

266. Pellegrini, A. D. , Dupuis, D. & Smith, P. K. (2007). Play in evolution and development. *Developmental Review*, 27(2), 261-276. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0273229706000633>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2006.09.001>

Abstract: In this paper we examine the role of play in human ontogeny and phylogeny, following Surplus Resource Theory. We consider how juveniles use play to sample their environment in order to develop adaptive behaviors. We speculate about how innovative behaviors developed in play in response to environmental novelty may influence subsequent evolutionary processes. Play during this period of immaturity is especially important in the processes of development and evolution, because in play new strategies and behaviors can be developed with minimal costs and these strategies, in turn, can influence evolutionary processes. We posit that play influences these processes by supporting the development of new strategies in novel environments during the juvenile period.

Notes: Argues that play provides a low-cost arena for the development of novel behaviours that then affect evolutionary processes. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

267. Pellegrini, A. D. , & Smith, P. K. (1998). Physical activity play: The nature and function of a neglected aspect of play. *Child Development, 69*(3), 577-598. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1998.tb06226.x>. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.1998.tb06226.x

Abstract: In this review, we consider the nature and possible developmental functions of physical activity play, defined as a playful context combined with a dimension of physical vigor. We distinguish 3 kinds of physical activity play, with consecutive age peaks: rhythmic stereotypies peaking in infancy, exercise play peaking during the preschool years, and rough-and-tumble play peaking in middle childhood. Gender differences (greater prevalence in males) characterize the latter 2 forms. Function is considered in terms of beneficial immediate and deferred consequences in physical, cognitive, and social domains. Whereas most theories assume that children's play has deferred benefits, we suggest that forms of physical activity play serve primarily immediate developmental functions. Rhythmic stereotypies in infancy are hypothesized to improve control of specific motor patterns. Exercise play is hypothesized to function primarily for strength and endurance training; less clear evidence exists for possible benefits for fat reduction and thermoregulation. In addition, there may be cognitive benefits of exercise play that we hypothesize to be largely incidental to its playful or physical nature. Rough-and-tumble play has a distinctive social component; we hypothesize that it serves primarily dominance functions; evidence for benefits to fighting skills or to emotional coding are more equivocal. Further research is indicated, given the potentially important implications for children's education, health, and development.

Notes: An outline of the role of three different forms of physical play in producing developmental benefits (both delayed and immediate). They emphasise that 'rough and tumble' play provides important social development opportunities in relation to dominance. Relates to personhood development.

268. Perrin, J. L. & Benassi, V. A. (2009). The connectedness to nature scale: A measure of emotional connection to nature? *Journal of Environmental Psychology, 29*(4), 434-440. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272494409000243>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2009.03.003>

Abstract: Mayer and Frantz (2004) proposed that their connectedness to nature scale (CNS) provides a measure of people's emotional connection to nature. After reanalyzing data from their article, collecting and analyzing our own data, and conducting a content analysis of CNS scale items, we conclude that the CNS does not measure an emotional connection to nature. Although results from our Study 1 and Study 2 support Mayer and Frantz's conclusion that the CNS measures one predominant factor, we suggest that factor measures cognitive beliefs and not emotional connections. Results from our Studies 3 and 4 suggest that the self-referential, less negatively toned wording of CNS items may account for differences in correlations, between the CNS and environmentalism (a measure of environmental identity) and between the New Ecological Paradigm Scale (a measure of environmental beliefs) and environmentalism, reported by Mayer and Frantz. In Study 5, we suggest that correlation differences reported by Mayer and Frantz may also be attributable to method variance, as opposed to content differences between the CNS and the New Ecological Paradigm scale.

We provide recommendations for revising the CNS to focus on beliefs about their connection to nature.

Notes: In the context of concerns about the affect of nature on well-being, this article reports five empirical studies that suggests that the Connectedness to Nature Scale measures cognitive (i.e., beliefs) rather than emotional connections to nature. Given the reliance of Subjective Well-Being (SWB) measures on affect rather than beliefs, this has implications for measuring the impact of connectedness to nature on SWB. Relates to well-being

269. Pianalto, M. (2009). Against the intrinsic value of pleasure. *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 43(1), 33-39. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/203911387?accountid=27890>
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&rft_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Aabiglobal&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Journal+of+Value+Inquiry&rft.atitle=Against+the+Intrinsic+Value+of+Pleasure&rft.au=Pianalto%2C+Matthew&rft.aulast=Pianalto&rft.aufirst=Matthew&rft.date=2009-01-01&rft.volume=43&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=33&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.title=Journal+of+Value+Inquiry&rft.issn=00225363

Abstract: Hedonists hold that pleasure is the only thing of intrinsic value and, thus, that a person's well-being is reducible to the amount of pleasure she experiences. One way to challenge hedonism is to contest the claim that only pleasure is intrinsically valuable; a well-known argument of this form is found in Robert Nozick's experience machine thought experiment, which suggests that other things matter to us in addition to how things feel on the inside. A plausible reading of the notion of other things mattering to us is to understand this as a way of saying that other things besides pleasure, or how things feel, have intrinsic value. If this is correct, then hedonism is mistaken. What goes unchallenged with this kind of argument is the assumption that pleasure has intrinsic value. However, the view that pleasure is intrinsically valuable can be challenged by considering the evolutionary role of pleasure as an experiential signal that both tracks individual well-being enhancing activity and motivates an individual to pursue things which contribute to his or her well-being. These ideas should hold, mutatis mutandis, for pain. Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson have argued that evolutionary psychology provides grounds for rejecting psychological hedonism. However, the argument we will consider is that reflecting upon an evolutionary account of the emergence of the capacity for pleasurable experiences provides a reminder of the important relationship pleasures, as a kind, have to other goods, and thus cannot have their value intrinsically. This is an argument against normative hedonism. If it is correct, then pleasure has value, but not intrinsic value, and thus is not the summum bonum. As a result, hedonism, in its normative sense, fails to provide a plausible conception of well-being.

Notes: A very interesting argument against the view that hedonism has intrinsic value. It rests on an evolutionary analysis of the function of 'pleasures' and, if correct, undermines the dominant, hedonistic orientation of much work on psychological well-being (Subjective Well-Being/ SWB). Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

270. Post, S. G. (2005). Altruism, happiness, and health: It's good to be good. *International Journal of Behavioral Medicine*, 12(2), 66-77. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000229598100004. doi:10.1207/s15327558ijbm1202_4

Abstract: Altruistic (other-regarding) emotions and behaviors are associated with greater well-being, health, and longevity. This article presents a summary and assessment of existing research data on altruism and its relation to mental and physical health. It suggests several complementary interpretive frameworks, including evolutionary biology, physiological models, and positive psychology. Potential public health implications of this research are discussed, as well its directions for future studies. The article concludes, with some caveats, that a strong correlation exists between the well-being, happiness, health, and longevity of people who are emotionally and behaviorally compassionate, so long as they are not overwhelmed by helping tasks.

Notes: A review of empirical literature on the relationship between altruistic behaviour and well-being. It suggests that, in general, altruistic activity enhances health and well-being. Relates to well-being.

271. Powell, L. J. ; Macrae, C. N. ; Cloutier, J. ; Metcalfe, J. & Mitchell, J. P. (2010). Dissociable neural substrates for agentic versus conceptual representations of self. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*, 22(10), 2186-2197. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000279058400004. doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21368

Abstract: Although humans generally experience a coherent sense of selfhood, we can nevertheless articulate different aspects of self. Recent research has demonstrated that one such aspect of self-conceptual knowledge of one's own personality traits is subserved by ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Here, we examined whether an alternative aspect of "self"-being an agent who acts to achieve one's own goals-relies on cognitive processes that overlap with or diverge from conceptual operationalizations of selfhood. While undergoing fMRI, participants completed tasks of both conceptual self-reference, in which they judged their own or another person's personality traits, and agentic self-reference, in which they freely chose an object or watched passively as one was chosen. The agentic task failed to modulate vmPFC, despite producing the same memory enhancement frequently observed during conceptual self-referential processing (the "self-reference" effect). Instead, agentic self-reference was associated with activation of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), a region previously implicated in planning and executing actions. Experiment 2 further demonstrated that IPS activity correlated with later memory performance for the agentic, but not conceptual, task. These results support views of the "self" as a collection of distinct mental operations distributed throughout the brain, rather than a unitary cognitive system.

Notes: Demonstrates a neurological disjunction between two aspects of the self (self as agent and self as known entity). Both neurological events are associated with improved memory through self-reference (respectively to the kind of self being referenced – agentic or known). While not mentioned by the authors, these results have conceptual connections to G.H. Mead's distinction between the 'I' (agent) and the 'me' (known). Relates to personhood.

272. Praetorius, N. (2009). The phenomenological underpinning of the notion of a minimal core self: A psychological perspective. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 18(1), 325-338. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810008000366>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.005>

Abstract: The paper argues that Zahavi's defence of the self as an experiential dimension, i.e. "identified with the first-person givenness of experiential phenomena", and of the notion of a pre-reflective minimal core self relies on an unwarranted assumption. It is assumed that awareness of the phenomenal mode of experiences of objects, i.e. what the object "feels" like for the experiencer, is comparable with, indeed entails, first-person givenness of experience. In consequence both the arguments concerning the foundational role of the pre-reflective minimal core self and the explanation of the unity and identity of the self through time give rise to intractable problems.

Notes: A conceptual criticism of the account of a minimal, pre-reflective core self that underpins phenomenological experience in consciousness. Relates to personhood.

273. Prinz, W. (2003). Emerging selves: Representational foundations of subjectivity. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 12(4), 515-528. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810003000539>. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1053-8100\(03\)00053-9](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1053-8100(03)00053-9)

Abstract: A hypothetical evolutionary scenario is offered meant to account for the emergence of mental selves. According to the scenario, mental selves are constructed to solve a source-attribution problem. They emerge when internally generated mental contents (e.g., thoughts and goals) are treated like messages arising from external personal sources. As a result, mental content becomes attributed to the self as an internal personal source. According to this view, subjectivity is construed outward-in, that is, one's own mental self is derived from, and is secondary to, the mental selves perceived in others. The social construction of subjectivity and selfhood relies on, and is maintained in, various discourses on subjectivity.

Notes: An interesting hypothesis that combines evolutionary insights with social constructionist assumptions to posit that the personal self is a necessary construction used to explain the existence of mental content (e.g., thoughts and goals). This hypothesis presumably also has an ontogenetic dimension. Relates to a social constructionist/ discursive account of personhood.

274. Rakoczy, H. (2006). Pretend play and the development of collective intentionality. *Cognitive Systems Research*, 7(2–3), 113-127. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389041706000052>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2005.11.008>

Abstract: Young children's pretend play is considered in the context of the development of collective intentionality. It is argued that (i) early pretending is an essentially social and culturally acquired form of action, and (ii) early social pretend play can be considered as the first form of true collective intentionality in ontogeny – involving shared cooperative activities and even some rudimentary form of joint creation of status functions. Recent experimental studies are reported that provide evidence for the claims. Finally, philosophical implications of these claims and findings are discussed. The most important implication that emerges is that existing conceptual analyses of collective intentionality stand in need of being supplemented by more fine-grained taxonomies for the description of such early forms of collective intentionality.

Notes: An account of the role of pretend play in the development of collective/cooperative intentionality. Its significance concerns the development of a social self through pretence. Relates to personhood.

275. Rapport, N. J. (2001). Personhood, Anthropology of. In J. S. Editors-in-Chief: Neil & B. B. Paul (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (pp. 11339-11343). Oxford: Pergamon. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0080430767009359>. doi:10.1016/b0-08-043076-7/00935-9

Abstract: 'The Anthropology of Personhood' concerns the exploration of the nature of the identity of the individual actor and the relationship between that identity and the symbolic forms and material practices of different sociocultural milieux. Beginning with Durkheim, and tracing out a line of thought that continues with Mauss, Geertz, and others, the article describes work that has dealt with the diversity of sociocultural conceptions of the human individual and how these connect with other sociocultural 'institutions' (family, law, exchange) in such a way as to determine differences in human experience. The individual actor of Western society is seen to be the result of a recent and exceptional historical-cultural development. This line of thought may be contrasted, however, with one associated with Leach, MacFarlane, Burridge, and others that denies the priority (ontological, developmental, historical) of the societal in its causing and conditioning of individual experience. It borrows from Weber appreciation that the particular acts of individual persons remain the sole carrier of meaningful conduct. While 'individualism' describes a particular sociocultural conceptualization of behavior (the pursuit of self-distinguishment), the article concludes, 'individuality' pertains to experience that is universal; by virtue of a unique consciousness, each of us engages with the world as other and is possessed of distinct perspectives upon it.

Notes: An overview of the dominant approaches to understanding the person in anthropological theory. These include threads that prioritise the social and the individual in the creation of individual persons. Relates to personhood.

276. Reid, A. (2004). Gender and sources of subjective well-being. *Sex Roles*, 51(11-12), 617-629. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000226732500001. doi:10.1007/s11199-004-0714-1

Abstract: The literature on national differences in sources of well-being (Kwan, Bond, & Singelis, 1997) was used to generate predictions about gender differences in sources of well-being. This linkage was made possible by parallels between national and gender differences in individualism, collectivism, and selfhood (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Respondents completed measures of self-construal, self-esteem, relationship harmony, and well-being (positive and negative affect). As anticipated, men's well-being was predicted better by self-esteem than by relationship harmony, whereas women's well-being was predicted similarly (though more moderately) by self-esteem and relationship harmony. A mediated pathway from independent self-construal to well-being through self-esteem was predicted and supported. Conceptual fit of this study with previous cross-national and gender research is discussed.

Notes: An empirical study of the relationship between gender and subjective well-being, finding that women's SWB was best predicted by both self-esteem and relationship harmony while men's was best predicted by self-esteem rather than relationship harmony. Relates to well-being.

277. Reyes-García, V. ; Godoy, R. ; Huanca, T. ; Leonard, W. R. ; McDade, T. ; Tanner, S. ; et al. (2007). The origins of monetary income inequality: Patience, human capital, and division of labor. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 28(1), 37-47. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513806000638>. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.07.001

Abstract: We present an explanation about the origins of monetary income inequality when an economically self-sufficient society opens to a market economy. The chain of associations runs from patience, to the accumulation of different forms of human capital, to self-selection into different occupations, and to the division of labor, which contributes to monetary income inequality. In a self-sufficient society, patience is exogenously determined and people rely on folk knowledge as the only form of human capital. With the establishment of schools, patient and impatient people sort themselves out by the type of human capital they begin to accumulate. Impatient people do not acquire folk knowledge because return to schooling takes many years to bear fruit. Schooling opens opportunities in occupations outside the village, whereas folk knowledge enhances employment opportunities that draw on farming or foraging. Self-selection into different occupations with different earnings potential spawns monetary income inequality. To test the explanation, we draw on data from a foraging–farming society in the Bolivian Amazon, the Tsimane'. We collected data during four consecutive quarters in 1999–2000 and a follow-up interview (2004). Data came from 151 adults (age, 16 years or more) from all households (n=48) in two villages with different levels of market exposure. During 1999–2000, impatience was

associated with (a) greater folk knowledge and fewer years of schooling, (b) lower likelihood of working in wage labor, and (c) greater likelihood of working in rural subsistence occupations. People who had been patient in 1999–2000 had greater wage earnings and more modern physical assets in 2004.

Notes: An analysis of data from an empirical study of the development of income inequalities in a society in transition from a self-sufficient to a market economy. Provides one possible explanation for how income inequalities might develop. Useful analysis given the connection between inequality and well-being. Relates to personhood (as it relates to personality) and (economic) well-being

278. Richerson, P. J. & Boyd, R. (1989). The role of evolved predispositions in cultural evolution: Or, human sociobiology meets Pascal's Wager. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 10(1–3), 195-219. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309589900198>. doi:10.1016/0162-3095(89)90019-8

Abstract: Much human behavior affected by culturally transmitted ideas—e.g., religious sentiments— does not appear to make adaptive sense. Whether sound sociobiological explanations can or cannot be given to such behavior is at the heart of debates between human sociobiologists and their critics. We argue that the debate has been miscast as a clash between mutually exclusive hypotheses, when in theory and probably in fact there are many cases that mix elements of both. When culture, using Darwinian methods, is modeled as a system of inheritance that coevolves with genes, it exhibits both adaptive properties and a series of processes that give rise to maladaptive variation. On the one hand, there is every reason to expect that cultural evolution is substantially shaped by evolved, genetically transmitted predispositions and that these predispositions often result in highly adaptive behavior. However, some kinds of beliefs are weakly affected by evolved predispositions and can have strong effects on behavior. For example, religious sentiments are carefully constructed to be difficult to challenge on the basis of empirical experience. Beliefs in rewards or punishments in an afterlife can substantially affect the behavior of people with quite utilitarian evolved goals. Once beliefs arise that are difficult to judge using evolved predispositions, processes such as group selection on cultural variation can be relatively strong. Patterns of behavior that could not be predicted without taking account of the evolutionary properties of culture can arise as a result of such “nonsociobiological” forces. Four coevolutionary scenarios capture much of the rich behavior that is possible when genetic and cultural evolution interact: 1) Culture may be kept on a “leash” by evolved predispositions, as classical sociobiological arguments would have it; 2) the tables may be turned, and genes may be leashed by the evolution of cultural norms that affect mate choice (we present a simple model of this process); 3) harmful cultural elements with an ability to attract imitators may arise, leading to a host-pathogen type of coevolution between genes and culture; and 4) genes and culture may evolve like a system of obligate mutualists. We speculate that the last scenario is the most generally important, but that the others are common. We view the application of population genetical methodology to cultural evolution as a friendly amendment to human sociobiology, but one that is essential to a complete Darwinian theory of human behavior.

Notes: An early and significant account of the links between evolutionary and cultural explanations of human behaviour. It forefronts gene-culture co-evolution as part of the explanation. Given the centrality of cultural belief systems in identity and personhood

formation, this discussion helps conceptualise the relationships between evolution and personhood. Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology/explanations.

279. Robinson, D. N. . (2012). Personhood: What's in a name? *New Ideas in Psychology, 30*(1), 89-96.

Abstract: Although there are persistent metaphysical challenges to the notion of “natural kinds” of entities that are what they are essentially, all developed and useful taxonomies are based on just such notions. “Persons,” if they are to be distinguished from other kinds of things, must possess unique properties or the potential for acquiring such properties. Reductive strategies, far from locating these properties, ignore them and thus render the concept of “person” either ambiguous or unintelligible. The properties that count, it is argued here, are those associated with moral and civic forms of life.

Notes: "Whether or not an entity is granted the status of a person- is taken to have attained personhood- has and can have significant consequences", particularly if only the criteria of 'rational beings' is applied, as robots can be designed to be rational thinkers. Robinson briefly discusses some theories of personhood, from Aristotle to current thinking. He argues that as well as rationality there also needs to be a moral and ethical component denoted by the category 'person'. He provides an account of why this is important. Relates to personhood.

280. Robson, A. J. (2002). Evolution and human nature. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16*(2), 89-106. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/212081032?accountid=27890>

No abstract.

Notes: "The economist's basic picture of preferences, beliefs and rationality has been subject to challenges from a growing number of empirical anomalies". The author offers an account of how biological evolution may have affected preferences, beliefs and rationality. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

281. Roca, C. P. & Helbing, D. (2011). Emergence of social cohesion in a model society of greedy, mobile individuals. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108*(28), 11370-11374. Retrieved from <http://www.pnas.org/content/108/28/11370.abstract>. doi:10.1073/pnas.1101044108

Abstract: Human well-being in modern societies relies on social cohesion, which can be characterized by high levels of cooperation and a large number of social ties. Both features, however, are frequently challenged by individual self-interest. In fact, the stability of social and economic systems can suddenly break down as the recent financial crisis and outbreaks of civil wars illustrate. To understand the conditions for the emergence and robustness of social cohesion, we simulate the creation of public goods among mobile agents, assuming that behavioral changes are determined by individual satisfaction. Specifically, we study a generalized win-stay-lose-shift learning model, which is only based on previous experience

and rules out greenbeard effects that would allow individuals to guess future gains. The most noteworthy aspect of this model is that it promotes cooperation in social dilemma situations despite very low information requirements and without assuming imitation, a shadow of the future, reputation effects, signaling, or punishment. We find that moderate greediness favors social cohesion by a coevolution between cooperation and spatial organization, additionally showing that those cooperation-enforcing levels of greediness can be evolutionarily selected. However, a maladaptive trend of increasing greediness, although enhancing individuals' returns in the beginning, eventually causes cooperation and social relationships to fall apart. Our model is, therefore, expected to shed light on the long-standing problem of the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior.

Notes: A fascinating model of how 'greediness', at a moderate level, can produce cooperative relations given certain spatial relations. Relates to personhood/self and evolution and well-being

282. Roland, C. E. & Foxx, R. M. (2003). Self-respect: A neglected concept. *Philosophical Psychology*, 16(2), 247-288. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080307764>. doi:10.1080/09515080307764

Abstract: Although neglected by psychology, self-respect has been an integral part of philosophical discussion since Aristotle and continues to be a central issue in contemporary moral philosophy. Within this tradition, self-respect is considered to be based on one's capacity for rationality and leads to behaviors that promote autonomy, such as independence, self-control and tenacity. Self-respect elicits behaviors that one should be treated with respect and requires the development and pursuit of personal standards and life plans that are guided by respect for self and others. In contrast, the psychological concept of self-esteem is grounded in the theories of self-concept. As such, self-esteem is a self-evaluation of competency ratios and opinions of significant others that results in either a positive or negative evaluation of one's worthiness and inclusionary status. The major distinction between the two is that while competency ratios and others' opinions are central to self-esteem, autonomy is central to self-respect. We submit that not only is self-respect important in understanding self-esteem, but that it also uniquely contributes to individual functioning. Research is needed to establish the central properties of self-respect and their effects on individual functioning, developmental factors, and therapeutic approaches.

Notes: Argues that the focus on self-esteem in psychology, rather than self-respect, has meant that the important links between self-respect and autonomy have been overlooked. Given that autonomy is central to many aspects of adaptive functioning it is also likely to be of importance in understanding the development of persons and the effectiveness of individual functioning. Has significance for understanding the nature of autonomy in persons. Relates to personhood.

283. Rubinstein, D. (2004). Language games and natural reactions. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 34(1), 55-71. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.2004.00234.x>. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.2004.00234.x

Abstract: Ludwig Wittgenstein imagines a variety of eccentric social practices—like a tribe trained “to give no expression of feeling of any kind”. But he also speaks of “the common behavior of mankind” that is rooted in “natural/primitive reactions”. This emphasis on the uniformities of human behavior raises questions about the plausibility of some of his imagined language games. Indeed, it suggests the claim of evolutionary psychologists that there are biologically based human universals that shape social practices. But in contrast to E.O. Wilson's belief that “genes hold culture on a leash”, Wittgenstein sees culture as a mediator—rather than a conduit—of “natural reactions”. This suggests that social science can incorporate the claims of evolutionary psychology without scanting the centrality of culture in action and allows that nature can be overwhelmed by culture.

Notes: This presentation of a Wittgensteinian analysis of the role of ‘human universals’ in social interaction argues that it is possible to sustain a dominant role for culture in determining human action that is compatible with acceptance of an evolved nature. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

284. Ryan, R. M. & Deci, E. L. (2001). On happiness and human potentials: A review of research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 52, 141-166. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/205845157?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Well-being is a complex construct that concerns optimal experience and functioning. Current research on well-being has been derived from two general perspectives: the hedonic approach, which focuses on happiness and defines well-being in terms of pleasure attainment and pain avoidance; and the eudaimonic approach, which focuses on meaning and self-realization and defines well-being in terms of the degree to which a person is fully functioning. These two views have given rise to different research foci and a body of knowledge that is in some areas divergent and in others complementary. New methodological developments concerning multi-level modeling and construct comparisons are also allowing researchers to formulate new questions for the field. This review considers research from both perspectives concerning the nature of well-being, its antecedents, and its stability across time and culture.

Notes: A significant overview of the two main approaches to well-being – hedonic and eudaimonic. Of particular interest is the focus, in the eudaimonic approach, on optimal functioning at the personal level as an indicator of well-being. Relates to well-being and personhood.

285. Ryff, C. D. ; Singer, B.H. & Dienberg Love, G. (2004). Positive health: connecting well-being with biology. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B. Biological Sciences.*, 359(1449 September 29), 1383–1394.

Abstract: Two key types of well-being, eudaimonic and hedonic, are reviewed. The first addresses ideas of self-development, personal growth and purposeful engagement, while the second is concerned with positive feelings such as happiness and contentment. How well-being varies by age and socio-economic standing is briefly summarized, followed by examination of its biological correlates (neuroendocrine, immune, cardiovascular, rapid eye movement (REM) sleep). Preliminary findings on a sample of ageing women showed that those with higher levels of eudaimonic well-being had lower levels of daily salivary cortisol, pro-inflammatory cytokines, cardiovascular risk, and longer duration REM sleep compared with those showing lower levels of eudaimonic well-being. Hedonic well-being, however, showed minimal linkage to biomarker assessments. Future research directions building on these initial findings are discussed.

Notes: An interesting empirically-grounded study of the relationship between both eudaimonic and hedonic well-being and health risks (stress, cardiovascular risk, etc.) in a sample of elderly women. Eudaimonic well-being is related to indicators of better such health. Relates to personhood and well-being.

286. Santor, D. A. & Walker, J. (1999). Garnering the interest of others: Mediating the effects among physical attractiveness, self-worth and dominance. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 38, 461-477. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000084426500007. doi:10.1348/014466699164275

Objectives. Evolutionary psychologists emphasize that self-worth and well-being are largely determined by the degree to which individuals garner and hold the interest of others. Personal attributes, such as physical attractiveness, are viewed as resources which serve as signals to others to pay attention to us.

Design and method. This study examined (a) the degree to which participant appraisals (N = 75) of self-worth were related to appraisals of how interested others were in them; and (b) the extent to which interest ratings account for the relation among self-worth, dominance and attractiveness ratings.

Results. The main findings of the present study showed (a) that the degree to which individuals derive self-worth from various attributes was strongly related to the degree to which individuals believed others were interested in them; and (b) that the amount of interest one believes others show in them mediated the relation between physical attractiveness and social self-worth.

Conclusion. Results have a number of implications concerning the nature of self-worth and the utility of psychological theories that emphasize evolutionary principles.

Notes: This study highlights the connections between the self-worth gained from personal attributes and appraisals of others' interest in oneself. In addition, it adopted an

evolutionary analysis to derive the hypotheses. Relates to personhood, well-being and evolutionary psychology.

287. Savage, J. & Kanazawa, S. (2004). Social capital and the human psyche: Why is social life "capital"? *Sociological Theory*, 22(3), 504-524. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000223287900009. doi:10.1111/j.0735-2751.2004.00231.x

Abstract: In this article, we propose a revised definition of social capital, premised on the principles of evolutionary psychology. We define social capital as any feature of a social relationship that, directly or indirectly, confers reproductive benefits to a participant in that relationship. This definition grounds the construct of social capital in human nature by providing a basis for inferring the underlying motivations that humans may have in common, rather than leaving the matter of what humans use capital for unspoken. Discussions and empirical reviews are presented on the innateness of human sociability, sex differences in sociability, and psychological mechanisms that mediate sociability.

Notes: Social capital has many definitions, and the authors believe that this is due to the failure to specify motivation for human behavior. This perspective is based on evolutionary psychology and defines social capital as "any feature of a social relationship that, directly or indirectly, confers reproductive benefits to a participant in that relationship", thus providing a common motivation.

Relates to evolutionary psychology.

288. Schwalbe, M. L. (1993). Goffman against postmodernism - emotion and the reality of the self. *Symbolic Interaction*, 16(4), 333-350. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1993MP10700002. doi:10.1525/si.1993.16.4.333

Abstract: Goffman has been read as arguing that selves are no more than images created in conformity with situational expectations. I read Goffman as saying that the reality of selfhood is not an image, but a psychobiological process shaped by signs and symbols. Seen in this way, the reality of the self is evident, as Goffman suggested, not in conformity but in moments of feeling, resistance, and choice. Drawing out what is implicit in Goffman, this article proposes that all forms of signifying behavior, including self-presentations, are means to sustain the coherence of the self. For this to work, however, people must, as Goffman pointed out, trust each other to respect the rules governing signifying behavior and must care about the feelings attached to selves. The article argues that the inequalities of so-called postmodern society are undermining the trust and care on which the interaction order and coherent selfhood depend. Goffman's ideas about the self are used to develop an optimistic critique of the conditions that have produced these pernicious trends.

Notes: A sociological account of the self based on an analysis of Goffman's ideas. Useful as a sociological approach that attempts to incorporate the biological and psychological underpinnings of being a self. Relates to personhood.

289. Sedikides, C. & Skowronski, J. A. (1997). The symbolic self in evolutionary context. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 1, 80-102.

Abstract: We propose that the capacity for a symbolic self (a flexible and multifaceted cognitive representation of an organism's own attributes) in humans is a product of evolution. In pursuing this argument, we note that some primates possess rudimentary elements of a self (an objectified self) and that the symbolic self (a) is a trait that is widely shared among humans, (b) serves adaptive functions, and (c) could have evolved in response to environmental pressures, with ecological and social pressures being of particular relevance. We suggest that these two environmental pressures caused the symbolic self to emerge in the Pleistocene epoch as an adaptation for *Homo erectus*, and we review the possible functions served by such an adaptation.

Notes: Discusses the relationship between evolutionary adaptation and possession of a symbolic self. An important article that produced a series of studies on the same theme. Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology.

290. Sharma, S. & Sharma, M. (2010). Self, social identity and psychological well-being. *Psychological Studies*, 55(2), 118-136. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12646-010-0011-8>. doi:10.1007/s12646-010-0011-8

Abstract: Self and social identity are key elements in the understanding of a person's strivings for health and well-being. This review (i) examines the concepts of self, social identity, and psychological well-being; (ii) integrates empirical evidence that relates various self-aspects or social identities to psychological well-being; (iii) analyzes within a stress and coping framework the well-being consequences of socially devalued self or threatened identities, perceived discriminations, challenges of acculturation and identity management; and (iv) delineates the role of self, social identity and related psycho-social variables as moderators and mediators in pathways leading to psychological well-being. Besides listing some methodological issues and empirical deficits, major concerns for future research are also identified. An explicit self and social identity perspective of this research synthesis brings personal and social aspects together, and this interface offers exciting opportunities for research advancement.

Notes: A comprehensive review of the relationships between self, social identity and well-being. Relates to personhood and well-being.

291. Sheldon, K. M. (2004). *Optimal human being: An integrated multi-level perspective*. Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. Retrieved from <http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/2004-17129-000>

Abstract: This book tackles two large and perennially debated questions: How can research scientists best integrate the different levels of analysis within the human sciences to create a complete picture? And how can individual persons best integrate the different levels or facets of themselves to achieve optimal being? I describe how these two questions complement each other and converge in important ways. I attempt to deliver a scientifically

supported message, one that is consistent with much that is found in the self-help books, but that rests on a strong foundation of empirical research. Thus, although the book is intended primarily for research psychologists and other biological and social scientists, I believe any educated reader will find it interesting and useful. Indeed, one important goal of the book is to provide readers with concrete tools they can use to effect personal growth. In addition, the book also serves as a useful supplemental text for graduate or undergraduate courses in personality psychology; one aim of the book is to canvass and integrate contemporary personality theory (as described next). Finally, the book serves as a text or supplement for courses in motivation, positive psychology, well-being, personal growth, or positive adaptation.

Notes: Attempts to provide a major theoretical framework to incorporate understandings of human nature and personal flourishing. Relates to personhood and well-being.

292. Sheldon, K. M. & Gunz, A. (2009). Psychological needs as basic motives, not just experiential requirements. *Journal of Personality*, 77(5), 1467-1492. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000269503000009. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2009.00589.x

Abstract: Self-determination theory (SDT) posits three evolved psychological needs, for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Considerable research has established that all three experiences are important for well-being. However, no SDT research has examined whether unmet needs have motivational force, an important criterion for establishing that certain experiences are indeed basic needs and motives (R. F. Baumeister & M. R. Leary, 1995). Three studies, using cross-sectional, experimental, and longitudinal methodologies, supply evidence that felt deficits in autonomy, competence, and relatedness arouse corresponding desires to acquire the missing experiences. However, a positive surfeit of felt-need satisfaction did not predict reduced desires for the corresponding needs. Implications for homeostatic, evolutionary, and humanistic perspectives upon basic psychological needs are discussed.

Notes: Provides evidence that needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness are motivational but that 'satisfaction' of those needs does not diminish them. Provides a significant link between evolutionary and humanistic accounts of individual persons. Relates to personhood and well-being.

293. Sheldon, K. M. ; Ryan, R. M. ; Rawsthorne, L. J. & Ilardi, B. (1997). Trait self and true self: Cross-role variation in the big-five personality traits and its relations with psychological authenticity and subjective well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 73(6), 1380-1393. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1997YK98900020. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.73.6.1380

Abstract: In two studies, college students evidenced differing levels of the "Big-Five" traits in different roles, supporting social-contextualist assumptions regarding trait expression. Supporting organismic theories of personality within-subject variations in the Big Five were predictable from variations in the degree of psychological authenticity felt in different roles. In addition, two concepts of self-integration or true selfhood were examined: One based on

high consistency of trait profiles across roles (i.e., low-self-concept differentiation; E. M. Donahue, R. W. Robins, B. W. Roberts, & O.P. John, 1993) and one based on high mean levels of authenticity felt across roles. The two self-integration measures were found to be independent predictors of psychological and physical well-being indicating that both self-consistency and psychological authenticity are vital for organized functioning and health.

Notes: An interesting study of the relationships between perceived true self and role self in which consistency between perceptions of self and expression of the 'Big Five' personality traits across roles is related to both psychological and physical well-being. Relates to personhood and well-being.

294. Shepher, J. & Reisman, J. (1985). Pornography: A sociobiological attempt at understanding. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 6(2), 103-114. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309585900032>. doi:10.1016/0162-3095(85)90003-2

Abstract: It is now generally conceded that humans engage in sexually dimorphic mating strategies, due largely to the high female versus the low male genetic investment in the rearing of offspring. This uneven investment has, arguably, led to: a) female preference for monogamously receptive males who are prepared to protect and nurture the female and their mutual offspring, and b) male requirements that the chosen female assure the investor of his paternity. Pornography is addressed here as media information delivery of a physiological arousal experience with roots in male sexual strategy/fantasy. Should pornography sufficiently arouse a biologically determined male predisposition for polygamy, then its informational system may be contributing to contemporary male frustration and even aggressivity toward the female in general and monogamous patterns of sexuality in particular. It may be argued that if the visual data of pornography encourages distrust of female sexual fidelity and a distorted perception of female personhood, such data could encourage disdain and/or animosity toward heterosexual comradeship and the value of such comradeship for individual and social solvency.

Notes: Taking the case of modern forms of pornography, this early article argues that through appeal to evolved male sexual goals and predispositions, modern pornography may misrepresent female personhood and stimulate doubts over female fidelity for males. This, in turn, could lead to more aggressive male views of females. An interesting example of the application of evolutionary understandings to social and economic processes that may influence ordinary understandings of personhood. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

295. Sherwood, D. A. (2009). Hnau what? C. S. Lewis on what it means to be a person. *Social Work and Christianity*, 36(1), 1-13.

Abstract: The conversation often seems to ignore the fact that different worldviews lead to widely divergent answers to the question, "What is a person?" or, "What does it mean to be a person?" Most secular modern or post-modern conceptualizations of the nature of personhood are not robust enough to support the notions of human rights and civil rights we tend to assume. Sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, which require an amazing faith in

the ability of genes to stimulate behavior that perpetuates the genes but not necessarily the carrier of the genes, do not provide a plausible account of actual human behavior. A robust and sustainable understanding of personhood involves rationality, moral order beyond personal preference, social construction, or utilitarian power, and, ultimately, trust in and obedience to God.

Notes: Argues that secular accounts of personhood cannot explain or sustain the full range of human behaviour and experience. Interesting for its highlighting of supposed inadequacies in current evolutionary and scientific accounts of personhood. Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology

296. Sidtis, D. & Kreiman, J. (2012). In the beginning was the familiar voice: Personally familiar voices in the evolutionary and contemporary biology of communication. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science*, 46(2), 146-159. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000303415100002. doi:10.1007/s12124-011-9177-4

Abstract: The human voice is described in dialogic linguistics as an embodiment of self in a social context, contributing to expression, perception and mutual exchange of self, consciousness, inner life, and personhood. While these approaches are subjective and arise from phenomenological perspectives, scientific facts about personal vocal identity, and its role in biological development, support these views. It is our purpose to review studies of the biology of personal vocal identity-the familiar voice pattern-as providing an empirical foundation for the view that the human voice is an embodiment of self in the social context. Recent developments in the biology and evolution of communication are concordant with these notions, revealing that familiar voice recognition (also known as vocal identity recognition or individual vocal recognition) has contributed to survival in the earliest vocalizing species. Contemporary ethology documents the crucial role of familiar voices across animal species in signaling and perceiving internal states and personal identities. Neuropsychological studies of voice reveal multimodal cerebral associations arising across brain structures involved in memory, emotion, attention, and arousal in vocal perception and production, such that the voice represents the whole person. Although its roots are in evolutionary biology, human competence for processing layered social and personal meanings in the voice, as well as personal identity in a large repertory of familiar voice patterns, has achieved an immense sophistication.

Notes: A fascinating review of the relationships between the biology of vocal identity, including its evolutionary basis, and the socially-mediated self or person. Presents the neuropsychology of vocal identity and recognition as an evolved feature enabling survival. Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology.

297. Silvers, S. (2010). Methodological and moral muddles in evolutionary psychology. *Journal of Mind and Behavior*, 31(1-2), 65-83. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000280876600005

Abstract: Evolutionary psychology, the self-proclaimed scientific theory of human nature, owes much of its controversial notoriety to reports in public media. In part this is because of its bold claims that human psychological characteristics are adaptations to the Pleistocene

environment in which they evolved and these inherited characteristics we exhibit now constitute our human nature. Proponents maintain that evolutionary psychology is a scientific account of human nature that explains what this much abused concept means. Critics counter that some evolutionary psychological hypotheses threaten to undermine other intuitive concepts of human nature and well-being, specifically, by emphasizing purported scientific evidence of natural inequalities based on sex, gender, or race. They argue that this "gene machine" view entails consequences endorsing or at least seeming to give scientific aid and comfort to politically conservative, "right-wing" social agendas. Proponents deny that the theory has such unwelcome implications. Such objections, they reply, stem from "left-wing" egalitarian ideologies that presuppose the cogency of the disputed tabula rasa concept of mind intrinsic to the standard social science model of behavior explanations. Philip Kitcher's (1985) initial scathing analysis of sociobiology, now called evolutionary psychology, as the science of human nature went basically unchallenged. Bioethicist Janet Radcliffe Richards (2000) has given a detailed critique of Kitcher's arguments; she finds them to be "leftward-leaning," and wanting. Here I examine her arguments and find them wanting though not "rightward-leaning."

Notes: A useful overview of the politically-charged nature of the public profile of standard evolutionary psychology. Relates to evolutionary psychology.

298. Skowronski, J. J. & Walker, W. R. (2012). Autobiographical remembering and the self. In V. S. R. Editor-in-Chief (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Human Behavior (Second Edition)* (pp. 251-256). San Diego: Academic Press. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123750006000483>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-375000-6.00048-3>

Abstract: As illustrated by the insights and ideas of philosophers such as John Locke, the exact relation between autobiographical memory and the self has long been a focus of scholarly interest. Recent efforts have explored these insights and ideas using the scientific techniques available to modern psychology. This article provides an entrée into this realm, highlighting research that explores (a) whether an episodic memory is necessary for a sense of self; (b) how the self directs and molds the contents of autobiographical recall; and (c) some of the cognitive, social, and developmental processes that are involved in the relation between the self and autobiographical recall.

Notes: Provides an overview of the relation between autobiographical memory and the sense of self. Combines developmental perspectives and the reciprocal interaction between the sense of the self and autobiographical memory. Relates to personhood.

299. Slaby, J. (2010). Steps towards a critical neuroscience. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 9(3), 397-416. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>:WOS:000280598700005. doi:[10.1007/s11097-010-9170-2](http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9170-2)

Abstract: This paper introduces the motivation and idea behind the recently founded interdisciplinary initiative Critical Neuroscience (<http://www.critical-neuroscience.org>). Critical Neuroscience is an approach that strives to understand, explain, contextualize, and, where called for, critique developments in and around the social, affective, and cognitive

neurosciences with the aim to create the competencies needed to responsibly deal with new challenges and concerns emerging in relation to the brain sciences. It addresses scholars in the humanities as well as, importantly, neuroscientific practitioners, policy makers, and the public at large. Does neuroscience indeed have such wide-ranging effects or are we collectively overestimating its impacts at the expense of other important drivers of social and cultural change? Via what channels is neuroscience interacting with contemporary conceptions of selfhood, identity, and well-being? Importantly, Critical Neuroscience strives to make the results of these assessments relevant to scientific practice itself. It aspires to motivate neuroscientists to be involved in the analysis of contextual factors, historical trajectories, conceptual difficulties, and potential consequences in connection to their empirical work. This paper begins to spell out a philosophical foundation for the project by outlining examples of the interaction taking place between the neurosciences and the social and cultural contexts in which they are embedded and by exposing some of the assumptions and argumentative patterns underlying dominant approaches. Recent anthropological work will be discussed to convey a sense of the de facto interactions between neuroscientific knowledge, its promissory projections, and the self-understandings of laypeople. This can be seen as a first step towards a phenomenology of the "seductive allure" that the neurosciences are exerting upon both the academic and the popular imagination. The concept of "critique" relevant to the project's overall orientation is outlined in the final section.

Notes: An introduction to the new area of 'critical neuroscience' which, amongst other emphases, considers the effect of neuroscience on current conceptions of selfhood and well-being. Relates to personhood, well-being and has implied consequences for evolutionary psychology.

300. Smith, A. L., Jr. (2000). Some recent thinking on personhood. *Christian bioethics*, 6(1), 113-122. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://MEDLINE:12166487. doi:10.1076/1380-3603(200004)6:1;1-c;ft113

Abstract: This essay surveys four recent theological works on the issue of personhood: John F. Crosby's *The Selfhood of the Human Person*, Stanley Rudman's *Concepts of Person and Christian Ethics*, Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos' *The Person in the Orthodox Tradition*, and James Walter's *What is a Person? An Ethical Exploration*.

Notes: A christian/theological consideration of personhood. Relates to personhood.

301. Smith, M. B. (1994). Selfhood at risk - Postmodern perils and the perils of postmodernism. *American Psychologist*, 49(5), 405-411. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1994NL78600002. doi:10.1037//0003-066x.49.5.405

Abstract: Various commentaries on the threats to personal well-being involved in contemporary Western middle-class life are examined, especially Gergen's (1991) treatment of the "saturated self." The version of postmodernism that Gergen advocated is criticized as representing an increasingly fashionable style of metatheory that reflects contemporary threats to selfhood but paralyzes endeavors to cope with them. Giddens's (1991) treatment of self and society in late modernity is selectively described as better fitted to a stance within

which scientific and professional psychology can contribute to realistic hopefulness rather than to fin de siècle hopelessness.

Notes: Argues that Kenneth Gergen's well-known, postmodern account of the self and its threat to well-being undermines attempts to counter such threats. A useful analysis of the links between theoretical accounts of personhood and experienced well-being. Relates to personhood and well-being.

302. Sober, E. & Wilson, D. S. (2000). Summary of: 'Unto others - The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior'. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 7(1-2), 185-206. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000090023100026

Abstract: The hypothesis of group selection fell victim to a seemingly devastating critique in 1960s evolutionary biology. In *Unto Others* (1998), we argue to the contrary, that group selection is a conceptually coherent and empirically well documented cause of evolution. We suggest, in addition that it has been especially important in human evolution. In the second part of *Unto Others*, we consider the issue of psychological egoism and altruism - do human beings have ultimate motives concerning the well-being of others? We argue that previous psychological and philosophical work on this question has been inconclusive. We propose an evolutionary argument for the claim that human beings have altruistic ultimate motives.

Notes: A significant defence of group selection in the context of a fundamental human altruistic motive. Argues that it is possible to have an account of genuine human altruism that is consistent with evolutionary theory. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for personhood and well-being.

303. Sointu, E. & Woodhead, L. (2008). Spirituality, gender, and expressive selfhood. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 47(2), 259-276. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000256123600007. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5906.2008.00406.x

Abstract: This article discusses contemporary spiritualities, focusing in particular on the recent growth of practices attending to "mind, body, and spirit" and centered on the goal of "holistic well-being." We argue that the growing popularity of such "holistic spirituality" since the 1980s can be greatly illuminated by reference to Charles Taylor's account of the expressive mode of modern selfhood. Taylor's account is limited, however, by its inability to explain why women are disproportionately active within the sphere of holistic spirituality. By paying closer attention to gender, we seek to refine Taylor's approach and to advance our understanding of contemporary spirituality. Drawing on findings from two qualitative studies of holistic spirituality and health carried out in the United Kingdom, this article offers an analysis of what the "subjective turn" may mean for women. We argue that holistic spiritualities align with traditional spheres and representations of femininity, while simultaneously supporting and encouraging a move away from selfless to expressive selfhood. By endorsing and sanctioning "living life for others" and "living life for oneself," holistic spiritualities offer a way of negotiating dilemmas of selfhood that face many women - and some men-in late modern contexts.

Notes: A phenomenological analysis of the appeal of 'holistic spirituality/well-being' in today's world, especially for women. Argues that it enables women to balance demands for caring for both self and others. Relates to personhood and well-being.

304. Soler, M. (2012). Costly signaling, ritual and cooperation: evidence from Candomblé, an Afro-Brazilian religion. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 33(4), 346-356. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S109051381100119X>. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.11.004

Abstract: The apparent wastefulness of religious ritual represents a puzzle for rational choice theorists and evolutionary scholars. In recent years, it has been proposed that such rituals represent costly signals that promote intragroup cooperation precisely because of the effort and resources they require. This hypothesis was tested over the course of a 14-month long ethnographic study in the northeast of Brazil. The research focused on adherents of Candomblé, an African diasporic religion organized in autonomous congregations primarily located in low-income urban areas. Individuals who reported higher levels of religious commitment behaved more generously in a public goods economic game and revealed more instances of provided and received cooperation within their religious community. This suggests that ritual as a costly signaling may effectively predict willingness to cooperate with other group members and that the signaler may accrue benefits in the form of received cooperation. Socioeconomic variables are also shown to mediate religious signaling. This raises the possibility that signalers strategically alter their expressions of commitment as their needs and circumstances change.

Notes: Applies evolutionary signalling theory to religious ritual. Relates to evolutionary psychology.

305. Sousa, D. (2012). Kierkegaard's anthropology of the self: Ethico-religious and social dimensions of selfhood. *Heythrop Journal-a Quarterly Review of Philosophy and Theology*, 53(1), 37-50. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000297798000004. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2265.2010.00636.x

Abstract: It is sometimes argued that the concept of the self is the unifying thread that ties together the rich diversity of philosophical and theological themes in Kierkegaard's works. In his conception of the self he provides us with a coherent and unified view of human existence. For Kierkegaard the self is not a static entity but a dynamic and unfolding reality, something I must strive to become. One is not a self but becomes a self as an ethico-religious task to be actualized. The purpose of this paper is to outline Kierkegaard's anthropology of the self with particular emphasis on the ethical and religious dimensions of selfhood. I will first elucidate the structure and dynamic character of the self, and then will examine the dialectical development of the self in the ethical and religious stages of existence. Finally I will address the widespread criticism of Kierkegaard's conception of the self as being radically individualistic and asocial.

Notes: Provides an account of Kierkegaard's view of the self as primarily an ethical process. Could be seen to connect to an evolutionary account of humans as moral beings by virtue of their sociality. Relates to personhood.

306. Stamatopoulou, D. (2011). "Symbol formation and the embodied self: A microgenetic case-study examination of the transition to symbolic communication in scribbling activities from 14 to 31 months of age". *New Ideas in Psychology*, 29(2), 162-188. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X10000486>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2010.09.001>

Abstract: In this article, a theoretical account for the early formation and production of graphic symbols is presented, along with an illustrative microgenetic case study that focuses on those key mechanisms related to the progressive formation of complex graphic schemata and on the underlying emerging transitions in the signifier–signified relation. This account proposes that the development of symbolic graphic functioning follows a series of recursive loops between action and production that gradually enable the fundamental distinction between instrumental action and perceived intentional production. Scribbling dynamics via mirroring processes push the child's primary reactive space to be converted into the child's interactive experiential space and in turn mapped on and gradually transformed to the "secondary-pictorial," communicative/expressive space, which also controls its manifestation. Scribbling, then, may be the underlying basis for the emergence of the first "symbolic articulation" of an embodied action representation—"natural-symbol," of the self and the world/other. These first undifferentiated "natural" symbols (i.e., image schemata), mostly seen as superfluous or motor devices to drawing, stand as the cornerstones of drawing symbolic development, since they function as the "missing" link between action, production, perception, visual representation, and symbol formation. In other words, scribbling, by its embodied anchor that substitutes the event/object, sustains the ability to coordinate action representations so as to become "schematized" reciprocally, initiating in turn conscious control and self-referential intentionality.

Notes: A fascinating thesis concerning the way in which seemingly non-symbolic scribbling behaviour may bridge the transition from motor movement to symbolism. Alongside this development is the development of the understanding of personal intentionality and conscious control of behaviour. Relates to personhood.

307. Staudinger, U. M. (2000). Many reasons speak against it, yet many people feel good: The paradox of subjective well-being. *Psychologische Rundschau*, 51(4), 185-197. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>:WOS:000089827000003. doi:10.1026//0033-3042.51.4.185

Abstract: It is suggested that the well-being paradox consists of two facets: (i) even under adverse circumstances many people are happy, and (ii) the empirical mean of subjective well-being seems to be in the positive range. It is demonstrated that the well-being paradox is not just a methodological artifact. Subjective well-being can be measured reliably and with predictive validity. Also imprecise risk assessment does not completely dissolve the paradox. Further, domain-specific, dimensional, and longitudinal measurement of subjective well-

being contribute some pieces to the puzzle but do not complete it. Central to the regulation of subjective well-being, however, are mechanisms and characteristics of self and personality such as comparison processes, adjustment of aspirational levels, goal investment patterns, and coping styles but also personality dimensions and characteristics of the self definition. Biological and cultural evolution may have contributed to the fact that the empirical mean of subjective well-being is positive, but also that the regulation of well-being has limits. Finally, the developmental model of selective optimization with compensation is offered as an integrative framework for the evidence presented.

Notes: Examines the 'paradox' of subjective well-being in which objective negative conditions do not prevent it and, overall, subjective well-being is positive. Relates to well-being.

308. Sternberg, R. J. & Grigorenko, E. L. (2004). Intelligence and culture: how culture shapes what intelligence means, and the implications for a science of well-being. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B. Biological Sciences*, 359 (1449, September 29), 1427–1434. .

Abstract: This paper discusses the relationship between culture and intelligence. The main message of the paper is that intelligence cannot fully or even meaningfully be understood outside its cultural context. Behaviour that is considered intelligent in one culture may be considered unintelligent in another culture, and vice versa. Moreover, people in different cultures have different implicit (folk) theories of intelligence, so may not even mean the same thing by the word. The relationships between different aspects of intelligence can vary across cultures, with correlations that are positive in one setting proving to be negative in another. The paper opens with a general discussion of issues regarding the relationship between the two concepts. It then describes the theory of successful intelligence, which motivates our work on the interface between culture and intelligence. Finally, the article draws some conclusions.

Notes: Examines cultural influences on the manifestation of intelligence, arguing that the cultural context is central to the understanding of intelligence. Relates to personhood and well-being

309. Stetsenko, A. (2012). Personhood: An activist project of historical becoming through collaborative pursuits of social transformation. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 30(1), 144-153.

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to contribute to recent scholarship that pursues radical revision of prevalent models of personhood mired in outdated notions of human development and its foundational principles. To achieve this goal, I revisit and expand Vygotsky's project of cultural historical psychology to offer a dialectical framework that encompasses but is not limited to relational ontology. Premised on the notion of collaborative transformative practice as the grounding for human Being and Becoming (1), my proposal is that at the core of human nature and development lies an ineluctably activist stance vis-À-vis the world; it is the realization of this stance through answerable deeds composing one unified life project that forms the path to personhood. The ethical dimension appears as foundational to Being and Becoming because it is integral to actions through

which we become who we are while changing the world in collaborative pursuits of social transformation. From an activist transformative stance persons are agents not only for whom "things matter" but *who themselves matter* in history, culture, and society and, moreover, who come into Being as unique individuals through and to the extent that they matter in these processes and make a contribution to them.

Note (1) The interrelated concepts of Being and Becoming are employed in the following sense. Being stands for ontological existence (in the sense of "Being in the world") whereas Becoming is a type of Being that implies (a) pathways of constant transformations in the states of Being (in contradistinction with the concept of development that combines periods of change with periods of relative stability), wherein (b) transformations pertain to changes in the states of "Being someone," that is, in the states of Being a certain type of a person vis-à-vis one's social world (in contradistinction with concepts such as change that can refer to states at subpersonal levels of existence), and conveying (c) active nature of this process in the sense that it stands for what the person does or accomplishes through one's own pursuits (in contradistinction with the concept of growth as a process that an individual undergoes or that happens to an individual). Thus, the concept of Becoming conveys the sense of ontological existence as a path of a continuous, ceaseless, and dynamic moment-to-moment transformation in one's standing and relations vis-à-vis the social world carried through one's own active pursuits whereby a person is constantly changed yet without positing any ontological breaks with the previous states of Being.

Notes: A very interesting argument to the effect that becoming a person is inherently an activist project performed in collaborative contexts. Because of this siting of the emergence of personhood, persons intrinsically 'matter' in the processes in which they are involved (and emerge). In providing this account, Vygotskian approaches to the social and cultural processes of psychological development are enlisted. Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology.

310. Stevens, P. (2010). Embedment in the environment: A new paradigm for well-being? *Perspectives in Public Health*, 130(6), 265-269. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/849563219?accountid=27890>

Abstract: Dominant models of health view people as essentially separable from their environment, affected directly by specific physical events or indirectly through idiosyncratic perceptions. Health is therefore a function of the individual, whether they are treated alone or in a group of similar individuals. A different (ecopsychological) view is that we are embedded within the environment; that notions of self, illness and well-being relate to where we are. Health practitioners and policy makers have realized that mind and body cannot be seen as being separate when promoting well-being, but 'self' and 'environment' is an equally false dichotomy. Although rarely acknowledged, we are continually interconnected via two-way physical interactions (electromagnetic, chemical and mechanical), and all we can know of the world comes via such interactions. Our concepts of self and other, health and disease, and all the relationships between them, are based on such interactions. If our environment changes, then these interactions change, yet our concepts often remain rigidly fixed. By introducing research into restorative, natural environments, the notion of adaptive mental states and the practices of ecotherapy, this paper offers an alternative view of well-being, shifting the emphasis away from the

individual and his/her illness and instead inviting consideration of the more dynamic relationships between people and place.

Notes: A general perspective on environmental psychology, ecopsychology and well-being. Relates to well-being and personhood.

311. Stone, J. E. ; Carpendale, J. I. M. ; Sugarman, J. & Martin, J. (2012). A Meadian account of social understanding: Taking a non-mentalistic approach to infant and verbal false belief understanding. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 30(2), 166-178. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X11000535>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2011.09.002>

Abstract: Performance on false belief tasks has long been considered a key indicator of the development of social understanding in young children. We consider the enabling conditions for performing non-verbal and verbal false belief tasks as well as a typical developmental path toward false belief understanding. We argue that, in early ontogenesis, children anticipate the coordination of activity with others rather than read, probe, or reflectively engage with the psychological states of others. As linguistically mediated reflective thought emerges, children gradually become able to parse and isolate the myriad of incipient somatic, affective, and intentional responses that arise in any given moment. With reflective thought, children also begin to develop distinct and temporally coherent understandings about the minds of self and other. We provide an account of how the reflective thought that facilitates false belief understanding emerges. Our account focuses on a gradually developing refinement of social coordination and the shared perspectival understandings inherent in social coordination.

Notes: Explains mastery of false belief tasks in terms of an early appreciation and anticipation of socially coordinated action rather than as a deduction from personal experience or inference about the belief states of others. Provides a socially grounded account of what is considered by psychologists to be a fundamental achievement of selfhood. Relates to personhood.

312. Stone, V. E. ; Cosmides, L. ; Tooby, J. ; Kroll, N. & Knight, R.T. (2002). Selective impairment of reasoning about social exchange in a patient with bilateral limbic system damage. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U S A.*, 99 (17, August 20), 11531–11536.

Abstract: Social exchange is a pervasive feature of human social life. Models in evolutionary biology predict that for social exchange to evolve in a species, individuals must be able to detect cheaters (nonreciprocators). Previous research suggests that humans have a cognitive mechanism specialized for detecting cheaters. Here we provide neurological evidence indicating that social exchange reasoning can be selectively impaired while reasoning about other domains is left intact. The patient, R.M., had extensive bilateral limbic system damage, affecting orbitofrontal cortex, temporal pole, and amygdala. We compared his performance on two types of reasoning problem that were closely matched in form and equally difficult for control subjects: social contract rules (of the form, “If you take the benefit, then you must satisfy the requirement”) and precaution rules (of the form, “If you engage in

hazardous activity X, then you must take precaution Y"). R.M. performed significantly worse in social contract reasoning than in precaution reasoning, when compared both with normal controls and with other brain-damaged subjects. This dissociation in reasoning performance provides evidence that reasoning about social exchange is a specialized and separable component of human social intelligence, and is consistent with other research indicating that the brain processes information about the social world differently from other types of information.

Notes: A clinical study of social exchange reasoning and its independence of other forms of superficially similar reasoning tasks. This supports separate development and evolution of social forms of reasoning from other forms. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

313. Strathern, M. (2004). The whole person and its artifacts. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 33, 1-19. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000225318000002.
doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.33.070203.143928

Abstract: The joint themes of this volume of the Annual Review of Anthropology, the body as a public surface and new technologies of communication, are also woven into the design of the new Wellcome Trust Gallery at the British Museum, inspiring the reflections of this chapter. In the museum setting, moreover, an interesting question of scale arises: how particular objects can point sometimes to very particular values and sometimes to very general ones. This museological paradox is explored here. Taking a cue from the Gallery's focus on well-being, we find a parallel in the contrast between particular medicines used for specific complaints and a more general demand made on medicine as a set of organized practices for promoting health. We also find ideas about the whole person. Attending to the whole person requires its own technology, its own artifacts. And looking at artifacts from different times and places compels us to ask, What kind of "whole" is being imagined? The question is posed with materials from early twentieth-century London, mid-century Papua, and turn-of-the-century biomedicine.

Notes: An anthropological discussion of how health and well-being enhancing artefacts may provide indications of what kind of whole person is being understood at different times. In particular, it examines the specific health interventions that target particular conditions in the context of broader notions of improving general health of whole persons. Relates to personhood and well-being.

314. Sugarman, J. (2005). Persons and moral agency. *Theory & Psychology*, 15(6), 793-811. Retrieved from <http://tap.sagepub.com/content/15/6/793.abstract>.
doi:10.1177/0959354305059333

Abstract: Charles Taylor's claim that personhood consists in its relation to moral goods and commitments, and that persons are moral agents, is summarized and examined. According to this view, persons not only have an understanding of themselves as moral agents, they are partially constituted by this understanding. It is argued that as moral agents, persons are capable of effecting changes in their lives through enacting understandings of the good.

Moreover, they have the capacity not only to adopt and wield social and cultural moral practices, but also to revise and transform them. Particular features of human psychology and its development are discussed that assist in clarifying the relation between persons and moral agency. Further, it is suggested that moral development might be understood as the gradual process whereby traditions are interpreted and reinterpreted toward the end of fashioning more virtuous persons.

Notes: Based on Charles Taylor's understanding of persons as primarily moral beings, this account highlights the way that understandings of the good become enlisted in the process of developing personhood. Relates to personhood.

315. Sugarman, J. & Martin, J. (2011). Theorizing relational agency. *Journal of Constructivist Psychology*, 24(4), 283-289. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000299957900003. doi:10.1080/10720537.2011.593455

Abstract: Gergen's conception of human agency as a relational phenomenon and its adequacy to the tasks of psychological description and explanation are examined. A contrasting view is discussed that shows how psychologically capable agency can be rendered intelligible only by attending to its developmental emergence in historically established sociocultural contexts. It is argued that an elaborated developmental account is necessary to comprehend how psychological agency, once it has emerged, is a unique form of relational being capable of transcending its biophysical and sociocultural origins. From this perspective, agentive personhood is not simply "a social performance," but rather, an active structuring of existence.

Notes: An interesting proposal that claims that a developmental account of the emergence of agency provides the basis for understanding agency in a way that is more than a simple consequence of biological or sociocultural structuring. Agency, it is argued, develops according to its own 'active structuring' of its relationality. Relates to personhood.

316. Sugarman, J. & Martin, J. (2011). Theorizing relational agency: Reactions to comments. *Journal of Constructivist Psychology*, 24(4), 321-323. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10720537.2011.593472>. doi:10.1080/10720537.2011.593472

Abstract: Five issues are raised in response to Gergen's comments: (a) agency as a unique form of relational being, (b) agency as self-determination, (c) self as first-person experience and understanding of particular existence, (d) the mereological fallacy, and (e) the necessity of a development perspective for recognizing the emergence of persons as self-determining agents.

Notes: Responses to criticisms of the original article, above. Relates to personhood.

317. Sugarman, J. & Sokol, B. (2012). Human agency and development: An introduction and theoretical sketch. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 30(1), 1-14.

Notes: From this introductory editorial to the Special Issue: "As the editors of this special issue of *New Ideas in Psychology*, it is our pleasure and privilege to introduce this thoughtful and provocative collection of papers on the topic of agency and development. In our opinion, the cumulative scholarship in this issue lends considerable weight to the importance of a developmentally informed, externalist conception of human agency, regardless of the authors' alignment with Piagetian, Vygotskian, or Meadian lines of scholarship. It is our hope that the papers herein will further stimulate the efforts of psychologists to address the importance of agency in psychological theorizing." Relates to personhood and has implications for evolutionary psychology.

318. Szolnoki, A. & Perc, M. (2012). Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding. *New Journal of Physics*, 14. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000308743800004. doi:093016 10.1088/1367-2630/14/9/093016

Abstract: Our well-being depends on both our personal success and the success of our society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation an essential trait. Experiments have shown that rewards can elevate our readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward inevitably entails paying a cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remains elusive. Here we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that instill new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from indirect territorial battle to the spontaneous emergence and destruction of coexistence, phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal fascinatingly rich social dynamics that explain why this costly behavior has evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, however, uncover an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding, coming from over-aggression, which in turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why, despite its success, rewarding is not as firmly embedded into our societal organization as punishment.

Notes: An analysis that accounts for the evolutionary emergence of cooperative and collaborative social interactions through the process of rewarding behaviour, despite the costliness of providing rewards. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for well-being (as derived from sociality).

319. Tanskanen, A. O. ; Rotkirch, A. & Danielsbacka, M. (2011). Do grandparents favor granddaughters? Biased grandparental investment in UK. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 32(6), 407-415. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513811000225>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.02.001>

Abstract: Differential grandparental investment in grandchildren is often explained with paternity uncertainty. The asymmetric inheritance of the sex chromosomes, especially of the

X chromosomes, may also bias grandparental investment. Recent studies show that ignoring the sex of the grandchild can mask important differences in the investment patterns of the same grandparent category, but this has not been tested in contemporary societies with nationally representative data. With 17 variables from the Involved Grandparenting and Child Well-Being 2007 survey, we tested differential grandparental investment as reported by British and Welsh adolescents and compared predictions based on X-chromosomal relatedness with predictions based on paternity uncertainty. The theories are expected to differ with regard to grandmaternal investment in grandsons and granddaughters. We test whether paternal grandmothers invest (H1) more in granddaughters than in grandsons, (H2) more in granddaughters than maternal grandmothers do and (H3) less in grandsons than maternal grandmothers do. In addition, following the suggestion that paternal grandmothers may reduce sibling competition between girls and boys by harming grandsons, we study whether (H4) paternal grandmothers channel more noninvestment into grandsons than into granddaughters. The results show no convincing support for the type of sex discrimination of grandchildren that is predicted by X-chromosomal relatedness theories, but do provide support for the paternity uncertainty theory. X-chromosomal relatedness does not appear to shape grandparental behavior in developed societies.

Notes: Research that tests the relative influence of paternal uncertainty theory and X-chromosomal relatedness theories of grandparental investment. Useful in outlining an important developmental example of rival (or at least distinct) evolutionary explanations. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for personhood and, potentially, well-being.

320. Tappan, M. B. (1999). Authoring a moral self: A dialogical perspective. *Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 12*(2), 117-131. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000079275900003. doi:10.1080/107205399266145

Abstract: This article argues that the moral self is situated neither psychologically nor socially, but dialogically-as a function of the linguistically mediated exchanges between persons and the social world that are the hallmark of lived human experience. Primary support for this argument is taken from the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, who suggests that the "authorship" of the narratives one tells about one's life is always a function of both self and other. This dialogical perspective is illustrated by an autobiographical account written by an emigre from Nazi Germany in which the author tells the story of a series of striking transformations in her moral self-moral identity, and in which her moral authority-ethical responsibility gradually emerge from the multitude of voices that she encounters in the social world. This article concludes that autobiographies provide perhaps the clearest evidence of the degree to which moral selfhood-identity is, at its core, a function of the ongoing dialogical interchange between self and others.

Notes: An account that argues for understanding the moral self and identity as residing in the dialogical encounters between self and other. That is, a sense of a moral self is principally a dialogical construction rather than either a biological or social construction. Use of autobiographies ('self stories') is used to demonstrate this conceptualisation of the basis of the moral self. Relates to personhood.

321. Tauber, A. I. (2005). The reflexive project: Reconstructing the moral agent. *History of the Human Sciences*, 18(4), 49-75. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000235378800003.
doi:10.1177/095269510508471

Abstract: In the 17th century, 'reflexivity' was coined as a new term for introspection and self-awareness. It thus was poised to serve the instrumental function of combating skepticism by asserting a knowing self. In this Cartesian paradigm, introspection ends in an entity of self-identity. An alternate interpretation recognized how an infinite regress of reflexivity would render 'the self' elusive, if not unknowable. Reflexivity in this latter mode was rediscovered by post-Kantian philosophers, most notably Hegel, who defined the self in its self-reflective encounter with an other, and whose full articulation would occur at the final culmination of Reason's evolution. In the rising tide of 19th-century individualism, Emerson and Kierkegaard formulated constructions both in debt to, and in opposition against, Hegelian metaphysics. For each, although employing distinct strategies of self-consciousness, 'the self' reached its apogee through divine encounter. Characterized by personal responsibility and individual choice, their philosophies would later be subsumed by secular existentialists committed to defining moral individualism and asserting the possibilities for human freedom and self authentication.

Notes: A very useful overview of the development of the central notion of personal reflexivity in philosophical thought since the 17th century. Relates to personhood.

322. TenHouten, W. D. (1997). Primordial temporality, the self, and the brain. *Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems*, 20(3), 253-279. Retrieved from
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1061736197900163>.
doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1061-7361\(97\)90016-3](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1061-7361(97)90016-3)

Abstract: Human adaptation, in every culture, importantly involves the categories of time and space. In addition to the ordinary-linear and patterned-cyclical kinds of time-consciousness, two kinds of primordial temporality—the immediate-participatory (Dōgen) and the episodic-futural (Heidegger)—are proposed. It is argued that these immediate and participatory temporalities correspond to the “I” and the “Me,” the two stages of G.H. Mead's socially-constructed self, respectively. The proposed two concepts of primordial temporality are criterion-validated by showing their bases in the episodic and participatory processing that Karl Pribram has associated with the frontolimbic and posterior regions of the brain, respectively, which are dynamically connected to produce what Charles Laughlin calls the “prefrontosensorial polarity principle.” The concepts of the author's quaternary, socio-evolutionary theory of time and temporality are recovered from the concepts that Pribram had used to explicate anterior-posterior cortico-cortical interactions.

Notes: A very interesting attempt to integrate philosophical understandings of the experience of time with Mead's well known account of the 'I' and the 'Me' and neuropsychological work on the processing of episodic and concurrent memory. Relates to personhood and evolutionary/biological psychology.

323. Teske, J. A. (2006). Neuromythology: Brains and stories. *Zygon*, 41(1), 169-196. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000235520900012. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9744.2006.00732.x

Abstract: I sketch a synthetic integration of several levels of explanation in addressing how myths, narratives, and stories engage human beings, produce their sense of identity and self-understand and shape their intellectual, emotional, and embodied lives. Ultimately it is our engagement with the metanarratives of religious imagination by which we address a set of existentially necessary but ontologically unanswerable metaphysical questions that form the basis of religious belief. I show how a multileveled understanding of evolutionary biology, history, neuroscience, psychology, narrative, and mythology may form a coherent picture of the human spirit. Neuropsychological functions involved in constructing and responding to the narratives by which we form our identities and build meaningful lives include memory, attention, emotional marking, and temporal sequencing. It is the neural substrate, the emotional shaping, and the narrative structuring of higher cognitive function that provide the sine qua non for the construction of meaning, relationship, morality, and purpose that extend beyond our personal boundaries, both spatial and temporal. This includes a neural affect system shaped by our developmental dependency, the dynamic narratives of self formed in the development of identity and reconstructed over the life span, drawing on culturally available mythic and storied forms. Narrative constitutes our movement in moral space and may have the potential both for healing and for disruption for us as individuals and as a species, providing a contingent solution to the alienation and fragmentation of personhood, relationship, and community.

Notes: Attempts an integration of many layers or levels of analysis from the biological to the mythological. Shows the interdependence and relationships between these levels. Relates to personhood and evolutionary psychology.

324. Thiessen, D. & Gregg, B. (1980). Human assortative mating and genetic equilibrium: An evolutionary perspective. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 1(2), 111-140. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309580900035>. doi:10.1016/0162-3095(80)90003-5

Abstract: Assortative mating in human and other animal species is reviewed. Assortive mating is most often positive (between individuals sharing phenotypic similarity), occurs on a variety of normal and abnormal traits, strengthens the mating bond, and increases fertility. These results can best be understood if it is assumed that natural selection operates to increase genetic homology between mates and between parents and off-spring. The outcome of selection for positive assortment is to increase the genetic relatedness among family members, thus facilitating communication and altruism and increasing inclusive fitness without an additional reproductive effort. The opposing evolutionary vector is to restrict excessive homozygosity and consequent inbreeding depression by minimizing matings between individuals of greatest similarity (e.g., members of nuclear families). The result of these opposing evolutionary vectors is a negative relationship between the degree of positive assortative mating and heritability (h^2): individuals gravitate toward those of similar but not identical phenotypic (and genetic) similarity. Individuals may assess their own and their potential mates' homozygosity and mate so as to maximize genetic homogamy and still avoid excessive inbreeding. Early imprinting and learning within the family unit act as the

proximate mechanisms to establish the criteria for optimal mate selection. Predictions that follow from this model are advanced, and several problems are discussed. Laboratory and field work with animals will be especially valuable in advancing our understanding of assortative mating.

Notes: An early discussion of assortative mating and how it is balanced against the negative effects of homozygosity. Relates to evolutionary psychology.

325. Thornton, J. E. (2003). Life-span learning: A developmental perspective. *International Journal of Aging & Human Development*, 57(1), 55-76. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000188883700004

Abstract: The article discusses learning as embedded processes of development and aging, and as social activity over the life course. The concept of life-span learning is proposed and outlined to discuss these processes as aspects of and propositions in life-span development and aging theory. Life-span learning processes arise and continuously develop in a dynamically complex body, brain, and the mind they support as essential features of development and aging over the life course. Life-span learning processes are established by evolutionary adaptive mechanisms, enriched by challenging environments, and continuously developed in supportive social structures. These ideas are derived from evolutionary biology and psychology, the cognitive sciences, life-span development and aging research, and adult development and learning studies. It is argued that life-span learning activities that challenge the body-mind-brain nexus are indispensable to optimize individual development and aging. Three global interventions and their strategies are discussed that enhance life-span learning: Learning to Learn, Learning for Growth, and Learning for Well-being.

Notes: Suggests that life-time learning approaches are evolutionarily adaptive processes that potentially can enhance well-being. Relates to well-being and personhood.

326. Tomasello, M. & Herrmann, E. (2010). Ape and human cognition: What's the difference? *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 19(1), 3-8. Retrieved from <http://cdp.sagepub.com/content/19/1/3.abstract>. doi:10.1177/0963721409359300

Abstract: Humans share the vast majority of their cognitive skills with other great apes. In addition, however, humans have also evolved a unique suite of cognitive skills and motivations—collectively referred to as shared intentionality—for living collaboratively, learning socially, and exchanging information in cultural groups.

Notes: A useful overview of research on the cognitive skills associated with shared intentionality. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

327. Tomasello, M. ; Melis, A. P. ; Tennie, C. ; Wyman, E. & Herrmann, E. (2012). Two key steps in the evolution of human cooperation: The interdependence hypothesis. *Current Anthropology*, 53(6), 673-692. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000311721200001. doi:10.1086/668207

Abstract: Modern theories of the evolution of human cooperation focus mainly on altruism. In contrast, we propose that humans' species-unique forms of cooperation-as well as their species-unique forms of cognition, communication, and social life-all derive from mutualistic collaboration (with social selection against cheaters). In a first step, humans became obligate collaborative foragers such that individuals were interdependent with one another and so had a direct interest in the well-being of their partners. In this context, they evolved new skills and motivations for collaboration not possessed by other great apes (joint intentionality), and they helped their potential partners (and avoided cheaters). In a second step, these new collaborative skills and motivations were scaled up to group life in general, as modern humans faced competition from other groups. As part of this new group-mindedness, they created cultural conventions, norms, and institutions (all characterized by collective intentionality), with knowledge of a specific set of these marking individuals as members of a particular cultural group. Human cognition and sociality thus became ever more collaborative and altruistic as human individuals became ever more interdependent.

Notes: A significant evolutionary theory of the development of full, collective shared intentionality that is not based primarily on altruism but on interdependent collaboration. Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood and has implications for well-being.

328. Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (1990). The past explains the present: Emotional adaptations and the structure of ancestral environments. *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 11(4-5), 375-424. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/016230959090017Z>. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0162-3095\(90\)90017-Z](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0162-3095(90)90017-Z)

Abstract: Present conditions and selection pressures are irrelevant to the present design of organisms and do not explain how or why organisms behave adaptively, when they do. To whatever non-chance extent organisms are behaving adaptively, it is 1) because of the operation of underlying adaptations whose present design is the product of selection in the past, and 2) because present conditions resemble past conditions in those specific ways made developmentally and functionally important by the design of those adaptations. All adaptations evolved in response to the repeating elements of past environments, and their structure reflects in detail the recurrent structure of ancestral environments. Even planning mechanisms (such as "consciousness"), which supposedly deal with novel situations, depend on ancestrally shaped categorization processes and are therefore not free of the past. In fact, the categorization of each new situation into evolutionarily repeating classes involves another kind of adaptation, the emotions, which match specialized modes of organismic operation to evolutionarily recurrent situations. The detailed statistical structure of these iterated systems of events is reflected in the detailed structure of the algorithms that govern emotional state. For this reason, the system of psychological adaptations that comprises each individual meets the present only as a version of the past.

Notes: An early presentation by Tooby and Cosmides of an evolutionary psychological analysis of how human psychology – in this instance specifically the emotional systems – are evolved adaptations to ancestral environments. Interesting, here, as an early example of evolutionary psychological analysis and also for targeting a system (the emotions) fundamental to most understandings of the experience of well-being and personhood. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and personhood.

329. Tsakiris, M. & Haggard, P. (2005). Experimenting with the acting self. *Cognitive Neuropsychology*, 22(3-4), 387-407. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000229746500010. doi:10.1080/02643290442000158

Abstract: Recent neuroscientific research has developed the concept of the embodied agent as a scientifically viable approach to the psychological concept of the self. Both the awareness of one's own actions and awareness of one's own body are necessary conditions for the experience of selfhood. The relative contributions of efferent and afferent information in self-awareness are yet to be fully understood. We review experimental evidence that highlights the phenomenological and functional differences between the "acting self" and the "sensory self." These differences may underlie the ubiquitous modulation of perception in voluntary action. We focus on three main research fields: somatosensory perception, time-awareness, and self-recognition. A series of experiments, designed so as to dissociate afferent from efferent information, are reviewed. As a whole the results suggest that intentional action functions as a general context for awareness, modulating the perception of one's own body. The "acting self," owner of the efferent information, modulates the phenomenal experience of the "sensory self" because of the intrinsically agentic nature of voluntary movement. Finally, it is suggested that this sense of agency is efferent-driven, originating from pre-action processes.

Notes: A significant account of how the agentic aspects of selfhood are linked to efferent systems which, in turn, are a central aspect of intentional action. Self-awareness is claimed to be therefore grounded in these agentic aspects and efferent information thus modulates our sensory (afferent) experience of self. Relates to selfhood/personhood.

330. Tucker, I. (2012). Deleuze, sense, and life: Marking the parameters of a psychology of individuation. *Theory & Psychology*, 22(6), 771-785. Retrieved from <http://tap.sagepub.com/content/22/6/771.abstract>. doi:10.1177/0959354312442787

Abstract: This paper offers a psychology of individuation, drawing on Gilles Deleuze's concepts of series, event, sense, and individuation to develop a way of thinking human experience that is non-reductionist and processual. Deleuze's writing produces a conceptualization of life as multiple, novel, and yet inherently linked to the past. The desire for such an undertaking comes from the need to avoid capturing experience according to theories that prioritize one factor over others, and in doing so define psychological life as a set of intrinsic properties. Understanding individuals as the products of individuating processes introduces a philosophy of change that, although not entirely "pure," can still be novel. A psychology of individuation potentially allows for the extraction of a virtual realm of sense that is "in between" forms of language and materiality, and which allows novelty to

emerge in our social worlds. The paper concludes by discussing the potential moral benefits of conceptualizing psychological life as produced through processes of individuation.

Notes: "What would psychology look like if the notion of the psyche as an essence is replaced with a definition of psychological life as individuated events? If applied to psychology, Deleuze's philosophy of individuation offers a mode of thinking that cannot be reductionist, as no one element (e.g., neurochemical or discursive) is defined outside of its relevance to other features. Defining things as individuated events means that we analyse the ways they have been produced, and how they are subject to continuous reworking as configurations of multiplicity. Variation is key here. Processes fluctuate and alter course; they are fluid. What this means for psychology is thinking rigorously about how things can and might vary in the future."

Notes: Using the work of Deleuze, the psychological self is understood as a series of individuated events rather than as a discrete entity. Relates to personhood.

331. Twenge, J. M. & King, L. A. (2005). A good life is a personal life: Relationship fulfillment and work fulfillment in judgments of life quality. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 39(3), 336-353. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0092656604000868>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2004.01.004>

Abstract: Three studies examined folk concepts of the good life in samples of college students and community adults. An experimental design varied a target's sex, work fulfillment (WF), and relationship fulfillment (RF). RF had the strongest effect on both judgments of life desirability and the person's moral goodness. WF was a significant but weaker influence. Targets with high RF were judged as more likely to go to heaven, whereas WF had no effect on this judgment. There was no effect for target gender. In Study 3, individual differences in intrinsic motivation in the relationship and work domains interacted with target fulfillment to predict desirability and moral goodness judgments. Overall, the results indicate that a good life must include fulfilling personal relationships; WF is a plus but seemingly not essential.

Notes: Reports a series of studies that demonstrate the centrality of relationship fulfillment to notions of the 'good life' in terms of both well-being and moral goodness. Relates to well-being.

332. Twigg, J. (2010). Clothing and dementia: A neglected dimension? *Journal of Aging Studies*, 24(4), 223-230. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000283970900002. doi:10.1016/j.jaging.2010.05.002

Abstract: The article explores the neglected subject of clothing and dementia. Addressing questions of the body, identity and selfhood, it argues - against the dominant understanding - that clothes continue to be significant in the lives and well-being of people with dementia. Drawing on new theorising that emphasises the embodied nature of selfhood, the article explores the role of clothing in the maintenance of identity; its nature as the 'environment closest in'; its significance in social interaction; and its potential character as an agent of control and normativity. The article concludes that clothing and dress offer a potentially

interesting field in which we can explore the nature of personhood in dementia, and in ways that offer insights into forms of response through which individuality and selfhood can be recognised, maintained and enhanced.

Notes: The author argues "that clothing and dress are in fact relevant to the well-being and care of people with dementia; that they touch on significant issues in relation to the body, identity and self; and that they offer us routes to access being and selfhood as they exist at a bodily level." The siting of the analysis in the context of dementia also highlights the importance of the external, performative aspects of personhood and individuality even when cognitive processes relevant to reproducing personhood are diminishing. Relates to personhood and well-being.

333. Valli, K. ; Revonsuo, A. ; Palkas, O. ; Ismail, K. H. ; Ali, K. J. & Punamaki, R. L. (2005). The threat simulation theory of the evolutionary function of dreaming: Evidence from dreams of traumatized children. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 14(1), 188-218. Article; Proceedings Paper. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000227897700011. doi:10.1016/s1053-8100(03)00019-9

Abstract: The threat simulation theory of dreaming (TST) (Revonsuo, 2000) states that dream consciousness is essentially an ancient biological defence mechanism, evolutionarily selected for its capacity to repeatedly simulate threatening events. Threat simulation during dreaming rehearses the cognitive mechanisms required for efficient threat perception and threat avoidance, leading to increased probability of reproductive success during human evolution. One hypothesis drawn from TST is that real threatening events encountered by the individual during wakefulness should lead to an increased activation of the system, a threat simulation response, and therefore, to an increased frequency and severity of threatening events in dreams. Consequently, children who live in an environment in which their physical and psychological well-being is constantly threatened should have a highly activated dream production and threat simulation system, whereas children living in a safe environment that is relatively free of such threat cues should have a weakly activated system. We tested this hypothesis by analysing the content of dream reports from severely traumatized and less traumatized Kurdish children and ordinary, non-traumatized Finnish children. Our results give support for most of the predictions drawn from TST. The severely traumatized children reported a significantly greater number of dreams and their dreams included a higher number of threatening dream events. The dream threats of traumatized children were also more severe in nature than the threats of less traumatized or non-traumatized children.

Notes: An empirical study to investigate the theory that dreaming evolved partly to simulate/practice cognitive responses to threatening or traumatic events. Support was found for the theory in terms of both frequency and severity of threatening dream events. The theory is grounded in an evolutionary analysis and concerns processes relevant to personal experiences of conscious states (i.e., dreaming). Relates to evolutionary psychology and personhood.

334. Veenhoven, R. (2010). Life is getting better: Societal evolution and fit with human nature. *Social Indicators Research*, 97(1), 105-122. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/89192729?accountid=27890>
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&rft_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Aassocjournals&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Social+Indicators+Research&rft.atitle=Life+is+Getting+Better%3A+Societal+Evolution+and+Fit+with+Human+Nature&rft.au=Veenhoven%2C+Ruut&rft.aulast=Veenhoven&rft.aufirst=Ruut&rft.date=2010-05-01&rft.volume=97&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=105&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.title=Social+Indicators+Research&rft.issn=03038300

Abstract: Human society has changed much over the last centuries and this process of 'modernization' has profoundly affected the lives of individuals; currently we live quite different lives from those forefathers lived only five generations ago. There is difference of opinion as to whether we live better now than before and consequently there is also disagreement as to whether we should continue modernizing or rather try to slow the process down. Quality-of-life in a society can be measured by how long and happy its inhabitants live. Using these indicators I assess whether societal modernization has made life better or worse. Firstly I examine findings of present day survey research. I start with a cross-sectional analysis of 143 nations in the years 2000-2008 and find that people live longer and happier in today's most modern societies. Secondly I examine trends in modern nations over the last decade and find that happiness and longevity have increased in most cases. Thirdly I consider the long-term and review findings from historical anthropology, which show that we lived better in the early hunter-gatherer society than in the later agrarian society. Together these data suggest that societal evolution has worked out differently for the quality of human life, first negatively, in the change from a hunter-gatherer existence to agriculture, and next positively, in the more recent transformation from an agrarian to an industrial society. We live now longer and happier than ever before.

Notes: A well known analysis of shifts in happiness related to modernisation processes. The historical span is not on the evolutionary time-scale but it does involve comparison of evolutionarily more original hunter-gatherer social arrangements with modern arrangements and so has implications for evolutionary analyses. Relates to well-being and has implications for evolutionary psychology.

335. Volk, A. A. & Atkinson, J. A. (2013). Infant and child death in the human environment of evolutionary adaptation. *Evolution and Human Behavior*. Retrieved from <http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1090513812001237?showall=true>

Abstract: The precise quantitative nature of the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA) is difficult to reconstruct. The EEA represents a multitude of different geographic and temporal environments, of which a large number often need to be surveyed in order to draw

sound conclusions. We examine a large number of both hunter–gatherer (N=20) and historical (N=43) infant and child mortality rates to generate a reliable quantitative estimate of their levels in the EEA. Using data drawn from a wide range of geographic locations, cultures, and times, we estimate that approximately 27% of infants failed to survive their first year of life, while approximately 47.5% of children failed to survive to puberty across in the EEA. These rates represent a serious selective pressure faced by humanity that may be underappreciated by many evolutionary psychologists. Additionally, a cross-species comparison found that human child mortality rates are roughly equivalent to Old World monkeys, higher than orangutan or bonobo rates and potentially higher than those of chimpanzees and gorillas. These findings are briefly discussed in relation to life history theory and evolved adaptations designed to lower high childhood mortality.

Notes: Discusses an important evolutionary pressure on human evolution. High infant death rates in the ‘EEA’ impact upon social and social psychological responses and environments. Given the high investment required to raise human children to puberty this is a significant selective pressure on human evolution and well-being. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

336. Walters, G. D. (1999). Human survival and the self-destruction paradox: An integrated theoretical model. *Journal of Mind and Behavior*, 20(1), 57-78. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000080223500004

Abstract: Borrowing from evolutionary biology, existentialism, developmental psychology, and social learning theory, an integrated model of human behavior is applied to several forms of self-destructive behavior, to include anorexia nervosa, suicide, substance abuse, and pathological gambling. It is argued that self-destructive behavior is a function of how the individual psychologically construes survival and copes with perceptions of isolation and separation from the environment. The paradox of self destructive behavior in organisms motivated by self-preservation is resolved by taking note of the fact that self-destruction stems from people's efforts to survive psychologically and resolve the subject-object duality, even when this places their physical well-being in jeopardy.

Notes: Presents an argument for how seemingly self-destructive behaviours might arise, in evolutionary terms, from the isolation of psychological ‘survival’ and coping from physical well-being. That is, evolved psychological protection mechanisms can work against physical survival in particular environments. The analysis helpfully reveals the selective tension between different forms of evolved mechanisms. Relates to evolutionary psychology, well-being and personhood.

337. Wang, X. T. (2002). Risk as reproductive variance. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 23(1), 35-57. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513801000915>. doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(01)00091-5

Abstract: In economics, normative utility theories of decision-making under risk use a single number (expected value) to index subjective utility at the cost of losing information about risk distribution. This paper examines how people make use of risk distributions (that is, variations in expected payoffs) to maximize the probability of reaching a goal and to

minimize the likelihood of falling below a minimum requirement (MR). The author proposes and tests a Bounded Risk Distribution model using both hypothetical life–death problems and real reproductive and parental decision problems. Study 1 demonstrated that a given degree of increase in expected number of saved lives had a significant effect on the respondents' risk preference when the increase was likely to cross the average MR of the respondents (in a small group context), but the same increase in expected value had little effect when the change was within a range below the average MR (in a kinship context) or above the MR (in a large group context). Study 2 examined alternative hypotheses for hypothetical risk acceptance with respect to kinship groups and found that whether the decision-maker was responsible or not had little effect on the setting of the MR and risk preference. The MR setting was mainly determined by the kinship context itself and was further fine-tuned by the framing of the choice outcomes. Study 3 was conducted in four rural villages in northwest China, and assessed real reproductive decisions. Interbirth intervals but not breast-feeding duration varied with a family's wealth, the sex of a child, and the perceived resemblance of a child to a parent. These results are interpreted in terms of the same Bounded Risk Distribution model that was applied in the hypothetical scenario studies.

Notes: An interesting empirical series of studies exploring evolutionary hypotheses about decision making in the context of various risk distributions. Relates to evolutionary psychology.

338. Warneken, F. & Tomasello, M. (2006). Altruistic helping in human infants and young chimpanzees. *Science (New York, N.Y.)*, 311(5765), 1301.

Abstract: Human beings routinely help others to achieve their goals, even when the helper receives no immediate benefit and the person helped is a stranger. Such altruistic behaviours (toward non-kin) are extremely rare evolutionarily, with some theorists even proposing that they are uniquely human. Here we show that human children as young as 18 months of age (prelinguistic or just-linguistic) quite readily help others to achieve their goals in a variety of different situations. This requires both an understanding of others' goals and an altruistic motivation to help. In addition, we demonstrate similar though less robust skills and motivations in three young chimpanzees.

Notes: Groundbreaking work on the seemingly inherent nature of cooperative and altruistic behaviours in humans and, to a lesser degree, chimpanzees. Has important implications for both well-being and personhood given the centrality of social relationships to well-being and the role of the social environment in developing personhood. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for well-being and personhood.

339. Weiss, C. ; Herwig, A. & Schuetz-Bosbach, S. (2011). The self in action effects: Selective attenuation of self-generated sounds. *Cognition*, 121(2), 207-218. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000296302100004. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.06.011

Abstract: The immediate experience of self-agency, that is, the experience of generating and controlling our actions, is thought to be a key aspect of selfhood. It has been suggested that

this experience is intimately linked to internal motor signals associated with the ongoing actions. These signals should lead to an attenuation of the sensory consequences of one's own actions and thereby allow classifying them as self-generated. The discovery of shared representations of actions between self and other, however, challenges this idea and suggests similar attenuation of one's own and other's sensory action effects. Here, we tested these assumptions by comparing sensory attenuation of self-generated and observed sensory effects. More specifically, we compared the loudness perception of sounds that were either self-generated, generated by another person or a computer. In two experiments, we found a reduced perception of loudness intensity specifically related to self-generation. Furthermore, the perception of sounds generated by another person and a computer did not differ from each other. These findings indicate that one's own agentive influence upon the outside world has a special perceptual quality which distinguishes it from any sort of external influence, including human and non-human sources. This suggests that a real sense of self-agency is not a socially shared but rather a unique and private experience.

Notes: An important empirical study of the experience of self-agency that concludes that self-initiated behaviour is internally identified partly through its role in attenuating the sensory experiences that result from that behaviour. Crucially, this means that self-agency – as experienced moment by moment – is not a socially shared or experience but a private one. Relates to selfhood/ personhood.

340. Welling, H. (2003). An evolutionary function of the depressive reaction: The cognitive map hypothesis. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 21(2), 147-156. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X03000175>. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0732-118X\(03\)00017-5](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0732-118X(03)00017-5)

Abstract: Existing hypotheses for an evolutionary function of depression are insufficient, primarily because they fail to show convincingly the advantages that might compensate for the high evolutionary costs of its features, such as general passivity, decreased appetite and sex drive. In this article, it is shown that depression may have the function of motivating a period of reduced activity after a major loss. It thus allows for time out to update the cognitive structures for altered circumstances, and avoids dangerous actions based on the use of inadequate cognitive maps. This cognitive map hypothesis provides a viable evolutionary explanation for the high incidence of depression reaction, in spite of its apparently unfavorable characteristics. The article discusses how this hypothesis may also shed light on the occurrence of clinical depression, proposing that it is caused by a failure to update complex conceptual cognitive structures. Finally, recommendations for the treatment of depression that derive from this hypothesis are presented.

Notes: An original theory of the adaptive role of depressive responses in humans that is used to explain their ubiquity and to understand the nature of clinical depression. Relates to evolutionary psychology and well-being.

341. Welz, C. (2010). Identity as self-transformation: Emotional conflicts and their metamorphosis in memory. *Continental Philosophy Review*, 43(2), 267-285. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000280078400006. doi:10.1007/s11007-010-9142-9

Abstract: This paper develops the thesis that personal identity is neither to be taken in terms of an unchanging self-sufficient 'substance' nor in terms of selfhood 'without substance,' i.e. as fluctuating processes of pure relationality and subject-less activity. Instead, identity is taken as self-transformation that is bound to particular embodied individuals and surpasses them as individuated entities. The paper is structured in three parts. Part I describes the experiential givenness of conflicts that support our sense of self-transformation. While the first part develops an inter-subjective topography of emotional movements, the second part pays attention to their temporal dimension. We work with conflicts and get transformed by them also in the way we remember them. Part II focuses on the process of self-understanding that accompanies conflicts and their metamorphosis in memory. Part III compares and discusses different models of a 'relational ontology' of the person, which question the idea that we are defined only by how we define ourselves-just as they question the idea that one's identity is independent of how one relates to one's having changed.

Notes: A philosophical account of personal identity based on the notion of self-transformation. Central to the account is the experience of and response to conflicts – their emotional content in a social setting and the way they provoke varying forms of self-understanding. Relates to personhood.

342. Welzel, C. & Inglehart, R. (2010). Agency, values, and well-being: A human development model. *Social Indicators Research*, 97(1), 43-63. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/89193947?accountid=27890>
http://bb5xk7cw9v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&rft_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Aassocjournals&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Social+Indicators+Research&rft.atitle=Agency%2C+Values%2C+and+Well-Being%3A+A+Human+Development+Model&rft.au=Welzel%2C+Christian%3BInglehart%2C+Ronald&rft.aulast=Welzel&rft.aufirst=Christian&rft.date=2010-05-01&rft.volume=97&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=43&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.title=Social+Indicators+Research&rft.issn=03038300

Abstract: This paper argues that feelings of agency are linked to human well-being through a sequence of adaptive mechanisms that promote human development, once existential conditions become permissive. In the first part, we elaborate on the evolutionary logic of this model and outline why an evolutionary perspective is helpful to understand changes in values that give feelings of agency greater weight in shaping human well-being. In the second part, we test the key links in this model with data from the World Values Surveys using ecological regressions and multi-level models, covering some 80 societies worldwide.

Empirically, we demonstrate evidence for the following sequence: (1) in response to widening opportunities of life, people place stronger emphasis on emancipative values, (2) in response to a stronger emphasis on emancipative values, feelings of agency gain greater weight in shaping people's life satisfaction, (3) in response to a greater impact of agency feelings on life satisfaction, the level of life satisfaction itself rises. Further analyses show that this model is culturally universal because taking into account the strength of a society's western tradition does not render insignificant these adaptive linkages. Precisely because of its universality, this is indeed a 'human' development model in a most general sense.

Notes: Proposes a universal model that situates human agency as central to the development of improved perceptions of life satisfaction. Agency leads from greater life opportunities via 'emancipatory' values. This then results in agency being more central to life satisfaction with a corresponding rise in perceived life satisfaction. Given its proposed universality it also has implications for evolutionary psychology. Relates to well-being, personhood and evolutionary psychology.

343. Wuketits, F. M. (1993). Moral systems as evolutionary systems: Taking evolutionary ethics seriously. *Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems*, 16(3), 251-271. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/106173619390035P>. doi:10.1016/1061-7361(93)90035-p

Abstract: In this paper I propose an evolutionary ethics that goes beyond mere description. I argue that the fact that human behavior is biologically constrained can give us some ideas about how to establish moral norms, so that the fact/value distinction in its strict sense is no longer tenable. Taking evolutionary ethics seriously means, after all, looking for possibilities of human beings as a biological species. Biological evolution does not entail any values and moral norms, but in organizing our social life we are well-advised to consider those factors that have channeled our evolution—i.e., not just ask what humans ought to do, but what they are able to do. My vantage point is that moral systems are evolutionary systems.

Notes: A clear, early philosophical account of ethics based upon an evolutionary understanding of their role. Relates to evolutionary psychology and has implications for personhood.

344. Yarnal, C. M. ; Chick, G. & Kerstetter, D. L. (2008). "I did not have time to play growing up... so this is my play time. It's the best thing I have ever done for myself": What is play to older women? *Leisure Sciences*, 30(3), 235-252. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000256676700004. doi:10.1080/01490400802017456

Abstract: Little is known about play in older women's leisure lives. An examination of The Red Hat Society(R), a leisure-based social group, expanded an understanding of play by including older women's viewpoints. Because of the absence of literature about emotion and friendship in both play theory and evolutionary theory, our research questions included: how do older women define play, and what are the outcomes of older women's play? Three themes about women's play emerged from data analysis (a) a context for fun, laughter, and feeling good, (b) the chance to be silly and goofy, and (c) positive public reaction to play.

Results are discussed by extending current conceptualizations of play theory and evolutionary theory and the roles of play in older women's leisure lives and their health and well-being.

Notes: An interesting empirical study of the role of play in older women's lives and its relationship to well-being. What is particularly interesting is the attempt to understand play from an evolutionary perspective but not solely as a form of early developmental 'practice' for children. Argues that play has distinct well-being advantages for adults. Relates to well-being and evolutionary psychology.

345. Zahavi, D. (2009). Is the self a social construct? *Inquiry-an Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, 52(6), 551-573. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000272592900001. doi:10.1080/00201740903377826

Abstract: There is a long tradition in philosophy for claiming that selfhood is socially constructed and self-experience intersubjectively mediated. On many accounts, we consequently have to distinguish between being conscious or sentient and being a self. The requirements that must be met in order to qualify for the latter are higher. My aim in the following is to challenge this form of social constructivism by arguing that an account of self which disregards the fundamental structures and features of our experiential life is a non-starter, and that a correct description and account of the experiential dimension must do justice to the first-person perspective and to the primitive form of self-referentiality, mineness or for-me-ness that it entails. I then consider and discuss various objections to this account, in particular the view that an endorsement of such a minimal notion of self commits one to an outdated form of Cartesianism. In the final part of the paper, I argue that the self is so multifaceted a phenomenon that various complementary accounts must be integrated if we are to do justice to its complexity.

Notes: A philosophical counter to the notion that the self is a socially constructed artefact. By highlighting the role of the first-person perspective, the author argues that social accounts of self neglect this primitive form of self-referentiality. Relates to personhood.

346. Zahavi, D. & Roepstorff, A. (2011). Faces and ascriptions: Mapping measures of the self. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 20(1), 141-148. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810010001996>. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.011>

Abstract: The 'self' is increasingly used as a variable in cognitive experiments and correlated with activity in particular areas in the brain. At first glance, this seems to transform the self from an ephemeral theoretical entity to something concrete and measurable. However, the transformation is by no means unproblematic. We trace the development of two important experimental paradigms in the study of the self, self-face recognition and the adjective self ascription task. We show how the experimental instrumentalization has gone hand in hand with a simplification of the self-concept, and how more conceptual and theoretical reflections on the structure, function and nature of self have either disappeared altogether

or receded into the background. We argue that this development impedes and complicates the interdisciplinary study of self.

Notes: Criticises established experimental operationalisations of the self – self-face recognition and adjective self-ascription – for narrowing and oversimplifying the conceptualisation of the self. The authors argue for re-introduction of omitted aspects of the self arising from its multidimensional nature. Relates to personhood.

347. Zhao, G. P. (2005). Playing as adaptation? Layered selfhood and self-regard in cultural contexts. *Culture & Psychology, 11*(1), 5-27. Article. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000228469900001. doi:10.1177/1354067x05050740

Abstract: The current paradigm shift from realism and humanism to social constructionism and postmodernism has tremendous implications for social sciences, especially for psychology. The idea that not only our knowledge, but also our self, emotions and cognitions are constructed by society and culture is embraced by some cross-cultural and cultural psychologists and postmodernists. While this stance attempts to integrate culture and psychology, it depreciates the part of the self that can stand apart from culture and society and therefore be shared among humankind. This paper proposes a layered model of selfhood to incorporate both universal and existential human experience and the influence of culture and society. Heine, Lehman, Markus and Kitayama's (1999) cross-cultural study of self-regard serves as an exemplar of the constructionist approach and their data are reanalyzed using the proposed model of selfhood. The notion of 'play' is introduced to understand the dynamics at the interface between cultural regulations and individuals. This paper also explores the cultural norms of East Asia and America.

Notes: A fascinating argument that seeks to go beyond a simple social constructionist account of human psychology. Importantly, they argue that the activity of play is the dynamic that mediates between what is universal in the human self and cultural and social influences on its development. Relates to personhood and has implications for evolutionary psychology.

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